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Introduction
[One] cannot but admire the striking example of democracy which 
this small multi- racial and multilingual nation has set for the world. 
Nor can [one] fail to give her credit for the loyalty with which she 
has cooperated with other nations in the past. Not only have various 
international bureaus been located at Bern, but Switzerland contin-
ued to give hospitality to the League of Nations when potentially 
hostile armies were massed on all her frontiers. The whole world 
expects Switzerland to hew the line of legal propriety, to chart her 
course with meticulous regard for her obligations under interna-
tional law.1
∵
1 The Subject and Basic Claims of This Book
The above quote, written by Manley O  Hudson, dates back to 1947. Today, 
more than seven decades later, Hudson’s optimistic remarks about Switzer-
land’s expected compliance with international law leave us wondering how 
the practice of the Swiss authorities has evolved. Has Switzerland indeed been 
‘chart[ing] her course with meticulous regard for her obligations under inter-
national law’?2
In this book, I examine how Swiss courts, but also domestic courts in gen-
eral, do and must interpret3 international law. For this purpose, I  analyze 
whether they comply with what international law requires from States when 
they interpret their international legal obligations. I  also assess whether 
Swiss courts’ interpretations are predictable, clear, and consistent. I  then 
suggest how to improve this domestic judicial practice from these two 
 perspectives.
The two basic claims guiding my study are the following. First, Switzer-
land and other States, when interpreting international law via their organs, 
 1 Manley O Hudson, ‘Switzerland and the International Court of Justice’ (1947) 41 American 
Journal of International Law 866, 867 f.
 2 See ibid 868.
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2 Introduction
including their courts, must abide by the interpretative methods required by 
international law. They must use these methods as guides in their interpre-
tative process. Indeed, courts’ adherence to the law’s interpretative  methods 
is a condition of the legality of their decisions. Second, courts, qua legal 
reasoners, must interpret the law as predictably, clearly, and consistently 
as possible. The predictability, clarity, and consistency of domestic courts’ 
 interpretations of international law matter because these virtues support 
 legality. Said virtues also matter because they influence the extent to which 
domestic judgments constitute reliable and helpful means for ascertaining 
international law.
This two- pronged argument may seem to be a truism. Of course, judges 
must abide by the law when they interpret it. And of course, they must in-
terpret it well. Why, then, state the obvious? Some readers, when flipping (or 
scrolling!) through the pages of this book, will likely think something along the 
lines of what us Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote about statutory 
interpretation:
No matter how one states the problem of statutory construction, for me 
at least it does not carry its own answer. Though my business throughout 
most of my professional life has been with statutes, I come to you empty- 
handed. I bring no answers. I suspect the answers to the problems of an 
art are in its exercise. Not that one does not inherit, if one is capable of 
receiving it, the wisdom of the wise. But I confess unashamedly that I do 
not get much nourishment from books on statutory construction, and 
I say this after freshly reexamining them all, scores of them.4
Justice Frankfurter’s statement about us statutory interpretation can be ex-
trapolated to any analysis of interpretative methods. As I will argue, the basic 
methods of legal interpretation are the same across domestic legal orders and 
in international law, despite the differences that exist between domestic and 
international lawmaking.
In some respects, Frankfurter is undoubtedly right. One cannot master judi-
cial interpretation only by reading the theoretical accounts of interpretation 
he alludes to. On the other hand, scholarly analyses of judicial interpretation 
are not comparable to books that teach us how to play the guitar. An argu-
ment as to how judicial interpretation must be conducted is an integral part 




Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
Introduction 3
of legal practice. It contributes to its justification and improvement. More-
over, the domestic (including the Swiss) case law shows that books on judicial 
interpretation are more urgently needed than we might think. Compliance 
with the law’s interpretative methods and the virtues of predictability, clarity, 
and consistency is often unmet in practice, especially when it comes to inter-
national law.
Since 1954, the share of published rulings in which the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal mentions international law has more than tripled.5 Analogous trends 
are witnessed in other jurisdictions. International law poses interpretative 
challenges for judges, due to its frequent vagueness and the stakes involved for 
States. However, as I will argue in more detail (infra, Chapter 5), these are not 
justifications for neglecting the interpretative methods of  international law. 
Quite the contrary: given the indeterminacy of international law, the counter- 
majoritarian features of judicial decision- making, and the risk that judges 
abuse their interpretative power, the practice of Swiss and other domestic 
judges cannot escape scrutiny. Judicial interpretations must, among other 
things, be evaluated based on whether they comply with the law’s interpreta-
tive methods, and based on whether they are predictable, clear, and consistent.
While many other legal and moral principles apply to and constrain judicial 
interpretation, my primary focus in this book lies on States’ international legal 
obligations and on the interpretative methods required by international law, 
as well as on the abovementioned three virtues of predictability, clarity, and 
consistency. I do not assess whether domestic courts reached the right inter-
pretative conclusion, all things considered.
2 Structure and Approach
The structure of this book builds on Joseph Raz’s statement that understand-
ing the concept of interpretation requires delving into the three following 
questions: what is interpretation, why interpret, and how to interpret?6 While 
I  follow this triptych (‘what?’, ‘why?’, and ‘how?’), I  sometimes adjust Raz’s 
 5 Odile Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens:  The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Practice of International Law in Figures’ (2018) 28 Swiss Review of 
International and European Law 489.
 6 Joseph Raz, ‘First Lecture: Even Judges Are Humans’ (Storrs Lectures: Between Authority and 
Morality, 2003); Joseph Raz, ‘Second Lecture: Theory of Interpretation – What Is Interpreta-
tion?’ (Storrs Lectures: Between Authority and Morality, 2003); Joseph Raz, ‘Third Lecture: Why 
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questions to make them fit the needs of a legal, doctrinal analysis, as well as 
the international legal context.7
My endeavor, contrary to Raz’s, is not that of a legal philosopher who stands 
outside the law. My aim is to start from the domestic (primarily Swiss) judi-
cial practice of international law and to examine it qua law and from within, 
ie, from the perspective of a participant rather than from that of an observer. 
I intend to provide an overview of this practice, but also to evaluate it based on 
two criteria that I develop further below, and to formulate recommendations 
for its further improvement.
Part one, entitled ‘What Is Interpretation?’, lays out the foundations of 
the study. In Chapter  1, I  introduce the issue at stake and explain its rele-
vance. Chapter  2 is devoted to terminological and conceptual clarifications. 
In  Chapter 3, I underscore features of the Swiss legal order that will help the 
reader understand some idiosyncrasies of the Swiss judicial practice of inter-
national law.
In the second part, entitled ‘Why Interpret?’, I elucidate what Joseph Raz 
calls the centrality of interpretation to legal practices. In Chapter 4, I clarify 
States’ international legal obligations when it comes to applying and therefore 
interpreting international law domestically. In this chapter, I also identify the 
legal effect of domestic rulings in international law.
The third and last part of the book is devoted to the question ‘How to 
interpret?’ In Chapter  5, I  prepare the ground for answering this query by 
showing why there are good reasons for requiring States to operate within 
a legal frame when they interpret international law. In Chapter 6, I discuss 
the components of this frame and the virtues and vices of different inter-
pretative methods. The two last chapters dig into, and evaluate, the Swiss 
judicial practice pertaining to treaties (Chapter 7), customary  international 
law (cil), and general principles of international law (Chapter  8). These 
 7 What constitutes a doctrinal piece of scholarship is, of course, a scholarly debate of its own. 
Following Martha Minow, doctrinal scholarship can be described as scholarly work which 
aims to:  ‘a. Organize and reorganize case law into coherent elements, categories, and con-
cepts; b. Acknowledge distinction between settled and emerging law; c. Identify difference 
between majority and “preferred” or “better” practice – ideally with some explanation for 
the criteria to be used’. See Martha Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship:  A Field Guide’ 
(2013) 63 Journal of Legal Education 65, 65. On doctrinal scholarship, see also Christopher 
McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 632, 
633 ff; Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83; Allan Beever and Charles Rickett, ‘Review 
Article: Interpretive Theory and the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 320; 
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Introduction 5
‘practical’ chapters also contain observations regarding the case law of do-
mestic courts in general.
In the conclusion, I reiterate my argument and findings. I also suggest how 
to improve the Swiss practice, and that of domestic courts more generally.
The cases studied are rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and of other se-
lected federal, cantonal, and military Swiss courts. I also rely on international 
and Swiss legal scholarship and legal theory and, occasionally, on the practice 
of foreign and international courts. When engaging with the case law in other 
States, my aim is not to undertake a full- fledged project of ‘comparative inter-
national law’.8 Rather, it consists in putting the Swiss practice into perspec-
tive. Understanding and evaluating this practice requires analyzing it within 
its broader context, and not in clinical isolation. On the other hand, I  hope 
that the ‘Swiss’ perspectives highlighted in this book will feed into the work 
of international legal scholars and practitioners, including into the work of 
researchers who are contributing to the growing9 field of comparative inter-
national law.
The literature I  use ranges across many theoretical approaches to law, 
from legal positivism to legal realism and cls. Many strands of legal schol-
arship have engaged with the topic of judicial interpretation, and they have 
explained, criticized, or sought to justify some of its aspects. My objective is 
to identify how these approaches can contribute to a better understanding of 
(and, hence, a more informed approach to) how domestic courts must inter-
pret international law. Some of these theories must be approached with care, 
as they do not necessarily fit the international interpretive context of the Swiss 
legal order and the evaluative criteria I adopt in this study.
I argue that interpretation should be pluralistic, ie, that an interpretative 
conclusion should result from the application of a plurality of interpretative 
methods (infra, Chapter 6, 2.5). I do not defend a specific normative interpre-
tative theory, such as textualism or purposivism (on the relationship between 
such theories and the law’s interpretative methods, see infra, Chapter 2, 5.1). 
Every method has its virtues and its limitations (infra, Chapter 6, section 2). 
Even judges who, like the late Antonin Scalia, wholeheartedly endorse a spe-
cific normative interpretative theory and are explicit about it, do not adopt a 
perfectly consistent approach across cases. Even they tend to invoke different 
interpretative arguments depending on the result they seek to reach. Instead 
of arguing that a specific method should be given more weight, I highlight why 
 8 Eg Anthea Roberts, Paul Stephan, Pierre-Hughes Verdier, and Mila Versteeg (eds), Compara-
tive International Law (Oxford University Press 2018).
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respecting the law’s methods is important in general, and perhaps especially in 
international law (infra, Chapter 5).
By focusing on a jurisdiction and polity committed to an idiosyncratic clus-
ter of values, my goal is not to endorse and to defend a given political philos-
ophy. Switzerland, a liberal, constitutional, semi- direct democracy committed 
to the rule of law (infra, Chapter 3, section 3), serves as a starting point to crit-
ically examine and articulate the methods any State must follow to interpret 
international law via its courts.
Swiss readers might wonder why this book is not written in one of the four 
Swiss national languages.10 If Swiss lawyers, and especially Swiss judges, are 
my intended audience, writing in a Swiss national language is arguably more 
appropriate. Facing a difficult choice which many authors must confront,11 
and with both an international and a domestic audience in mind, I  settled 
on English based on various considerations. First, my study highlights States’ 
international legal obligations. It hence concerns other jurisdictions as well, 
not only Switzerland. Second, this book engages with, and seeks to contribute 
to, contemporary international legal scholarship on international law in do-
mestic courts, which is predominantly (though not only) written in English. 
Third, due to the globalization of legal research, scholarly analyses of the Swiss 
practice of international law are increasingly written in English.12 One must 
be critical of this dominance of English, however.13 Partly because the great 
bulk of international legal scholarship published today is written in English,14 
domestic rulings available in this language enjoy disproportionate attention.15 
 10 Ie, German, French, Italian, and Romansh.
 11 Roberts, Is International Law International? (n 9) 263.
 12 Eg Thore Neumann and Anne Peters, ‘Switzerland’ in August Reinisch (ed), The Privileges 
and Immunities of International Organizations in Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press 
2013); Andreas R Ziegler, ‘The Application of wto Law in Switzerland’ in Claudio Dordi 
(ed), The Absence of Direct Effect of wto [sic] in the ec and in Other Countries (Giappichelli 
2010); Daniela Thurnherr, ‘The Reception Process in Austria and Switzerland’ in Helen 
Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the echr on National 
Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008).
 13 For a recent critique, see Christian Tomuschat, ‘The (Hegemonic?) Role of the English 
Language’ (2017) 86 Nordic Journal of International Law 196.
 14 John Louth, ‘Guest Post: How Many International Law Books Are Published in a Year?’ 
(Opinio Juris, 2015)  <opiniojuris.org/ 2015/ 04/ 08/ guest- post- how- many- international- 
law- books- are- published- in- a- year>; Michael Wood, ‘Editorial Comment  – The Present 
Position Within the ilc on the Topic “Identification of Customary International Law”: In 
Partial Response to Sienho Yee, Report on the ilc Project on “Identification of Customary 
International Law”’ (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 3, 13.
 15 ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
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Moreover, the fact that resources like the Oxford Reports on International Law 
in Domestic Courts (ildc), the online database of domestic rulings on inter-
national law provided by Oxford University Press, are only available in English, 
might hinder some domestic judges from using them.
3 The Benchmarks of Legality and Quality
Finally, it is essential to clarify the benchmark I  use to evaluate the judicial 
practice. As previously mentioned, I propose to conduct this assessment based 
on two criteria: legality (or lawfulness), ie, whether a judicial interpretation has 
been reached in conformity with the law’s interpretative methods; and what 
I  call quality, ie, the extent to which a judicial interpretation is predictable, 
clear, and consistent. In the following, I briefly explain what the two criteria 
consist in.
The criterion of legality allows me to examine whether a judicial decision 
has been reached in conformity with what legal interpretative methods re-
quire. A  judicial interpretation that violates the legal frame that governs it 
(ie, the law’s interpretative methods) disregards the law. Given judges’ duty to 
abide by the law, and given States’ duty to respect international law, such an 
interpretation fails from the perspective of legality. Observing the law’s inter-
pretative methods demands that no method be disregarded. This requirement 
applies even if there will often be tensions between different methods, and 
even if in some cases, some methods will not seem helpful or important com-
pared to others. Moreover, these methods must be taken seriously: instead of 
merely paying lip service to them, courts must genuinely seek to identify the 
features of the law to which these methods point. Importantly, however, com-
pliance with the applicable interpretative methods does not prevent different 
courts from reaching different, incompatible interpretative outcomes.
The second criterion I use to evaluate a judicial interpretation is its qual-
ity, ie, the predictability, clarity, and consistency of the legal reasoning that 
underpins it. When referring to quality, I will not examine whether a judicial 
interpretation is legitimate (ie, whether the judge has the moral right to rule 
over the law’s subjects), or whether it is justified (ie, whether it is morally 
International Law’ (2016) 7  <www.ila- hq.org/ index.php/ study- groups>; Cecilia M 
Bailliet, ‘National Case Law as a Generator of International Refugee Law: Rectifying an 
Imbalance Within the unhcr Guidelines on International Protection’ in Mary E Footer, 
August Reinisch, and Christina Binder (eds), International Law and … Select Proceedings 
of the European Society of International Law, Vol 5, 2014 (Hart Publishing 2016).
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defensible).16 The concept of legitimacy is highly complex and controversial, 
and legal philosophers have discussed it extensively. In this book, I  will not 
provide a general theory of international justice, of the role the State ought to 
play in international law, nor will I provide a general theory of the legitimacy of 
international law, of Swiss law, or of Swiss courts’ interpretations thereof. This 
should not detract from the fact that I will be defending claims that can have 
implications for – and would be elements of – such theories, and that I will be 
defending claims as to how judges must (from the perspective of international 
law) and should (from the perspective of high- quality legal reasoning) decide 
cases. Moreover, I will be relying on concepts (such as good reasoning) that are 
used in legal practice, but that also exist outside the law, eg in moral reasoning.
Instead of providing an analytical account of legitimacy, I will evaluate ju-
dicial interpretations based on whether they are predictable, clear, and con-
sistent. These three characteristics are linked to the legal and moral principle 
of the rule of law, of which I do not provide a theory here, but which I believe 
the practice of international law should promote, and to which legal practice 
aspires.17 These three virtues are congruent with the principles Joseph Raz de-
rives from the rule of law, and which specifically pertain to courts and their 
decisions.18
The virtues of predictability, clarity, and consistency go hand in hand.19 
A predictable interpretation must be clear and consistent with other interpre-
tations, and it is difficult to imagine how consistency could be achieved with-
out clarity. Nonetheless, the three virtues may also pull in opposite directions. 
Their precise weights and implications might lead to disagreements, and the 
terminology used to describe them fluctuates. However, their basic character-
istics are well established in legal practice.
First, predictability (which, in this book, is used as a synonym for stability, 
certainty, constancy, and foreseeability) ensures that a judicial interpretation 
can, with a minimal degree of certainty, be anticipated by the law’s subjects.20 
 16 Alan John Simmons, ‘Justification and Legitimacy’ (1999) 109 Ethics 739. Note that I am 
referring to normative legitimacy, and not to sociological legitimacy. However, while soci-
ological legitimacy is not the focus of this study, it is likely that the legality and quality of 
courts’ reasoning contribute to the sociological legitimacy of their decisions.
 17 On this complex topic, see Denise Wohlwend, The International Rule of Law:  Notion, 
Scope, and Subjects (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
 18 See the principles 1 and 2 highlighted by Joseph Raz, ie, the requirement that laws be 
prospective, open, clear, and relatively stable: Joseph Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’, 
The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 214 f.
 19 Eg bge 141 v 509, at 7.1.1.
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Predictability does not mean that courts cannot overrule previous decisions 
in exceptional cases. However, the law’s subjects must be able to expect such 
changes to happen, and departures from past cases must be carefully justified.21 
By contrast, arbitrary, whimsical interpretations prevent the law’s subjects from 
adjusting their behavior to what the law requires. They make it impossible to 
predict22 how law- applying bodies will determine the law.
Second, the clarity23 (or intelligibility, transparency) of judicial interpre-
tations makes them understandable. Contrary to opacity, clarity enables the 
law’s subjects to grasp what the law requires, and to adjust their behavior 
accordingly.
Third, a consistent (or coherent) judicial interpretation is devoid of contra-
dictions.24 It lacks both internal contradictions, and contradictions with the 
reasoning of the court in previous cases. While internal consistency allows the 
law’s subjects to make sense of judicial interpretations and to anticipate them, 
consistency with previous cases chiefly aims at ensuring that these subjects 
will be treated equally.
The value attached to predictable, clear, and consistent decisions, and the 
expectation that judicial interpretations will honor these virtues, are reflected 
in domestic and international legal practice.25
As regards predictability, under Swiss law, for instance, laws must be such 
that their subjects are able to at least roughly anticipate the legal  consequences 
of their actions.26 Predictability (or certainty) is also a principle of English 
law, for example.27 In international law, predictability is reflected in the prin-
ciple of non- retroactivity.28 The importance of predictability can be derived 
 21 On this problématique, see ibid 56 f; Pascal Pichonnaz, ‘L’effet rétroactif du change-
ment de jurisprudence : quelques réflexions à l’aune du pluralisme méthodologique’ in 
Alexandra Rumo- Jungo and others (eds), Une empreinte sur le Code civil :  Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Paul- Henri Steinauer (Schulthess 2013).
 22 Some authors argue that the task of a lawyer consists in predicting how courts will adjudi-
cate a dispute. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law 
Review 457.
 23 Fuller (n 20) 63 ff.
 24 On contradictions in the law, see ibid 65 ff.
 25 Geranne Lautenbach notes the difficulty of codifying these requirements:  Geranne 
Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 39.
 26 Eg in criminal law: bge 141 iv 279, at 1.3.3. Regarding the restriction of fundamental 
rights, see sfac, judgment A- 4941/ 2014 of 9 November 2016, at 10.
 27 Jonathan Mance, ‘Should the Law Be Certain?’ (Oxford Shrieval Lecture, 
2011) <www.supremecourt.uk/ docs/ speech_ 111011.pdf>.
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from the fact that under domestic29 and international30 law, courts must de-
cide cases according to law, independently, and impartially. The virtue of pred-
icable interpretations is stressed in scholarship as well.
The value attached to clarity is expressed by the constitutional right to be 
given reasons for official decisions.31 It is also linked to the fact that under both 
domestic32 and international33 law, judicial proceedings must, in principle, be 
public. In scholarship, judgments are frowned upon if the underlying reason-
ing is not transparent and intelligible.
Consistency is pursued in legal practice as well. Courts, when providing 
reasons for their interpretations, strive to show that these interpretations are 
required by the law, and that they are the result of sound reasoning. If judges 
were to do otherwise, their judgments would attract criticism, as lawyers and 
scholars often challenge court rulings based on their lack of consistency. Con-
sistency is also reflected in the doctrine of stare decisis that exists in many ju-
risdictions, and in norms mandating stability across cases even in the absence 
of such a doctrine.34 It is also linked to the right to equality, which is protected 
by domestic constitutional law35 and by international law.36
As the previous remarks show, evaluating, criticizing, and seeking to im-
prove the quality of legal reasoning based on its predictability, clarity, and con-
sistency is not only a requirement of the rule of law: it is also reflected in legal 
practice and scholarship.37
I will not seek to prove that predictability, clarity, and consistency are good, 
legitimate features, nor will I demonstrate that they are required by the rule 
of law in international relations. Such a project is, as previously stated, not 
what I am pursuing in this study. For my purposes, I will simply assume that 
if a court interprets a given provision and concludes that its meaning is X, it 
should be able to offer a predictable, clear, and consistent explanation of this 
result. If the court does not do so, I will assume that its interpretation fails from 
the  perspective of the quality of legal reasoning and, hence, that it carries little 
 29 Art. 5(1) (adherence to law) and 30(1) Cst. (independence and impartiality).
 30 Art. 6(1) echr; art. 14(1) iccpr (independence and impartiality).
 31 Art. 29(2) Cst.
 32 Art. 30(3) Cst.
 33 Art. 6(1) echr; art. 14(1) iccpr.
 34 Art. 23 fa- sft.
 35 Art. 8 and 29(1) Cst.
 36 Art. 14 echr; art. 2(1), 14(1), and 26 iccpr.
 37 For an example, see Noora Arajärvi, ‘The Requisite Rigour in the Identification of 
Customary International Law:  A Look at the Reports of the Special Rapporteur of the 
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weight for the determination of the sources of international law (art. 38(1)(a)– 
(c) icj Statute) and qua auxiliary means (art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute).
Indeed, assessing the quality of a legal interpretation helps in determining 
the weight this interpretation should be given with respect to the meaning of 
the interpretandum.38 A judicial interpretation that is not transparent, that 
contains a non sequitur, or that otherwise fails to demonstrate why the le-
gal meaning of the interpretative object is X, is of poor quality from the per-
spective of legal practice, both domestic and international. This is the case 
even if this interpretation is otherwise in conformity with legal interpretative 
methods. The quality of judicial decisions also influences the extent to which 
these decisions can (and should, from the perspective of the rule of law) con-
tribute to the ascertainment of international law. (On the status of domestic 
rulings in the sources of international law and qua auxiliary means, see infra, 
 Chapter 4, section 3).
The two criteria of legality and quality will underpin my evaluation of the 
judicial practice throughout the present study. In emphasizing that domes-
tic courts must respect legal interpretative methods, I  will point to the first 
 criterion, ie, legality or lawfulness. In stressing that they must reason in a pre-
dictable, clear, consistent way, I will point to the second criterion, namely to 
the quality of the court’s reasoning. One could argue that these criteria (and 
especially the three virtues of judicial reasoning) are indeterminate. Yet as 
 Aristotle notes, ‘[o] ur discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness 
as the subject matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all 
discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts’.39
Legality and high- quality reasoning are closely related. Predictable, clear, 
and consistent reasoning facilitates the observance of interpretative methods. 
Vice versa, interpretative methods increase the degree of predictability, clarity, 
and consistency of judicial decision- making. Given the close links that exist 
between legality and quality, and as is common in legal scholarship, I will often 
mention them jointly.
I now turn to the first part of this study, entitled ‘What Is Interpretation?’
 38 As Scott Brewer notes regarding the law of evidence, ‘we might fashion an analogue for 
the Socratic maxim “the unexamined life is not worth living”: the unexamined evidentiary 
argument is not worth believing’. See Scott Brewer, ‘Logocratic Method and the Analysis 
of Arguments in Evidence’ (2011) 10 Law, Probability and Risk 175, 175.
 39 Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ bk i ch 3 <classics.mit.edu/ Aristotle/ nicomachaen.1.i.html>. 
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 chapter 1
The Interpretation of International Law 
by Domestic Courts – A Topic That Matters
[T] he place of international law in municipal court cases amounts 




Why should we care about how domestic courts must interpret  international 
law? In this chapter, I  provide an overview of the existing literature dealing 
with the interpretation of international law by domestic courts, both in Swit-
zerland and in other jurisdictions (2). I  explain the reasons that lead me to 
focus on Switzerland (3), courts (4), domestic courts (5), and international 
law (6). Finally, I clarify why it is worthwhile to examine the domestic practice 
from the angle of interpretative methods (7).
2 The State of the Literature
In 2014, the Swiss Federal Tribunal mentioned international law in 27.3% of 
its published decisions. By contrast, six decades earlier, in 1954, the Court 
 cited international law in 8.5% of them. In other terms, the share of pub-
lished cases containing a reference to international law has more than tripled 
in 60 years.41
The Swiss example is not an outlier. The interpretation of international law 
in domestic courts ‘has become a regular occurrence, at least in certain states 
 40 Robert Y Jennings, ‘The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of 
International Law’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 4.
 41 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
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16 Chapter 1
and in certain fields’.42 International law is invoked and applied in domestic 
courts across the globe, be it in liberal democracies43 or in authoritarian re-
gimes,44 in former colonial powers45 or in decolonized States.46
Mirroring this global trend, international law in domestic courts and do-
mestic courts in international law are thriving fields in legal scholarship today. 
The myriad contributions published on the issue in recent years,47 the launch 
of an online database of relevant domestic court cases in 2007,48 and the crea-
tion of book series devoted to international law in domestic legal orders49 are 
only a few examples of the interest contemporary international lawyers devote 
to this topic.
The issue itself is not new. International lawyers have been intrigued by 
domestic courts’ interpretation of international law for decades.50 1905 saw 
the publication of a book by Dionisio Anzilotti entitled Il diritto internazio-
nale nei giudizi interni.51 In 1929, Hersch Lauterpacht published an article in 
which he presented domestic municipal decisions, including court decisions, 
as ‘sources of international law’.52 States have been compiling yearly digests 
 42 Georg Nolte, ‘Introduction’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The 
Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts:  Unity, Diversity, Convergence 
(Oxford University Press 2016) 1.
 43 Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World:  American Law and the New Global Realities 
(Alfred A Knopf 2015).
 44 Congyan Cai, ‘International Law in Chinese Courts During the Rise of China’ (2016) 110 
American Journal of International Law 269, 269.
 45 See Tom Bingham’s preface in Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic 
Courts (Hart Publishing 2005) xi.
 46 VH Hegde, ‘Indian Courts and International Law’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 53, 55.
 47 Eg Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law 
by Domestic Courts:  Uniformity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016); 
André Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011).
 48 Oxford Reports on International Law in Domestic Courts, <opil.ouplaw.com/ page/ ILDC/ 
oxford- reports- on- international- law- in- domestic- courts>.
 49 <global.oup.com/ academic/ content/ series/ i/ international- law- in- domestic- legal- orders- 
ildo>.
 50 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Municipal Decisions as Sources of International Law’ (1929) 10 
British Year Book of International Law 65; Richard A Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts 
in the International Legal Order (Syracuse University Press 1964); Richard Lillich, ‘The 
Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order’ (1970) 11 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 9; Thomas M Franck and Gregory M Fox (eds), International 
Law Decisions in National Courts (Transnational Publishers, Inc 1996).
 51 Dionisio Anzilotti, Il diritto internazionale nei giudizi interni (Zanichelli 1905).





















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
A Topic That Matters 17
of their practice of international law for years,53 and the International Law 
Reports have included domestic rulings since their inception in the late 1920s. 
The scope of international law, and especially of treaty law, has been steadily 
expanding ever since, making it difficult for domestic lawyers and judges to 
ignore its existence54 and the fact that States must respect international law.
If States have the duty to respect international law, why is it necessary to ex-
amine how domestic courts, including Swiss courts, must interpret this body of 
law? I argue that a new study that builds on and seeks to guide the practice, and 
that complements scholarly efforts to date is needed for at least five reasons.
First, existing scholarship on domestic courts and international law pri-
marily focuses on mapping the existing practice rather than on the normative 
(legal55 and/ or moral) principles that must or should guide it (2.1). More over, 
legal theorists and philosophers tend to neglect international law (2.2). Third, 
the place of domestic judicial decisions in the sources of international law 
is ambiguous (2.3). Fourth, scholars and courts often neglect that the fact 
that States must respect the interpretative methods of international law is a 
corollary of their international legal obligations (2.4). Finally, a comprehen-
sive overview and evaluation of Swiss courts’ practice of international law is 
 missing (2.5).
2.1 Descriptive Bias
While there is no dearth of scholarly work on international law in domestic 
courts, this scholarship is predominantly ‘descriptive and of a sociological 
kind’, as Samantha Besson puts it. Consequently, this work seldom addresses 
the normative (legal or moral) principles domestic courts must or should re-
spect when interpreting international law.56
 53 See the digest published annually in the Swiss Review of International and European Law, 
currently compiled by Lucius Caflisch. For another example out of many:  Juan Santos 
Vara, Soledad R Sánchez- Taberneroy, and Daniel González Herrera, ‘Crónica sobre la apli-
cación judicial del derecho internacional público en España (julio 2014 – junio 2015)’ 
(2015) 29 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales.
 54 See already The Interpretation of Statutes (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 1974) <www.
lawcom.gov.uk/ wp- content/ uploads/ 2016/ 08/ LC.- 021- SC.- 011- THE- INTERPRETATION- 
OF- STATUTES.pdf>.
 55 As mentioned, this study focuses on legal principles.
 56 Samantha Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication:  A 
Peripheral Case of Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ in Mary E Footer, 
August Reinisch, and Christina Binder (eds), International Law and … Select Proceedings 
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Scholars have pointed out that domestic courts, when they interpret in-
ternational law, fulfill a domestic, but also an international ‘function’.57 They 
have underlined this ‘duality’,58 typically via Georges Scelle’s sociological 
(and often misspelt) concept of ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’.59 They have 
stressed that domestic rulings contribute to the formation of international 
law, and that domestic judges, by citing their own rulings (or, more generally, 
their own State’s practice), can increase the influence of this domestic prac-
tice on international lawmaking.60 Scholars and private organizations such 
as the ila have ‘mapped’ the types of engagement of domestic courts with 
international law,61 adopting a ‘functional’62 approach or other descriptive 
 57 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law:  The International 
Judicial Function of National Courts’ (2011) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review 153.
 58 ila, ‘Proposal for an ila Study Group on the Principles on the Application of International 
Law by Domestic Courts’ (2011) 1  <www.ila- hq.org/ index.php/ study- groups>. See also 
Janet Walker, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Tribute to 
Richard Falk’ (2005) 11 ilsa Journal of International and Comparative Law 365.
 59 Georges Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’ in Walter Schätzel 
and Hans- Jürgen Schlochauer (eds), Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation: 
Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Vittorio Klostermann 1956). 
Many scholars rely on Scelle’s concept, eg Anthea Roberts, ‘Comparative International 
Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2011) 60 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57, 68; André Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality 
of Direct Effect of International Law’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International 
Law 105, 111. See also (with regard to the cjeu, which is often compared to a domes-
tic court):  André Nollkaemper, ‘Between Dédoublement Fonctionnel and Balancing of 
Values: Three Replies to Pasquale De Sena and Maria Chiara Vitucci’ (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 862.
 60 Samantha Besson and Odile Ammann, ‘La pratique suisse relative à la détermination 
du droit international coutumier’ (Freiburger Schriften zum Europarecht Nr. 21 / Cahiers 
 fribourgeois de droit européen n° 21, 2016) <www.unifr.ch/ ius/ euroinstitut_ fr/ forschung/ 
publikationen/ freiburger_ schriften>.
 61 ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts With International Law’ (2012) <www.ila- hq.org/ index.php/ study- 
groups>; ila, ‘Working Session Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the 
Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (2016) <www.ila- hq.org/ 
index.php/ study- groups>; ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts With International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 15); Sharon Weill, The Role of National 
Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press 2014); 
Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47) 17.
 62 Weill (n 61) 2; ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts 
With International Law, Final Report: Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law’ (n 15) 2. See also Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International 
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approaches.63 They have focused on the ‘impact’ of domestic case law64 or 
of domestic law more generally on international law65 and, vice versa, on the 
impact of international law on domestic cases.66 Researchers have compiled 
national judicial decisions on international law,67 and they have compared dif-
ferent States’ domestic case law on international law.68 Political scientists have 
typically been interested in why domestic courts apply international law.69 
Only a few authors suggest that domestic judges must or should conceive of 
their role in a particular way, be it from the perspective of domestic law70 or 
from an international perspective.71 In general, scholars often dwell on the 
outcome of domestic courts’ judgments pertaining to international law, rather 
than on the interpretative framework and reasoning these courts use.72
 63 Veronika Fikfak, ‘Reinforcing the icj’s Central International Role? Domestic Courts’ 
Enforcement of icj Decisions and Opinions’ in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), A 
Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2015).
 64 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Judicial Dialogue in Multi- Level Governance:  The Impact 
of the Solange Argument’ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The 
Practice of International and National Courts and the (De- )Fragmentation of International 
Law (Hart Publishing 2012); ‘International Law Through the National Prism: The Impact 
of Judicial Dialogue’ (Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research) <www.nwo.nl/ en/ 
research- and- results/ research- projects/ i/ 22/ 6722.html>.
 65 Luigi Ferrari Bravo, ‘International and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal 
Systems’ in R St J Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process 
of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory (Martinus Nijhoff 
1986); Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine Chiam, Devika Hovell, and George Williams 
‘International Law and National Law: Fluid States’ in Hilary Charlesworth, Madelaine 
Chiam, Devika Hovell, and George Williams (eds), The Fluid State: International Law and 
National Legal Systems (The Federation Press 2005) 8.
 66 Eg Simon Olleson, State Responsibility Before International and Domestic Courts:  The 
Impact and Influence of the ilc Articles (Oxford University Press 2013).
 67 Fatima (n 45).
 68 Anthea Roberts and others, ‘Comparative International Law: Framing the Field’ (2015) 
109 American Journal of International Law 467; Roberts and others (n 8).
 69 For an overview:  Lisa Conant, ‘Whose Agents? The Interpretation of International 
Law in National Courts’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations:  The State of the Art 
(Cambridge University Press 2013) 401 ff.
 70 Curtis A Bradley, ‘The Supreme Court as a Filter Between International Law and American 
Constitutionalism’ (2016) 104 California Law Review 101.
 71 Falk (n 50).
 72 Eg Alexandra Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts:  Lessons From the Inter- American 
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights’ (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 
493; Raffaela Kunz, ‘Weder entfesselt noch geknebelt: Rechtsfindung nationaler Gerichte 
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When scholars actually look at the methods courts do, must, or should fol-
low when interpreting international law, they mostly focus on international 
courts.73 A small number of contributions deal with the methods domestic 
courts do, must, or should employ.74 Yet this work often remains at a relatively 
high level of generality, and it concentrates on the vclt, without questioning 
it. Moreover, the implications of these studies for the Swiss judicial practice are 
not obvious. In domestic legal  theory, many are interested in the phenomenol-
ogy of judicial decision- making,75 or in empirical difficulties judges face when 
deciding cases.76 When courts’ legal and/ or moral77 duties and the method-
ological aspects of their interpretative  activity do take centre stage, scholars 
generally ignore international law.
2.2 Domestic Bias
This last remark leads us to a second point: while the nature and essence of judi-
cial reasoning is one of the old chestnuts of jurisprudence,78 legal theorists and 
Marje Mülder and others (eds), Richterliche Unabhängigkeit: Rechtsfindung im Öffentlichen 
Recht, 58. Assistierendentagung Öffentliches Recht (Nomos 2018). For a counterexample, 
see Juliette McIntyre, ‘Same Pod, Different Peas: The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in Australian and Canadian Courts’ (2017) 3 Canadian Journal of Comparative 
and Contemporary Law 19.
 73 Sienho Yee, ‘Article 38 of the icj Statute and Applicable Law: Selected Issues in Recent 
Cases’ (2016) 7 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 472; Maurice Mendelson, 
‘The International Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law’ in Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice and Alan Vaughan Lowe (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of 
Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge University Press 1996); Niels 
Petersen, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Politics of Identifying 
Customary International Law’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 357; 
Neha Jain, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and General Principles of Law in International Criminal 
Law’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 111; Stefan Talmon, ‘Determining 
Customary International Law: The icj’s Methodology Between Induction, Deduction and 
Assertion’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 417.
 74 See the contributions in Aust and Nolte (n 47).
 75 Duncan Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ 
(1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education 518; Julia Hänni, Vom Gefühl am Grund der 
Rechtsfindung:  Rechtsmethodik, Objektivität und Emotionalität in der Rechtsanwendung 
(Duncker & Humblot 2011).
 76 Adrian Vermeule, ‘Interpretive Choice’ (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 74.
 77 For a seminal account of how judges should decide cases, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (Belknap Press 1986).
 78 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1994); Dworkin (n 
77); Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press 1997); Julie 
Dickson, ‘Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2001) <plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ spr2010/ entries/ legal- reas- interpret>; 
Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical 
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philosophers have (but for a few exceptions)79 shied away from international 
law.80 Seminal work that has dealt with international law at the margins, such 
as HLA Hart’s Concept of Law,81 is outdated, at least with regard to newer devel-
opments on the international plane.82 In recent years, calls for an expansion of 
the scope of ‘municipal’ jurisprudence have become more vocal,83 and there 
have been scholarly efforts to address this jurisprudential blind spot84 and 
to analyze judicial interpretation in international law.85 Yet domestic courts 
and the interpretative methods of international law have made only rare 
 79 Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2010); Jeremy Waldron, ‘International Law:  “A Relatively Small and 
Unimportant” Part of Jurisprudence?’ in Luís Duarte d’Almeida, James Edwards, and 
Andrea Dolcetti (eds), Reading HLA Hart’s ‘The Concept of Law’ (Hart Publishing 2013); 
George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press 2007); Nicole Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and 
Transnational Legal Theory (Oxford University Press 2013); John Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2011)  238 ff; William Twining, 
General Jurisprudence:  Understanding Law From a Global Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); Keith Culver and Michael Giudice, Legality’s Borders:  An Essay 
in General Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 2010); Julie Dickson, ‘Who’s Afraid 
of Transnational Legal Theory? Dangers and Desiderata’ (2015) 6 Transnational Legal 
Theory 565; Timothy Endicott, ‘“International Meaning”: Comity in Fundamental Rights 
Adjudication’ (2002) 13 International Journal of Refugee Law 280.
 80 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  
(n 78); Dworkin (n 77); Timothy Endicott, Vagueness in Law (Oxford University Press 
2000); Michel Troper, Véronique Champeil- Desplats, and Christophe Grzegorczyk (eds), 
Théorie des contraintes juridiques (lgdj/Bruylant 2005); Fuller (n 20); Patrick S Atiyah 
and Robert S Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo- American Law: A Comparative Study 
in Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Clarendon Press 1987).
 81 Hart (n 78)  ch x. For a critique:  Waldron, ‘International Law:  “A Relatively Small and 
Unimportant” Part of Jurisprudence?’ (n 79).
 82 Such recent trends include the growth of international adjudication, the shift from 
interstate to intrastate international law, and the codification of secondary norms of 
international law.
 83 Joseph Raz, ‘Why the State?’ (2014) <papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2339522>. On this evolution, see McCrudden (n 7) 644.
 84 Besson and Tasioulas (n 79); Liam Murphy, What Makes Law:  An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Law (Cambridge University Press 2014).
 85 Samantha Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication: Getting Over 
the Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ in 
Cesare Romano, Karen Alter, and Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2014); Hervé Ascensio, ‘La notion de juridiction 
internationale en question’ in sfdi (ed), La juridictionnalisation du droit international 
(Pedone 2003); Samantha Besson and Andreas R Ziegler (eds), Le juge en droit européen 
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appearances in this context.86 This gap is regrettable, since important insights 
have been gained on the nature and essence of judicial reasoning in domestic 
law. These analyses can undoubtedly be useful to international law if they are 
adjusted to the specificities of international lawmaking.
2.3 ‘Amour Impossible’
Third, although domestic judicial decisions are frequently relied upon qua inter-
pretative guides in international legal practice, their place in the sources of in-
ternational law is obscured by art. 38(1) icj Statute. This provision ambiguously 
refers to ‘judicial decisions’ as ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of [international] law’. It reflects the ‘amour impossible’87 between the doctrine 
of the sources of international law and the influence that  international88 and 
domestic adjudication exert on international law in practice. While there is 
widespread agreement among scholars and practitioners that domestic rulings 
are not a source of international law, these actors often struggle to legally char-
acterize the ‘influence’ that domestic courts have on the formation and evolu-
tion of international law. In practice, there is no doubt that domestic rulings 
on international law attract interest. They are included in many international 
law casebooks89 which, already early on, contained ‘copious references’90 to 
them. They appear in domestic law digests,91 and they are compiled in online 
databases.92 Yet it is rarely explicitly acknowledged that these rulings contrib-
ute to the formation and evolution of treaty law, cil, and general principles of 
international law, and that they are auxiliary means that help interpreters of 
international law in subsequent cases (infra, Chapter 4, section 3).
 86 See however Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication:  A 
Peripheral Case of Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56); Fatimata 
Niang, ‘De quelques contraintes européennes sur le juge suisse’ in Samantha Besson and 
Andreas R Ziegler (eds), Le juge en droit européen et international / The Judge in European 
and International Law (Schulthess 2013).
 87 Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication:  Getting Over the 
Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ (n 85); 
Ascensio (n 85).
 88 Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication:  Getting Over the 
Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ (n 85).
 89 Among many others:  Samantha Besson, Droit international public :  Abrégé de cours et 
résumés de jurisprudence (3rd edn, Stämpfli 2016); Barry E Carter and Allen S Weiner, 
International Law (6th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011). See also, more recently, André 
Nollkaemper and August Reinisch (eds), International Law in Domestic Courts: A Casebook 
(Oxford University Press 2018).
 90 Lauterpacht, ‘Municipal Decisions as Sources of International Law’ (n 50) 68, footnote 1.
 91 Eg ibid 67 f, footnote 1. On this issue, see Jennings (n 40).
 92 ILDC (n 48). See also the International Law Reports, <www.cambridge.org/ core/ series/ 
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2.4 Legal Imperative
The lack of attention to domestic courts’ interpretative methods when they 
interpret international law is problematic from the perspective of States’ in-
ternational obligations. This aspect is sometimes neglected in practice and 
scholarship.93 It is important to point out that in this study, I focus on what in-
ternational law requires. However, the law’s interpretative methods must also 
be respected in virtue of domestic law, as I will emphasize (Chapter 6, infra).
Societies governed by law cannot afford to defer to judicial ‘pragmatism’, or 
to ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’, as Swiss courts call their own inter-
pretative approach (infra, section 3, and Chapter  3, 4.2.6). States (including 
judges) must abide by the law and its interpretative methods. This is true with 
regard to both domestic and international law, which share the same basic 
interpretative methods despite some differences that exist between domestic 
and international lawmaking (infra, Chapter 5, 3.3). Pragmatism hinders this 
objective when it is unpredictable, opaque, and inconsistent.
In this study, I primarily focus on States’ legal duties, which States must hon-
or via their organs, including their courts. More specifically, I zoom in on the 
law’s interpretative methods. I do not study other moral duties and principles 
affecting the way courts should interpret international law, such as the prin-
ciple of the rule of law, the principle of judicial integrity, and the principle of 
fidelity to the law. While these moral duties are undoubtedly important and 
have a major influence on judicial reasoning, the complex issues they raise 
must be left for another occasion.
My study is not limited to evaluating whether Swiss courts’ interpretations 
conform with what the law requires: I also examine whether these interpreta-
tions are good interpretations, in the sense that they succeed in illuminating 
the legal meaning of their object in a predictable, clear, and consistent way. 
Whether these characteristics of what makes a high- quality interpretation 
contribute to the legitimacy of this interpretation is beyond the scope of my 
project. Instead, I start from the assumption that these virtues are set by le-
gal practice itself, be it domestic or international, and that it is worthwhile to 
pursue them. The fact that these virtues are aspirational, that there might be 
tensions between some of them, and that courts often fail to meet them, does 
not mean that these virtues are not and should not be used as guides. As a mat-
ter of fact, adherence to them pervades our legal practices, and both domestic 
and international lawyers and scholars routinely use them to evaluate judicial 
interpretations.
 93 Jan Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias, and Panos 
Merkouris (eds), Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 
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As of today, a comprehensive scholarly overview and evaluation of the Swiss 
judicial practice of international law from the perspective of interpreta-
tive methods is missing. Scholars have analyzed the ‘Europeanization’94 
and ‘internationalization’ (or ‘globalization’)95 of Swiss law and politics. 
They have highlighted the growing empirical relevance international law 
has had in the Swiss legal order in recent decades.96 Articles have been de-
voted to the persuasive authority of eu law in the Swiss legal and judicial 
practice,97 and to the way Swiss courts deal with conflicts between domes-
tic law and ihrl.98 Some monographs address selected aspects of Swiss 
courts’ application of international law, eg by compiling existing case sum-
maries99 or by highlighting specific features of the case law.100 However, 
there is no overarching account of how Swiss courts do and must interpret 
international law that is not confined to particular substantive areas,101  
 94 Emilie Kohler, Le rôle du droit de l’Union européenne dans l’interprétation du droit suisse 
(Stämpfli 2015); Francesco Maiani, ‘Lost in Translation:  Euro- Compatibility, Legal 
Security, and the Autonomous Implementation of eu Law in Switzerland’ (2013) 1 
European Law Reporter 29.
 95 Eg Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Judicial Globalization:  New Development or Old Wine in New 
Bottles?’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 505; Wolf Linder, ‘Swiss Legislation in 
the Era of Globalisation: A Quantitative Assessment of Federal Legislation (1983– 2007)’ 
(2014) 20 Swiss Political Science Review 223.
 96 Linder (n 95).
 97 Francesco Maiani, ‘La “saga Metock”, ou des inconvénients du pragmatisme helvé-
tique dans la gestion des rapports entre droit européen, droit bilatéral et droit interne’ 
(2011) 130 Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht / Revue de droit suisse 27; Maiani (n 
94); Samantha Besson and Odile Ammann, ‘L’interprétation des accords bilatéraux 
Suisse- ue : une lecture de droit international’ in Astrid Epiney and Stefan Diezig (eds), 
Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2013/ 2014 / Annuaire suisse de droit européen 
2013/ 2014 (Schulthess 2014).
 98 Eva Maria Belser and Rekha Oleschak Pillai, ‘Engagement of Swiss Courts With 
International Law: Looking at the Swiss Federal Supreme Court and Its Ways of Dealing 
With Conflicts Between Domestic Law and International Human Rights Guarantees’ (on 
file with author).
 99 Andreas R Ziegler (ed), La jurisprudence suisse du droit international public :  les grands 
arrêts du Tribunal fédéral suisse de droit international public (Dike 2015).
 100 Helen Keller, Rezeption des Völkerrechts:  Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie zur Praxis des 
u.s. Supreme Court, des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und des schweize-
rischen Bundesgerichts in ausgewählten Bereichen (Springer 2003).
 101 Olivier Jacot- Guillarmod, Le juge national face au droit européen : perspective suisse 
et communautaire (Helbing & Lichtenhahn/Bruylant 1993); Astrid Epiney, Beate 
Metz, and Benedikt Pirker, Zur Parallelität der Rechtsentwicklung in der eu und in der 
Schweiz:  Ein Beitrag zur rechtlichen Tragweite der ‘Bilateralen Abkommen’ (Schulthess 
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sources,102 or norms103 of international law, or to particular aspects of the 
relationship between Swiss law and international law.104 Most contributions 
dealing with Swiss courts’ interpretative methods focus on domestic law105 
and the so- called ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’106 used by the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal to interpret Swiss law. They often do so without challenging 
this pragmatic approach, and without looking at how it plays out with regard 
to international law.107 Foreign (non- Swiss) legal scholars sometimes mention 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht / Revue suisse de 
droit international et de droit européen 33; Vanessa Thalmann, Reasonable and Effective 
Universality:  Conditions to the Exercice by National Courts of Universal Jurisdiction 
(Schulthess 2018).
 102 Mario Kronauer, Die Auslegung von Staatsverträgen durch das Schweizerische 
Bundesgericht (Polygraphischer Verlag 1972); Simonetta Stirling- Zanda, ‘The 
Determination of Customary International Law in European Courts (France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland)’ (2004) 4 Non- State Actors and 
International Law 3; Olivier Jacot- Guillarmod, ‘Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Lausanne et 
Lucerne :  Méthodes d’interprétation comparées de la règle internationale convention-
nelle’ in Jean- François Perrin (ed), Les règles d’interprétation :  principes communément 
admis par les juridictions, Enseignement du 3e cycle de droit 1988 (Editions universitaires, 
1989); Besson and Ammann (n 60).
 103 Xavier Oberson, ‘Récents développements dans le droit de l’assistance internationale 
en matière fiscale, notamment avec les Etats- Unis :  sept leçons à tirer de l’affaire ubs’ 
in François Bellanger and Jacques de Werra (eds), Genève au confluent du droit interne 
et du droit international : Mélanges offerts par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève 
à la Société suisse des juristes à l’occasion du Congrès 2012 (Schulthess 2012); Gregor 
T Chatton, Vers la pleine reconnaissance des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels 
(Schulthess 2014); Epiney, Metz, and Pirker (n 101).
 104 Daniel Wüger, Anwendbarkeit und Justiziabilität völkerrechtlicher Normen im schweize-
rischen Recht: Grundlagen, Methoden und Kriterien (Stämpfli 2005).
 105 Ernst Kramer, Juristische Methodenlehre (4th edn, CH Beck/manz/Stämpfli 2013); Alain 
Papaux, Introduction à la philosophie du ‘droit en situation’ : de la codification légaliste au 
droit prudentiel (Schulthess 2006); Tornike Keshelava, Der Methodenpluralismus und 
die ratio legis:  Eine sprachkritische Untersuchung (Schulthess 2012); Pascal Pichonnaz 
and Stefan Vogenauer, ‘Le “pluralisme pragmatique” du Tribunal fédéral : une méthode 
sans méthode ? Réflexions sur l’atf 123 III 292’ (1999) Aktuelle juristische Praxis / 
Pratique juridique actuelle 417; Marc Amstutz and Marcel Alexander Niggli, ‘Recht und 
Wittgenstein I., Wittgensteins Philosophie als Bedrohung der rechtswissenschaftlichen 
Methodenlehre’ in Pierre Tercier (ed), Gauchs Welt:  Festschrift für Peter Gauch zum 65. 
Geburtstag (Schulthess 2004).
 106 As I will explain in more detail (infra, Chapter 3, 4.2.6), ‘pragmatism’ is used by the Court 
to denote an anti- theoretical approach, on the one hand, and a result- oriented one, on 
the other. ‘Pluralism’ designates the fact that the Court does not accept any hierarchy 
among the interpretative methods.
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Swiss cases to illustrate their theories and findings,108 but they seldom go be-
yond the cases available in the ildc database of Oxford University Press.109 
This is problematic, be it only because the small sample of Swiss decisions 
included is hardly representative.110
3 Why Switzerland?
To study the interpretation of international law in domestic courts without 
looking at a specific domestic legal order has the advantage of yielding broadly 
applicable findings about the domestic judicial practice. However, the difficulty 
with such an approach is that many domestic legal (and, of course,  extra- legal) 
features constrain111 and influence how the courts of a given State interpret in-
ternational law. Some States are monist and directly incorporate international 
law into their legal order. Others are dualist and require that international law 
be transposed domestically in order to be valid under domestic law. In some 
jurisdictions, courts are bound by a doctrine of stare decisis. In others, adher-
ence to precedent is not a judicial duty, even if judges usually seek to maintain 
consistency across cases. Some courts issue majority,  plurality, and dissent-
ing opinions, have transparent voting procedures, and have the legal power 
to strike down laws deemed unconstitutional and/ or incompatible with their 
State’s international obligations, while courts in other States do not. Some na-
tions are members of many international and regional organizations and host 
a range of such organizations on their territory. Others are more isolated and, 
therefore, are not confronted with specific international legal issues.
Explaining and evaluating the features of domestic courts’ interpretative ac-
tivity while remaining disconnected from the idiosyncrasies of domestic legal 
orders risks generating very thin findings that remain at a high level of general-
ity. As the domestic judicial practice of international law is heterogeneous,112 
entering the ‘domestic thicket’113 in which international law is embedded 
 108 Mathias Forteau, ‘The Role of the International Rules of Interpretation for the 
Determination of Direct Effect of International Agreements’ in Helmut Philipp Aust 
and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Unity, 
Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016); Nollkaemper, National Courts and 
the International Rule of Law (n 47).
 109 Forteau (n 108); Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47).
 110 As of June 2019, the database contained 37 Swiss decisions.
 111 On this concept, see Troper, Champeil- Desplats, and Grzegorczyk (n 80).
 112 Nolte (n 42).
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provides a richer understanding of how international law penetrates domestic 
legal orders, and of how the domestic judicial practice must and can be im-
proved.
While some insights about the courts of one State cannot be generalized, 
others are more broadly applicable. Some international legal issues arise more 
frequently in some jurisdictions than in others, and this practice can inform 
courts in other States with less experience of such issues. Moreover, the Swiss 
legal order is influenced by the legal systems of France, Germany, Italy, the 
United States and, in recent years, increasingly by eu law, which warrants 
cross- fertilization. The conditions under which domestic legal orders can 
borrow from the practice of other States are complex. They represent a core 
issue in comparative law that I cannot fully develop here. Instead, I want to 
stress that Swiss courts’ practice of international law offers an interesting case 
study for a variety of reasons. These reasons, I argue, outweigh other factors 
that could speak against taking Switzerland as a main example, eg its relatively 
small population, its idiosyncratic foreign policy, and its moderate, if not weak 
geopolitical power (which could justify labelling Switzerland a ‘semiperipher-
al’ State).114
First, Switzerland is monist (infra, Chapter 3, 2.2.1): international law is in-
terpreted by Swiss courts without having to be transposed into domestic law 
and, therefore, without prior legislative intervention.115 Courts in dualist States 
interpret international law too, albeit in its ‘domesticated’ form. Given the ab-
sence of such a legislative filter in Switzerland,116 Swiss courts’ contribution to 
the domestic interpretation of international law is likely to be significant.
Second, because of the characteristics of Swiss foreign relations (infra, 
Chapter 3, 2.1), eg the presence of numerous ios on Switzerland’s territory and 
its treaty relationships with other States and organizations like the eu, the 
Swiss legal order is confronted with a range of international legal issues that 
may not exist, or be as salient, in other States.
Third, Swiss courts’ institutional relationship to the political branches is 
noteworthy. Indeed, Swiss judges operate in a semi- direct democracy where 
citizens can have a say on issues of foreign relations and on the relationship 
 114 This terminology is used by Anthea Roberts. See Roberts, Is International Law 
International? (n 9) 45.
 115 One could argue that all States are initially dualist, since they have the power to establish 
the conditions under which international law is given effect in their legal order. If one 
follows this view, States subsequently become monist or dualist.
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between domestic law and international law (infra, Chapter 3, 3.4). Moreover, 
Swiss judges are typically elected by the legislature and, as a result, affiliated 
with a political party (infra, Chapter 3, 4.2.4). This proximity of politics to for-
eign relations law, on the one hand, and to courts, on the other, is based on 
considerations of democratic legitimacy. It also makes it all the more impor-
tant that Swiss courts maintain the independence and impartiality required 
by their domestic legal duty to abide by the law and by some of Switzerland’s 
international obligations.
Fourth, the Swiss State has an ambiguous relationship to international law. 
One important cause of ambivalence is the recent success, at the ballot box, 
of political initiatives challenging Switzerland’s existing international obliga-
tions, but it is not the only one. Other factors include Switzerland’s commit-
ment to neutrality, and its reluctance to join organizations such as the eu and, 
until 2003, the un (infra, Chapter  3, 2.1). Of course, this ambiguity exists in 
the vast majority of States, yet the combination of the aforementioned factors, 
including this ‘Swiss exceptionalism’, makes the Swiss case law particularly 
 intriguing.
Fifth, Swiss courts rely on a so- called ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ 
to interpret the law, including international law. (For a more detailed analysis 
of this concept, see infra, Chapter 3, 4.2.6.) In short, ‘pragmatism’ (as the term 
is used by the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and in contrast with its philosophical 
meaning)117 describes Swiss judges’ result- oriented and anti- theoretical ap-
proach to interpretation. ‘Pluralism’ denotes their rejection of any hierarchy 
between the law’s interpretative methods. Especially due to Swiss courts’ prag-
matism, and due to the fact that this anti- theoretical flavor is also reflected in 
many Swiss scholarly pieces on judicial interpretation,118 the Swiss case law 
needs further theorizing. This also applies to international law: as Eva Maria 
Belser and Rekha Oleschak Pillai note, ‘[t] he way in which domestic courts 
in Switzerland engage with international law and how they choose between 
avoidance, alignment and contestation strategies is often difficult to predict 
and sometimes hard to understand’.119
Finally, despite its aforementioned idiosyncratic features, Switzerland 
is left out of the vast majority of comparative analyses of domestic courts’ 
 117 Christopher Hookway, ‘Pragmatism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) <plato.
stanford.edu/ entries/ pragmatism>.
 118 Hans Peter Walter, ‘Die Praxis hat damit keine Mühe … oder worin unterscheidet sich die 
pragmatische Rechtsanwendung von der doktrinären Gesetzesauslegung – wenn über-
haupt?’ (2008) 144 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 126.
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interpretation of international law.120 More generally, English- speaking ju-
risdictions such as the United States and the United Kingdom are overrepre-
sented in relevant scholarship (inter alia out of linguistic convenience),121 but 
also in databases providing access to domestic judgments pertaining to inter-
national law. Moreover, relatively few publications include the Swiss legal or-
der.122 These gaps are unfortunate, especially given Switzerland’s good overall 
compliance with international law123 and its democratic political culture. One 
of my aims is thus to make the Swiss practice more accessible to scholars and 
practitioners. While considerations of visibility (and, for publishers, profitabil-
ity) increasingly constrain the choices scholars make when determining which 
jurisdictions to focus on, there is a case for studying small States, too. Interna-
tional legal scholarship must also focus on less ‘mainstream’ domestic legal 
orders than the usual suspects, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, 
etc. As Gelter and Siems note, ‘lawyers, judges, and legal scholars in the smaller 
country in such an asymmetric relationship often are aware of current legal 
developments in the larger one, while jurists from the larger country remain ig-
norant about developments in the smaller one’.124 Moreover, contrary to many 
large and powerful States, smaller and less influential States have a strong in-
terest in ensuring that international legal obligations are taken seriously.125
 120 Aust and Nolte (n 47); Benedetto Conforti and Francesco Francioni (eds), Enforcing 
International Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Brill/ Nijhoff 1997); Dinah Shelton 
(ed), International Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and 
Persuasion (Oxford University Press 2011); David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts 
in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2009).
 121 See the examples cited in ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (1935) 29 American 
Journal of International Law 937.
 122 There are some exceptions, of course, eg Neumann and Peters (n 12); Stirling- Zanda (n 
102); Andreas R Ziegler, ‘Subtle but Enduring – The Role of Domestic Courts in the Shaping 
of International Economic Law Through Proper Interpretation of Domestic Law:  The 
wto Agreement Before Swiss Courts’ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper 
(eds), The Practice of International and National Courts and the (De- )Fragmentation of 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2012); Thurnherr (n 12); Keller (n 100).
 123 On the echr, for instance, see Switzerland Press Country Profile (last updated in April 
2019), <www.echr.coe.int/ Documents/ CP_ Switzerland_ ENG.pdf>. See also the (over-
all positive) concluding observations of the various un treaty bodies pertaining to 
Switzerland, <tbinternet.ohchr.org/ _ layouts/ TreatyBodyExternal/ TBSearch.aspx>.
 124 Martin Gelter and Mathias M Siems, ‘Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Before the 
Courts: Cross- Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe’ (2014) 21 Supreme Court 
Economic Review 215, 247.
 125 Federal Council, Botschaft zur Volksinitative ‘Schweizer Recht statt fremde Richter 
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One could argue that international law (just like domestic law) is ‘interpreted’ 
by a broad range of actors: governments, diplomats, legislatures, io s, ngo s, 
corporations, judges, municipal officials, lawyers, and other individuals all en-
gage in international legal interpretation.126
This is indeed true if we consider the broad meaning of ‘legal interpreta-
tion’ in ordinary language.127 Moreover, some international legal acts are pre-
dominantly interpreted by specific authorities. In Switzerland, cil is mostly 
interpreted by the federal executive, less frequently by courts, and only excep-
tionally by the legislature.128 Yet not all actors we loosely consider to be ‘legal 
interpreters’ have the legal duty to explain the law’s meaning to others,129 and 
the power to do so in a legally authoritative way, ie, in a way that gives reasons 
for action to the law’s subjects. Courts, on which I  focus, are unique in this 
respect.
Still, why narrow down my study to the interpretations of ‘judges in black 
robes’,130 instead of taking a broader look at how international law must be in-
terpreted by legal officials? Why focus on domestic courts, ie, on judicial insti-
tutions constituted by domestic law, of which the jurisdiction and procedural 
law are governed by domestic law?131
This choice is justified because, in contemporary societies governed by 
law, courts have the legal duty to provide reasons for their decisions.132 Given 
courts’ duty to obey the law, these reasons must be legally relevant; otherwise, 
courts act unlawfully.133 Said reasons must show that the judicial decision is in-
deed required by law, as opposed to policy, tradition, or etiquette. Other State 
 126 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law:  On Semantic Change and 
Normative Twists (Oxford University Press 2012); Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and 
Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2015).
 127 Raquel Barradas de Freitas, Explaining Meaning: Towards a Minimalist Account of Legal 
Interpretation (University of Oxford 2013, on file with author) 2 f.
 128 Besson and Ammann (n 60).
 129 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 2 f.
 130 Dworkin (n 77) 12.
 131 See e contrario Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication: Getting 
Over the Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ 
(n 85) 418.
 132 Zenon Bankowski and others, ‘On Method and Methodology’ in D Neil MacCormick and 
Robert S Summers (eds), Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (Aldershot 1991) 13 
f; Hutchinson and Duncan (n 7) 107.
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organs do not have comparable duties: provided it respects the applicable le-
gal procedure, the executive can make decisions based on strategic consider-
ations, and domestic legislatures typically adopt new laws because such laws 
are deemed opportune by their majority. By contrast, as us Supreme Court Jus-
tice John Marshall famously held in Marbury v. Madison, ‘[i] t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’.134 
Thus, judicial interpretation lends itself particularly well to legal analysis. It 
is also worth recalling that we (lawyers) typically135 evaluate judicial interpre-
tations based on the extent to which they are lawful, predictable, clear, and 
consistent. We do not simply assess them based on their rhetorical appeal or 
a cost-benefit analysis, for instance. It is precisely such a legal evaluation that 
I undertake in this study.
5 Why Domestic Courts?
If courts are particularly interesting (supra, section 4), why study domestic 
courts rather than international ones?136 One reason is that, from the perspec-
tive of the sources of international law, domestic judicial decisions help ascer-
tain international law in general (art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute), but also – and this 
distinguishes them from international rulings – constitute elements for its de-
termination (art. 38(1)(a)– (c) icj Statute) (infra, Chapter 4, section 3). Indeed, 
a domestic ruling, if consolidated by the practice of other national institutions 
and States, can shape the ‘subsequent practice’ of the parties to a treaty (art. 
38(1)(a) icj Statute, art. 31(3)(b) vclt), lead to the emergence of cil (art. 38(1)
(b) icj Statute), or express States’ recognition of a general principle of law (art. 
38(1)(c) icj Statute). Moreover, like international rulings, domestic judgments 
are ‘subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international] law’ 
(art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute). The more these rulings conform to the criteria of 
legality and high- quality reasoning (supra, Introduction, section 3), the more 
guidance they provide for future interpretations of international law, both do-
mestically and on the international plane.
Of course, domestic rulings also distinguish themselves in virtue of their 
legal authority in the domestic legal order. Some international courts (such as 
 134 Marbury v. Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), at 177.
 135 At least to the extent we engage in doctrinal and theoretical legal analysis, and not in 
moral or political philosophy, for instance.
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the ECtHR or the icj) have the power – subject to the characteristics of their 
respective jurisdiction – to authoritatively determine States’ rights and obliga-
tions. Yet States are usually free to choose the means by which to enforce such 
rulings domestically. By contrast, domestic rulings are always legally author-
itative domestically, unless they are appealed to a higher domestic instance. 
They can hence give effect to the State’s international legal obligations in the 
domestic legal order. Domestic rulings have decisional authority, but also, in 
some cases, interpretive authority in the domestic legal order (ie, authority in 
the context of future interpretations of the law).137
Another reason that makes it worthwhile to focus on domestic courts is that 
they adjudicate a broader range of issues than international judges. Indeed, 
in principle,138 domestic courts’ jurisdiction encompasses domestic law, inter-
national law (be it in its domesticated or in its original form, depending on 
whether the domestic legal order is dualist or monist), and issues pertaining to 
the relationship between domestic and international law. International judges, 
by contrast, usually have jurisdiction over a narrower subset of issues, and they 
do not in principle interpret domestic law (infra, Chapter 2, section 4). Due to 
the scope of their jurisdiction, it is all the more important that domestic courts 
reach their decisions in conformity with what the law and high- quality legal 
reasoning require.
Moreover, as Hege Elisabeth Kjos notes, ‘international courts and tribunals 
stand in the shadow of domestic courts when it comes to the number of cases 
rendered with a public international law dimension’.139 This justifies looking at 
domestic courts, and not merely at international ones, as is often the case in 
scholarship.
In this book, I distinguish domestic courts from regional ones, such as the 
ECtHR or the cjeu. The latter have the legal power to bind a number of States, 
 137 On the distinction between decisional and interpretive authority in the context of inter-
national adjudication, see Samantha Besson, ‘The Erga Omnes Effect of Judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights  – What’s in a Name?’ in Samantha Besson (ed), 
La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme après le Protocole 14 : Premier bilan et perspec-
tives / The European Court of Human Rights After Protocol 14: Preliminary Assessment and 
Perspectives (Schulthess 2011) 129; Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International 
Adjudication:  Getting Over the Amour Impossible Between International Law and 
International Adjudication’ (n 85) 420.
 138 Some international legal issues may be removed from domestic courts’ jurisdiction, eg 
Chapter 3, 4.2.1 (infra).
 139 Hege Elisabeth Kjos, ‘International Law Through the National Prism: The Role of Domestic 
Law and Jurisprudence in Shaping International Investment Law’ in Mary E Footer, 
August Reinisch, and Christina Binder (eds), International Law and … Select Proceedings 
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which usually belong to a specific geographic area, and which have accepted 
the jurisdiction of these regional judicial bodies. Admittedly, given its position 
as the highest court of an autonomous legal order (which is not the case of the 
ECtHR), the cjeu can be likened to a domestic court in cases where it inter-
prets international law.140 Yet the fact that the eu legal order is integrated into 
domestic legal orders and that international law is interpreted both at the eu 
level and by the courts of the eu Member States adds a layer of complexity to 
the analysis. This limits the applicability of the ‘domestic court’ analogy.
I also distinguish domestic courts from hybrid ones, such as the Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. 
The jurisdiction and/ or procedural law of hybrid courts are governed by both 
domestic and international law, and these courts usually operate for a  limited 
period, with a narrower jurisdiction than domestic courts. Hybrid courts hence 
form a category of their own.
It is important to stress than by emphasizing the role of domestic courts, 
my aim is not to suggest that these courts should step in and solve every issue 
that arises at the interface of the domestic legal order and international law. 
The rule of law is sometimes (erroneously) viewed as ‘synonymous with “the 
rule of the Courts”’.141 In liberal democracies like Switzerland (infra, Chapter 3, 
section 3), fundamental decisions that affect a society should be made at the 
ballot or in parliament rather than in the courtroom. Still, domestic judgments 
shape international law and its relationship to domestic law (and, of course, 
domestic law itself). This fact is often ignored or sidelined in scholarly142 and 
 140 ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law’ (n 15) 2; ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles 
on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61) 2; Helmut Philipp 
Aust, Alejandro Rodiles, and Peter Staubach, ‘Unity or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and 
Treaty Interpretation’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 75, 100. On this 
issue, see eg Jed Odermatt, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union:  International 
or Domestic Court?’ (2014) 3 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 
696; Odile Ammann, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Interpretation 
of International Legal Norms: To Be or Not to Be a “Domestic” Court?’ in Samantha Besson 
and Nicolas Levrat (eds), L’Union européenne et le droit international / The European Union 
and International Law (Schulthess 2015).
 141 Arthur Lehman Goodhart, ‘The Nature of International Law’ (1936) 22 Transactions of 
the Grotius Society 31, 85.
 142 Andreas Glaser, ‘Umsetzung und Durchführung des Rechts der Bilateralen Verträge 
in der Schweiz:  Institutionen und Verfahren’ in Andreas Glaser and Lorenz Langer 
(eds), Die Verfassungsdynamik der europäischen Integration und demokratische 
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official143 analyses of (and public debates on) the relationship between do-
mestic and international law. It is therefore important to scrutinize domes-
tic courts’ activity and, if necessary, to formulate recommendations for its 
 improvement.
6 Why International Law?
Do domestic courts deal with legal acts that are distinctive from domestic ones 
when they interpret international law? Arguably not, for in some respects, the 
‘divide’ between domestic and international law is anything but sharp.144 Writ-
ten and unwritten law, agreements (both private and public), custom, and gen-
eral principles exist in both domestic and international law. Many sources of 
international law draw upon State practice. Domestic laws often mention the 
State’s international legal obligations, and domestic legal practices enable (or 
undermine) the observance of these obligations in the domestic legal order. 
State organs implement both domestic and international law.145 Importantly, 
the respective subject matters of these two bodies of law tend to converge,146 
especially due to the proliferation of ‘inward- looking’147 international legal 
norms governing States’ conduct within their own jurisdiction.
Because of these overlaps between domestic and international law (which 
scholars have captured via concepts such as ‘consubstantial norms’,148 
facultas 2015); Andreas Glaser and Lorenz Langer, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der 
Bilateralen Verträge: Eine Herausforderung für die schweizerische Demokratie’ (2013) 23 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für internationales und europäisches Recht / Revue suisse de 
droit international et de droit européen 563.
 143 Federal Council, Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Bericht des Bundesrates 
in Erfüllung des Postulats 07.3764 der Kommission für Rechtsfragen des Ständerates 
vom 16. Oktober 2007 und des Postulats 08.3765 der Staatspolitischen Kommission des 
Nationalrates vom 20. November 2008, 5 March 2010, fg 2010 2263 (hereinafter: Federal 
Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law).
 144 Janne E Nijman and André Nollkaemper, ‘Introduction’ in Janne E Nijman and André 
Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2007).
 145 Jonkheer HF van Panhuys, ‘Relations and Interactions Between International and National 
Scenes of Law’ (1964) 112 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 7.
 146 Ximena Fuentes Torrijo, ‘International Law and Domestic Law: Definitely an Odd Couple’ 
(2008) 77 Revista Jurídica Universidad de Puerto Rico 483.
 147 Christian J Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Introduction: Domestic Courts as Agents of 
Development of International Law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 531, 534.
 148 Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law:  The International Judicial 
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‘multi- sourced equivalent norms’,149 or ‘interface norms’),150 it could be argued 
that when domestic courts interpret international law, their activity is not fun-
damentally different from the interpretation of domestic law. Yet  domestic 
laws should not be equated too hastily with international ones, as domestic 
and international lawmaking processes are distinct.151 While domestic laws are 
created by the legislature of one State (and, to a certain extent, by this State’s 
judicial and executive organs), international lawmaking typically involves at 
least two States via their organs.152 This difference determines the way inter-
national law must be interpreted. For instance, one cannot solely resort to one 
State’s unilateral, internal practice to ascertain international law. Domestic 
courts must take the characteristics of international lawmaking into account. 
Otherwise, they are not interpreting the interpretandum.
International law creates distinctive challenges for legal interpreters, not 
only because its process of formation differs from that of domestic norms, 
but also because it is frequently vague, as I  will argue in more detail (infra, 
Chapter 5, 4.1.2).153 Unfortunately, and to expand on my previous remarks on 
the topic (supra, 2.2), legal theorists and philosophers have tended to neglect 
international law, with the exception, perhaps, of international human rights 
law.154 Detailed jurisprudential analyses of the interpretation of international 
Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61); ila, 
‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International 
Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International 
Law’ (n 15) 13. For a critique of this terminology (but not of the existence of relation-
ships between domestic and international law, eg in ihrl):  Besson, ‘Human Rights’ 
Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication:  A Peripheral Case of Domestic Courts as 
International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56).
 149 Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany (eds), Multi- Sourced Equivalent Norms in International 
Law (Hart Publishing 2011).
 150 Nico Krisch, ‘Pluralism in International Law and Beyond’ (2015) 8  <papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2613930>.
 151 Samantha Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ in Samantha Besson 
and John Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2010) 167.
 152 See also Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law:  A Constitutionalist 
Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 907, 915.
 153 On vagueness, see Hart (n 78) 124 ff. On its relationship to open texture, see Friedrich 
Waismann, ‘Symposium: Verifiability’ (1945) 19 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
119, 123; Joseph Horovitz, Law and Logic: A Critical Account of Legal Argument (Springer 
1972) 9; Frederick Schauer, ‘On the Open Texture of Law’ (2011) 4 f <papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1926855>. See also infra, Chapter 5.
 154 Eg Endicott, ‘“International Meaning”: Comity in Fundamental Rights Adjudication’ (n 
79); Kristen Hessler, ‘Resolving Interpretive Conflicts in International Human Rights Law’ 
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law are rare in canonical works of legal theory. Even scholars who have pro-
vided seminal descriptive or normative accounts of the mechanics of domes-
tic adjudication have often bracketed international law.155 This also applies to 
Swiss scholarship on domestic adjudication. As Holger Fleischer notes, ‘most 
literature on [legal interpretation and statutory interpretation] still treats in-
terpretative methodology as a national field of study’.156 This neglect, which 
has a range of causes157 that I  cannot fully explore here, makes it timely to 
devote attention to the topic.
Another important justification and trigger for analyzing domestic courts’ 
interpretation of international law is that this activity takes up an increasingly 
significant place in domestic (and Swiss)158 adjudication. This practical signif-
icance is not only due to Switzerland’s growing network of treaties with other 
States and ios. It is also symptomatic of a shift in the subject matter of inter-
national law. As is well known, this body of law is evolving from a law predom-
inantly governing interstate relationships to one increasingly concerned with 
intrastate matters. Many other factors explain the rising significance of inter-
national law in domestic and Swiss courts, such as the internationalization of 
judges and lawyers’ legal education, or the greater accessibility of international 
legal documents (see however infra, Conclusion and Recommendations, sec-
tion 2). The precise weight of these causes would require empirical verification 
and will not be dwelled upon here. What matters, for my purposes, is that the 
relevance of international law in domestic courts makes it a worthwhile and 
topical object of inquiry.
A last reason for focusing on international law relates to the specificities of 
the Swiss legal order (infra, Chapter 3), and to the impact of these features on 
the relationship between domestic and international law. Chief among these 
peculiarities are Switzerland’s semi- direct democracy (infra, Chapter  3, 3.4), 
coupled with recent trends in Swiss politics. In the past, popular proposals to 
 155 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (n 78); Hart (n 78); Raz, Between Authority and 
Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason (n 78); Dworkin (n 77); Henry M 
Hart and Albert M Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application 
of Law (mimeographed, tentative edition 1958).
 156 Holger Fleischer, ‘Comparative Approaches to the Use of Legislative History in Statutory 
Interpretation’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 401, 402.
 157 This neglect may for instance be due to a lack of specialized training or interest in inter-
national law, to a sense that international law is not conceptually different from domestic 
law or, to the contrary, to a sense that the (alleged) ‘inferiority’ of international law justi-
fies analyzing it separately from domestic law.
 158 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
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amend the Swiss Constitution were rarely accepted by Swiss voters, but in the 
last couple of decades the success rate of these popular initiatives has risen 
significantly. This, and the increased targeting of international law by some 
 political groups,159 creates tensions with Switzerland’s international obliga-
tions. Because the Swiss Constitution does not offer mechanisms to arbitrate 
conflicts between constitutional or federal statutory law, on the one hand, and 
international law, on the other,160 this task is shifted to the courts. In light of 
the scarce guidance provided by the Constitution, Swiss courts face the chal-
lenge of having to develop a predictable, clear, and consistent approach to 
such conflicts. Their ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ (infra, Chapter  3, 
4.2.6), in particular, needs to be critically evaluated in the context of the in-
terpretation of international law and, if necessary, adjusted to its specificities. 
More  generally, in a time when international law experiences heightened 
contestation and criticism in the domestic political realm,161 it is particularly 
 essential that judges, international lawyers, and the public in general remain 
aware of the mandatory international legal framework that constrains States in 
the  interpretation of their international obligations.
7 Why Focus on the Law’s Interpretative Methods?
A method is a way of doing something. It designates ‘a systematic procedure, 
technique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline 
or art’.162
I focus on what methods international law requires States to use when they 
interpret international legal acts via their organs, and more specifically via their 
courts. However, it is worth noting that domestic courts also have the duty to 
respect the law’s interpretative methods under domestic law. Of course, the 
differences between domestic and international lawmaking explain why the 
methods that have developed in domestic legal orders diverge, in some minor 
respects, from the interpretative methods of international law. One example 
 159 See in general Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts in an Era 
of Populism’ (2019) 17 International Journal of Constitutional Law 576.
 160 See especially art. 5(4) and art. 190 Cst.
 161 Eg James Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ 
(2018) 81 Modern Law Review 1; Philip Alston, ‘The Populist Challenge to Human Rights’ 
(2017) 9 Journal of Human Rights Practice 1.
 162 See the definition of ‘method’ in <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ method>. 
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concerns the use of legislative history, which is only permitted under  specific 
conditions under international law. Under Swiss law, by contrast, historical in-
terpretation is on the same footing as other interpretative methods. However, 
these domestic peculiarities are irrelevant from the perspective of interna-
tional law. They are not valid justifications for disregarding the interpretative 
methods of international law. Moreover, such nuances should not detract from 
the fact that the basic methods of interpretation of domestic and  international 
law, and their respective justifications, are identical (see Chapters  5 and 6, 
 infra).
For many years now, methods of judicial interpretation have come under 
heavy criticism. Sean D. Murphy even writes that ‘[c] ontroversy over the util-
ity and limits of canons and other interpretive principles has bedevilled the 
field of jurisprudence since ancient times’.163 Legal realists,164 critical legal 
scholars,165 and political scientists166 have emphasized that judicial reasoning 
is influenced by arbitrary considerations. First, such authors are usually skep-
tical of attempts to discern a method in domestic judicial decisions. ‘When 
someone starts talking about “interpretation”, reach for your gun’,167 some 
warn. Others consider that what the law is depends on what judges ‘ate for 
breakfast’.168 Second, these scholars typically argue that formulating norma-
tive recommendations for domestic courts regarding the methods they must 
use (which is my endeavor in this study) is futile because judicial interpreta-
tion is inherently ‘political’ and judicial discretion inevitable. Curtis Mahoney 
notes that in the United States, the interpretative methods of treaty law are 
‘undertheorized’.169 In Switzerland, many judges, lawyers, and legal scholars 
are reluctant to reflect upon the methods of judicial reasoning and to revise 
 163 Sean D Murphy, ‘The Utility and Limits of Canons and Other Interpretive Principles 
in Public International Law’ in Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko, and Constantinos 
Salonidis (eds), Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and Other Principles 
of Interpretation in Public International Law (Kluwer Law International 2018) 13.
 164 Eg Holmes (n 22).
 165 Eg Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (n 78); Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in 
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ (n 75).
 166 Eg Martin M Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago 
Press 1981).
 167 William G Lycan, Judgement and Justification (Cambridge University Press 1988)  195. 
This sentence is cited in Michael S Moore, ‘The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A 
Turn for the Worse?’ (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 871, 871.
 168 Alex Kozinski, ‘What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making’ 
(1993) 26 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 993.
 169 Curtis J Mahoney, ‘Treaties as Contracts:  Textualism, Contract Theory, and the 














Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
A Topic That Matters 39
existing accounts of adjudication. Hans Peter Walter, who served on the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal from 1984 to 2002, explains that the Court’s ‘pragmatic meth-
odological pluralism’ (supra, 2.5 and infra, Chapter 3, 4.2.6) is unproblematic in 
practice,170 and most Swiss scholars do not question the ‘pragmatic’ approach. 
Third, prudentialism (a doctrine that seeks to maximize the protection of 
some interests, and hence to avoid outcomes jeopardizing them) has gained 
traction in legal thinking.171 It is highly prevalent in public debates and offi-
cial statements regarding Switzerland’s relationship with international law.172 
The Swiss executive more often mentions the strategic importance for Swit-
zerland to respect international law than the State’s international legal duties 
(infra, Chapter 3, 2.1.1).173 Prudentialism suggests that abiding by the law (and, 
hence, by its interpretative methods) is only warranted in some circumstanc-
es and is a strategic choice. Last, and relatedly, the prevalence of descriptive 
analyses of domestic judicial interpretation of international law (supra, 2.1), 
of which Georges Scelle’s ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ is only one example, has 
 distracted scholars’ attention from courts’ legal duties (and from other moral 
duties which I do not examine here).
The challenges posed by legal realism and cls ought to be taken seriously. 
Even without extensive knowledge of sociology or cognitive psychology, one 
can expect that as an empirical matter, considerations that are independent 
from the legal act and its features (eg subjective preferences, socio- cultural 
aspects, or psychological features) do influence judicial decision- making. At-
tempts to downplay the influence of such factors are unconvincing. On the 
other hand, to stress that interpretative methods must be respected does 
not imply the endorsement of a counterfactual, mechanistic view of judicial 
decision- making. Non- evaluative conceptions of judicial decision- making 
(provided they have ever been endorsed at all) seem obsolete and even laugh-
able to most lawyers today.174 Deductive reasoning requires that the premises 
 170 Walter (n 118).
 171 On prudentialism in us constitutional legal argument, see Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional 
Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford University Press 1982) ch 5. On its role in us for-
eign relations, see Curtis A Bradley and Jack L Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases 
and Materials (3rd edn, Wolters Kluwer 2009) 42.
 172 Eg Federal Council, Botschaft zur Volksinitative ‘Schweizer Recht statt fremde Richter 
(Selbstbestimmungsinitiative)’, fg 2017 5355.
 173 Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), 2271 f.
 174 Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions 
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of the syllogism be clarified beforehand,175 and a polity that confers legal au-
thority upon judges gives them the power to do so. Even legal positivists whose 
theories are rejected by critical legal scholars in some of their aspects176 high-
light the frequent vagueness of the law, and the evaluative judgments its inter-
pretation requires.177
Instead of denouncing judicial value judgments, which are a necessity, we 
(lawyers and scholars) should strengthen the devices by which judicial discre-
tion is kept within reasonable bounds. The law’s interpretative methods are an 
important safeguard in this context. They are not merely part of an efficiency 
calculus,178 or a convenient way of making rulings acceptable to their address-
ees. Their respect, I argue, is mandated by States’ international obligations. It is 
also required by judges’ domestic legal duty to apply the law (infra, Chapter 5).
Scholars have scrutinized the methods used by international courts to 
interpret international law.179 They have also looked at those relied upon 
 175 This is also acknowledged by Swiss scholars, eg Yann Grandjean, ‘Le juge est- il un acteur 
politique ?’ (2013) Aktuelle juristische Praxis / Pratique juridique actuelle 365, 369.
 176 Duncan Kennedy, ‘A Left/ Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/ Kelsen Theory of 
Legal Interpretation’, Legal Reasoning: Collected Essays (Davies Group Publishers 2008).
 177 This position has also been endorsed by natural lawyers. See eg Samuel Pufendorf, De jure 
naturae et gentium libri octo (Clarendon Press/H Milford 1934) 818: ‘laws cannot possibly 
foresee all cases, nor mention them, by reason of their infinite variety (Xenophon, The 
Cavalry Commander [ix. i]: “To write out all that a man ought to do is no more possible 
than to know everything that is going to happen” (B.))’.
 178 On this view, see Vermeule (n 76).
 179 On the icj, see Eirik Bjorge, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Methodology of Law 
Ascertainment and Comparative Law’ in Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), 
Courts and Comparative Law (Oxford University Press 2015); Talmon (n 73); Peter 
Tomka, ‘Custom and the International Court of Justice’ (2013) 13 The Law and Practice 
of International Courts and Tribunals:  Special Issue on ‘The Judge and International 
Custom’ 195; Alberto Alvarez- Jiménez, ‘Methods for the Identification of Customary 
International Law in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence:  2000– 2009’ 
(2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 681; Robert Kolb, Interprétation 
et création du droit international : esquisse d’une herméneutique juridique moderne pour le 
droit international public (Bruylant 2006); Sienho (n 73); Petersen (n 73). On the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, see Noora Arajärvi, The Changing Nature of Customary 
International Law: Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal 
Tribunals (Routledge 2014); Birgit Schlütter, Developments in Customary International 
Law:  Theory and the Practice of the International Court of Justice and the International 
‘ad hoc’ Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Martinus Nijhoff 2010). On the 
cjeu, see Jiří Malenovský, ‘Le juge et la coutume internationale : perspective de l’Union 
européenne et de la Cour de justice’ (2013) 12 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals – Special Issue on ‘The Judge and International Custom’ 217; Pieter 
Jan Kuijper, ‘The European Court and the Law of Treaties: The Continuing Story’ in Enzo 
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by domestic courts with regard to domestic180 and international law. In the 
latter case, they have mostly used the vclt.181 It is worth noting that at the 
time this book was being finalized (June 2019), the Vienna Convention had 
just celebrated its fiftieth anniversary, and it had been in force for nearly  forty 
years. However, international lawyers and scholars often consider domestic 
rulings on international law with suspicion. Reasons for this distrust include 
domestic courts’ alleged lack of expertise and methodological rigor,182 pa-
rochialism (ie, a neglect of the peculiarities of international law or even an 
avoidance of international legal issues),183 judicial imperialism vis- à- vis other 
Press 2011); Ammann, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Interpretation 
of International Legal Norms: To Be or Not to Be a “Domestic” Court?’ (n 140). On the 
ECtHR, see Ineta Ziemele, ‘Customary International Law in the Case Law of the European 
Court of Human Rights: The Method’ (2013) 12 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals: Special Issue on ‘The Judge and International Custom’ 243.
 180 See (for Swiss courts) Pichonnaz and Vogenauer (n 105). See also the references men-
tioned supra, 2.5.
 181 Aust and Nolte (n 47).
 182 Massimo Iovane, ‘Domestic Courts Should Embrace Sound Interpretative Strategies in 
the Development of Human Rights- Oriented International Law’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), 
Realizing Utopia: The Future of International Law (Oxford University Press 2012); André 
Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ in Gideon Boas and William A Schabas (eds), International 
Criminal Developments in the Case Law of the icty (Martinus Nijhoff 2003) 292.
 183 Lawrence Hill- Cawthorne, ‘Application of International Humanitarian Law by Domestic 
Courts’ (ejil: Talk!, 2015) <www.ejiltalk.org/ application- of- international- humanitarian- 
law- by- domestic- courts>. See also Michael P Van Alstine, ‘The Death of Good Faith in 
Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection’ (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 
1885; Anthony Gray, ‘Forum Non Conveniens in Australia:  A Comparative Analysis’ 
(2009) 38 Common Law World Review 207; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings 
Regarding the Application of International Law:  An Analysis of Attitudes of National 
Courts’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International Law 159; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Reclaiming 
Democracy:  The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts’ 
(2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 241; Wolfgang Friedmann, The 
Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press 1964)  371; ila, 
‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law’ (n 61) 7; Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality of Direct Effect of 
International Law’ (n 59); Michael Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed 
for and Applied by National Courts?’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), 
The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic Courts: Unity, Diversity, Convergence 
(Oxford University Press 2016); Wood (n 14)  12; Sergei Y Marochkin and Vladimir 
A Popov, ‘International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law in Russian Courts’ (2011) 
2 Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies 216. See also the findings (pertain-
ing to the practice of Canadian courts) of Joshua Karton and Samantha Wynne, ‘Canadian 
Courts and Uniform Interpretation: An Empirical Reality Check’ (2013) 18 Uniform Law 
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States,184 and the influence of domestic legal constraints on domestic rul-
ings.185 In the United States, for instance, judges and scholars often analyze 
international law through the lens of ‘us foreign relations law’186 and tend to 
obliterate the international perspective. Hence, a minority of scholars even 
consider that domestic rulings should not be used as ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of [international] law’ pursuant to art. 38(1)(d) 
icj Statute.187 On the other hand, judicial reasoning can be deemed impor-
tant because, as the English Judge Cator put it with regard to the British Prize 
Court in Egypt, a court is ‘primarily the guardian of its nation’s honour and for-
eign countries will cite its decisions as indicating the temper of its people. An 
 English Prize Court should certainly interpret the rules of International Law 
in a broad spirit rather than a narrow one’.188 This debate shows that scholars, 
judges, and lawyers do express interest in – and concerns about – the methods 
domestic courts use to interpret international law.
International Law by Canadian Courts’ (2002) xl Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 3. On the parochialism of us courts, see Margaret Hartka, ‘The Role of International 
Law in Domestic Courts: Will the Legal Procrastination End?’ (1990) 14 Maryland Journal 
of International Law 99; Martin A Rogoff, ‘Interpretation of International Agreements by 
Domestic Courts and the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some 
Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court’ (1996) 11 American University 
Journal of International Law and Policy 559. See however Shany, who rejects the main-
stream diagnosis of domestic judicial parochialism:  Yuval Shany, ‘National Courts as 
International Actors:  Jurisdictional Implications’ (2009) 15 federalismi.it  – Rivista di 
diritto pubblico italiano, comunitario e comparato 2.
 184 Antonio Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonc-
tionnel) in International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 210, 231, 
footnote 55.
 185 ila, ‘Working Session Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement 
of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61) 11; ilc, ‘First Report on Formation 
and Evidence of Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ 
(2013) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 663 37, para 84. See also (with reference to the icty):  ilc 
Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions of 
National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ (2016) 
un Doc a/ cn.4/ 691 25 f, para 41.
 186 Bradley and Goldsmith (n 171).
 187 Alain Pellet and Daniel Müller, ‘Article 38’ in Andreas Zimmermann and others (eds), The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2019)  953 para 323. See also (implicitly):  Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems 
Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’ in Symbolae Verzijl (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1958).
 188 David Foxton, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: Some Lessons From the Prize Court 
in the Great War’ (2002) 73 British Year Book of International Law 261, 270. According to 











Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
A Topic That Matters 43
Resorting to specific interpretative methods is, of course, not a panacea. Ju-
dicial interpretations reached through flawless methods may still be illegal or – 
by the standards of legal argumentation – poorly reasoned (infra, Chapter 5). 
Moreover, for obvious reasons of judicial economy and practicability, domestic 
courts cannot engage in a detailed, textbook- like analysis of the sources of in-
ternational law whenever an international legal issue arises. Yet if courts in-
terpret international law in conformity with its interpretative methods, and in 
a predictable, clear, and consistent way, many of the aforementioned charges 
against domestic case law are rebutted.
 
Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
© Odile Ammann, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004409873_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC 4.0 License.
 chapter 2
Terminology and Conceptual Apparatus
Interpretation lacks sharpness. We see this lack of sharpness both in 
ordinary discourse and in the literature on the role of  interpretation 
in particular domains, art criticism and legal theory among them. 
With rare exceptions, the concept is used as an umbrella under 
which a large variety of otherwise unrelated things fit comfortably. 
So choosing interpretation as one’s focus of attention is risky. It is 
risky because the pressure to find order can easily lead to a manipu-




Before digging into the details of the domestic judicial practice of  international 
law, some conceptual and terminological clarifications are in order. First of 
all, what do lawyers  – as opposed to musicians, dancers, or physicists, for 
 example – do when they interpret? What do they mean by interpretation (2)? 
Second, what is judicial interpretation (3) and what is domestic judicial inter-
pretation (4)? Third, I clarify the notion of interpretative method (5). Finally, 
given that the present study is concerned with the interpretation of interna-
tional law, it is important to delineate what this body of law encompasses (6).
2 Legal Interpretation
Interpretation can be defined, following Andrei Marmor, as the ascription of 
meaning to an object190 (the interpretandum). The object’s meaning desig-
nates its intelligibility, ie, the features of the object that can be intellectually 
 189 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 8.
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grasped.191 Interpretation refers both to the process (or activity) by which 
meaning is attached to the object and to the result (or outcome) of this pro-
cess.192 As Timothy Endicott puts it, ‘[a] n interpretation is an answer to the 
question: “What do you make of this?” ’193
Interpretation is by no means specific to the legal realm. We interpret when 
we read a novel, converse with a friend, attend a religious ceremony, look at a 
photograph, or try to make sense of scientific data. Comedians, psychologists, 
and pianists specialize in the interpretation of plays, human behavior, and mu-
sical pieces, respectively. As Raquel Barradas de Freitas highlights, the word 
‘interpretation’ is used by ‘ornithologists, scientists, anthropologists, artists, 
astrologers, actors, literary critics, marketing specialists, mathematicians, ar-
chaeologists, poets, chefs, musicians, chess players and lawyers’.194 Why, then, 
is legal interpretation special, if at all?
Legal interpretation is different from non- legal interpretation mainly be-
cause the law (the interpretandum) is idiosyncratic.195 This point may seem 
trivial, but it is crucial in order to understand what legal interpretation is.
The interpretandum of legal interpretation must be carefully defined at the 
outset. In and outside legal practice, we commonly talk about legal interpreta-
tion as an activity that is about the law.196 We usually say that judges (and other 
actors) interpret the law. The title of this study also refers to the interpretation 
of international law. In fact, to use the word ‘law’ (or the notion of ‘legal norm’) 
to designate the object of legal interpretation is imprecise. Indeed, one must 
distinguish between the interpretandum, on the one hand, based on which the 
law is determined (ie, social facts such as the adoption of documents, the draft-
ing of paragraphs, the conduct of parliamentary deliberations, or even brute 
natural facts)197 and the law, on the other hand, ie, the legal norm that is iden-
tified through, and is the outcome of, interpretation, and which is not a social 
fact.198 As Raquel Barradas de Freitas notes, ‘legal norms (unlike legal texts) 
 191 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 31.
 192 See ibid 10.
 193 Timothy Endicott, ‘Putting Interpretation in Its Place’ (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 
451, 451.
 194 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 9.
 195 This is true even if many objects of legal interpretation exist, which explains why ‘judicial 
interpretation is not defined by its object’. See ibid 193.
 196 As Scott Shapiro notes, we routinely use the word ‘law’ in myriad ways to designate a 
variety of objects: Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Belknap Press 2011) 4 ff.
 197 One example cited by Raquel Barradas de Freitas is the eruption of the volcano 
Eyjafjallajökull in 2010, which triggered air travel restrictions. See Barradas de Freitas (n 
127) 99.
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constitute legal meaning: they are not objects of interpretation. Legal rules and 
standards are not interpretable’.199 She adds that ‘anything – from the birth of 
a baby to a volcanic eruption, from the waving of a hand to a love letter – can 
potentially have legal meaning’.200
While some features of the law are shared by non- legal objects, others are 
not. The combination of these features is unique to the law and shapes the 
interpretation of legal acts in an idiosyncratic way. Some of the characteristics 
I identify in the next paragraphs presuppose the endorsement of legal positiv-
ism or of Raz’s theory of authority.
First, law is an intentional object.201 It is created by human beings in order 
to fulfill a particular purpose. In this respect, it is similar to other artistic ob-
jects which result from an intentional effort, but dissimilar to natural ones, 
such as trees, clouds, or birds, for instance – unless one endorses a teleological 
view of nature, as some natural lawyers do.202 It is worth pointing out that 
non- intentional objects are just as interpretable as intentional ones.203 One 
may think of the interpretation of the movement of clouds, of a chemical re-
action, of an old stone, or of medical symptoms, for instance. Relatedly, legal 
interpretation differs from the interpretation of other objects because of the 
primary goal its interpreters pursue, namely that of identifying rights, powers, 
and duties.
Second, law is not only an object, but also a practice.204 It is designed to be 
applied to particular cases, and it is shaped by those who participate in it, es-
pecially by its officials who enjoy legal authority and engage in legal interpreta-
tion.205 This distinguishes legal interpretation from the interpretation of many 
other objects. A literary critic’s interpretation of a novel, for example, does not 
 199 See ibid 1, 183 ff. Contra Panos Merkouris, ‘Interpreting the Customary Rules on 
Interpretation’ (2017) 19 International Community Law Review 126, 128.
 200 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 185.
 201 On intentionality, see Robert Stecker, Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech, and the 
Law (Blackwell 2003) ch 1. On artefacts, see Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 83 ff.
 202 Eg Robert George, ‘Natural Law’ (2008) 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 171.
 203 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 23.
 204 As Samantha Besson writes, ‘[l] aw is something people do:  it is a practice. It is actually 
something people do together (publicly), and not only on their own: it is a social and accord-
ingly also a political practice’. Samantha Besson, ‘International Legal Theory qua Practice of 
International Law’ in Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, André Nollkaemper, and Wouter 
Werner (eds), International Law as a Profession (Cambridge University Press 2017) 6.
 205 Raquel Barradas de Freitas defines legal officials as ‘people who, in virtue of their pro-
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shape the meaning of the novel in the way a court ruling does. A literary inter-
pretation does not become part of literature.
Third, law is normative. By giving reasons for action to its subjects, it aims 
at guiding their behavior. Normativity is not specific to law: morality, tradition, 
and religion, for instance, also provide individuals with reasons for action. 
By contrast, the interpretation of a play or a song does not have the purpose 
of guiding behavior. It can enhance the understanding of the object, but the 
meaning it conveys is not obligatory. To be obeyed, the law must be capable 
of being obeyed. Some legal duties,206 such as the legal prohibition of arbi-
trariness, have the purpose of ensuring that the law’s subjects are indeed in a 
position to abide by the law’s requirements.
Because courts’ decisions are legally authoritative, they display the three 
aforementioned features: (i) they are intentional objects that carry meaning; 
(ii) they are part of a practice, which they shape; and (iii) they are normative 
and obligatory. I now turn to this category of legal interpretation, namely judi-
cial interpretation.
3 Judicial Interpretation
In this book, I am concerned with one type of legal interpretation. I am inter-
ested in judicial interpretation, or the interpretation of laws by courts (supra, 
Chapter 1, section 4).
One of the old chestnuts of jurisprudence is whether judicial interpretation 
does and/ or should entail a creative, lawmaking component. The  controversy 
hinges on a deeper disagreement of lawyers and legal scholars about the 
 proper role of courts in the domestic legal order and/ or in international law.207 
In other words, there is agreement on the conceptual core of judicial interpre-
tation, but less so about what judicial interpretations should look like. This 
issue is complicated by the fact that an interpretation cannot be assessed in 
the abstract. One must look at specific cases, which are all unique in terms of 
the facts and legal issues involved.
Scholars use fluctuant terminology to refer to judicial interpretation. The 
notions of ‘application’, ‘identification’, ‘ascertainment’, and ‘determination’, to 
 206 Arguably, such duties are also moral duties, yet this aspect is beyond the scope of this 
book. On this issue:  Grant Lamond, ‘The Rule of Law’ in Andrei Marmor (ed), The 
Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (Routledge 2012).
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name but a few, are frequently encountered in analyses of judicial interpreta-
tion. Given the central place of judicial interpretation in the present study, it 
is important to clarify at the outset the terminology that I am using, and why.
Judicial interpretation is the ascription of meaning to a legal act by a 
court (supra, section 2). The term ‘interpretation’ does not presuppose the 
 endorsement of a specific conception of interpretation (eg interpretation 
as a strictly mechanistic, non- evaluative act or, at the other end of the spec-
trum, as an inevitably creative or ‘jurisgenerative’ activity, as Robert Cover has 
coined it).208
The notion of the application of the law focuses on the stage where the legal 
act is ‘put to use’.209 It is often employed in a way that glosses over the evaluative 
and law- creating character of judicial interpretation. A common statement – 
often made to denounce judicial activism – is that judges merely apply, but do 
not make law. This conception of the judiciary, which has been endorsed by 
domestic210 and international211 courts, is often associated with the doctrine of 
the separation of powers, which requires judges to operate as the ‘mouthpiece 
of the law’.212 Yet interpretation is not merely value- free application of the law 
(and such a view has hardly ever been defended in legal theory anyway).213 It 
is inevitably evaluative. Of course, there is little incentive for courts to openly 
acknowledge the evaluative judgments their activity requires them to perform, 
as this candor might undermine their institutional (sociological) legitimacy. 
This is especially the case in jurisdictions that lack a doctrine of binding prec-
edent (on Switzerland, see infra, Chapter 3, 4.2.7), as opposed to jurisdictions 
where judicial decisions are, under certain conditions, sources of law.
 208 Robert M Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 
97 Harvard Law Review 4, 11 ff. See also Ingo Venzke, ‘The Role of International Courts 
as Interpreters and Developers of the Law: Working Out the Jurisgenerative Practice of 
Interpretation’ (2011) 34 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review 99.
 209 See the definition of ‘application’ in <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ 
application>.
 210 In the United States: Marbury v. Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), at 177; United 
States v. Butler, 297 u.s. 1 (1936), at 62 f.
 211 icj, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, 8 July 1996, icj 
Reports 1996, 226, at 237, para 18.
 212 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (Garnier 1868) 149.
 213 One author endorsing this position is John Maxcy Zane, see Scott Brewer, ‘Exemplary 
Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy’ 
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While every application of the law requires interpretation,214 not every law- 
applying act raises salient and difficult interpretative issues. Moreover, legal 
interpretation is not necessarily conducted with a view to applying the law, as 
advisory opinions illustrate.215 Finally, it must be added that the application of 
the law is not the monopoly of the judiciary, since law- applying authorities in-
clude both courts and executive (or administrative) authorities.
A related notion that must be distinguished from legal interpretation is 
enforcement, ie, the act through which the rights and duties of legal sub-
jects are pointed out. Contrary to what is often assumed, coercion is not a 
necessary feature of enforcement. As Samantha Besson notes, courts are not 
always involved in the coercive enforcement of their own judgments, yet 
their interpretations contribute to enforcing the law.216 Enforcement logically 
takes place after the law has been interpreted. Relatedly, obedience (or the 
synonymous terms of respect, abidance, adherence, or compliance) with the 
law is only possible if the meaning of the law (and hence the content of the 
obligation) is reasonably precise. Another term that is often employed as a 
synonym for enforcement is implementation, although one could use ‘imple-
mentation’ in a more specific way to designate compliance with the law by 
the law’s  subject(s), as Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Eleni Methymaki suggest. 
Enforcement, by contrast, is typically performed by other actors than the law’s 
 addressees ( although these other actors may be under the obligation to re-
spect this law as well).217
Notions such as identification, ascertainment, and determination connote 
the active, law- creating dimension of interpretation. They suggest that the 
meaning of the interpretandum needs to be discovered, unveiled, or recog-
nized, as if interpretation were an archaeological exercise.218 These terms also 
 214 Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication:  Getting Over the 
Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ (n 
85)  420; Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules:  A Philosophical Examination of Rule- 
Based Decision- Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press 1991) 207 f. Schauer’s notion 
of law application includes cases in which the law’s subjects follow the law.
 215 On this point, see ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 938 f.
 216 Samantha Besson, ‘International Judges as Dispute- Settlers and Law- Enforcers:  From 
International Law Without Courts to International Courts Without Law’ (2011) 34 Loyola 
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 33, 37 f.
 217 Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Eleni Methymaki, ‘Sources and the Enforcement of 
International Law: Domestic Courts – Another Brick in the Wall?’ in Samantha Besson 
and Jean d’Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2017) 6, 9.
 218 Ingo Venzke, ‘Semantic Authority, Legal Change and the Dynamics of International Law’ 
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reflect the fact that this meaning needs to be actively defined, that reasons 
must be offered to justify why the interpretandum means X.  Duncan Hollis 
for instance considers that interpretation performs an ‘existential function’ in 
international law regardless of the source at stake.219 This dimension of the 
interpretative process can be compared to what Ronald Dworkin, in domestic 
legal theory, calls the pre- interpretive stage.220 Hollis’s conception of interpre-
tation is convincing to the extent that it also takes into account the aspect of 
content- determination, even if existential interpretation is always ‘lurking in 
the background’, as he puts it.221 In this vein, Jean d’Aspremont differentiates 
between ‘law ascertainment’ (ie, the identification of the legal act) and ‘con-
tent determination’ (the identification of its content or meaning).222 This dis-
tinction is compelling if these two dimensions of interpretation are not seen 
as mutually exclusive, but complementary and often intermingled in practice, 
as  d’Aspremont himself acknowledges,223 especially with regard to unwritten 
law.224 The aforementioned three terms (identification, ascertainment, and de-
termination) are often used in relation to unwritten international law. The ilc’s 
work on custom refers to the ‘identification of customary international law’,225 
as do scholars interested in the issue.226 Scholars mostly use the notion of ‘deter-
mination’ to refer to cil,227 though they occasionally resort to it in connection 
with international legal acts in general.228 The notion of ‘ascertainment’ is less 
 219 Duncan B Hollis, ‘The Existential Function of Interpretation in International Law’ in Andrea 
Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2015). See also Duncan B Hollis, ‘Sources in Interpretation Theories: An 
Interdependent Relationship’ in Samantha Besson and Jean d’Aspremont (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2017).
 220 See Hollis, ‘Sources in Interpretation Theories:  An Interdependent Relationship’ (n 
219) 4; Dworkin (n 77) 65 f.
 221 Hollis, ‘Sources in Interpretation Theories: An Interdependent Relationship’ (n 219) 6.
 222 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content- Determination 
and Law- Ascertainment Distinguished’ in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew 
Windsor (eds), Interpretation in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2015).
 223 See ibid 118.
 224 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the 
Lines Between Sources and Interpretation’ (2016) 27 European Journal of International 
Law 1027, 1041.
 225 See <legal.un.org/ ilc/ guide/ 1_ 13.shtml>; Besson and Ammann (n 60).
 226 Alvarez- Jiménez (n 179); Patrick Dumberry, The Formation and Identification of Rules 
of Customary International Law in International Investment Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2016). On these notions: Besson and Ammann (n 60) 7– 9.
 227 Talmon (n 73); Stirling- Zanda (n 102).
 228 d’Aspremont, ‘The Multidimensional Process of Interpretation: Content- Determination 
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frequently employed.229 It pervades Jean d’Aspremont’s monograph on the ‘as-
certainment of legal rules’.230
Many scholars are reluctant to refer to the ‘interpretation’ of customary 
(international) law, presumably because it is vaguer than written law (which 
is fixed on a physical medium). Thus, judicial decision- makers arguably have 
to play a more active part in interpreting it. However, another reason for this 
reluctance to talk about ‘interpretation’ is that interpretation is  erroneously 
associated with textual material. Yet interpretation, qua inquiry into the 
meaning of a legal act, allows us to identify written and unwritten laws alike. 
Moreover, all laws, written or unwritten, leave room for indeterminacy (infra, 
Chapter 5, 4.1). Finally, the identification of a legal act (ie, the dimension of law 
ascertainment) coexists with the identification of its meaning, be it a written 
legal act or not.
In the present analysis, I predominantly refer to the notion of ‘interpreta-
tion’, at least as regards written international law. For unwritten international 
law, the use of terms such as ‘identification’, ‘determination’, and ‘ascertain-
ment’ is common and seems appropriate, as these notions denote the  greater 
involvement of the judiciary (and of other authorities) in establishing the ex-
istence of the law compared to what is the case with regard to written law. 
However, it is important to stress that in all these cases, the same operation – 
namely interpretation231 – is at stake.232
Interpretation is conceptually distinct from the formation of the law (ie, the 
process of its creation), even if both can overlap in practice (see especially 
 229 Cedric MJ Ryngaert and Duco W Hora Siccama, ‘Ascertaining Customary International 
Law:  An Inquiry Into the Methods Used by Domestic Courts’ (2018) 65 Netherlands 
International Law Review 1.
 230 Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law:  A Theory of the 
Ascertainment of Legal Rules (Oxford University Press 2011).
 231 On the interpretability of custom, see the dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in 
icj, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v.  Denmark; Federal 
Republic of Germany v.  Netherlands), Judgment, icj Reports 1969, 3, at 181; ila, 
‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on the Content and Evolution of the Rules 
of Interpretation’ (2016) 8  <www.ila- hq.org/ index.php/ study- groups>; Hollis, ‘Sources 
in Interpretation Theories: An Interdependent Relationship’ (n 219); Panos Merkouris, 
‘Interpretation of Customary International Law: The Rules of the Game’ (Oxford Public 
International Law Discussion Group, 2016) <www.law.ox.ac.uk/ research- subject- groups/ 
graduate- discussion- group- index/ public- international- law- discussion- group- 0>; 
Merkouris (n 199).
 232 ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
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Chapter  3, 4.2.7, and Chapter  4, 3., infra, on the domestic and international 
legal effect of domestic rulings, respectively).
4 Domestic Judicial Interpretation
This study deals with a specific type of judicial interpretation, ie, legal inter-
pretation as practiced by domestic courts (see also supra, Chapter 1, section 5).
A domestic court (or judicial body) is a permanent institution established by 
the law of a particular State and legally tasked with resolving legal disputes in 
a way that, unless the decision is appealed, is authoritative for the domestic le-
gal order.233 Domestic laws (but also many of States’ international obligations) 
usually require that courts resolve such disputes in an impartial, independent 
fashion, by providing reasons for their decisions, and that their decisions can in 
principle be appealed to a higher domestic judicial body (eg infra, Chapter 3, 
section 4, regarding the Swiss judiciary). These decisions can sometimes also 
be challenged before an international court. As mentioned (supra, Chapter 1, 
section 5), domestic courts, unlike international ones, interpret international 
and domestic law, in the latter case either in its ‘original’ form (in monist States) 
or in its domesticated form (in dualist States).
International courts, by contrast, are established by laws created by several 
States (and, in many cases, under the auspices of an io). They are legally tasked 
with resolving legal disputes in a way that is authoritative234 for their parties. 
As previously noted (supra, Chapter 1, section 5), international courts have a 
limited jurisdiction, and they cannot in principle interpret domestic law. The 
pcij has famously considered that ‘[f] rom the standpoint of International Law 
and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts which ex-
press the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same manner as do 
legal decisions or administrative measures’.235 Similarly, the icj has held that 
 233 The ilc Secretariat defines domestic courts as ‘all judicial organs exercising their func-
tions within the domestic legal order, regardless of their position in the national system’. 
See ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law: The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ (n 
185) 3 para 4.
 234 Of course, the modalities of this legal authority and the means deployed to achieve com-
pliance with decisions of international courts vary greatly.
 235 pcij, case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, merits, judgment 
No 7, pcij Series A No 7, 25 May 1926, 4, at 19. See also the individual opinion of Judge 
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‘it is for each State, in the first instance, to interpret its own domestic law. The 
Court does not, in principle, have the power to substitute its own interpreta-
tion for that of the national authorities, especially when that interpretation is 
given by the highest national courts’.236
Sometimes, the application of domestic law by these international courts is 
inevitable,237 eg when the State’s compliance with international law needs to 
be appraised,238 or when a given issue is governed by domestic law, like the law 
of nationality, corporate law, or migration law. Although the pcij has generally 
endeavored to stick to the interpretation of domestic law as defined by domes-
tic courts, unless this interpretation was ‘uncertain or divided’,239 the Court 
has, as Jean d’Aspremont shows, interpreted domestic law autonomously in 
a series of cases.240 Similarly, while the icj defers to the national authorities 
with regard to the interpretation of domestic law unless an interpretation is 
‘manifestly incorrect’,241 this has not prevented it from finding that the domes-
tic authorities had failed to act in accordance with domestic law in several 
 cases.242
When contrasting international and domestic courts, it is also worth 
noting that from the perspective of international law, the legal authority 
of international courts has a wider scope than that of domestic courts, as 
international rulings can bind multiple States. A single domestic ruling, by 
contrast, is not a source of international law and, hence, cannot bind an-
other State.
With the Constitution of the Free City, advisory opinion, pcij Series a/ b No 65, 4 December 
1935, 60, at 61 f, para 2.
 236 icj, case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v.  Democratic Republic 
of the Congo), merits, judgment, icj Reports 2010, 639, at 665, para 70. See also Philip 
V Tisne, ‘The icj and Municipal Law: The Precedential Effect of the Avena and Lagrand 
Decisions in u.s. Courts’ (2005) 29 Fordham International Law Journal 865, 907.
 237 pcij, case concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France, 
judgment No 15, pcij Series A No 21, 12 July 1929, 93, at 124.
 238 pcij, case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, merits, judgment 
No 7, pcij Series A No 7, 25 May 1926, 4, at 19.
 239 pcij, case concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France, 
judgment No 15, pcij Series A No 21, 12 July 1929, 93, at 124.
 240 See Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Permanent Court of International Justice and Domestic 
Courts: A Variation in Roles’ In Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Christian J Tams (eds), Legacies 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 231 ff.
 241 icj, case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo), merits, judgment, icj Reports 2010, 639, at 665, para 70.
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5 Methods of Interpretation
A method is a way of doing something.243 Methods of legal interpretation are 
ways of ascertaining laws. The use of some methods is legally required. It is on 
these methods, and on the legal norms that require their use, that I will focus 
in the following paragraphs.
It is important to distinguish the concept of (legally required) interpreta-
tive methods from related concepts (infra, 5.1– 5.5). The notion of method is, 
indeed, used loosely and inconsistently in legal practice and scholarship. As a 
result, lawyers and legal scholars often talk at cross- purposes when they argue 
about interpretative reasoning. Thus, conceptual clarity is needed.
While they are often conflated in practice, legal norms that require the use 
of specific interpretative methods must be distinguished from normative in-
terpretative theories (5.1), axiological and structural interpretative principles 
(5.2), rules (5.3), auxiliary means (5.4), and argument types (5.5). I use the term 
‘interpretative methods’ interchangeably with interpretative canons, maxims, 
guidelines, and principles (except for axiological or structural principles, infra, 
5.2). A canon is an accepted normative principle.244 A maxim is a fundamental 
principle of conduct.245 Finally, a guideline is an indication or outline of policy 
or conduct.246
5.1 Normative Interpretative Theories
Legal norms that require the use of interpretative methods, eg textual or tele-
ological interpretation, are not normative interpretative theories (or method-
ologies) such as textualism or purposivism. Methods are conceptually distinct 
from what Olivier Corten calls ‘objectivist’ versus ‘voluntarist’ theories, which 
demand that laws be interpreted either separately from, or based on, the inten-
tion of their authors.247 They are distinct from deontological versus utilitarian 
interpretative theories, which hinge on the moral philosophy the interpreter 
endorses. They also differ from what, in international law, is called ‘restrictive 
 243 As mentioned (supra, Chapter 1, section 7), a method is a ‘systematic procedure, tech-
nique, or mode of inquiry employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art’, ie, a 
reasoned, ordered process. See <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ method>.
 244 See the definition of ‘canon’ in <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ canon>.
 245 <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ maxim>.
 246 <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ guideline>.
 247 Olivier Corten, ‘Les techniques reproduites aux articles 31 à 33 des Conventions de 
Vienne : approche objectiviste ou approche volontariste de l’interprétation ?’ (2011) 115 
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interpretation’, a theory requiring that international law be interpreted so as to 
least interfere with a State’s sovereignty.248
Normative interpretative theories mandate giving priority to a specific as-
pect of the interpretandum, such as its wording or drafting history, or so as to 
produce a particular result. They do not require that their users develop an 
elaborate normative framework: their endorsement is often implicit in judicial 
practice. Just like methods, normative interpretative theories exist in domestic 
and international law.249
Legal norms that prescribe the use of certain methods, by contrast, demand 
that decision- makers ascertain the law based on some features of the inter-
pretandum. However, although there are categorical reasons for using these 
specific methods, interpretative norms do not typically provide categorical 
reasons for action.250 In other terms, norms requiring the use of specific meth-
ods do not provide a meta- principle that directs how to choose among the dif-
ferent directions in which various methods point. They merely mandate using 
some features of the interpretandum.
5.2 Structural and Axiological Interpretative Principles
Interpretative norms are a subcategory of legal principles. Principles are man-
datory norms governing the interpretation of other legal acts, and are drafted 
at a relatively high level of generality and abstractness. A  principle ‘states a 
reason which argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular de-
cision’.251 While principles do not prescribe the outcome of a case, they orient 
and therefore constrain interpretative reasoning. Principles can be defeated 
by other, incompatible principles, provided there are good reasons for which 
these other principles must prevail.
 248 On restrictive interpretation, see Luigi Crema, ‘Disappearance and New Sightings of 
Restrictive Interpretation(s)’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 681; 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties’ (1949) 26 British Yearbook of International Law 48; Rogoff (n 
183) 607 ff. For a rejection of this theory, see icsid, Aguas del Tunari sa v. Bolivia, Decision 
on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction, icsid Case No arb/ 02/ 3, 21 October 2005, at 
para 91.
 249 Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig for instance note that international courts interpret 
treaties based on a ‘dominant hermeneutic’. See Joost Pauwelyn and Manfred Elsig, 
‘The Politics of Treaty Interpretation: Variations and Explanations Across International 
Tribunals’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations (Cambridge University Press 2013).
 250 Eg Murphy (n 84) 32.
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Norms prescribing the use of interpretative methods must be distinguished 
from another subcategory of principles, namely structural and axiological prin-
ciples. These principles encapsulate a form of political organization or a value 
that judges must take into account when interpreting the law. In  domestic law, 
such principles include the constitutional principles of proportionality, sub-
sidiarity, and equality.252 In international law, structural and axiological princi-
ples can (but need not) qualify as general principles of international law. They 
include the principle of good faith, for instance, which is a general principle in 
the sense of art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute, and the principle of complementarity,253 
which is not a general principle of international law.
Contrary to norms on interpretative methods, which point to features of 
the law that decision- makers must rely on, structural and axiological princi-
ples provide criteria that interpreters must use when choosing among different 
possible interpretations.
5.3 Rules
In practice, norms prescribing the use of interpretative methods are often 
called ‘rules’. This is likely due to the fact that the use of methods is required 
by legal norms, which include rules.254 However, the two concepts are distinct.
Legal rules define what conduct is legally permissible. Once the facts have 
been established, legal rules can be applied to them in a syllogistic fashion.255 
Although rules, like every legal act, are open- textured and can thus become 
vague in particular cases, they allow for deductive reasoning once they have 
been interpreted. Examples of interpretative rules include conflict rules (eg lex 
specialis or lex posterior) and rules of logic (eg a fortiori or ejusdem generis; on 
argument types, see infra, 5.5).256
 252 Eg in Switzerland, the constitutional principle of the rule of law (art. 5 Cst.) or the consti-
tutional principle of subsidiarity (art. 5a Cst.).
 253 Art. 17 icc Statute.
 254 Art. 31 vclt for instance is entitled ‘general rule of interpretation’. Contra Klabbers, 
‘Virtuous Interpretation’ (n 93).
 255 Hart and Sacks (n 155) 155.
 256 Robert Kolb refers to such rules of logic as ‘arguments’ lawyers use for interpreta-
tive purposes:  Robert Kolb, ‘Is There a Subject- Matter Ontology in Interpretation of 
International Legal Norms?’ in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), A Farewell to 
Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2015) 475. For a detailed analysis of a range of such rules (labelled ‘canons and 
principles’), see Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko, and Constantinos Salonidis (eds), 
Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and Other Principles of Interpretation 
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Norms that prescribe the use of interpretative methods, by contrast, can sel-
dom (if at all) be applied deductively. They are not ‘iron- clad rules’257 that de-
termine the outcome of judicial interpretation. Instead, they point to relevant 
features of the interpretandum that decision- makers must take into account, 
and they require inductive reasoning (eg to determine the context or legisla-
tive history of a legal act).
5.4 Auxiliary Means
Auxiliary means assist decision- makers in ascertaining the law. They are not 
sources of law, but material that helps interpreters in the identification of the 
law. In other words, auxiliary means are distinct from elements which (objec-
tively) contribute to the formation and evolution of the law, even if they can 
influence these processes. One example of auxiliary means, under Swiss law, 
is ‘established doctrine and case law’,258 which Swiss judges must follow when 
filling gaps.
Norms that mandate the use of interpretative methods and auxiliary 
means are related. Auxiliary means may be necessary in order to use a given 
method. A judge may for example need to consult auxiliary means to identify 
the object and purpose or legislative history of a domestic statute or treaty. 
Moreover, methods, like auxiliary means, assist interpreters in ascertaining 
the law. However, unlike methods, auxiliary means are not features of the law 
that judges must take into account when interpreting it. Instead, they help 
decision- makers in their interpretative task.
5.5 Argument Types
A last distinction concerns norms prescribing the use of interpretative meth-
ods, versus what Scott Brewer calls argument types, ie, patterns of reasoning. 
Scott Brewer lists four basic argument types:  deduction, induction, analogy, 
and inference to the best explanation (or abduction).259
Scholars often refer to the inductive versus deductive method, and some 
have analyzed the practice of international law through the lens of such ar-
gument types.260 The notion of method I refer to in this study is distinct from 
argument types, however. Indeed, a given method can be deployed through 
 257 ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 947.
 258 Art. 1(3) scc.
 259 Brewer (n 213) 942 ff.
 260 Eg Talmon (n 73). See also Anthea Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches 
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various argument types. An argument type does not tell judicial decision- 
makers to which features of the law they must attend. Instead, it determines 
the logical structure their reasoning must adopt.
6 The Interpretation of International Law
This book deals with the interpretation of international law. It is therefore es-
sential to clarify the notions of ‘international legal act’ (the interpretandum) 
and ‘international law’ (the result of the interpretation of an international le-
gal act). As previously noted (supra, section 2), ‘law’ and ‘legal act’ are distinct 
concepts, even if the term ‘law’ is often used loosely to designate the legal act 
(the interpretative object).
The present study primarily looks at the interpretation of public interna-
tional law. I hence often use the term ‘international law’ as shorthand for ‘pub-
lic international law’. Public international law, defined narrowly, designates 
the set of norms resulting from legal acts that govern interstate relations. Yet 
in contemporary scholarship and international legal practice, the term is em-
ployed more broadly to refer to norms resulting from legal acts that govern 
the relations between different subjects of international law, the behavior of 
international legal subjects within their jurisdiction and, sometimes, the be-
havior of individuals.261 The bottom line is that these norms are the result of 
international lawmaking processes, ie, processes involving the organs of more 
than one State.
Private international law, on the other hand, is the body of domestic and 
international legal norms that determine the legal rights and duties of individ-
uals in situations with a cross- border dimension. It addresses issues such as the 
jurisdiction of domestic courts, the applicable law, and/ or the conditions for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in such cases.262 André 
Nollkaemper notes that looking at private international law cases where ‘the 
interests of the state are not as immediately involved as they are in public law 
cases that challenge governmental power alters the stakes dramatically’.263
While public international law is my primary focus, the claims I defend in 
this book – namely that domestic courts must take the interpretative methods 
 261 See the definitions listed in Besson, Droit international public : Abrégé de cours et résumés 
de jurisprudence (n 89) 2.
 262 See for instance art. 1 of the Federal Act on Private International Law of 18 December 
1987 (sr 291).
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of international law more seriously, and that they must strive to reason pre-
dictably, clearly, and consistently – apply to public and private international 
law alike. An in- depth study of Swiss courts’ rulings on private international 
law264 (and the extent to which private international law raises distinctive in-
terpretative issues) is beyond the scope of my project, though these rulings 
have been taken into account in the overview and evaluation of the Swiss prac-
tice (infra, Chapters 7 and 8).
International law is law.265 Hence, it could be argued that the interpretation 
of international law shares the features of the interpretation of domestic law. In-
deed, international and domestic law tend to overlap not only in terms of their 
respective subject matters, but also as regards the authorities that apply them 
(in most cases, domestic authorities, including courts, see also supra, Chapter 1, 
section 5). However, as previously emphasized (supra, Chapter  1, section 6), 
international law differs from domestic law in one important respect, namely 
with regard to the characteristics of (and especially the actors involved in) inter-
national lawmaking. Art. 38 icj Statute, which, in the practice of international 
law, is taken to have customary status, lists three sources of international law, ie, 
treaties, cil, and general principles. Judicial decisions and scholarly writings, 
by contrast, are not sources, but ‘subsidiary means’ (art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute), 
what I call auxiliary means (infra, Chapter 4, 3.2). I analyze the place of domes-
tic judicial decisions from the perspective of art. 38 icj Statute in Chapter  4 
(infra).
Contrary to the processes through which domestic law is created, which in-
volve the State’s legislative branch (and, to an extent that varies from one legal 
 264 On this issue, see Cashin Ritaine (n 101); Niklaus Meier, ‘Auslegungseinheit von LugÜ 
und EuGVVO unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schweizer Beteiligung am 
Vorabentscheidungsverfahren vor dem EuGH’ (2012) 22 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für 
internationales und europäisches Recht / Revue suisse de droit international et de droit 
européen 633; Andreas Bucher, ‘Que devient le droit (civil) international au Tribunal 
fédéral ?’ Jusletter of 8 May 2017.
 265 Hart (n 78) 216 ff; Hans Kelsen, ‘Lecture III:  International Law and the State’, Law and 
Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1940– 41 (Harvard 
University Press 1942). Contra John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
(John Murray 1832). See also Anthony D’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’ 
(1984) 79 Northwestern University Law Review 1293. For a more recent piece on the 
topic, see Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Law as Law’ in James Crawford and Martti 
Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2012). While defending the truth of the proposition that ‘international 
law is law’ is beyond the scope of this study, international law can be characterized as law 
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order to the other, the State’s executive and judicial branch), international law-
making processes typically and primarily take place through the participation 
of the organs of various States (which, in some cases, act in the framework of 
an io).266 The interpretation of international law therefore requires looking 
beyond one particular jurisdiction, eg when courts inquire into the travaux 
préparatoires of a treaty or into the ordinary meaning of its text, but also when 
they ascertain unwritten international law.
In recent years, some scholars have criticized the ‘placative confidence’ 
with which most participants in the practice of international law approach the 
question of what the sources of international law are (ie, their often uncritical 
reliance on art. 38 icj Statute).267 A number of authors have tried to provide 
a broader concept of international lawmaking than the usual reference to art. 
38 icj Statute,268 eg by highlighting that this provision is not exhaustive.269 
Harold Koh has developed the notion of ‘transnational legal process’270 to em-
phasize the multifaceted nature of international legal practice. It is indeed im-
portant to acknowledge the existence of ‘informal’ international lawmaking271 
and what Prosper Weil, in a seminal article published in the early 1980s, called 
the ‘relative normativity’ of international law (and especially the fact that in-
ternational law includes jus cogens but also – according to some authors – soft 
law).272 For reasons of scope, and given the numerous non- state actors that in-
fluence the formation and evolution of international law, this study focuses on 
the formal sources of international law listed in art. 38 icj Statute. It does not 
 266 As Samantha Besson notes, what distinguishes international law and domestic law are 
their respective sources, see Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ (n 
151) 167.
 267 See ibid 164.
 268 Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A  Wessel, and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal 
International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press 2012).
 269 Arajärvi (n 37) 30.
 270 The term designates ‘the theory and practice of how public and private actors – nation- 
states, international organizations, multinational enterprises, non- governmental organi-
zations, and private individuals – interact in a variety of public and private, domestic and 
international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of trans-
national law’; Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law 
Review 181, 183 f.
 271 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Sources of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Online Edition) (Oxford University Press 2011) para 10 <opil.ouplaw.
com>. Wolfrum accepts the existence of other sources beyond those listed in the icj 
Statute.
 272 Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 American 
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look at processes that influence international lawmaking without qualifying as 
formal sources or auxiliary means.
The notion of international law used in this book – and in the bulk of con-
temporary international and eu legal scholarship273  – does not encompass 
eu law. While what today is called the eu was created through a network of 
international treaties, its Court of Justice soon clarified that these treaties had 
created a legal order of its own. The eu is reluctant to embrace the categories 
of international law, and the law that governs its legal order belongs to a regime 
sui generis. However, Switzerland is tied to the eu through several bilateral 
treaties, which are taken into account in this book.274
 273 On the (ambivalent) relationship between the eu and international law, see Samantha 
Besson and Nicolas Levrat (eds), L’Union européenne et le droit international / The 
European Union and International Law (Schulthess 2015).
 274 Of course, the fact that the eu is not a State, but a new legal order of international law 
may have implications for the way agreements with the eu must be interpreted. On this 
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 chapter 3
Interpreting International Law 
in Context – Domestic Specificities
What I am convinced of is the need to start with some particular-
ization. I don’t find myself at all convinced when people start out 
claiming they can tell us about judging without some grounding in 
a specific imagined situation.275
[T] he interpretation of international law is culturally sensitive and 
needs to be analysed in light of the legal, political and social con-
texts of the different domestic legal orders.276
∵
1 Introduction
In this chapter, I highlight several characteristics of the Swiss legal order that 
deserve emphasis for the purposes of this study.277 These characteristics fall 
into three categories. A first cluster of features pertains to the relationship be-
tween the Swiss State and international law (2). It encompasses the charac-
teristics, principles, and goals of Swiss foreign relations law and policy (2.1), 
and the way the Swiss legal order regulates its relationship with international 
law (2.2). I then highlight a series of principles of political organization that 
govern the Swiss State (3): federalism (3.1), linguistic diversity (3.2), the rule of 
law (3.3), semi- direct democracy (3.4), and legislative supremacy (3.5). Third, 
I focus on the structure, organization, and functioning of the Swiss judiciary 
(4), before concluding (5).
As stated at the outset (supra, Chapter  1, section 3), I  do not look at the 
interpretation of international law by domestic courts in abstracto. I focus on 
 275 Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ (n 75) 45.
 276 Aust and Nolte (n 47) v.
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a given institutional and domestic legal context,278 and on how courts have 
decided specific cases. Refraining from focusing on a specific domestic judi-
ciary and on individual cases would lead to an analysis that lacks substance. 
It would also make it difficult to provide a thorough, reasonably comprehen-
sive, and nuanced account of the challenges and constraints domestic courts 
face. International law is designed to be implemented in domestic legal or-
ders, which differ in terms of their legal, institutional, and political structures. 
It would be artificial to sever the domestic case law from the context in which 
it is nested. Jurisdiction- specific approaches to international law in domestic 
courts have been widely adopted by international legal scholars,279 and the 
blending of such approaches with the methods of comparative law has even 
given birth to a field of its own: ‘comparative international law’.280
Highlighting the specificities of the Swiss legal order that are significant for 
an analysis of the Swiss judicial practice of international law has several aims. 
First, as Duncan Kennedy puts it, these idiosyncrasies are part of the legal ‘ma-
terial’ with which Swiss courts have to ‘work’ when applying international law 
domestically.281 Disentangling this domestic ‘thicket’282 makes it possible to 
identify some of the legal (and other) reasons for which Swiss courts interpret 
international law in a given way.283 Second, domestic law must be factored into 
any normative appraisal of domestic judicial practices. Third, the present list is 
also a preliminary step to mapping the Swiss judicial practice of international 
law through empirical work.284 Fourth, and importantly, this chapter sets the 
 278 Etymologically, ‘context’ points to what is weaved together (from con- , with, and -texere, 
to weave). A contextual approach aims at disentangling a set of circumstances that are 
knit together and form the background of an issue or activity.
 279 Sloss (n 120); Aust and Nolte (n 47); August Reinisch, International Organizations Before 
National Courts (Cambridge University Press 2000).
 280 Roberts and others (n 8). See also Mathias Forteau, ‘Comparative International Law 
Within, Not Against International Law: Lessons From the International Law Commission’ 
(2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 498. While I do not engage in a com-
prehensive comparative legal analysis, I will refer to the practices of courts in other States 
to put the Swiss case law into perspective (see Chapters 7 and 8, infra).
 281 Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ (n 75).
 282 Carter and Weiner (n 89) 150.
 283 On the importance of this question, see Manuel J Ventura, ‘Book Review: Sharon Weill, 
The Role of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law’ (2016) 14 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 744. On the us historical context, for example, 
see Bradley and Goldsmith (n 171) ch 1; David L Sloss, Michael D Ramsey, and William 
S Dodge (eds), International Law in the u.s. Supreme Court:  Continuity and Change 
(Cambridge University Press 2011).
 284 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
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stage for the argument that guides this entire study. As will become apparent, 
several features of the Swiss legal order explain why the Swiss judicial  practice of 
international law has been predominantly outcome- oriented, anti- theoretical, 
and deferential towards other branches of government. Yet if Swiss courts are 
to interpret international law – as opposed to doing something else that does 
not qualify as such – they must strive to bring their practice into conformity 
with the interpretative methods of international law, and they must  offer pre-
dictable, clear, and consistent reasoning in support of their conclusions.
Several caveats apply to this chapter. First, I  predominantly flesh out the 
legal characteristics of the Swiss legal order. Of course, myriad extra- legal 
 peculiarities (be they sociological,285 psychological,286 or anthropological,287 
to name but a few examples) explain the domestic judicial practice of inter-
national law from an ‘external’288 vantage point and deserve attention. For 
 reasons of scope and expertise, I  take these other approaches into account 
only at the margins. However, the line between ‘legal’ and ‘extra- legal’ features 
is not a sharp one, as providing insights into Swiss judges’ ‘internal point of 
view’289 requires looking beyond legal provisions to analyze the way partic-
ipants in  legal practices think, talk, and argue about the law. Hence, I  also 
 include aspects that are not strictly ‘legal’ (in the sense of being provided for 
under Swiss law) but that shed light on the Swiss case law.
Second, while I believe to have included what are, for the purpose of this 
study, noteworthy features of the Swiss legal order, I  have certainly not ex-
hausted all the legal characteristics that define the Swiss judicial practice of 
international law and distinguish it from that of other domestic courts. Addi-
tional features include procedural law, for instance, or areas of domestic law 
that have no obvious connection to international law, but are relevant to a 
 given case.
Third, the facets I highlight should not be considered in isolation. Quite to 
the contrary, they are likely to influence each other.
 285 Simone Rau and Barnaby Skinner, ‘Das sind die härtesten Asylrichter der Schweiz’ 
(Tagesanzeiger, 2016) <blog.tagesanzeiger.ch/ datenblog/ index.php/ 12556/ je- nach- richter- 
dreimal- hoehere- erfolgschancen>.
 286 Hänni (n 75).
 287 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’ 
(2006) 108 American Anthropologist 38.
 288 On external approaches in legal scholarship, see McCrudden (n 7). On the relationship 
between these approaches and international law, see Besson, ‘International Legal Theory 
qua Practice of International Law’ (n 204).
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Lastly, the significance of the domestic legal context does not mean that 
domestic courts are not, or must not, be guided by international law, which 
is the main focus of this study. From the perspective of international law, do-
mestic law cannot in principle justify a State’s violation of its international ob-
ligations.290 The international legal framework that governs domestic courts’ 
interpretation of international law is analyzed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 
6 (infra).
2 The Swiss State and International Law
A first cluster of legal specificities that deserves emphasis concerns the rela-
tionship between the Swiss State and international law. The goals, principles, 
and characteristics of Swiss foreign relations law (2.1), and the status, rank, 
and direct effect of international law in the Swiss legal order (2.2) all constrain 
Swiss courts’ adjudication of international legal issues.
2.1 Swiss Foreign Relations Law
Foreign relations law is the body of legal acts that defines the relationship of a 
State (or of another subject of international law) with other international legal 
subjects, as well as the rights, duties, and powers of international legal subjects 
in this context. It must be distinguished from the State’s foreign policy, which 
is primarily driven by strategic, as opposed to legal, considerations (though 
legal aspects will often be of great importance). In practice, foreign relations 
law and foreign policy are intermingled: policy goals are achieved through law, 
which constrains and enables policy, and which defines its general orientation.
What is the relevance of foreign relations law for domestic courts’ interpre-
tation of international law? A State’s foreign relations law determines the type 
of international legal issues that can be brought before its courts, and it con-
strains the way in which courts can resolve such issues. It can also make this 
State ‘specially affected’291 by specific international legal acts292 (besides other 
 290 Art. 27 vclt.
 291 icj, case concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v.  Denmark; Germany 
v. Netherlands), merits, judgment, icj Reports 1969, 20 February 1969, 3, at 42 f, para 
73 f. See also icj, case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
advisory opinion, icj Reports 1996, 8 July 1996, 226, at 253 f, para 65.
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factors, eg geography).293 While some reject the concept of ‘specially  affected 
States’ due to sovereign equality and States’ interconnectedness,294 others con-
tend that if a State is particularly exposed to specific international legal issues, 
particular weight should be conferred to its practice and opinio juris for the 
purposes of ascertaining cil.295 In any case, whenever a State is one of the 
few (or even the only one) to have faced a given international legal issue, its 
practice will likely be taken into account by other States to determine what 
international law requires.296
In this subsection, I first highlight the general characteristics of Swiss for-
eign relations law (2.1.1), before focusing on the domestic separation of powers 
in foreign relations (2.1.2).
2.1.1 Swiss Foreign Relations Law in General
The Swiss Constitution states that in its foreign relations, the federal State 
‘shall ensure that the independence of Switzerland and its welfare is safe-
guarded’ and ‘assist in the alleviation of need and poverty in the world and 
promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful coexistence of 
 293 For an example:  Bernard H Oxman, ‘Some Observations on the Draft Conclusions 
on Identification of Customary Law Provisionally Adopted by the ilc’s Drafting 
Committee at the Sixty- Sixth Session’ (2014) ajil Unbound <www.asil.org/ blogs/ some- 
observations- draft- conclusions- identification- customary- law- provisionally- adopted- 
ilc%25E2%2580%2599s>.
 294 Dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in icj, case concerning the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, icj Reports 1996, 8 July 1996, 375, 
at 414; dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry in ibid 429, at 536. The concept was 
initially included, but later removed from the ilc’s draft conclusions on cil. Compare the 
following reports:  ilc, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law 
by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur’ (2015) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 682; ilc, ‘Fourth Report 
on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur’ 
(2016) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 695. See also un General Assembly, Report of the ilc, 67th session 
(4 May – 5 June and 6 July – 7 August 2015), un Doc a/ 70/ 10, 44, para 82.
 295 icj, case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opin-
ion, icj Reports 1996, 8 July 1996, 226, at 253 f, para 65. Some States emphasized the 
practice and opinio juris of ‘those [States] who possess [nuclear] weapons’ to suggest the 
existence of cil prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons. See also ilc, ‘Fifth 
Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, Special 
Rapporteur’ (2018) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 717 29 ff para 64 ff.
 296 One example is the Pinochet litigation in the House of Lords. See ilc, ‘Fragmentation 
of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2006) un Doc a/ cn.4/ l.682 para 187 at 371. For a critique, see Ingrid 
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peoples as well as the conservation of natural resources’.297 Another provision 
that indicates the orientation of Swiss foreign relations is the Confederation’s 
commitment ‘to a just and peaceful international order’.298 While case law 
on these constitutional goals and principles is non- existent,  concretizations 
can be found in legislation,299 as well as in a number of governmental doc-
uments.300 The Foreign Policy Strategy Report for 2016– 19, for instance, enu-
merates the foundational principles of Swiss foreign relations:  the rule of 
law, neutrality, universality, dialogue, solidarity, responsibility, efficiency, and 
coherence.301
The commitment of the Swiss State to the rule of law in both interstate 
and intrastate matters figures among the basic principles of Swiss foreign re-
lations,302 and it is included (either explicitly or through related terms, such 
as ‘legal certainty’) under three of the four strategic priorities mentioned in 
the Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy Report.303 The rule of law also appears in 
numerous passages of the Federal Council’s Foreign Policy Report.304 The fed-
eral government has linked Switzerland’s attachment to the rule of law to its 
acceptance of the icj’s compulsory jurisdiction under art. 36(2) icj Statute,305 
 297 Art. 54(2) Cst.
 298 Art. 2(4) Cst.
 299 See especially the fa- cpp.
 300 Such documents include the Foreign Strategy Report, which the fdfa submits to 
the Federal Council at the beginning of a legislative term (fdfa, Swiss Foreign Policy 
Strategy 2016– 19: Federal Council Report on the Priorities for the 2016– 19 Legislative 
Period, <www.dfae.admin.ch/ content/ dam/ eda/ en/ documents/ publications/ Schweizerische 
Aussenpolitik/ Aussenpolitische- Strategie- 160301_ EN.pdf>), and the annual Federal 
Council’s Foreign Policy Report (Federal Council, Foreign Policy Report 2018, fg 2019 
1505, <www.admin.ch/ opc/ de/ federal- gazette/ 2019/ 1505.pdf>). The fdfa intermit-
tently publishes reports on specific foreign policy issues, such as neutrality, interna-
tional cooperation, and counter- terrorism, and several periodicals.
 301 fdfa, Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016– 19 (n 300) 11 ff.
 302 Ibid 5.
 303 Ie, ‘relations with the European Union and the eu and efta member states’, ‘relations 
with global partners’, ‘peace and security’, and ‘sustainable development and prosperity’, 
ibid 14 ff.
 304 Federal Council, Foreign Policy Report 2018 (n 300); for an earlier example, see Federal 
Council, Foreign Policy Report 2015, fg 2016 503, <www.admin.ch/ opc/ fr/ federal- 
gazette/ 2016/ 503.pdf>, 537 f; 549 ff; 610 ff.
 305 fdfa, Handbook on Accepting the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: Model 
Clauses and Templates, 2014, <www.eda.admin.ch/ content/ dam/ eda/ en/ documents/ 
publications/ Voelkerrecht/ handbook- jurisdiction- international- court_ en>. See also 
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to its cooperation with the ad hoc international criminal tribunals,306 and to its 
ratification of the icc Statute.307 It has also mentioned it in connection with 
the echr, ratified by Switzerland in 1974,308 and with the iccpr and icescr, 
which Switzerland ratified in 1992.309 This commitment to the rule of law also 
manifests itself via the Swiss government’s efforts to push reforms of the un 
Security Council310 and the un treaty bodies.311
Another salient feature of Swiss foreign affairs is Switzerland’s neutrality.312 
It explains why Switzerland has been reluctant (or has refused) to join ios such 
as the un (Switzerland became a member in 2002),313 nato (Switzerland is 
not a party to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty), the eu (Switzerland is not an 
eu member State), and the eea (Swiss voters rejected a proposed adhesion in 
1992). The law of neutrality being relevant for the Swiss legal order, Switzerland 
is a ‘specially affected State’ in this regard.
 306 Federal Council, Botschaft betreffend den Bundesbeschluss über die Zusammenarbeit 
mit den Internationalen Gerichten zur Verfolgung von schwerwiegenden Verletzungen des 
humanitären Völkerrechts, 18 October 1995, fg 1995 iv 1101, for instance at 1105.
 307 Federal Council, Botschaft über das Römer Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs, 
das Bundesgesetz über die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof und 
eine Revision des Strafrechts, 15 November 2000, fg 2001 391, for instance at 406, 431, 
and 483.
 308 Federal Council, 40 Jahre emrk- Beitritt der Schweiz:  Erfahrungen und Perspektiven, 
Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulats Stöckli 13.4187 vom 12. Dezember 2013, 
14 November 2014, fg 2015 357, at 359, 407 f, 410. The echr was ratified after the 
removal of two constitutional obstacles. First, women’s suffrage was introduced in 1971. 
Then, in 1973, the so- called ‘confessional articles’ of the Swiss Constitution (which dis-
criminated against the Jesuits, and prohibited both the creation of new monasteries or 
religious orders and the restoration of abolished ones) were abrogated.
 309 Federal Council, Botschaft betreffend den Beitritt der Schweiz zu den beiden internationalen 
Menschenrechtspakten von 1966 und zu einer Änderung des Bundesrechtspflegegesetzes 
vom 30. Januar 1991, 2 April 1991, fg 1991 i 1189, at 1196.
 310 <www.eda.admin.ch/ missions/ mission- new- york/ en/ home/ working- methods- of- the- 
security- council.html>.
 311 <www.un.org/ ruleoflaw/ blog/ portfolio- items/ switzerland- strengthening- and- 
enhancing- the- effective- functioning- of- the- human- rights- treaty- body- system>.
 312 For an analysis of Switzerland’s history of neutrality from the perspective of international 
law, see Detlev F Vagts, ‘Editorial Comment: Switzerland, International Law and World 
War II’ (1997) 91 American Journal of Jurisprudence 466.
 313 In 1947, Manley O Hudson wrote: ‘As [Switzerland] had stayed out of all but humanitar-
ian action through two World Wars, she was not to be regarded in 1945 as a “peace- loving” 
state. Of course the scenes on the stage of 1945 have now shifted to some extent, and pos-
sibly Switzerland could today qualify for United Nations membership. She has made no 
application for such membership, however, and her centuries- old tradition of neutrality 
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Its neutrality notwithstanding, and in line with its commitment to the rule 
of law in international relations, Switzerland has entered into a number of 
international legal relationships with States and other subjects of interna-
tional law. It has concluded two sets of bilateral agreements with the eu, 
and it has ratified a wide range of other bilateral and multilateral treaties.314 
 Switzerland is a member of an array of international and regional organi-
zations, including the un, the wto, the Council of Europe, the efta, the 
osce, and the oecd, and it cooperates with nato through the ‘Partnership 
for Peace’ program.
Partly owing to its neutrality, Switzerland is the host State of an important 
number of ios and un agencies. The headquarters of these organizations are 
mostly in Geneva. The city harbors one of the four main offices of the un, the 
icrc, the ilo, the who, the wipo, the iso, and many other organizations.315 
Other ios are based in Basel (where the bis has its seat) or Bern (where the 
Universal Postal Union and the Intergovernmental Organization for Interna-
tional Carriage by Rail are located). The presence of these organizations on 
Swiss territory is governed by domestic legal provisions316 and international 
treaties317 which clarify these organizations’ rights and duties, including the 
privileges and immunities granted by the host State. The international law on 
privileges and immunities of States, ios, and their agents is hence relevant to 
the Swiss judicial practice of international law and makes Switzerland a ‘spe-
cially affected State’ in this respect.318 It is worth noting that due to the pres-
ence of these organizations, Switzerland is the depositary of many treaties (eg 
the Geneva Conventions).319
 314 For an overview: <www.admin.ch/ opc/ de/ classified- compilation/ international.html>.
 315 <www.eda.admin.ch/ eda/ en/ fdfa/ foreign- policy/ international-  organizations/ 
international- organizations- switzerland.html>.
 316 See especially the Federal Act on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities, and the 
Financial Subsidies Granted by Switzerland as a Host State of 22 June 2007 (sr 192.12).
 317 As of June 2019, Switzerland had entered into headquarters agreements with 27 
ios:  see <www.eda.admin.ch/ eda/ en/ home/ foreign- policy/ international- organizations/ 
international- organizations- switzerland.html>.
 318 On the Swiss practice in this area, see Neumann and Peters (n 12).
 319 As of June 2019, Switzerland was the depositary of 79 treaties. See <www.dfae.admin.ch/ 
eda/ en/ home/ aussenpolitik/ voelkerrecht/ internationale_ vertraege/ depositar.html>. On 
the functions of depositaries, see Claude Schenker, ‘Dépositaire :  une impartialité 
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2.1.2 Domestic Separation of Powers in Foreign Relations
The domestic separation of powers defines the respective competences of the 
three branches of government in foreign relations.320 It constrains domestic 
courts’ interpretation of international law by specifying the instances in which 
courts are legally required to defer to the other branches.
Regarding the horizontal (inter- branch) separation of powers, the Swiss 
Constitution provides that foreign relations are the primary responsibility 
of the federal government (the Federal Council).321 The government has the 
power to sign and ratify treaties,322 which in principle require the subsequent 
approval of the federal parliament (the Federal Assembly).323 In practice, 
and like in many States,324 the Federal Council often ratifies treaties based on 
its independent powers to do so.325 As far as the judiciary is concerned, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has the duty to apply international law,326 although 
some foreign relations issues fall outside of its jurisdiction (infra, 4.2.1). The 
Federal Assembly ‘participate[s] in shaping foreign policy and supervise[s] the 
maintenance of foreign relations’.327 The parliamentary powers in foreign re-
lations should not be underestimated. The Federal Assembly comprises two 
Foreign Policy Committees (one for each house). The Committees examine 
specific issues referred to them, and they formulate proposals in their area of 
responsibility.328 The Federal Council regularly informs and consults them.329 
By launching initiatives and parliamentary interventions, the Committees can 
raise issues related to foreign relations.330
It is worth mentioning that in the past, the Swiss constitutional order 
provided for a ‘co- mingling of the powers of government’,331 as the federal 
 320 For an analysis of international law in domestic courts from the perspective of the consti-
tutional separation of powers: David Haljan, Separating Powers: International Law Before 
National Courts (tmc Asser Press 2013).
 321 Art. 184(1) Cst.
 322 Art. 184(2) Cst.
 323 Art. 166(2) Cst.
 324 One example is the high practical relevance of sole executive agreements in us foreign 
relations.
 325 Art. 7a of the Federal Government and Administration Organization Act of 21 March 
1997 (sr 172.010).
 326 Art. 190 Cst.
 327 Art. 166(1) Cst.
 328 Art. 44 fa- fa.
 329 Art. 152 fa- fa.
 330 Art. 45(1)(a) fa- fa.
 331 Ruth D Masters, International Law in National Courts:  A Study of the Enforcement of 
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parliament and the federal executive both exercised ‘executive, legislative, and 
judicial functions’.332 This ‘co- mingling’ was starkly attenuated by subsequent 
constitutional amendments.
The Constitution further clarifies the vertical separation of powers be-
tween the Confederation and the cantons in international relations (see also 
infra, 3.1). While foreign affairs are a federal matter,333 the cantons must be 
 consulted by the federal government whenever their interests are affected by 
a decision,334 and these interests must be respected by foreign policy.335 The 
cantons also have limited treaty- making powers.336
2.2 International Law in the Swiss Legal Order
Another feature that constrains Swiss courts’ interpretative activity concerns 
the way the Swiss legal order regulates its relationship to international law, ie, 
the status (2.2.1), rank (2.2.2), and direct effect (2.2.3) of international law.337 
Given the scarce guidance provided by the Swiss Constitution on these issues, 
emphasis is placed on the practice of the Swiss authorities. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in particular has clarified several aspects of this relationship.
2.2.1 Status
The domesic status of international law pertains to the conditions under which 
international law becomes an integral part of domestic law. In this regard, 
States oscillate between two poles:  monism and dualism. Monism does not 
require that international law be transposed into domestic law to be valid in 
the domestic legal order. By contrast, dualism demands such a transposition. 
It is based on a conception of domestic and international law as two separate, 
‘self- contained’338 sets of norms that ‘never overlap’.339
 332 See ibid 91.
 333 Art. 54(1) Cst.
 334 Art. 55(1) Cst; Federal Act on the Participation of the Cantons in the Foreign Policy of the 
Confederation of 22 December 1999 (sr 138.1).
 335 Art. 54(3) Cst.
 336 Art. 56(1) Cst.
 337 See already Besson and Ammann (n 60). See also (with references): Besson, Droit interna-
tional public : Abrégé de cours et résumés de jurisprudence (n 89) 303 ff.
 338 Giorgio Gaja, ‘Dualism: A Review’ in Janne E Nijman and André Nollkaemper (eds), New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 52.
 339 In the original:  ‘deux cercles qui sont en contact intime, mais qui ne se superposent 
jamais’; Heinrich Triepel, ‘Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international’ 
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Overall, Swiss law and practice endorse monism:  the Constitution does 
not require that treaties be transposed to be part of the domestic legal or-
der,340 all levels of government must respect international law,341 courts 
must apply international law,342 and constitutional amendments cannot 
disregard so- called mandatory provisions of international law.343 The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal has mentioned the monism of the Swiss legal order early 
on,344 and it endorses it with regard to all sources of international law.345 
On the other hand, some of the Court’s early rulings were clearly dualist,346 
and past scholarly writings have stated that ‘Swiss jurists adhere to the du-
alistic theory’.347 While several proposals to switch to dualism have been 
made at the federal legislative level,348 they have never garnered enough 
 parliamentary support. They have also been consistently rejected by the 
Federal Council.349
 340 bge 127 ii 177, at 2 c).
 341 Art. 5(4) Cst.
 342 Art. 190 Cst.
 343 Art. 139(3), art. 193(4), art. 194(2) Cst.
 344 See the decision cited in Federal Council, Botschaft an die Bundesversammlung  betreffend 
die Mitwirkung der Schweiz bei Ausführung der Generalakte der Konferenz von Algesiras 
vom 7.  April 1906, fg 1907 ii 112, 15 March 1907, at 119; the case is mentioned by 
Masters (n 331)  96. See also ibid 98. For later decisions, see eg bge 132 iii 122, at 
3.1.1 (explicit reference to monism with primacy of international law); BGer, judgment 
9C_ 873/ 2012 of 25 February 2013, at 4.2 (explicit reference to monism); bge 130 i 312, 
at 4.1 (explicit reference to monism with primacy of international law); bge 122 ii 234, 
at 4 a), and bge 94 i 669, at 2 (implicit references to monism).
 345 BGer, judgments 2A.783/ 2006, 2A.784/ 2006, and 2A.785/ 2006 of 23 January 2008, 
at 7.1; bge 133 ii 450, at 6.1; bge 44 i 49, at 4. See further: BGer, judgment 2C_ 950/ 
2012 of 8 August 2013, at 2.2 (treaties); bge 115 Ib 496, at 5 b) (cil); BGer, judgment 
1A.63/ 2002 of 9 April 2002, at 2.1 (general principles of international law). See for 
instance Astrid Epiney, ‘Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht aus der Sicht 
des Bundesgerichts: Anmerkung zum bge 2C_ 828/ 2011 vom 12. Oktober 2012’ Jusletter 
of 18 March 2013.
 346 bge 49 i 188, at 3, cited in Masters (n 331) 97.
 347 See ibid 98.
 348 Lukas Reimann, Motion 14.3221 and Motion 16.3239, Dualismus statt Monismus, 
27 May 2014 and 3 May 2016; Swiss People’s Party, Postulat 09.3676, Völkerrecht und 
Landesrecht: Systemwechsel vom Monismus zum Dualismus, 11 June 2009; Christoph 
Mörgeli, Interpellation 04.3802, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und schwei-
zerische Souveränität, 16 December 2004; Samuel Schmid, Interpellation 96.3479, 
Völkerrecht:  Wechsel zum Dualismus, 2 October 1996; Alexander J.  Baumann, Motion 
96.3482, Systemwechsel für die Einführung von Völkerrecht, 2 October 1996.
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The irritante alternative350 between monism and dualism is often criti-
cized for being simplistic, at odds with reality, and of limited practical signif-
icance.351 Still, it remains the most accurate and useful way of capturing the 
range of positions States adopt with regard to the status of international law in 
their legal order. However, it is important to note that this status hinges on the 
practice of a given State352 rather than on its commitments on paper. It could 
even be argued that States are initially dualist, before positioning themselves 
on the monist/ dualist spectrum via their organs. Another important point is 
that the distinction between monism and dualism is a spectrum rather than 
a  dichotomy.353 Status is multifaceted: a State may be monist (or dualist) with 
regard to some sources,354 norms, or substantive areas of international law, 
but not with regard to others.355 Its practice may change over time, and the 
practice of different State organs may be inconsistent. In monist States like 
Switzerland, courts still have to decide whether or not international law is ap-
plicable to a given case.356 In this context, they may (consciously or uncon-
sciously) adopt ‘blunting rules’, as the ila Study Group on the Principles on 
 350 Denis Alland, ‘Les destins internes du droit international public’, Anzilotti et le droit inter-
national public : un essai (2nd edn, Pedone 2013) 91.
 351 Pierre- Hugues Verdier and Mila Versteeg, ‘International Law in National Legal Systems: An 
Empirical Investigation’ (2015) 109 American Journal of International Law 514, 516; ila, 
‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law’ (n 61)  6; Charlesworth and others (n 65)  2; Besson, 
‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ (n 151) 184. See also Federal Council, 2010 
Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), at 2286.
 352 For such a diagnosis: Nijman and Nollkaemper (n 144) 2 f; Mattias Kumm, ‘Democratic 
Constitutionalism Encounters International Law: Terms of Engagement’ in Sujit Choudhry 
(ed), The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press 2006) 257.
 353 Jean Dhommeaux, ‘Monismes et dualismes en droit international des droits de l’homme’ 
(1995) 41 Annuaire français de droit international 447, 448; Andreas L Paulus, ‘The 
Emergence of the International Community and the Divide Between International and 
Domestic Law’ in Janne E Nijman and André Nollkaemper (eds), New Perspectives on 
the Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 229; 
Charlesworth and others (n 65) 2. See also Federal Council, 2010 Report on International 
and Domestic Law (n 143), at 2291.
 354 Bugalo Maripe, ‘Giving Effect to International Human Rights Law in the Domestic 
Context of Botswana: Dissonance and Incongruity in Judicial Interpretation’ (2014) 14 
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 251, 258.
 355 See the examples in ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law’ (n 15) 8 f.
 356 This preliminary question is reminiscent of what, in us law, has been called Chevron step 
zero, see Cass R Sunstein, ‘Chevron Step Zero’ (2006) 92 Virginia Law Review 187. I am 
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the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law (hereinafter: ‘ila 
Study Group on Domestic Courts’) calls them, ie, approaches that mitigate the 
monism of their legal order.357
Courts are constrained by the monism of the Swiss State, but they also con-
tribute to shaping it. Monism is often associated with a favorable, ‘open’ atti-
tude towards international law,358 and vice versa. Granted, dualist States, which 
apply international law in its domesticated form, are more likely to reason as if 
they were applying domestic law.359 On the other hand, their organs might be 
more willing to apply international law than those of monist jurisdictions.360 
Much depends, as previously stated, on the practice of the State authorities.361 
Swiss courts for instance sometimes mention international law even when it 
has not been invoked by the parties.362 They also tend to apply domestic and 
international law in parallel when their subject matters overlap,363 as opposed 
to courts in other States.364 This matches the observation made by Rosalyn 
Higgins that in monist jurisdictions, international law is more likely to be 
‘treated as a familiar topic’ by the courts.365 On the other hand, Swiss courts 
 357 See infra (n 641). The cedaw Committee for instance, in its Concluding Observations 
of 2016 pertaining to Switzerland’s 4th and 5th periodic reports, criticizes ‘the lim-
ited awareness of the [cedaw] Convention and the general recommendations of the 
Committee as important tools of interpretation within the judiciary’, among other actors. 
See Concluding Observations of the cedaw Committee, un Doc cedaw/ c/ che/ co/ 4- 5, 
18 November 2016, para 10 f.
 358 Gaja (n 338) 61. See also Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law 
(n 143), 2285.
 359 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 143.
 360 Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), 2286. See also 
(on dualist South Africa): John Dugard, ‘South Africa’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of 
Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 
2009) 475.
 361 Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), at 2300. 
For an example, see Melissa A  Waters, ‘Creeping Monism:  The Judicial Trend Toward 
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 Columbia Law 
Review 628.
 362 bge 139 i 129, at 3.3 (art. 6(1) echr and art. 14 icescr). See also bge 141 i 211 (regard-
ing the echr and the iccpr). See, by contrast, bge 141 i 97, where the appellant was 
explicitly relying on art. 6(1) echr (at 5) and art. 14 iccpr (at 6).
 363 bge 140 iv 108, at 6.8 (art. 17(3) Cst. and art. 10 echr); bge 141 ii 182, at 6.3.6, 6.4.1 
(art. 16(3) Cst. and art. 10 echr).
 364 Eg Veronika Fikfak, ‘English Courts and the “Internalisation” of the European Convention 
of Human Rights? Between Theory and Practice’ (2015) 5 uk Supreme Court Annual 
Review 118, 24 ss.
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also refrain from referring to relevant international law in some cases.366 In 
a judgment issued in 2018, for instance, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that 
whenever national law did not conflict with international law (in casu with 
the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons), the lower court 
‘must first apply the national law, with which it is familiar’.367 Such statements 
illustrate the ambivalent role domestic courts often adopt with regard to the 
interpretation of international law.
2.2.2 Rank
The domestic rank of international law pertains to how conflicts between do-
mestic and international law are resolved under domestic law. Although ‘one 
of the great principles of international law, informing the whole system and 
applying to every branch of it’368 is that international law, qua law, claims su-
premacy over domestic law,369 including constitutional law,370 the rank of in-
ternational law in the domestic legal order is governed by domestic law.
In Switzerland, the rank of international law is controversial given the con-
stitutional silence on the matter, and due to the high stakes involved for the 
Swiss State. The issue regularly surfaces in Swiss politics.371
 366 One example is bge 136 iii 168, at 3.3.4, where the Court applied the Schubert Praxis but 
did not mention contradictory international law, especially not the principle pacta sunt 
servanda (art. 26 vclt). See, by contrast, bge 139 i 16, at 5.1, where the Court mentioned 
art. 27 vclt.
 367 Bge 145 v 55, at 4.1.
 368 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered From 
the Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit 
international 85.
 369 icj, case concerning the Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the 
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, advisory opinion, icj Reports 
1988, 26 April 1988, 12, 34 f, para 57.
 370 pcij, case concerning the Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin 
or Speech in the Danzig Territory, advisory opinion, pcij Series a/ b No 44, 4 February 
1932, 3, at 24; icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United 
States), judgment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 65, para 139; Anne Peters, 
‘Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law’ (2009) 3 Vienna 
Online Journal on International Constitutional Law 170, 183 f.
 371 To mention two recent examples: first, a popular initiative launched by the Swiss People’s 
Party and rejected by Swiss voters in 2018 aimed, inter alia, at establishing the suprem-
acy of the Swiss Constitution over international law, except for mandatory provisions 
of international law (see <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis460t.html>). Second, in June 
2015, the Federal Council examined the proposal of the parliamentary group ‘fdp.
The Liberals’ to arbitrate conflicts between Swiss law and international law through a 
democratic tiebreaker. The group suggested determining the rank of international law 
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States often acknowledge the supremacy of international law in  principle,372 
but they seldom accept that international law is supreme over all of domestic 
law.373 As a matter of fact, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has made clear that the 
Constitution does not endorse an ‘unconditional supremacy of international 
law over domestic law’.374 Indeed, the Constitution does not settle the issue of 
rank, except for ‘mandatory provisions of international law’375 which consti-
tutional amendments must respect (on this autonomous notion of Swiss law, 
see infra).
Regardless of how they address the issue of rank, States typically try to avoid 
conflicts between domestic law and international law in the first place. They 
do so chiefly through the principle of consistent interpretation,376 which ex-
presses a State’s adherence to the supremacy of international law.377 This prin-
ciple establishes the presumption that legislatures intend to comply with the 
State’s international obligations.378 The Swiss Federal Tribunal first articulated 
the principle of consistent interpretation in 1968, holding that the federal legis-
lature was to be presumed not to have intended to violate international law.379 
‘In case of doubt,’ the Court added, ‘domestic law is to be interpreted consist-
ently with international law’, a principle reflecting ‘new trends in France, in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and in the Netherlands’.380
Despite consistent interpretation, conflicts between international law and 
Swiss law do arise. To analyze how clashes are handled by the Swiss authorities, 
the domestic and international legal norm at stake (fdp.The Liberals Group, Postulat 
13.3805, Klares Verhältnis zwischen Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, 24 September 2013). 
The Federal Council recommended the rejection of the proposal, stating that it was dif-
ficult to implement and that conflicts would increasingly be resolved in favor of Swiss 
law (Federal Council, Klares Verhältnis zwischen Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Bericht des 
Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 13.3805, 12 June 2015, <www.ejpd.admin.ch/ 
dam/ data/ bj/ staat/ gesetzgebung/ voelkerrecht/ ber- br- d.pdf>, at 2). The parliament fol-
lowed the Federal Council’s recommendation and rejected the proposal.
 372 BGer, judgment 1A.161/ 2000 of 15 June 2000, at 4 f).
 373 André Nollkaemper, ‘Rethinking the Supremacy of International Law’ (2010) 65 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 65.
 374 bge 133 v 367, at 11.1.2.
 375 Art. 139(3), 193(4), and 194(2) Cst.
 376 For an articulation of this principle in the United States, see Murray v.  the Charming 
Betsey, 6 u.s. 64 (1804).
 377 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 e). On States’ duty of consistent interpretation, see pcij, case con-
cerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 
10, 21 Feburary 1925, 6, at 20.
 378 On this point, see The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 8 f.
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one must distinguish between cantonal law, federal law to the exclusion of so- 
called ‘federal acts’ (art. 164 Cst.), federal acts, and constitutional law.
The supremacy of international law is uncontroversial with regard to can-
tonal law,381 since federal law (which includes international law)382 trumps 
cantonal law.383 An equally straightforward case is the relationship between 
international law and federal law, excluding federal acts pursuant to art. 164 
Cst. The Constitution states that the courts ‘apply the federal acts’.384 Apart 
from federal acts, however, federal law (eg federal ordinances and decrees) 
gives way to international law.
The relationship between international law and federal acts (as defined 
by art. 164 Cst.) is without doubt the aspect of the interface between Swiss 
law and international law that has spilt the most ink.385 To handle conflicts 
between international law and federal acts, the starting point is art. 190 Cst. 
This provision states that Swiss courts ‘apply the federal acts and international 
law’. Art. 190 entails that courts cannot refrain from applying federal acts and 
international law (infra, 3.5), but it does not clarify their relationship. Hence, 
whenever federal acts and international law conflict, Swiss courts are in a typ-
ical case of ‘double bind’:386 they are bound by two incompatible legal duties.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s interpretation of art. 190 Cst. has  fluctuated 
over time. In its early case law, the Court often denied the existence of a 
conflict by presuming that the legislature had not intended to derogate 
from international law.387 Yet in 1933, it held that treaties had ‘no other 
 value than any other law regularly voted in and promulgated’, and that con-
flicts were to be resolved by giving preference to the lex posterior.388 Later 
 381 bge 135 ii 243, at 3.1.
 382 Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Benjamin Schindler, and Rainer J Schweizer (eds), Die schweize-
rische Bundesverfassung: St. Galler Kommentar (3rd edn, Dike 2014) 1044.
 383 Art. 49(1) Cst.
 384 Art. 190 Cst.
 385 Eg Stefan Schürer, ‘Hat die pkk- Rechtsprechung die Schubert- Praxis relativiert? Eine 
Analyse der pkk- Rechtsprechung und ihrer Auswirkungen auf die Schubert- Praxis’ 
(2015) 116 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 115; Marco 
Sassòli, ‘Völkerrecht und Landesrecht:  Plädoyer eines Völkerrechtlers für Schubert’ in 
François Bellanger and Jacques de Werra (eds), Genève au confluent du droit interne et du 
droit international : Mélanges offerts par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Genève à la 
Société suisse des juristes à l’occasion du Congrès 2012 (Schulthess 2012).
 386 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47) 14.
 387 Masters (n 331) 100 ff. As early as 1884, in bge 10 i 583, at 1, the Court applied a treaty 
contradicting a prior federal act. For early rulings in which the Court endorses the 
supremacy of international law, see bge 42 i 102, at 1; bge 27 i 52, at 1; bge 7 i 774, at 4.
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rulings389 reflect an endorsement of the supremacy of international law and of 
the idea that whenever a treaty settles an issue, federal acts are not applicable, 
or only on a subsidiary basis.390 Since the early 1990s, the Court has deemed 
the principle of supremacy ‘largely undisputed’.391 It has emphasized the su-
premacy of human rights treaties,392 but also of treaties in general,393 and it 
considers that supremacy ‘follows from the very nature of the international 
legal norm, which is hierarchically superior to any domestic legal norm’.394 It 
has thereby abandoned its practice of prioritizing the lex posterior,395 at least 
in principle (on the Schubert Praxis, see infra).
The recent practice confirms the Court’s ambivalent attitude towards in-
ternational law. On the one hand, the Court considers that the duty to apply 
federal acts pursuant to art. 190 Cst. does not prohibit396 examining their 
conformity with constitutional law and with international law,397 especially 
with the echr398 (Anwendungsgebot, kein Prüfungsverbot). Hence, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal can point to inconsistencies between domestic law and in-
ternational law, and it can recommend that the legislature amend problem-
atic provisions.399 The Court has gone further. It has refrained from applying 
federal acts conflicting with the echr400 and with the Swiss– eu Agreement 
on the Free Movement of Persons,401 and it has even hinted that based on the 
supremacy of international law, it might interpret federal acts contra legem 
and consistently with international law.402 On the other hand, the Court has 
 389 bge 123 ii 279, at 2 d); bge 119 v 171, at 4 a); bge 116 Ib 106, at 1 a); bge 111 v 201, 
at 2 b); bge 110 v 72, at 2 b); bge 109 Ib 165 at 7 b); bge 106 Ib 400, at 5 a); bge 100 Ia 
407, at 1 b); bge 97 i 372, at 1; bge 91 i 127, at 2; bge 87 i 134, at 2.
 390 bge 123 ii 134, at 1 a); bge 122 ii 485, at 1; bge 122 ii 140, at 2 (on the so- called ‘princi-
ple of favor’, pursuant to which the Court applies domestic laws if they are more generous 
regarding mutual legal assistance in criminal matters).
 391 bge 119 v 171, at 4 a).
 392 bge 125 ii 417, at 4 d).
 393 bge 141 ii 436, at 4.1; bge 139 i 16, at 5.1; bge 138 ii 524, at 5.1. See also (implicitly) 
bge 123 ii 279, at 2 d).
 394 bge 131 v 66, at 3.2.
 395 bge 122 ii 485, at 3 a).
 396 Some scholars even argue that the Court should be required to bring such inconsistencies 
to the legislature’s attention, see Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer (n 382) 3053.
 397 bge 136 i 49, at 3.1.
 398 bge 117 Ib 367, at 2 e) and f).
 399 bge 136 i 49, at 3.1 (regarding constitutional law); bge 117 Ib 367, at 2 e) and f) (regard-
ing international law).
 400 bge 125 ii 417, at 4 d); bge 130 i 312, at 1.1 and 4.3.1.
 401 See especially bge 133 v 367, at 11. See also bge 131 ii 352, at 1.3.2.
 402 bge 136 ii 120, at 3.5.3. The case pertained to the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (sr 
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adopted a hands- off approach when reviewing the conformity of federal acts 
with the echr.403 Moreover, the Court maintains a significant exception to 
the principle of supremacy, namely the so- called Schubert Praxis.404
The Schubert Praxis owes its name to the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s ruling 
of 1973 in Schubert contro Commissione cantonale ticinese di ricorso. In this 
case, the Court held that whenever the legislature willingly derogates from the 
State’s existing international legal obligations, the more recent federal act will 
trump international law.405 The Court allows counter- exceptions to this excep-
tion, namely when federal acts are intended to derogate from the echr406 or 
from the non- discrimination principle enshrined in the Swiss– eu Agreement 
on the Free Movement of Persons.407 Another exception mentioned by judges 
and scholars is jus cogens.408 In other cases, however, Schubert applies. A flex-
ible, ad hoc approach to the issue of rank enables judges to take the content 
of international and domestic legal acts into account when settling conflicts 
between domestic and international law.409 It remains that when Swiss courts 
apply Schubert, they trigger a violation of international law and, therefore, 
Switzerland’s international responsibility. It is worth noting that the Schubert 
Praxis has been addressed inconsistently by different chambers of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal,410 and that some rulings reflect the Court’s internal divisions 
in a way that is unusually candid by Swiss standards.411
Another contentious issue relates to conflicts between international law 
and Swiss constitutional law. Indeed, the Swiss Constitution states that con-
stitutional amendments must respect ‘mandatory provisions of international 
 403 Stefan Schürer, ‘Die punktuelle Neutralisierung der emrk in der Praxis des Bundesgerichts. 
Zur verkürzten Grundrechtsprüfung bei der Anwendung von Bundesgesetzen’ (2016) 
117 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 171.
 404 bge 136 iii 168.
 405 bge 99 Ib 39, at 3, 4.
 406 See the references in bge 139 i 16, at 5.1.
 407 bge 133 v 367, at 11 and especially 11.6; bge 142 ii 35, at 3.
 408 Gilbert Kolly, ‘Le Tribunal fédéral suisse’ (2016) 3 Les Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil con-
stitutionnel 47, 52; Sassòli (n 385) 198 f.
 409 Federal Council, Klares Verhältnis zwischen Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Bericht des 
Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 13.3805, 12 June 2015, <www.ejpd.admin.ch/ 
dam/ data/ bj/ staat/ gesetzgebung/ voelkerrecht/ ber- br- d.pdf>.
 410 Compare for instance bge 139 i 16 and bge 136 iii 168.
 411 In a decision of 1993, the Court noted that the principle of the supremacy of interna-
tional law was ‘largely undisputed’; the only contrary opinion it mentioned was a law 
review article by federal judge Hansjörg Seiler, who was not involved in deciding the 




















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
80 Chapter 3
law’,412 but it does not prohibit constitutional enactments from violating non- 
mandatory international law.
The concept of ‘mandatory provisions of international law’ is an autono-
mous concept of Swiss law. Its scope is broader than the (in any case contested 
and unsharp) international concept of jus cogens pursuant to art. 53 vclt, as 
‘Swiss’ jus cogens includes non- derogable echr and iccpr rights.413  However, 
the Swiss Constitution does not exclude the possibility that its provisions 
might violate derogable international human rights.414 Although the Federal 
Council has stated that constitutional law must be interpreted in light of the 
supremacy of international law, except when ‘fundamental principles or the 
core content of fundamental rights’ are at stake,415 this one- time statement has 
not been taken up by Swiss courts. Yet the Swiss Federal Tribunal has sought 
to mitigate the risk that Switzerland’s international responsibility be triggered 
by constitutional provisions violating non- mandatory international law, espe-
cially echr guarantees. It has held that constitutional law lacking direct effect 
must be further specified by the federal legislature, especially regarding its re-
lationship with international law.416 In this landmark case pertaining to the 
popular initiative on the expulsion of foreign criminals, the Court considered 
that even if a constitutional provision conflicting with the echr has direct 
effect, judges must respect the European Convention when applying the Con-
stitution.417 Another sign that the Court seeks to avert international respon-
sibility is that it has preventively given preference to the echr by pointing 
 412 Art. 139(3), 193(4), and 194(2) Cst.
 413 Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), at 2314. See also 
bge 133 ii 450, at 7.1, where the Swiss Federal Tribunal considers that non- derogability 
indicates that a norm has the character of jus cogens. See also Federal Council, Botschaft 
zur Volksinitative ‘Schweizer Recht statt fremde Richter (Selbstbestimmungsinitiative)’, fg 
2017 5355, at 5365.
 414 bge 139 i 16, at 5.2.1.
 415 Federal Council, Botschaft zur Genehmigung des Abkommens über den Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum vom 18. Mai 1992, 21 August 1992, fg 1992 iv 1, at 92 (‘Grundprinzipien 
und Kerngehalte der Grundrechte’). The French translation speaks of ‘principes fonda-
mentaux ou l’essence même des droits fondamentaux’, see the French version of fg 1992 
iv 1, at 87.
 416 bge 139 i 16, at 4.3.4.
 417 Ibid, at 5.3. The case has been widely discussed in Swiss scholarship and politics. See for 
instance Giovanni Biaggini, ‘Über die Auslegung der Bundesverfassung und ihr Verhältnis 
zur emrk’ (2013) 114 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 316; 
Astrid Epiney, ‘Zur Rolle des Bundesgerichts bei der Verfassungsauslegung:  Gedanken 
zu bge 139 I  16’ Jusletter of 6 October 2014; Yvo Hangartner, ‘Bundesgerichtlicher 
Positionsbezug zum Verhältnis von Bundesverfassung und Völkerrecht’ (2013) Aktuelle 
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out that under Swiss law, its own decisions may be revised if the ECtHR subse-
quently rules that they have triggered an echr violation.418
The question of rank is often contentious, and even more so considering 
the ambiguity of the Swiss Constitution regarding this subject. Given that the 
determination of this sensitive issue is conferred to the courts, it is essential 
that Swiss judges settle it based on the law’s interpretative methods, in a pre-
dictable, clear, and consistent way.
2.2.3 Direct Effect
An international legal act has direct effect (ie, it is ‘directly enforceable’ or ‘self- 
executing’) if it can be relied upon by individuals in court. If it lacks direct ef-
fect, the act cannot be invoked until the legislature has concretized it.419 Direct 
effect raises the question of which State organ has the legal power to reduce the 
law’s vagueness.420 The modalities of direct effect are usually defined by domestic 
law.421 In rare cases, however, direct effect is mandated by international law.422
The direct effect of international law is a complex issue that cannot be fully 
addressed here.423 In the following subsections, I set out and evaluate the prac-
tice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal regarding the direct effect of written (2.2.3.1) 
and unwritten (2.2.3.2) international law, before providing some concluding 
remarks (2.2.3.3). I focus on the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal because 
it is particularly rich and detailed compared to that of other Swiss courts.
2.2.3.1 Written International Law
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has mainly addressed the criteria of direct effect in 
connection with treaty law. The Court, which deems direct effect ‘a question 
of interpretation’,424 considers that an international legal act has direct effect 
 418 Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer (n 382) 3051. See art. 122 fa- sft.
 419 Federal Council, 2010 Report on International and Domestic Law (n 143), at 2286.
 420 Wüger (n 104) 205.
 421 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Self- Executing and Non- Self- Executing Treaties in National and 
International Law’ (1992) 235 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 303, 
396; Forteau (n 108) 99 f. See also bge 126 i 240, at 2 g).
 422 icj, LaGrand (Germany v. United States), judgment, icj Reports 2001, 27 June 2001, 466, 
at 494, para 77, regarding art. 36(1) vccr; pcij, case on the Jurisdiction of the Courts 
of Danzig (Pecuniary Claims of Danzig Railway Officials Who Have Passed Into the Polish 
Service, Against the Polish Railways Administration), advisory opinion, pcij Series B 
No 15, 3 March 1928, 4, at 17 f (on the Danish- Polish Agreement Concerning Officials 
(Beamtenabkommen)).
 423 Eg Wüger (n 104).
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if three conditions are fulfilled: (i) the act is sufficiently precise to be able to 
form the basis of a decision, (ii) it pertains to the rights and duties of individ-
uals, and (iii) it is addressed to the law- applying (as opposed to the legislative) 
authorities.425 In some cases, the Court only mentions some of these criteria 
(eg (i),426 or (i) and (iii)),427 which is problematic from the perspective of pre-
dictability, clarity, and consistency.
Countless rulings have dealt with the direct effect of written  international 
law in the Swiss legal order, and it would be tedious (if at all feasible) to enu-
merate them. In this subsection, I  highlight four particularly controversial 
and – in my view – problematic cases. They pertain to the icescr, the cedaw, 
the 1972 Swiss– eec Free Trade Agreement, and European social security law. 
I discuss Swiss courts’ interpretation of treaties in general in Chapter 7 (infra).
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has often held that the icescr does not in prin-
ciple have direct effect,428 with the exception of art. 8(1)(a) icescr.429 It has 
considered art. 2(2),430 art. 3,431 art. 7(d),432 art. 9,433 art. 11(1),434 and art. 13(2)
(b) and (c) icescr435 to lack direct effect, and it has left open the direct effect 
of art. 8(1)(d)436 and art. 13(2)(a) icescr.437 This contradicts the statement of 
the un Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that a lack of direct 
effect of some icescr provisions438 is ‘difficult to sustain’, and that art. 2(3)(a) 
 425 bge 124 iii 90, at 3 a); bge 120 Ia 1, at 5 b); Christine Kaufmann and Christoph Good, 
‘Die Anwendbarkeit von ilo- Recht vor Schweizer Gerichten:  Potential und Grenzen’ 
(2016) Aktuelle juristische Praxis / Pratique juridique actuelle 647, 647; Ziegler, ‘The 
Application of wto Law in Switzerland’ (n 12) 395.
 426 bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.1.
 427 bge 124 ii 293, at 4 b).
 428 bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.1; bge 135 i 161, at 2.2; bge 126 i 240, at 2 c); bge 125 iii 277, at 2 
e); bge 123 ii 472, at 4 d); bge 122 i 101, at 2 a); bge 122 v 221, at 3 a); bge 121 v 246, 
at 2 c); bge 121 v 229, at 3 a).
 429 bge 122 v 221, at 3 a).
 430 Ibid.
 431 Ibid.
 432 bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.
 433 bge 139 i 257, at 6; bge 135 i 161, at 2.2.
 434 bge 122 i 101, at 2 a).
 435 bge 120 Ia 1, at 5 d).
 436 bge 125 iii 277, at 2 e). While the Court considered that there were ‘weighty reasons’ to 
consider the provision to have direct effect (at 2 d) bb)), it left the question open.
 437 bge 133 i 156, at 3.6.4.
 438 Ie, art. 3, art. 7(a)(i), art. 8, art. 10(3), art. 13(2)(a), (3), and (4), and art. 15(3) icescr. See 
cescr, General Comment No 3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (art. 2, para 1, of 
the Covenant), 14 December 1990, un Doc e/ 1991/ 23, at para 5. See also cescr, General 
Comment No 9:  The Domestic Application of the Covenant, 3 December 1998, un Doc 
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icescr requires that States provide effective judicial remedies.439 As a mat-
ter of fact, the Committee has criticized the Swiss case law for  systematically 
denying direct effect to most icescr rights.440 Many scholars have criticized 
the Swiss case law, stating that there are in principle no obstacles to granting 
social rights direct effect.441 It is also worth noting that several domestic socio- 
economic rights have direct effect in the Swiss legal order.442
A second illustration is provided by the cedaw, which Switzerland ratified 
in 1997. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that art. 11(1)(e) cedaw (pursuant 
to which States must treat women and men equally in terms of social security 
benefits) lacked direct effect.443 It has also cited the Federal Council’s state-
ment that most provisions of the cedaw lacked direct effect.444 The Court did 
not challenge or reexamine the government’s sweeping assessment, although 
the Federal Council had actually left open the possibility that the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal might grant direct effect to some cedaw guarantees in the future.445 
 439 cescr, General Comment No 3 (footnote 438), at para 5. See also cescr, General Comment 
No 9 (footnote 438), at para 2 and 3; and para 7, 10 (emphasizing the importance of jus-
ticiability), and 14.
 440 cescr, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles 16 and 17 of 
the Covenant, Concluding Observations:  Switzerland, un Doc e/ c.12/ che/ co/ 2- 3, 26 
November 2010, at para 5.
 441 See Maya Hertig Randall and Gregor T Chatton, ‘Les droits sociaux en Suisse’ in Krzysztof 
Wojtyczek (ed), Social Rights as Fundamental Rights (Eleven International Publishing 
2016) 435 ff.
 442 Jörg Künzli, Anja Eugster, and Alexander Spring, Die Anerkennung justiziabler Rechte im 
Bereich der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Menschenrechte durch das Bundes- 
und das kantonale Recht (Schweizer Kompetenzzentrum für Menschenrechte 2014) 68 
f. For an overview: Hertig Randall and Chatton (n 441) 439 ff.
 443 bge 139 i 257, at 6.
 444 bge 137 i 305, at 3.2. See also Federal Council, Botschaft betreffend das Übereinkommen 
von 1979 zur Beseitigung jeder Form von Diskriminierung der Frau, 23 August 1995, fg 1995 
iv 901, at 925; Federal Council, Botschaft über die Genehmigung des Fakultativprotokolls 
vom 6. Oktober 1999 zum Übereinkommen vom 18. Dezember 1979 zur Beseitigung jeder 
Form von Diskriminierung der Frau (op cedaw), 29 November 2006, fg 2006 9787, at 
9802 and 9813.
 445 Federal Council, Botschaft über die Genehmigung des Fakultativprotokolls vom 6. Oktober 
1999 zum Übereinkommen vom 18. Dezember 1979 zur Beseitigung jeder Form von 
Diskriminierung der Frau (op cedaw), 29 November 2006, fg 2006 9787, at 9802 (con-
sidering that the Swiss Federal Tribunal could accept the direct effect of ‘at least some 
parts’ of art. 9 cedaw and art. 15 cedaw, and ‘potentially also’ of art. 7 cedaw and 
art. 16 cedaw); Federal Council, Botschaft betreffend das Übereinkommen von 1979 zur 
Beseitigung jeder Form von Diskriminierung der Frau, 23 August 1995, fg 1995 iv 901, at 
923 ff (noting that the issue of direct effect would have to be considered by the Swiss law- 
applying authorities, while stating its own view according to which most provisions of the 
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In another context, with regard to the un Convention on the Rights of Persons 
With Disabilities, the Federal Council has stressed that the law- applying au-
thorities must determine direct effect on a case- by- case basis.446 This suggests 
that the Court’s deference to the government when interpreting the  cedaw is 
unwarranted, especially given that the Convention provides that States must 
provide effective judicial remedies. The Swiss judicial practice has been re-
peatedly deplored by the cedaw Committee.447 It is worth adding that the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has denied the direct effect of other treaties aimed at 
protecting women.448
Another interesting example pertains to the 1972 Free Trade Agreement 
(fta) between Switzerland and the eec. For several decades, and in spite 
of widespread scholarly criticism,449 the Swiss Federal Tribunal declined 
to grant direct effect to the fta’s provisions.450 In 2005, however, the Court 
tacitly overruled its previous case law and applied the provisions of the fta 
without even mentioning the issue of direct effect.451 Daniel Wüger notes that 
the Federal Council had previously enjoined the Court to overrule its case 
law,452 and that the Federal Appeals Commission for Customs, in a decision 
of 2001, had contradicted the Court on the very issue that the  federal judges 
addressed in 2005.453 In light of these facts, the Court’s silence on direct effect 
 446 Federal Council, Botschaft zur Genehmigung des Übereinkommens vom 13. Dezember 
2006 über die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen, 19 December 2012, fg 2013 661, 
at 674.
 447 Concluding Observations of the cedaw Committee, un Doc cedaw/ c/ che/ co/ 4– 5, 
18 November 2016, at para 12 f; Concluding Observations of the cedaw Committee, 
un Doc cedaw/ c/ che/ co/ 3, 7 August 2009, para 15; Concluding Observations 
of the cedaw Committee, un Doc a/ 58/ 38(supp), 18 August 2003, para 97 ff, at 
para 106 f.
 448 The Court has denied direct effect to the International Agreements for the Suppression of 
the White Slave Traffic of 1904, 1910, 1921, and 1933 (bge 128 iv 117, at 3 b)), as well 
as to the provisions of ilo Convention No 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation (bge 106 Ib 182, at 4 a)).
 449 Christina Schnell, Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit in der Schweiz:  Ausgewählte rechtliche 
Aspekte zum Personenfreizügigkeitsabkommen (Schulthess 2010)  86; Thomas Cottier 
and Erik Evtimov, ‘Die sektoriellen Abkommen der Schweiz mit der eg: Anwendung und 
Rechtsschutz’ (2003) 139 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 77, 101 ff.
 450 bge 104 iv 175, at 2 c); bge 105 ii 49, at 3 b); bge 118 Ib 367, at 6 a).
 451 bge 131 ii 271, at 10; Daniel Wüger, ‘Bundesgericht wendet Freihandelsabkommen erst-
mals unmittelbar an – ein Schritt vorwärts, ein Schritt zurück’ Jusletter of 4 April 2005.
 452 See ibid 43.
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is disconcerting and raises the suspicion that the judges caved due to political 
pressure.
Yet another case where the Court suddenly flipped its approach to direct 
effect pertains to ilo Convention No 128 and to the European Code of Social 
Security.454 In a ‘spectacular’455 turnaround, the Swiss Federal Tribunal over-
ruled its (much criticized)456 case law based on which these treaties had no 
direct effect. It granted direct effect to art. 32(1)(e) of the ilo Convention No 
128 and art. 68(f) of the European Code of Social Security.457
In all four examples, the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s approach to direct effect 
fails to convince. Its case law does not appear to follow a predictable, clear, and 
consistent method.
2.2.3.2 Unwritten International Law
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has barely ever dealt with the issue of whether 
unwritten international legal acts (ie, cil and general principles of interna-
tional law) have direct effect. The Court often mentions the notion of ‘direct 
applicability’, but uses it to refer to both direct effect and rank.458 This makes 
it difficult to determine whether the Court is actually considering the issue 
of direct effect. The Court has stated that non- refoulement is a mandatory 
principle of international law that, qua cil, has direct effect in the  United 
States, yet the customary character of the principle was (as is often the case, 
infra, Chapter  8) only mentioned in passing.459 In several decisions, the 
Court has noted that ‘the general principles of international law are directly 
applicable in Switzerland qua domestic law’.460 In most instances, however, 
it  applies unwritten international law without examining its direct effect.461 
The direct effect of unwritten international law is also sidelined in Swiss legal 
 454 On this case law, see Hertig Randall and Chatton (n 441) 444 f.
 455 See ibid 445.
 456 Kaufmann and Good (n 425) 653.
 457 bge 119 v 171, at 4 b). See also bge 120 v 224, at 2. Regarding art. 68(f) of the European 
Code of Social Security, see also bge 121 v 45, at 1.
 458 bge 117 Ib 337, at 2 a); bge 125 ii 417, at 4 d); BGer, judgment 1A.63/ 2002 of 9 April 
2002, at 2.1; Christian Dominicé, ‘Le droit international coutumier dans l’ordre juridique 
suisse’ in Jeanne Belhumeur and Luigi Condorelli (eds), L’ordre juridique international 
entre tradition et innovation (Graduate Institute Publications 1997) para 8.
 459 BGer, judgment 1A.212/ 2000 of 19 September 2000, at 5 a).
 460 bge 117 Ib 337, at 2 a): ‘Selon les conceptions en vigueur en Suisse, les principes généraux 
du droit des gens y sont directement applicables comme droit interne’. See also bge 125 
ii 417, at 4 d); BGer, judgment 1A.63/ 2002 of 9 April 2002, at 2.1.
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scholarship,462 as is the method based on which direct effect ought to be 
determined.463
2.2.3.3 Concluding Remarks
To summarize the findings of the previous subsections (2.2.3.1 and 2.2.3.2, su-
pra), the Swiss Federal Tribunal has developed criteria based on which direct 
effect is determined. However, this test is anything but predictable, clear, and 
consistent, and it is not applied to unwritten international law. The Court does 
not appear to refer to art. 31 f vclt when determining the direct effect of treaty 
provisions. A provision’s (lack of) direct effect is often asserted without being 
carefully demonstrated.
Direct effect has implications for the State’s duties towards individuals. There-
fore, it is politically sensitive, especially regarding economic, social, and cultural 
rights.464 The absence of a predictable, clear, and consistent method of deter-
mining direct effect creates the risk that courts will do so based on considera-
tions that are unrelated to the legal act under scrutiny, including political pres-
sure. In reality, courts routinely grant some treaty provisions direct effect, while 
consistently denying direct effect to others. The axiomatic character of Swiss 
judicial decisions on direct effect matches Forteau and Nollkaemper’s findings 
that domestic courts seldom explain why an international legal act has or lacks 
direct effect465 and that some rulings on direct effect seem ‘fundamentally po-
litical’.466 It also reflects what Nollkaemper calls the ‘duality’ of direct effect: do-
mestic courts use direct effect either ‘as a powerful sword that can pierce the 
boundary of the national legal order and protect individual rights’, or as a way 
of ‘shield[ing] the national legal order from the effects of international law’.467
The lack of a predictable, clear, and consistent method regarding direct ef-
fect makes it difficult for individuals to anticipate whether they can invoke an 
 462 See ibid 283– 286; Simonetta Stirling- Zanda, L’application judiciaire du droit interna-
tional coutumier :  étude comparée de la pratique européenne (Schulthess 2000)  152 ff. 
See however Robert Baumann, Der Einfluss des Völkerrechts auf die Gewaltenteilung: am 
Beispiel Deutschlands, Frankreichs, des Vereinigten Königreichs, der Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika, Schwedens und der Schweiz (Schulthess 2002)  358 ff. See also Dominicé  
(n 458) para 16 ff.
 463 Daniel Wüger for instance, in his study on the direct effect of international law in the 
Swiss legal order, merely states that the direct effect of cil should be assessed ‘no differ-
ently than that of treaty law’. Wüger (n 104) 286.
 464 On social rights, see Hertig Randall and Chatton (n 441) 393.
 465 Forteau (n 108) 105 f.
 466 Nollkaemper, ‘The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law’ (n 59) 109.
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international legal act in court. It is also problematic when courts clarify other 
aspects of the relationship between domestic and international law.
3 Legal Principles of Political Organization
The legal relationship between the State and other international legal subjects 
(supra, section 2) is not the only constraint on domestic courts’ interpretation 
of international law. Judges are also limited by legal principles that structure 
the polity. In Switzerland, these principles include federalism (3.1), linguistic 
diversity (3.2), the rule of law (3.3), semi- direct democracy (3.4), and the su-
premacy of the federal legislature (3.5).
3.1 Federalism
Most States are unitary States. They are ruled by a central government which 
decides which powers it wants to delegate to the State’s subunits. By contrast, 
Switzerland  – like the United States, Germany, Austria, Belgium, India, and 
Russia, among other  examples – is a federal State, ie, a State composed of sov-
ereign units468 (26 cantons) which have transferred some of their  competences 
to the federal level (the Confederation).469
The Swiss cantons enjoy regulatory autonomy in some respects, while be-
ing subjected to federal law in others. On the one hand, the federal govern-
ment, qua government of enumerated powers, can only exercise the powers 
 delegated to it by the cantons.470 Moreover, popular initiatives requesting a 
partial constitutional revision471 and so- called ‘mandatory referenda’472 re-
quire a majority of both the people and the cantons. On the other hand, feder-
al law overrides contrary provisions of cantonal law,473 and the cantons must 
faithfully implement federal law474 (which includes international law).475
 468 Art. 3 Cst.
 469 Wolfgang Rudolf, ‘Federal States’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(Online Edition) (Oxford University Press 2011) para 13 <opil.ouplaw.com>.
 470 Art. 42(1) Cst. The principle of cantonal autonomy enjoys constitutional protection (art. 
47), and State tasks must be allocated based on the principle of subsidiarity (art. 5a and 
art. 43a).
 471 Art. 138(4) Cst.
 472 Art. 140(1) Cst.
 473 Art. 49(1) Cst. Eg bge 141 v 455, at 6.1.
 474 Art. 46(1) Cst.





















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
88 Chapter 3
From the perspective of international responsibility, the acts of federal 
subunits are attributable to the State.476 Besides triggering a violation of their 
State’s existing international obligations, cantonal laws and practices can hin-
der the ratification of treaties, or make it necessary for the State to add reser-
vations upon ratification.477 I address the structure of the cantonal judiciary in 
subsection 4.1.2 (infra).
A telling illustration of the challenges cantonal laws create from the perspec-
tive of international law (inter alia due to the sensitivity of cantonal preroga-
tives) is the constitutional ban on face- covering headgear which entered into 
force in the canton of Ticino on 1 July 2016, after being accepted in a cantonal 
popular vote in 2013.478 One of the effects of the ban is that women are pre-
vented from wearing burqas and niqabs in public.479 Besides interfering with 
cantonal and federal constitutional law,480 the ban contradicts Switzerland’s 
international obligations to protect freedom of conscience and religion.481 
 476 Art. 4(1) arsiwa. Various us States’ repeated violations of foreign nationals’ rights under 
the vccr, for instance, have triggered the international responsibility of the United 
States. See icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.  United 
States), judgment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12.
 477 Switzerland has for instance added a reservation to art. 25(b) iccpr (which, inter alia, 
guarantees voting secrecy) to take into account some communal voting procedures and 
the cantonal ‘Landsgemeinden’, a secular voting tradition by show of hands still prac-
ticed in some cantons. See Federal Council, Botschaft betreffend den Beitritt zur Schweiz 
zu den beiden internationalen Menschenrechtspakten von 1966 und zu einer Änderung des 
Bundesrechtspflegegesetzes, 30 January 1991, fg 1991 i 1189, at 1201. This explains why 
Switzerland has signed, but not ratified Protocol 1 to the echr, art. 3 of which guarantees 
the right to free elections by secret ballot.
 478 On this issue, see Samuele Vorpe, ‘Das Burkaverbot im Lichte der Religionsfreiheit: Ist die 
Tessiner kantonale Verfassungsbestimmung über das Gesichtsverhüllungsverbot mit Art. 
15 bv vereinbar?’ Jusletter of 20 June 2016.
 479 Federal Council, Botschaft zur Gewährleistung der geänderten Verfassungen der Kantone 
Bern, Uri, Solothurn, Basel- Stadt, Basel- Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell 
Innerrhoden, Tessin, Waadt und Jura, 12 November 2014, fg 2014 9091, at 9110.
 480 Eg art. 15 Cst.
 481 Eg art. 9 echr and art. 18 iccpr. See however ECtHR (Grand Chamber), s.a.s. v. France, App 
No 43835/ 11 (echr Reports 2014), 1 July 2014. For an analysis of this decision, see Samantha 
Besson, ‘Human Rights Waivers and the Right to Do Wrong Under the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ in Josep Casadevall and others (eds), Mélanges en l’honneur de / Essays in 
honour of Dean Spielmann (Wolf Legal Publishers 2015). It is worth noting that in 2014, the 
ag- bs, in an exceptionally detailed ruling, confirmed the invalidity of an analogous cantonal 
constitutional initiative on these grounds. See ag- bs, judgment vg 2013.1 of 1 January 2014. 
The decision is also reported by Andreas Glaser, ‘Teil 3: Demokratische Gesetzgebung im Gle
ichheitsdilemma: Diskriminierungsverbot und Demokratie – ein Widerspruch?’ in Béatrice 
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Nonetheless, in March 2015, the proposed amendment of the Constitution 
of the canton of Ticino obtained the Federal Assembly’s seal of approval, the 
‘federal guarantee’.482 In September 2018, 66.6% of voters in the canton of St. 
Gallen accepted to enshrine a similar ban in their cantonal law. As of June 
2019, a popular vote on a federal ban on face- covering headgear was still pend-
ing.483 It is worth noting that in October 2018, the Swiss Federal Tribunal partly 
granted two appeals lodged against the cantonal law implementing the Ticino 
ban.484 The Court ordered that the law be amended so as not to disproportion-
ately harm specific constitutional rights, ie, freedom of assembly, freedom of 
expression, and economic freedom. While it mentioned the s.a.s. ruling of the 
ECtHR,485 the Swiss Federal Tribunal did not examine whether the  cantonal 
law infringed freedom of religion, as the appellants had not invoked this 
 provision.
3.2 Linguistic Diversity
From a comparative perspective, Switzerland’s linguistic diversity is notewor-
thy. It impacts Swiss judges’ activity in several respects.486
Linguistic diversity has been part of Switzerland’s cultural identity since the 
mid- 19th century.487 It is protected by Swiss constitutional law, which states 
that Switzerland has four national languages: German, French, Italian, and 
 Romansh.488 A national language can be used to address the federal authorities, 
and individuals are entitled to receive an answer in this language.489  Switzerland’s 
official languages, on the other hand, ie, German, French, and Italian,490 are the 
 482 Art. 51(2) and art. 172(2) Cst. See Federal Assembly, Bundesbeschluss über die 
Gewährleistung der geänderten Verfassungen der Kantone Bern, Uri, Solothurn, Basel- 
Stadt, Basel- Landschaft, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Tessin, Waadt 
und Jura, 11 March 2015, fg 2015 2035.
 483 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ f/ pore/ vi/ vis465.html>.
 484 bge 144 i 281.
 485 Ibid, at 3.2.
 486 Of course, linguistic diversity also influences the activity of other Swiss officials, eg qua 
criterion for the election of the members of the Federal Council (art. 175(4) Cst).
 487 Georges Lüdi, ‘Mehrsprachigkeit’, Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz / Dictionnaire histori-
que de la Suisse / Dizionario storico della Svizzera (2013) <www.hls- dhs- dss.ch/ textes/ d/ 
D24596.php>.
 488 Art. 4 Cst. On linguistic diversity and law in Switzerland, see Niccolò Raselli, ‘Langues et 
justices dans un Etat plurilingue’ (2016) Aktuelle juristische Praxis / Pratique juridique 
actuelle 639.
 489 Art. 6(3) fa- nl.
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languages in which federal legislation is published.491 All three linguistic versions 
enjoy the same legal authority.492
Linguistic diversity is one criterion for constituting the chambers of the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal.493 Legal briefs submitted to the Court must be writ-
ten in an official language,494 and judicial proceedings take place in one of 
the four national languages.495 This linguistic variety can create inconsist-
encies in the case law when a legal issue is addressed differently in proceed-
ings conducted in different languages. Judges predominantly working in a 
 specific language (as well as their clerks) might for example be biased in 
terms of the scholarship they resort to. Language can hence partly explain 
variations in the way Swiss courts interpret international law. On the other 
hand, and like judges in other multilingual States (eg Belgium, South  Africa, 
and  Canada), Swiss judges are familiar with the interpretive difficulties that 
may be triggered when legal acts are available in several authoritative lin-
guistic versions. Such linguistic discrepancies are liable to arise, mutatis 
mutandis, in the context of treay law with different, yet equally authoritative 
linguistic versions.496
3.3 The Rule of Law
Art. 5 Cst., entitled ‘rule of law’,497 was adopted in the constitutional revision 
of 1999. It codifies a previously ‘unwritten principle of Swiss constitutional 
law’498 which, according to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, ‘impregnate[s] the 
Swiss constitutional order’.499 When referring to this concept, I am addressing 
the legal principle of the rule of law. I am not looking at the moral principle 
 491 Art. 10(1) and art. 11 fa- nl.
 492 Art. 14 fa- cflfg.
 493 Art. 18(2) fa- sft.
 494 Art. 42(1) fa- sft.
 495 Art. 54(1) fa- sft. The Act refers to ‘official languages’ as including Romansh, which con-
tradicts art. 70(1) Cst.
 496 For examples of inconsistencies between different linguistic versions of a treaty, see 
bge 102 Ia 179, at 3 a) (echr); bge 83 i 16, at 3 (Refugee Convention); bge 98 ii 231, 
at 4 (Warsaw Convention). See also Marie- Louise Gächter- Alge, Mehrsprachigkeit im 
Völkervertragsrecht: Von der Ausarbeitung zur Auslegung (Difo- Druck 2011).
 497 <www.admin.ch/ opc/ en/ classified- compilation/ 19995395/ 201601010000/ 101.pdf> 
(unofficial translation).
 498 Federal Council, Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung, 20 November 1996, fg 1997 
i 1, at 131 f, with reference to bge 103 Ia 369 (see especially at 6) and bge 121 i 22 (see 
at 3 a)).
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of the rule of law, nor am I analyzing how its respective conceptualizations in 
continental500 versus common law501 jurisdictions relate.502
The Swiss constitutional principle of the rule of law is four- pronged. It pro-
vides that State activities ‘are based on and limited by law’ (para 1), that State 
action must be proportionate (para 2), that State authorities must act in good 
faith (para 3) and, finally and importantly, that the Confederation and the can-
tons must ‘respect international law’ (para 4). Art. 5(1) and (4) are particularly 
interesting from the perspective of domestic courts’ interpretation of interna-
tional law. Art. 5(1) Cst. (the principle of legality)503 requires that State author-
ities abide by the law504 and that their activity be traceable to a (sufficiently 
determinate)505 legal basis.506 It is not a self- standing constitutional right and 
must be invoked jointly with the principle of the separation of powers, the 
prohibition of arbitrariness, or specific constitutional rights, for instance.507 
 500 Scholars have used the notion of the ‘legal State’ to distinguish the continental concep-
tion of the rule of law from the rule of law as conceptualized in Anglo- American legal 
theory. See Stephan Kirste, ‘Philosophical Foundations of the Principle of the Legal State 
(Rechtsstaat) and the Rule of Law’ in James R Silkenat, James E Hickey, and Peter D 
Barenboim (eds), The Legal Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) 
(Springer 2014). Moreover, Swiss scholars differentiate between the Swiss conception of 
the rule of law (or ‘legal State’) and the principle of the ‘Rechtsstaat’ or ‘Etat de droit’ as 
articulated in continental political philosophy, see Ehrenzeller, Schindler and Schweizer (n 
382) 105. This gives credence to Kirste’s observation that the principle of the rule of law/ of 
the legal State branches out into diverse conceptions adopted by different domestic legal 
orders, based on a given State’s history and dominating moral and political philosophy.
 501 Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and Its Virtue’ (n 18); Lamond (n 206); Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule 
of Law and the Importance of Procedure’ in James Fleming (ed), Getting to the Rule of Law 
(New York University Press 2011) 5 f; Finnis (n 79) 270 f.
 502 According to Stephan Kirste, even if the historical, cultural, and ideological contexts of 
their respective emergence differ, both concepts pursue a ‘common goal’. In both cases, 
their philosophical justification lies in the protection of individual freedom. See Kirste 
(n 500). On the rule of law in international law, see Wohlwend (n 17).
 503 bge 131 ii 13, at 6.3.
 504 ‘Vorrang des Rechts’, see bge 91 i 266, at 7; bge 104 Ib 74, at 5 b) bb). See also bge 141 v 
557, at 5.2 (applicable to private individuals exercising a public function, in casu a private 
company providing compulsory health insurance services).
 505 bge 109 Ia 273, at 4 d). According to the Court, the requirement of legal determinacy 
aims at preventing that the law- applying authorities make ‘unnecessarily substantial 
value judgments’.
 506 ‘Vorbehalt des Rechts’, see bge 82 i 21, at 3 a); bge 106 Ia 277, at 3 d). Regarding taxes 
and fees: bge 95 i 243, at 4 a); bge 83 i 81, at 5; bge 84 i 89, at 2. See however bge 
112 Ia 18, at 3 b). On these two aspects, see Federal Council, Botschaft über eine neue 
Bundesverfassung, 20 November 1996, fg 1997 i 1, at 132.
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Art. 5(4) (the principle of the international rule of law)508 requires that State 
authorities (including courts) ‘respect’ (and, though not explicitly stated, 
apply)509 international law. The provision has regularly been invoked by the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal to highlight the applicability of international law and 
to justify its supremacy over domestic law.510
The constitutional principle of the rule of law is complemented by the 
prohibition of arbitrariness (art. 9 Cst.) and the principle of good faith (art. 
5(3) and 9 Cst.). Arbitrariness, which art. 9 Cst. prohibits, is, according to the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal, ‘the negation of [the] principle [of the rule of law]’.511 
 Another concretization of the constitutional principle of the rule of law is the 
right of individuals to have their case reviewed by an independent, impartial 
court.512 All these provisions apply to and constrain Swiss courts’ interpreta-
tion of international law. It is worth noting that judicial independence, impar-
tiality, and respect for the law are also mandated by Switzerland’s international 
obligations, especially art. 6 echr and art. 14 iccpr. Litigants often invoke 
them jointly with domestic constitutional law before Swiss courts.513
3.4 Semi- Direct Democracy
Switzerland is a semi- direct democracy. Its political structure is characterized 
by elements of direct and representative democracy, both at the cantonal and 
federal level. It is especially due to its mechanisms of direct democracy – on 
which I  focus in this subsection – that the Swiss political system stands out 
from a comparative perspective.
On the federal plane, instruments of direct democracy include the popular 
initiative and the referendum. It is important to stress that the word ‘referen-
dum’ has a specific meaning under Swiss law that differs from the usage of 
this term in scholarship outside Switzerland. Popular initiatives give Swiss vot-
ers the possibility to request a total or partial revision of the Constitution.514 
Mandatory and optional referenda require or allow voters to decide certain 
issues in a popular vote.515 Referenda are required, inter alia, in the con-
text of ‘accession to organizations for collective security or to supranational 
 508 Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer (n 382) 130.
 509 See ibid.
 510 bge 139 i 16, at 5.1.
 511 ECtHR, Al- Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, App No 5809/ 08 (echr 
Reports 2016), 21 June 2016, para 145.
 512 Art. 30(1) Cst; see also art. 29, 29a, and art. 191c Cst.
 513 bge 137 i 128, at 4; bge 133 ii 450, at 7.3.
 514 Art. 138 f Cst.
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communities’.516 Both the referendum and the popular initiative also exist at 
the cantonal and subcantonal level. The cantons of Geneva,517 Zurich,518 Basel- 
Stadt,519 and Bern520 (the case law of which is included in this study, see infra, 
4.1.2) all provide for mandatory and optional referenda, popular constitutional 
initiatives, and popular legislative initiatives, both at the cantonal and at the 
municipal level. Some of these cantonal instruments are even designed to ad-
dress issues of international law.521
On the one hand, scholars point out that governments can ‘lock in’ domes-
tic constituencies by entering into treaties from which these constituencies 
cannot opt out.522 On the other hand, recent examples show that referenda, 
even if they are not binding from the perspective of international law, influ-
ence the relationship between the domestic legal order and international law. 
They can even lead to a renegotiation of (or to a withdrawal from) treaties. 
The ‘Brexit’ vote of 23 June 2016 (which, in and of itself, is not even legally 
binding under uk law) is a case in point. Another example is Swiss voters’ 
decision, on 9 February 2014, to introduce a cap on foreign immigration.523 
The outcome of this vote conflicts with the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons.
Federal popular initiatives increasingly challenge Switzerland’s  international 
obligations. Out of the 22 constitutional initiatives accepted by Swiss voters 
(status as of June 2019), the first of which dates back to 1893, 10 were adopted 
between 2002 and 2014.524 Some of these votes have modified Switzerland’s 
foreign relations in a fundamental way. On 3 March 2002, for instance, Swiss 
voters approved Switzerland’s accession to the un.525 Other votes have created 
tensions with the State’s obligations on the international plane, eg the 2004 
 516 Art. 140(1)(b) Cst.
 517 Art. 56 ff Cst- ge.
 518 Art. 22 ff Cst- zh.
 519 Art. 44 ff Cst- bs.
 520 Art. 55 ff Cst- be.
 521 Art. 23(e) Cst- zh, for instance, provides that popular initiatives can request that negoti-
ations be started regarding the conclusion, amendment, or termination of an intercan-
tonal or international agreement that is subject to a referendum.
 522 Tom Ginsburg, ‘Locking in Democracy:  Constitutions, Commitment, and International 
Law’ (2006) 38 nyu Journal of International Law and Politics 707, 712.
 523 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ f/ pore/ vi/ vis413.html>.
 524 See also Council of States, Political Institutions Committee, Requirements as Regards the 
Validity of Popular Initiatives, Analysis of the Need for Reform, fg 2015 7099, at 7102. For 
a similar diagnosis: Cesla Amarelle, ‘Législation au forceps et sous la pression du temps à 
la lumière des initiatives populaires’ (2014) 25 LeGes 419.
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vote in favor of the ‘life- long imprisonment of extremely dangerous and non- 
reformable criminals’,526 or the 2009 ban on the construction of minarets.527
One reason for this trend is the extremely deferential review exercised by 
the Federal Assembly when it examines the substantive validity of constitu-
tional popular initiatives.528 Initiatives must be declared invalid ‘in whole or 
in part’ if they violate ‘the requirements of consistency of form, and of subject 
matter, or […] mandatory provisions of international law’.529 Moreover, they 
cannot be manifestly impracticable.530 Since the creation of the constitutional 
initiative, in 1891, the Federal Assembly declared a popular initiative invalid as 
a whole only four times,531 and only once because it considered that an initia-
tive breached mandatory provisions of international law.532 It partially invali-
dated the ‘enforcement initiative’ due to its narrow definition of jus cogens.533 
Several proposals to reform the conditions of the validity of constitutional in-
itiatives have been rejected by the Federal Assembly, including proposals to 
involve the Swiss Federal Tribunal via advisory opinions.534 It is worth noting 
that in a landmark case decided in April 2019, the Court invalidated a federal 
 526 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ f/ pore/ vi/ vis294.html>. The vote challenges procedural guarantees 
protected, inter alia, by art. 5(4) echr.
 527 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ f/ pore/ vi/ vis353.html>. This ban is problematic from the perspec-
tive of art. 9 echr, among other provisions.
 528 Other reasons identified by the Political Institutions Committee of the Council of States 
include societal tensions, the use of popular initiatives for electoral purposes, and the 
expansion of the scope of international law binding upon Switzerland. See fg 2015 7099, 
at 7113.
 529 Art. 139(3) Cst. See also art. 98 fa- fa.
 530 Giovanni Biaggini, bv Kommentar:  Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenos-
senschaft (2nd edn, Orell Füssli 2017) 1098 f.
 531 Ie, the initiative for the ‘temporary reduction of military expenditures (weaponry truce)’ 
(1955), the initiative against ‘high costs of living and inflation’ (1977), and the initiative 
for ‘lower military expenditures and a stronger peace policy’ (1995). I  am indebted to 
Camilla Jacquemoud for her input on this topic.
 532 In 1996, the Federal Assembly invalidated the initiative for a ‘reasonable asylum pol-
icy’ (Federal Assembly, Federal Decree on the Popular Initiative ‘For A Reasonable Asylum 
Policy’, 14 March 1996, fg 1996 i 1355).
 533 Federal Assembly, Federal Decree on the Popular Initiative ‘For the Enforcement of the 
Expulsion of Foreign Criminals (Enforcement Initiative)’, 20 March 2015, fg 2015 2701.
 534 Council of States, Political Institutions Committee, Requirements as Regards the Validity 
of Popular Initiatives, Analysis of the Need for Reform, fg 2015 7099, at 7111 f. The Federal 
Assembly and the Federal Council considered that entrusting the Court with such a 
role would interfere with the separation of powers and introduce constitutional review 
through the backdoor: fg 2015 7099, at 7111 f. See also Federal Council, 2010 Report on 
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popular vote for the first time in its history, on the grounds that the federal 
government had provided incorrect information ahead of the vote.535
A range of initiatives have explicitly addressed Switzerland’s relationship to 
international law. Examples include the (unsuccessful) initiative requiring a pop-
ular vote for the ratification of specific international treaties,536 or the (equally 
unsuccessful) initiative on ‘self- determination’, which proposed to introduce 
the supremacy of Swiss constitutional law over international law, except for 
 mandatory provisions of international law.537 Some proposals did not gather the 
required number of signatures to be put to vote, eg the initiative on Swiss neu-
trality,538 the initiative ‘for an eu accession moratorium’, which demanded that 
no negotiations on eu accession be conducted for at least ten years,539 and yet 
another initiative requesting that the udhr be part of the Swiss Constitution.540
In recent years, political parties and interest groups have used the instru-
ments of direct democracy in ways that have tended to exacerbate the tensions 
between Swiss law and international law. These tensions also come to the fore 
in cases brought before Swiss courts. The political sensitivity of these issues 
makes it even more important that Swiss courts, when they interpret interna-
tional law, respect its interpretative methods, and that they reason predictably, 
clearly, and consistently.
3.5 The Federal Assembly qua ‘Supreme Authority of the Confederation’
An important feature of the Swiss case law is that courts tend to defer to the  federal 
legislature (the Federal Assembly), be it with regard to domestic legal issues or 
with regard to international law (on this last point, see also infra, 4.2.2.2). Indeed, 
the Swiss Constitution provides that ‘[s] ubject to the rights of the People and the 
Cantons, the Federal Assembly is the supreme authority of the Confederation’.541
The bicameral structure542 of the Federal Assembly is inspired by the us 
political system. While the National Council543 represents the interests of 
the people (its 200 seats being allocated proportionally to the Swiss cantons’ 
 535 BGer, judgment 1C_ 338/ 2018 of 10 April 2019 (to be published in the official compen-
dium). See also BGer, judgments 1C_ 315/ 2018, 1C_ 316/ 2018, 1C_ 329/ 2018, 1C_ 331/ 
2018, 1C_ 335/ 2018, 1C_ 337/ 2018, 1C_ 339/ 2018, and 1C_ 347/ 2018 of 10 April 2019.
 536 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis363.html>.
 537 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis460t.html>.
 538 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis416.html>.
 539 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis395.html>.
 540 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis389.html>.
 541 Art. 148(1) Cst.
 542 Art. 148(2) Cst.
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respective populations), the Council of States544 encompasses two repre-
sentatives per canton (and, if applicable, one per half- canton). In addition to 
adopting federal acts,545 the Federal Assembly appoints high officials at the 
federal level,546 and it exercises oversight over the other federal branches.547 
It is tasked with various further issues (eg taking measures to enforce federal 
law, and ruling on the validity of popular initiatives),548 and it has other resid-
ual federal powers not entrusted to any other federal authority.549 One major 
expression of the supremacy of the federal legislature is that federal acts are 
immune from judicial review550 (see also supra, 2.2.2).
Considering this legislative supremacy, Swiss courts usually show defer-
ence towards the federal legislature, even when federal acts appear to violate 
 constitutional or international law. This is in stark contrast to courts’ activism in 
other States with constitutional review. Moreover, considerations of democratic 
legitimacy frequently surface in Swiss rulings.551 The Swiss Federal Tribunal has 
stressed that judicial proceedings be transparent, so that court decisions are sub-
ject to a ‘democratic check’.552 In a cantonal case pertaining to life- long intern-
ment, the President of the District Court of Weinfelden is reported to have stated 
that the court ‘must respect the will of the people and is prohibited from circum-
venting it with legal tricks and stratagems’.553 As I will emphasize, another mani-
festation of the importance accorded to democratic legitimacy is that Swiss  judges 
are appointed by the legislature or, in some cases, by the people (infra, 4.2.4).
Democratic legitimacy should be a pivotal concern for Swiss judges  given 
the commitment of the Swiss legal order to democratic principles. This 
 544 Art. 150 Cst.
 545 Art. 163 ff Cst.
 546 Art. 168(1) Cst.
 547 Art. 169 Cst.
 548 Art. 173(1) Cst.
 549 Art. 173(2) Cst.
 550 Art. 190 Cst.
 551 bge 125 i 119, at 3 d); bge 125 i 209, at 8 a) (comparing the requirements in terms of 
impartiality of members of the executive, on the one hand, and of judges, subject to art. 
6(1) echr, on the other hand); bge 131 i 333, at 4.3, and bge 135 i 233, at 2.1 (on the 
required democratic legitimacy of a municipal legislative act). Constitutional provisions 
enjoy a high degree of democratic legitimacy due to their enactment procedure, see bge 
133 i 110, at 6.2. Democratic legitimacy is also very often mentioned by the Court in 
relation to the freedom of vote, see for instance in bge 140 i 394, at 8.2.
 552 bge 139 i 129, at 3.3.
 553 Alex Baur, ‘Wenn Juristen das Recht biegen’ Die Weltwoche (2010) 
<www.weltwoche.ch/ ausgaben/ 2010_ 48/ artikel/ artikel- 2010- 48- kommentar- wenn- 





















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
Interpreting International Law in Context 97
commitment is also reflected in some of Switzerland’s international obliga-
tions, especially in the echr. On the other hand, as is well known, democratic 
legitimacy is not the sole vector of political legitimacy. Democracy requires 
to be complemented by fundamental rights, some of which are protected by 
international law. Otherwise, democracy becomes tyrannical. When weighing 
these potentially conflicting considerations, and given the sensitivity of the is-
sue, judges may be tempted to give in to political pressure. To mitigate this risk, 
lawful and high- quality judicial reasoning is key (infra, Chapter 5).
4 The Swiss Judiciary
The domestic judicial practice of international law cannot be fully grasped 
without at least a basic understanding of the domestic judicial system under 
scrutiny. After clarifying the structure of the Swiss judiciary (4.1), I flesh out the 
most relevant characteristics of Swiss courts’ activity from the perspective of 
the topic of this book (4.2).
4.1 The Structure of the Swiss Judiciary
In this subsection, I explain how the Swiss judiciary is structured, both on the 
federal level (4.1.1) and in the four cantons which I use as case studies (4.1.2). 
These remarks will help us understand the legal powers and characteristics of 
various Swiss courts, and why these courts’ case law is of interest to a study 
about international law.
4.1.1 Federal Courts
Besides the Swiss Federal Tribunal (4.1.1.1), the Swiss federal judiciary554 encom-
passes the Federal Administrative Court (4.1.1.2), the Federal Criminal Court 
(4.1.1.3), and the Federal Patent Court. Due to its narrow jurisdiction555 and to the 
marginal relevance of international law to its activity, the Patent Court is left out of 
this book. The case law of the two other judicial bodies is considered to the extent 
that it provides insights into international legal issues. Because of the  relatively 
young age of these two bodies, the number of available cases is significantly 
limited compared to those of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. I do not consider the 
decisions of appeals commissions (or other quasi- judicial bodies) subsequently 
replaced by courts in the course of the reform of the judiciary in the early 2000s.
 554 <www.eidgenoessischegerichte.ch>.













Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
98 Chapter 3
4.1.1.1 The Swiss Federal Tribunal
In this book, I often highlight the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, al-
though the decisions of other federal (infra, 4.1.1.2 and 4.1.1.3), cantonal ( infra, 
4.1.2), and military courts (infra, 4.1.3) are also taken into account (see  especially 
Chapters 7 and 8, infra). I emphasize the case law of the ‘supreme judicial au-
thority of the Confederation’556 for several reasons.
First, while all Swiss courts have jurisdiction over international legal issues 
and are hence liable to trigger the State’s international responsibility, the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal arguably enjoys the highest interpretive authority on the do-
mestic plane. It is also the most authoritative expression of the Swiss practice of 
international law, at least as regards the interpretation of federal law (a notion 
which, under Swiss law, includes international law).557 This should not detract 
from the fact that other federal courts (and federal authorities) have the same 
legal authority to interpret federal law, unless the Swiss Federal Tribunal acts 
within its powers to review their decisions. Second, the case law of the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal spans over many decades, contrary to that of other federal courts 
established in the early 2000s. The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s practice is hence par-
ticularly suited to an in- depth and representative analysis. A third reason is the 
breadth of the Court’s jurisdiction, which explains the richness of its case law 
from the perspective of international law. Lastly, from a practical perspective, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law is easily accessible, and the Court has the 
most elaborate search engine of all Swiss courts (see Chapters 7 and 8, infra).
As regards its internal organization, the Court has seven chambers (or divi-
sions). Two of them specialize in public law, two in civil law, one in criminal 
law, and two in social insurance law.558 While international law is particularly 
likely to be invoked in public law cases, the other chambers are frequently 
confronted with such issues as well.559 The Swiss Federal Tribunal counts 38 
full- time judges and 19 part- time judges. Judges are elected by the Federal As-
sembly (see also infra, 4.2.4).560 Any individual holding the right to vote at the 
federal level is eligible.561 Federal judges serve for a six- year term.562 They can 
 556 Art. 188(1) Cst.
 557 Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer (n 382) 1044.
 558 <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- gericht/ federal- gerichts- 
abteilungen.htm>.
 559 Eg bge 136 iii 168. See also Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through 
an Empirical Lens:  The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Practice of International Law in 
Figures’ (n 5).
 560 Art. 5(1) fa- sft, art. 135 fa- fa.
 561 Art. 5(2) fa- sft; art. 136(1) Cst.
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be reelected an unlimited number of times, until they reach the age of 68.563 
As of June 2019, the Court employed 153 law clerks.564
I analyze the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to international legal issues in 
subsection section 4.2.1 (infra).
4.1.1.2 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court (sfac) started its activity in 2007. It 
was created as part of the reform of the Swiss judiciary, in 2000.565
The Court is divided into six chambers. The third chamber (which handles 
cases dealing with social insurance and public health), the fourth and fifth 
chambers (which examine asylum law cases), and the sixth chamber (which 
deals with cases pertaining to the legislation on foreign nationals) are particu-
larly significant for present purposes. However, all chambers are liable to be 
confronted with international legal issues. The judges are elected by the Fed-
eral Assembly for a six- year term.566 At the end of 2018, the Court counted 76 
judges, who were assisted by 238 clerks.567
The Court has jurisdiction to review challenges against the decisions of spe-
cific federal authorities.568 Such decisions sometimes pertain to Swiss foreign 
relations and to Switzerland’s international obligations. Violations of (directly 
applicable) international legal acts are ‘violations of federal law’ that can be ap-
pealed to the Court.569 The Court’s case law can be expected to provide insights 
into the interpretation of international immigration and refugee law, dtas, and 
various other bilateral agreements (eg treaties on the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, and treaties on mutual legal assistance).
4.1.1.3 The Swiss Federal Criminal Court
The Swiss Federal Criminal Court (sfcc) started its activity in 2004. Like the 
sfac, it was established in the context of the reform of the Swiss judiciary.570
 563 Art. 9(2) fa- sft.
 564 <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- richter/ federal- richter- 
gerichtsschreiber.htm>.
 565 Art. 191a(2) Cst.
 566 Art. 5(1) and art. 9(1) fa- sfac.
 567 See the sfac’s annual report for 2018, <www.bvger.ch/ bvger/ fr/ home/ le- tribunal- 
administratif- federal/ rapports- de- gestion.html>.
 568 Art. 5 fa- fap; art. 31 ff fa- sfac.
 569 Art. 49(a) fa- fap. Eg Elias Hofstetter and Oliver Zibung, ‘Art. 49’ in Bernhard Waldmann 
and Philippe Weissenberger (eds), Praxiskommentar zum Bundesgesetz über das 
Verwaltungsverfahren (Schulthess 2009) 977.
 570 On this reform, see Federal Council, Botschaft zur Totalrevision der Bundesrechtspflege, 
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The Court is divided into a Criminal Law Chamber and an Appellate Cham-
ber. As of June 2019, the Court was staffed by 20 regular judges571 and 10 sub-
stitute judges.572 The judges are elected by the Federal Assembly for a six- year 
term.573
The sfcc574 has jurisdiction over several international legal issues, includ-
ing claims pertaining to international legal assistance575 and violations of icl, 
ihl, and ihrl.576 Its case law can especially provide insights into the interpre-
tation of cil and into specific substantive areas of international law, such as 
the law of immunities.
4.1.2 Selected Cantonal Courts
As previously mentioned, Switzerland is a federal State that counts 26 can-
tons (supra, 3.1). The cantons have their own political and legal institutions, 
including their own judiciary, usually composed of several district courts and 
of a cantonal supreme court. The decisions of cantonal courts can only be re-
viewed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal on specific grounds, which include al-
leged violations of federal and international law.577
International legal scholarship dealing with the case law of lower courts 
is scarce. International lawyers typically focus on the decisions of higher do-
mestic courts. They likely do so because of the greater interpretive authority of 
these decisions from the perspective of domestic law and, hence, qua expres-
sion of the State’s practice on international law,578 especially when these higher 
courts overrule the decisions of lower courts on issues of international law.579 
international law into account, ‘the implementation of which is increasingly part of the 
tasks of the Swiss judge’ (ibid 4475). By creating an appeal in federal criminal matters, 
Switzerland was able to withdraw its reservation to art. 14(5) of the iccpr and to respect 
the requirements of art. 2 of Protocol 7 to the echr. See ibid at 4476.
 571 <www.bstger.ch/ de/ il- tribunale/ giudici/ elenco- giudici- penali- federali.html>.
 572 <www.bstger.ch/ de/ il- tribunale/ giudici/ elenco- giudici- supplenti.html>.
 573 Art. 42(1) and 48(1) fa- ofca.
 574 <www.bstger.ch>.
 575 Art. 37(2)(a) fa- ofca.
 576 Art. 23 f of the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code of 5 October 2007 (sr 312.0).
 577 Art. 95(b) fa- sft. See also Federal Council, Botschaft zur Totalrevision der 
Bundesrechtspflege, 28 February 2001, fg 2001 4202, at 4335.
 578 ilc, ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Special 
Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (2014) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 672 25, para 41 e.
 579 One example is the decision of the Greek Supreme Court in Distomo, stating that Germany 
enjoyed no State immunity for war crimes. The decision was subsequently overruled by 
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Moreover, in some States, scholars note that international law is more often 
invoked in the higher courts than at the lower levels.580
Ignoring lower courts is unjustified, however. First, not all lower court cases 
dealing with international law reach the highest courts, either because these 
courts lack jurisdiction or simply because no appeal is lodged.581
Second, lower courts play an important role in the implementation of 
 federal law and, hence, of at least some areas of international law, eg ihrl.582 
A  related reason that justifies consulting the case law of lower courts is its 
quantitative importance compared to that of higher courts: a significant share 
of a State’s ‘judicial business’ is conducted in the lower courts.583
Third, lower courts’ case law is of interest when it departs from the estab-
lished case law in a given State or on the international plane. Although such 
unorthodox rulings are unlikely to speak authoritatively for the State and, 
hence, to contribute to State practice on the international plane, they can 
influence the case law of other courts in later cases. As highlighted by Louis 
Brandeis, federal subunits are analogous to ‘laboratories’ where experimenta-
tions are (for better or worse) carried out.584 As a matter of fact, Simonetta 
Stirling- Zanda, in her analysis of the determination of cil in selected Euro-
pean courts, observes that lower courts are often ‘bolder and more progres-
sive’ in their reasoning than higher courts.585 In Switzerland, for instance, the 
Administrative Court of the canton of St. Gallen has adopted a particularly 
international law- friendly approach to the issue of reverse discrimination of 
The icj concluded that Distomo was of ‘limited precendential value’, Petersen (n 73) 20. 
See icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening), judg-
ment, icj Reports 2012, 3 February 2012, 99, at 134, para 76.
 580 Hegde (n 46) 56.
 581 As David Zaring notes with regard to the us judiciary, many scholars focus on the appli-
cation of international law by the us Supreme Court although ‘[t] he chance that any case 
will end up in the Supreme Court […] is today infinitesimal’. David Zaring, ‘The Use of 
Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis’ (2006) 3 Journal of Empirical 
Legal Studies 297, 305. See also ilc, ‘Fifth Report on Identification of Customary 
International Law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur’ (n 295) 25 f para 56.
 582 Samantha Besson and Eva Maria Belser (eds), La Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme et les cantons / Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die Kantone 
(Schulthess 2014).
 583 See (for the United States): Thomas R Phillips, ‘State Supreme Courts: Local Courts in a 
Global World’ (2003) 38 Texas International Law Journal 557, 557.
 584 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 u.s. 262 (1932), at 311. This expression has also been 
used in Swiss legal scholarship, see for instance Hertig Randall and Chatton (n 441) 405 f.
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Swiss nationals.586 Of course, the highest court of a legal order may set limits 
on these idiosyncratic interpretations to secure hermeneutic uniformity.
Fourth, although fact- finding is not the focus of this study,587 it is impor-
tant to note that lower courts play an important role in establishing the facts 
of a case, while higher courts usually review them under narrow circumstances 
only.588
Fifth, even when it does not deal with issues of international law, the case 
law of federal subunits can be of interest because federalism relies on concepts 
that also exist, mutatis mutandis, at the international level. Examples include 
the principle of subsidiarity, self- determination, and territorial integrity, and 
cases pertaining to intercantonal agreements.589
In light of these reasons, the present analysis includes the decisions of 
Swiss cantonal courts to the extent they are relevant from the viewpoint of 
international law.590 For reasons of feasibility, I have focused on the decisions 
of the highest courts of the cantons of Geneva (4.1.2.1),591 Zurich (4.1.2.2),592 
Basel- Stadt (4.1.2.3),593 and Bern (4.1.2.4).594 This choice is due to these can-
tons’ demographic and socio- economic importance, but also to the existence 
of ios, diplomatic representations, and multinational corporations on their 
territory. Hence, international law can be expected to have practical relevance 
in these cantonal jurisdictions. Moreover, most of the recent595 case law of the 
highest courts of these cantons is accessible online in full- text mode, even if 
 586 The Court has made a teleological interpretation of art. 42(2) fa- fn, inter alia in light of 
art. 8 and 14 echr. See VwGer- sg, decision B 2011/ 74 of 6 July 2011 (published in gvp 
2011:1), at 2.8.
 587 Of course, as I will emphasize, the interpretation of many international legal acts requires 
an empirical inquiry, eg to ascertain State practice and opinio juris (Chapter 8, infra). This 
specific fact- finding role of courts will be considered.
 588 Regarding Switzerland, see art. 97 fa- sft.
 589 In Switzerland, for example, the efforts of some separatist forces in the canton of Bern to 
join the canton of Jura raise issues in terms of the right to self- determination and of the 
territorial integrity of the Swiss cantons. See bge 117 Ia 233, at 4 c).
 590 See the list of cantonal courts available at <www.bger.ch/ fr/ index/ press/ press- inherit- 
template/ press- jurisdiction- links/ press- jurisdiction- links- gerichte- schweiz.htm>.
 591 <ge.ch/ justice/ cour- de- justice>.
 592 <www.gerichte- zh.ch/ entscheide/ entscheide- anzeigen.html>.
 593 <www.rechtsprechung.gerichte- bs.ch>.
 594 <www.justice.be.ch/ justice/ de/ index/ entscheide/ entscheide_ rechtsprechung/ 
entscheide.html>, <www.openjustitia.apps.be.ch/ alfresco/ extension/ openjustitia/ search/ 
advanced/ search.xhtml> (for the oger- be and VwGer- be, respectively).
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the searches can be laborious due to the characteristics of some cantonal da-
tabases.596 The case law of other cantonal and district courts was not surveyed 
systematically. It was occasionally considered based on case reports published 
in Swiss legal journals, and based on search results in the Swisslex database.597
The following subsections briefly describe the structure and functioning of 
the aforementioned cantonal courts.
4.1.2.1 The Supreme Court of the Canton of Geneva
The Supreme Court (Cour de justice) is the highest court of the canton of 
 Geneva. It is divided into a Civil Law, a Criminal Law, and a Public Law Di-
vision, which all encompass various subdivisions. Recent rulings can be ac-
cessed online,598 although the dates from which this case law is available vary 
from one subdivision to the other.599
As of June 2019, the Supreme Court was staffed by 37 regular judges.600 
 Judges in the canton of Geneva are elected by the people,601 except for labor 
court judges, who are elected by the cantonal parliament.602 Judges serve for 
a six- year term.603
4.1.2.2 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich
The High Court (Obergericht) is the highest court of the canton of Zurich 
in civil and criminal matters.604 It is divided into two Civil Law and three 
 596 One example is the Supreme Court of the canton of Geneva, which is divided into various 
divisions (‘cours’) and chambers (‘chambres’). When performing a keyword search, the 
search must be conducted separately for each subdivison. Another difficulty is that can-
tonal databases do not recognize the grammatical variations of a given keyword.
 597 <swisslex.ch>.
 598 <ge.ch/ justice/ dans- la- jurisprudence>.
 599 Civil Law Court:  Civil Law Chamber (since 2004), Labor Tribunal (since 1998), 
Tenancy Law Tribunal (since 2007), Chamber of Surveillance in Matters Pertaining to 
the Commercial Register and to the Land Register, to the Tribunal for the Protection 
of Children and Adults and to the Former Guardianship Court (since 2007), Chamber 
of Surveillance in Matters of Debt Collection and Bankruptcy (since 2004), Lawyers’ 
Taxation Commission (since 2007). Criminal Court: Criminal Law Chamber (since 2007), 
Criminal Appeals Chamber (since 2011), Indictment Chamber (since 2007), Board of 
Appeals and Revisions (since 2011).
 600 <ge.ch/ justice/ sites/ default/ files/ justice/ common/ listes/ magistrats/ Magistrats_ CJ.pdf>. 
Figures on the judiciary of the canton of Geneva are also available at <ge.ch/ justice/ 
magistrats>.
 601 Art. 122(1) Cst- ge.
 602 Art. 123(1) Cst- ge.
 603 Art. 122(1) Cst- ge.
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Criminal Law Chambers. As of January 2019, the High Court counted 44 reg-
ular judges.605
The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) adjudicates disputes in pub-
lic law matters.606 It encompasses four specialized divisions. As of June 2019, 
it was staffed by 14 regular judges.607 All judges are elected by the  cantonal 
parliament and serve for a six- year term.608
4.1.2.3 The Court of Appeals of the Canton of Basel- Stadt
The Court of Appeals (Appellationsgericht) is the highest judicial body in the can-
ton of Basel- Stadt in civil, criminal, administrative, and constitutional matters.609
As of June 2019, 8 presiding judges and 14 part- time judges were serving on 
the Court.610 Presiding judges are elected by the people.611 Part- time judges are 
chosen by the cantonal parliament.612 Judges serve for a six- year term.613
4.1.2.4 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Bern
The High Court (Obergericht) is the highest court in civil and criminal matters 
in the canton of Bern.614 As of June 2019, it encompassed 22 regular judges.615 
Regular judges are elected by the cantonal parliament for a six- year term.616
The Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) is the highest cantonal court 
in public law matters.617 It is divided into three chambers, which deal with ad-
ministrative law, social insurance law, and cases in French, respectively (the can-
ton of Bern is bilingual). As of June 2019, 19 regular judges were serving on the 
Court.618 All judges are elected by the cantonal parliament for a six- year term.619
 605 See the Court’s annual report for 2018, available at <www.gerichte- zh.ch/ fileadmin/ 
user_ upload/ Dokumente/ obergericht/ Rechenschaftsberichte/ Rechenschaftsbericht_ 
2018.pdf>.
 606 See Art. 1 of the Verwaltungsrechtspflegegesetz of the canton of Zurich of 24 May 1959.
 607 <www.vgr.zh.ch/ internet/ verwaltungsgericht/ de/ ueber_ uns/ organisation.html>.
 608 Art. 75(1) and 41(2) Cst- zh.
 609 Art. 117(1) Cst- bs.
 610 <www.appellationsgericht.bs.ch/ ueber- das- gericht/ gerichtspraesidien.html> and <www. 
appellationsgericht.bs.ch/ ueber- das- gericht/ richterinnen.html>.
 611 Art. 44(1)(d) Cst- bs.
 612 Art. 89(1) Cst- bs.
 613 Art. 73(2) Cst- bs.
 614 Art. 98(1)(b) and art. 99(1)(e) Cst- be.
 615 <bit.ly/ 2W9YFfP>.
 616 Art. 77(1)(d) and (e) Cst- be.
 617 Art. 100(1) Cst- be.
 618 <bit.ly/ 2I15O8t>.
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4.1.3 Military Tribunals
Besides the decisions of federal and cantonal courts, it is important not to 
overlook the rulings of military tribunals, which adjudicate disputes pursuant 
to military law.
In Switzerland, which has a militia army primarily composed of conscripts 
and volunteers,620 the Swiss Criminal Code does not apply to offences subject 
to military criminal law.621 Offences that fall under the Swiss Military Criminal 
Code (smcc) can be prosecuted regardless of where they have been commit-
ted.622 Offences criminalized by the smcc include violations of the neutrality 
of Switzerland,623 other acts undermining military security, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.624 Decisions of military tribunals are hence 
liable to provide insights into the interpretation of ihl, icl, and ihrl.625
The Swiss military justice system includes eight military tribunals of first in-
stance, three military courts of appeal and, at the top of the hierarchy, the Mil-
itary Court of Cassation (mcc). In this book, I primarily consider the decisions 
of the mcc which have been published on the website of the Swiss authorities 
since 2006.626 Exceptionally, I rely on the decisions of lower military tribunals.
Members of the military justice system must be officers in the army and, in 
principle, have graduated in law.627 Judges serving on the lower military tri-
bunals are appointed by the Federal Council for a four- year term.628 Appoint-
ments to the mcc are made by the Federal Assembly for a four- year term.629
4.2 Characteristics of Swiss Courts’ Interpretative Activity
In this subsection, my goal is to capture features of Swiss courts’ interpre-
tative activity that illuminate the legal context of courts’ interpretation of 
 620 Art. 58(1) Cst.
 621 Art. 9(1) SCrimC. Art. 3– 8 S smcc clarify which persons are subject to military 
criminal law.
 622 Art. 10(1) SCrimC.
 623 Art. 92 f SCrimC.
 624 See Chapters 5, 6, and 6bis, respectively.
 625 Eg mcc, N. and Auditor v. Military Appeals Tribunal 1A, judgment of 27 April 2001, dmc 
Vol 12 No 21; mcc, Auditor v. Divisional Tribunal 1, judgment of 5 September 1997, dmc 
Vol 12 No 4. Most relevant rulings are available at <www.icrc.org/ applic/ ihl/ ihl- nat.nsf/ 
vwLawsByCategorySelected.xsp?xp_ countrySelected=CH>.
 626 <ww.oa.admin.ch/ de/ entscheidungen- militaerjustiz.html>. I  excluded the more 
comprehen sive database (<eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/ view/ delivery/ 41BIG_ INST/ 12329 
504630001791#main- carousel>) for reasons of scope.
 627 Art. 2(1) Swiss Military Criminal Procedure Code of 23 March 1979 (sr 322.1).
 628 Ibid, art. 7(1) and art. 11(1).
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international law. These features include courts’ jurisdiction over interna-
tional legal issues (4.2.1), the extent to which they defer to the other branches 
(4.2.2),630 courts’ duties as regards the interpretation of international law 
(4.2.3),631 the procedure pertaining to judges’ appointment (4.2.4) and to the 
drafting of their judgments (4.2.5), the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s so- called ‘prag-
matic methodological pluralism’ (4.2.6) and, finally, the legal authority of judi-
cial law in the Swiss legal order (4.2.7).
4.2.1 Jurisdiction Over International Legal Issues
The jurisdiction of federal courts other than the Swiss Federal Tribunal has 
been examined in subsections 4.1.1.2 and 4.1.1.3 (supra). Cantonal laws do not 
exclude the jurisdiction of cantonal courts over international legal issues. The 
most detailed laws on Swiss courts’ jurisdiction over international legal issues 
concern the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
While the Swiss Federal Tribunal has general jurisdiction over international 
legal issues (supra, 4.1.1.1), there are exceptions to this principle. Some issues 
that may trigger the application of international law are outside the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The Swiss Constitution provides that acts of the Federal Council 
and of the Federal Assembly cannot in principle632 be reviewed by the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal.633 These acts, according to the Court, are ‘essentially politi-
cal decisions’.634 A jurisdictional exclusion also applies to decisions in matters 
pertaining to foreign relations and is hence likely to involve questions of inter-
national law. The Federal Act on the Swiss Federal Tribunal further clarifies the 
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction.635
 630 See already Besson and Ammann (n 60) 40.
 631 See also ibid 32.
 632 See however bge 125 ii 417, at 4 b) (where the Court reviewed the compatibility of a 
confiscation order of the Federal Council with art. 6(1) echr).
 633 Art. 189(4) fa- sft.
 634 bge 134 v 443, at 3.1.
 635 Art. 83 fa- sft. Appeals in public law matters are inadmissible if they deal with specific 
foreign relations matters or international legal issues, including decisions affecting the 
State’s external security, neutrality, diplomatic protection, and other issues pertaining 
to foreign relations, except where international law establishes a right that the issue be 
adjudicated by a court ((a); see also bge 132 i 229, at 6.1). Decisions on international 
administrative assistance are also outside the Court’s jurisdiction, with the exception of 
administrative assistance in fiscal matters ((h); see also art. 84a). Appeals against deci-
sions pertaining to international assistance in criminal matters are admissible only in 
specific cases and if these cases are deemed ‘particularly important’, eg when the pro-
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Swiss courts have not developed an elaborate approach to their own ju-
risdiction, analogous to the political question doctrine636 or the act of State 
doctrine637 of us and uk courts.638 These doctrines state the conditions un-
der which courts can review the acts of other domestic authorities or other 
States. The Swiss Federal Tribunal considers that the notion of ‘other matters 
pertaining to foreign affairs’639 (which are outside its jurisdiction) must be 
interpreted narrowly. On the other hand, it has noted that the executive en-
joys a wide margin of appreciation to defend the State’s interests domestically 
and abroad, and that it has the sole responsibility for decisions taken in this 
area.640
Swiss courts have refused to review some claims by resorting to specific 
judicial strategies (or ‘avoidance doctrines’, as Eyal Benvenisti calls them).641 
One illustration which I have already mentioned concerns the determination 
of direct effect (supra, 2.2.3).642 Another example pertains to the law of im-
munities. According to the Swiss case law, disputes involving a foreign State 
are justiciable only if they display a sufficiently tight nexus (a so- called ‘Bin-
nenbeziehung’) to Switzerland.643 The way courts justify their resort to such 
‘avoidance doctrines’ must be scrutinized, as these doctrines might allow them 
to abdicate from their duty to apply the law.644
 636 In the United States, see Baker v.  Carr, 369 u.s. 186 (1962) and, in foreign affairs, 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 u.s. 996 (1979); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 u.s. 1421 (2012). In 
the United Kingdom, see R (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v. Prime Minister and 
Others, (2002) ewhc 2777 (Admin), cited by Weill (n 61) 76, footnote 41.
 637 In the United States, see Underhill v.  Hernandez, 168 u.s. 250 (1897); Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 u.s. 398 (1964). On the uk doctrine of non- justiciability, see 
Buttes Gas & Oil v. Hammer (No 3), (1982) ac 888 ukhl, 931.
 638 (Regarding the political question doctrine) Bernhard Ehrenzeller, ‘Politische Fragen 
vor Verwaltungsgerichten’ (2016) 117 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und 
Verwaltungsrecht 3, 16. On these doctrines, see Weill (n 61) 70 ff.
 639 Art. 83(a) fa- sft.
 640 bge 137 i 371, at 1.2.
 641 Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law:  An 
Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’ (n 183). On the ‘avoiding role’ of domestic courts 
applying ihl, see Weill (n 61) 69 ff. The ila Study Group on Domestic Courts talks about 
‘blunting rules’. See ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of Domestic 
Courts With International Law’ (n 15) 10 ff.
 642 Ehrenzeller (n 638) 17.
 643 bge 134 iii 570, at 2.2.
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4.2.2 Courts’ Relationship With the Other Branches of Government
In principle, Swiss courts adjudicate international legal issues independently 
from the other branches.645 Yet the Swiss Federal Tribunal frequently takes the 
back seat and defers to or cites the federal executive (infra, 4.2.2.1) and the 
federal legislature (infra, 4.2.2.2). It is worth noting at the outset that the fuzzy 
division of competences between the Federal Assembly and the Federal Coun-
cil in foreign relations (supra, 2.1.2) creates uncertainty as to their respective 
powers to apply and interpret (and, hence, to contribute to the formation of) 
international law. This uncertainty affects the activity of Swiss courts, which 
often consult the practice of their own State on a given international legal issue 
(see Chapters 7 and 8, infra).
4.2.2.1 The Federal Executive
The Swiss Federal Tribunal frequently mentions the executive’s position on 
 international law and/ or its relationship to domestic law. This especially ap-
plies to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (fdfa) and its Directorate 
of International Law (dil).
The Court has particularly often invoked reports, statements, and other 
 documents issued by the dil on the relationship between domestic and inter-
national law.646 Other topics on which the Swiss Federal Tribunal has cited the 
dil include domestic treaty- making powers,647 State succession,648 State rec-
ognition,649 immunities of officials of ios,650 and the service abroad of official 
documents.651 Hence, the Court has mainly cited the Directorate on matters of 
 645 bge 132 ii 65, at 4.2.3. As the Swiss Federal Tribunal stated in Frigerio with regard to 
treaty interpretation, ‘the practice of the political and administrative authorities does not 
bind the courts’, even if this practice is ‘not insignificant for the judge’s own opinion- 
forming’, bge 94 i 669, at 5; see also bge 105 Ib 286, at 1 b). The latter especially applies 
when the agreement is primarily applied by other authorities. In such cases, departures 
from their practice must be justified by ‘compelling reasons’, bge 94 i 669, at 5.  See 
also bge 112 Ia 148, at 5 b). To emphasize judicial independence, the Court has also 
stressed that all Swiss authorities have the duty to apply and to respect international law 
within the limits of their competences, see bge 117 Ib 367, at 2 e). Somewhat ironically, 
the Court has then cited the fdfa’s report on the relationship between domestic and 
international law.
 646 bge 125 ii 417, at 4 d); bge 120 Ib 360, at 2 c); bge 116 iv 262, at 3 b) cc); bge 123 ii 
595, at 7 c) and c) hh); bge 119 v 171, at 4 a).
 647 bge 120 Ib 360, at 2 b).
 648 bge 132 ii 65, at 3.5.2; bge 139 v 263, at 5.3 and 6.2; bge 123 ii 511, at 5 d).
 649 bge 130 ii 217, at 5.3.
 650 bge 120 v 405, at 3 b).
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general international law, or with regard to the politically sensitive issue of for-
eign immunities. At times, the Court has requested the Directorate to provide 
information deemed relevant to the case.652 In some instances, it is unclear 
whether the dil’s view has been solicited by the Court or one of the parties, 
or whether the dil has submitted it proprio motu.653 The Directorate actively 
intervened in several federal court cases on the immunities of States and ios 
and their officials.654 Empirical work is needed to assess the extent to which 
the dil influences the Court in its decision- making, especially in high- profile 
cases. However, such an endeavor is complicated by the confidential character 
of judicial work, and by judges’ (understandable) reluctance to state that the 
other branches influence them.
Many rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal refer to official documents 
or statements issued by the fdfa, eg in cases pertaining to the law of 
 immunities,655 the State’s treaty- making power,656 or human rights protection 
in  foreign States.657 The fdfa has been asked to provide information by the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal in some cases,658 and the Court has sometimes used its 
statements to corroborate its own interpretations.659 Although it generally em-
phasizes the separation of powers in foreign affairs, the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
frequently defers to the fdfa, eg in cases pertaining to privileges and immu-
nities or targeted sanctions.660 The Swiss Federal Tribunal also acknowledges 
 652 bge 111 v 65, at D and 4 b).
 653 bge 136 iii 575, at 4.3.1.
 654 bge 136 iii 379, at B.b (intervening in favor of the bis); bge 134 iii 177, at A. (interven-
ing in favor of Russia).
 655 bge 108 iii 107, at 3; bge 115 v 11, at 3 a); bge 134 iii 122, at 5.2.
 656 bge 112 Ia 75, at 4 c).
 657 bge 133 iv 76, at 4.3 (although the Court emphasizes in this case that such reports, even 
if they must be taken seriously, do not exclude extradition per se, see at 4.4).
 658 bge 110 v 145, at D.
 659 bge 131 v 174, at 3.4.
 660 The Court has considered that the fdfa’s refusal to intervene with the bis to protect 
the interests of corporations incorporated in Switzerland is an act that lies within the 
Department’s discretionary power, see bge 137 i 371, at 1.3.2. It has backed the fdfa 
in a case pertaining to decisions on targeted sanctions taken by the Department in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring on the basis of the power of the executive branch to ‘issue 
ordinances’ ‘when the interests of the country’ are at stake (art. 184(3) Cst.), a notion 
that the Court interprets in a highly deferential way. See bge 141 i 20, at 5.1.1 (regarding 
sanctions taken against Egyptian nationals close to Hosni Mubarak in the aftermath of 
the Arab spring); bge 132 i 229, at 10.3 (regarding sanctions against former Congolese 
dictator Mobutu). The Court has upheld targeted sanctions taken in order to pursue pru-
dential interests, such as the aim of ‘preventing that the reputation of Switzerland be 
tarnished on the international plane’ (bge 132 i 229, at 10.2), and decisions of the fdfa 
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the powers of the Department over specific issues, for instance as regards visa 
requirements.661 Exceptionally, however, the Court has explicitly disavowed 
the fdfa, for example regarding an extradition request662 or immunities from 
execution.663
Many of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s rulings with respect to international 
law refer to the Federal Council. The Court mentions it when the Council acts 
within its competences with regard to international law (eg concerning State 
recognition664 or foreign relations),665 and when it issues interpretive declara-
tions pertaining to specific treaties.666 It also mentions the Council to identify 
the Swiss practice on specific international legal issues.667 The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal frequently cites the dispatch written by the Federal Council prior to 
the ratification of a treaty by the Federal Assembly.668 This can be problematic 
430). It has also backed the fdfa’s handling of a dispute between the cern and two co- 
contractors, rejecting the claim that the Department had failed to respond to the request 
of the co- contractors (and to intervene with the cern on their behalf) ‘within a reasona-
ble time’, as required by art. 6(1) echr (bge 130 i 312, at 5.4.2.1).
 661 bge 139 i 37, at 3.2.2.
 662 In a suit pertaining to an extradition request from Kazakhstan, the Court, contrary to 
the fdfa’s and to the Federal Office of Justice’s statements (bge 124 ii 132, at B.), con-
cluded that the Kazakh authorities had not given sufficient guarantees for extradition to 
be granted.
 663 In bge 134 iii 122, at 5.3.3, the Court rejected the fdfa’s statement that immunities 
from execution can be forfeited only for assets assigned to activities jure gestionis.
 664 bge 139 v 263, at 3 (recognition of Kosovo); bge 130 ii 217, at 5.3 (absence of recogni-
tion of Taiwan).
 665 bge 141 ii 436, at 4.4.1 (regarding the Swiss Federal Council’s decision to adopt the oecd 
standard regarding automatic exchange of information); bge 123 ii 175, at 2 b) (regard-
ing the collaboration of Switzerland with the ad hoc international criminal tribunals).
 666 bge 118 Ib 462, at 2 a) (on the European Convention on Extradition).
 667 bge 112 Ia 75, at 4 c) (on art. 46 vclt); bge 123 ii 595, at 4 b) (on the principle of good 
faith in mutual legal assistance cases); bge 130 iii 430, at 3.4.2 (on the deprivation of 
diplomatic immunity); bge 108 ii 398, at 3 a) (on the incorporation theory endorsed by 
Switzerland to determine the nationality of corporations, despite the fact that the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal’s case law slightly differs from this theory, at 3 b)).
 668 bge 141 ii 233, at 4.3.1 (on the Aarhus Convention); bge 97 i 359, at 6 b) (on a treaty 
concluded in 1858 between the Swiss Confederation and the Grand Duchy of Baden); 
bge 81 ii 366, at 1 (on the 1952 Swiss– German Settlement Agreement); bge 110 Ib 191, 
at 2 (regarding the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards); bge 136 ii 241, at 14.2, bge 133 v 367, at 9.1, and bge 131 v 390, at 
10.1 (on the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons); bge 110 Ib 208, at 
2 b) (on the Refugee Convention); bge 104 Ia 448, at 7 c), and bge 99 Ia 78, at 5 a) (on 
the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters); bge 102 ii 128, at 
3 (on the Hague Convention of 1956 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations 
in Respect of Children); bge 103 Ia 293, at 7 b) (on the echr); bge 108 Ib 525, at 3 (on 
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if this domestic document is used as a substitute for the (international) travaux 
préparatoires to the treaty (art. 32 vclt). The Court has further deferred to the 
government on questions of treaty interpretation,669 on the interpretation of 
domestic laws with a nexus to Swiss foreign relations,670 and on issues pertain-
ing to the law of immunities671 and extradition.672 It has backed the Federal 
Council in high- profile human rights cases673 and issues pertaining to the priv-
ileges and immunities of ios,674 as well as in a case of diplomatic treason.675 
The Court has also cited the Federal Council on matters pertaining to the rela-
tionship between domestic and international law676 and the definition of jus 
cogens.677 Some rulings even mention the position of individual members of 
 669 bge 132 ii 65, at 2.3 (on the interpretation of treaties of establishment); bge 141 ii 
233, at 4.3 (on the interpretation of the Aarhus Convention); bge 110 Ib 82, at 4 b) bb) 
(on the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters); bge 123 i 19, 
at 4 (on the cerd); bge 84 ii 487, at 2 b) (on the Swiss– French Agreement of 1869 on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments); bge 105 Ib 37, at 4 c) (on treaties per-
taining to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments); bge 103 Ia 517, at 4 f) 
(on ilo Conventions No 100 and 111); bge 111 v 201, at 3 (on ilo Convention No 128).
 670 bge 126 iv 236, at 4 c) (on art. 267(2) SCrimC, which criminalizes diplomatic treason); 
bge 120 v 150, at 2 b) (on the domestic legal consequences of Switzerland’s ratifica-
tion of the echr); bge 133 v 233, at 3.4 (on the social security status of Swiss un offi-
cials); bge 109 iv 51, at 2 (on the domestic implementation of the Single Convention of 
Narcotic Drugs of 1961).
 671 bge 106 Ia 142, at 2 a) (on the right of foreign States to challenge enforcement measures 
in Swiss courts); bge 120 v 405, at 3 a), and bge 110 v 145, at 2 a) (on the regime of 
privileges and immunities of the members of permanent representations to ios).
 672 bge 99 iv 257, at 5 d).
 673 bge 125 ii 417 (pkk- case); bge 126 ii 145 (on a liability suit pertaining to Switzerland’s 
restrictive asylum policy during World War ii; BGer, judgment 2A.784/ 2006 of 23 January 
2008 (Al- Dulimi), and bge 133 ii 450 (Nada), two cases in which the Court backed the 
executive’s implementation of un targeted sanctions and for which Switzerland was 
subsequently found to have violated the echr by the ECtHR. See ECtHR, Al- Dulimi 
and Montana Management Inc. v.  Switzerland, App No 5809/ 08 (echr Reports 2016), 
21 June 2016; ECtHR, Nada v. Switzerland, App No 10593/ 08 (echr Reports 2012), 12 
September 2012.
 674 bge 130 i 312.
 675 bge 126 iv 236, at 9.
 676 bge 133 ii 450, at 6.1 (on the issue of what international legal norms bind Switzerland); 
bge 139 i 16, at 5.2.1 (on the relationship between international law and a subsequently 
enacted, contradictory contitutional provision); bge 137 i 305, at 3.2 (on the cedaw’s 
status in the Swiss legal order; the issue of direct effect was left open by the Court); bge 
93 ii 192, at 4 (on the supremacy of a Swiss– French Treaty on Jurisdiction and on the 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments over Swiss law); bge 121 v 246, at 2 c) (on the lack of 
direct effect, in principle, of the provisions of the icescr).
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the Federal Council.678 Others provide evidence of a close collaboration be-
tween the Swiss Federal Tribunal and the federal government.679 On rare oc-
casions, the Court explicitly disagrees with the government.680 In other cases, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal strives to show that it does not contradict the Fed-
eral Council’s position.681
To conclude, even if the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s deference towards the fed-
eral government in foreign affairs is nowhere near as pronounced as in some 
other States,682 it generally markedly relies on the federal executive. While 
deference may be warranted when the Federal Council acts within its desig-
nated constitutional competences in foreign affairs, it is important to stress 
that courts must adjudicate disputes with independence and impartiality. This 
duty is reflected in Swiss law, but also (qua State duty) in international law.683 
Courts must not shy away from examining the (domestic and international) 
legality of foreign affairs.
4.2.2.2 The Federal Legislature
As already noted (supra, 2.2.2), art. 190 Cst. states that the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal must apply federal acts and international law.684 One consequence 
is that federal acts are immune from judicial review, even when they are 
deemed incompatible with constitutional law or international law. Proposals 
to introduce constitutional review or to strengthen judicial review have been 
 678 bge 123 ii 595, at 4 d), where the Court reports the legislative history of the domestic 
statute at stake and mentions in detail the disagreements between the Federal Council 
and the legislature; bge 133 ii 97, at 2.2 (mentioning the position of Federal Councillor 
Christoph Blocher).
 679 In Nada, for instance, the Federal Council and the Swiss Federal Tribunal conducted an 
exchange of views before the Federal Council transferred the complaint of Youssef Nada 
to the Court. See bge 133 ii 450 (facts).
 680 One example pertains to an interpretative declaration of the Federal Council to the 
echr, which the Court deemed an invalid reservation, see bge 118 Ia 473.
 681 bge 82 i 75, at 9 (on the law of immunities).
 682 On a past French practice according to which the Conseil d’Etat deferred to the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on matters of treaty interpretation, and which the ECtHR con-
sidered contrary to art. 6(1) echr, see ECtHR, Beaumartin v. France, App No 15287/ 89 
(echr Reports Series A No 296- B), 24 November 1994, See also United States v. Curtiss- 
Wright Export Corp., 299 u.s. 304 (1936), where the us Supreme Court famously held 
that the President was the ‘sole organ of the nation in its external relations’. For an exam-
ple of utter deference of domestic courts to the executive, see Congyan (n 44).
 683 See art. 5(1) and (4) and art. 30(1) Cst., on the one hand, and art. 6 echr and art. 14 
iccpr, on the other hand.
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discussed many times,685 but they have always been rejected by the federal 
parliament. In 2012, the federal government’s proposal to abrogate art. 190 and 
to introduce a concrete review of federal acts686 was once again rejected by the 
parliament.687
While the Swiss Federal Tribunal cannot invalidate federal acts deemed 
incompatible with international law, the Court can ‘invite the legislature’ to 
amend acts deemed problematic.688 On its official website, the Court notes 
that ‘controversial judgments can nourish the political debate and eventually 
lead the parliament to reformulate laws or to incorporate new topics’.689 In 
several cases, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has indeed ‘nudged’ the federal leg-
islature by pointing out that in case of prolonged legislative inaction, it might 
intervene in the future and enforce the supremacy of international law.690
The Court’s involvement has been timid, however. One example pertains 
to reverse discrimination (ie, the discrimination of Swiss citizens compared 
to eu citizens), which the Swiss Federal Tribunal deems problematic from the 
perspective of art. 8 and 14 echr. In 2010, the Court indicated that it might 
eventually tackle the issue itself, should the legislature fail to design a remedy 
compatible with the Constitution and the echr ‘in a predictable future’.691 In 
2015, however, the Court backed down and merely acknowledged the legisla-
ture’s failure to address the problem, without taking any further steps.692
 685 Federal Council, Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung, 20 November 1996, fg 1997 
i 1, at 505 ff; Federal Council, Botschaft zur Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der 
Aufgaben zwischen Bund und Kantonen (nfa), 14 November 2001, fg 2002 2291, at 2464 
ff; Otto Zwygart, Parliamentary Initiative 99.455, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 10 October 
1999; Heiner Studer, Parliamentary Initiative 05.445, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, 6 
October 2005; Vreni Müller- Hemmi, Parliamentary Initiative 07.476, Bundesverfassung 
massgebend für rechtsanwendende Behörden, 10 October 2007. See also the comprehen-
sive article of Maya Hertig Randall, ‘L’internationalisation de la juridiction constitution-
nelle : défis et perspectives’ (2010) 129 Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht / Revue de 
droit suisse 221.
 686 This proposal was made by the Federal Council namely in order to ensure a congruence 
between the powers of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and those of the ECtHR, which can 
assess the compatibility of federal acts with the echr; Federal Council, Botschaft über 
eine neue Bundesverfassung, 20 November 1996, fg 1997 i 1, at 508.
 687 One of the arguments raised in parliament was that ‘judicial decisions are ultimately not 
more rational than popular decisions’, see Paul Rechsteiner, Council of States, Summer 
Session 2012, 7th session, 4 June 2012, 8.15 am (regarding parliamentary initiatives 
05.445 and 07.476).
 688 bge 136 i 65, at 3.2.
 689 <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- faq/ federal- faq- 5.htm>.
 690 bge 125 iii 209, at 6 e).
 691 bge 136 ii 120, at 3.5.3.
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4.2.3 The Duty to ‘Apply’ and ‘Respect’ International Law
The Constitution states that Swiss courts ‘apply the federal acts and inter-
national law’693 and that federal and cantonal authorities ‘shall respect in-
ternational law’.694 However, Swiss courts have no domestic legal duty to 
consider international law, unlike the Supreme Court of South Africa, for 
instance.695 They are free, under domestic law, to choose the means they 
consider appropriate to ensure that Switzerland respects its international 
obligations. Of course, from the perspective of international law, they may 
trigger their State’s international responsibility, regardless of what domestic 
law provides.696
As previously noted (supra, 3.4), the constitutional popular initiative 
‘on self- determination’ sought to amend art. 190 Cst. and to establish the 
supremacy of the Swiss Constitution over other laws, including the State’s 
international obligations. The initiative was rejected by Swiss voters on 25 
 November 2018.
4.2.4 Judges’ Election by the Parliament and Political Affiliation
Swiss judges are elected by the parliament and, for some of them, by the peo-
ple. In most cases, they are appointed for a determinate period of time, with 
the consequence that judges must run for reelection. While this Swiss peculi-
arity attenuates the counter- majoritarian697 traits of judicial decision- making 
by unelected judges, it also generates difficulties, as I will emphasize. Only a 
few cantons have mitigated the influence of political parties on judges,698 eg 
Fribourg699 and Ticino.700
 693 Art. 190 Cst.
 694 Art. 5(4) Cst. In all these cases, the term ‘international law’ refers to the sources of 
international law listed in art. 38 icj Statute, see Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer 
(n 382) 3038.
 695 Art. 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 16 December 1996: ‘When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – (a) must promote the values 
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law’.
 696 Art. 27 vclt, art. 4(1) arsiwa.
 697 Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(Bobbs- Merrill 1962) 16 ff.
 698 Marco Borghi, ‘La mainmise des partis politiques suisses sur l’élection des juges’ (2016) 
Justiz – Justice – Giustizia para 3.
 699 Judges are elected for an indeterminate period of time, see art. 121(2) Cst- fr.
 700 Prior to the election of judges by the cantonal parliament, a committee of experts issues 
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The legislature701 enjoys substantial leeway when electing federal judges, 
as the law does not prescribe specific criteria.702 Linguistic representativeness 
is of great relevance to judges’ election (on linguistic diversity, see supra, 3.2). 
The representation of the three official languages was constitutionally re-
quired until the revision of the Constitution in 1999,703 and the Federal Act on 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal still mandates the federal legislature to take linguis-
tic diversity into account when electing federal judges.704 Another important 
(yet soft) criterion is political representativeness.705 Because their (re)election 
is usually entrusted to the legislature, Swiss judges are, de facto, forced to join 
a political party,706 to which they pay an annual fee of up to 5% of their yearly 
salary.707 The politicization of Swiss judges has increased in recent years, with 
fewer judges being members of no political party. While in the 1920s, close to 
30% of judges serving on the Swiss Federal Tribunal had no party affiliation, 
this percentage is now close to zero.708
The parliamentary (or even popular) election of Swiss judges is a peculiarity 
from a comparative law perspective.709 It contrasts with other States where 
judges are appointed by the President, as is the case with judges of the French 
Cour de Cassation or Austrian Constitutional Court judges, for instance. It also 
differs from hybrid modes of selection, like in Italy, where constitutional judges 
are chosen in part by the parliament, in part by the President, and in part by 
 701 Federal judges are elected by the Federal Assembly based on a proposal of the Judi-
cial Committee. See <www.parlament.ch/ en/ organe/ committees/ other- committees/ 
committee- jc>.
 702 Luc Gonin and Olivier Bigler, ‘La sélection des juges fédéraux en Suisse, avec un aperçu 
cantonal de la situation dans le Canton de Genève’ in Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (ed), 
Rapports suisses présentés au xixe Congrès international de droit comparé : Vienne, du 20 
juillet au 26 juillet 2014 (Schulthess 2014) 17 f.
 703 Art. 107(1) of the Swiss Constitution of 29 May 1874.
 704 Art. 18(2) fa- sft.
 705 <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- richter.htm>.
 706 See the list at <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- richter/ 
federal- richter- bundesrichter.htm>. On the constitutional problems this ‘forced affil-
iation’ creates, see Borghi (n 698)  para 38 ff; Nicolas Queloz, ‘Compléments récents 
apportés au droit pénal suisse de la corruption et développements relatifs aux relations 
entre juges et partis politiques’ (2006) Justiz – Justice – Giustizia para 20 ff.
 707 Tiziano Balmelli, ‘Quelques remarques sur l’exigence de réformer les procédures de dési-
gnation des juges : la controverse des contributions financières réclamées par les partis’ 
(2006) Justiz – Justice – Giustizia.
 708 Adrian Vatter, ‘Die Parteifarben der obersten Richter im Wandel’ nzz of 23 September 2013.
 709 Benjamin Suter, ‘Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges: A Comparison Between 
Swiss and New Zealand Judiciaries’ (2015) 46 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
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the judiciary. Judges’ reelection also distinguishes the Swiss judiciary from 
States where judges in the highest courts have life tenure,710 or where reelec-
tion is impossible.711
Several Swiss judges have defended the Swiss system in their writings.712 Yet 
as many scholars713 and even some Swiss magistrates714 highlight, this legisla-
tive (or popular) mode of selection and, hence, the partisan affiliation of most 
Swiss judges, the fee they pay their political party, and the fact that they need 
to run for reelection, all jeopardize courts’ independence and impartiality. The 
importance of judicial independence is reflected in domestic constitutional 
law and international law. It is also stressed in soft law instruments,715 includ-
ing as regards the judicial interpretation of international law.716 These features 
of the Swiss system have been criticized by the Group of States Against Corrup-
tion (greco), with little success so far.717
Of course, judges decide based on a (more or less consistent) set of beliefs 
regardless of any formal political affiliation. Moreover, Swiss judges’ political 
affiliation has the merit of being transparent, and it is a way of ensuring that in 
making their decisions, they remain accountable to the legislature.718 However, 
the absence of separate opinions in the Swiss judiciary (infra, 4.2.5) makes it 
almost impossible to identify when a judge departs from the party’s line. In 
 710 Eg in the United States, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands.
 711 Eg in Germany.
 712 Hansjörg Seiler, ‘Richter als Parteivertreter’ (2006) Justiz  – Justice  – Giustizia; Peter 
Albrecht, ‘Richter als (politische) Parteivertreter?’ (2006) Justiz – Justice – Giustizia.
 713 Borghi (n 698); Balmelli (n 707); Queloz (n 706).
 714 Niccolò Raselli, ‘Richterliche Unabhängigkeit’ (2011) Justiz  – Justice  – Giustizia 6 f; 
Karl Spühler, ‘Der Richter und die Politik’ (1994) 130 Zeitschrift des Bernischen 
Juristenvereins 28.
 715 European Charter on the Statute for Judges of 8– 10 July 1998, at 2.1; un Commission 
on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Independence of 
the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, Annex: Bangalore Principles of Judicial 
Conduct, un Doc e/ cn.4/ 2003/ 65, 10 January 2003, Value 1.
 716 Institut de droit international, ‘The Activities of National Judges and the International 
Relations of Their State’ (1993) <www.justitiaetpace.org/ idiE/ resolutionsE/ 1993_ mil_ 
01_ en.PDF>.
 717 greco, Corruption Prevention in Respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors, 
Evaluation Report, Switzerland, Fourth Evaluation Round, GrecoEval4Rep(2016)5, 2 
December 2016, <rm.coe.int/ CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/ DisplayDCTMContent? 
documentId=09000016806fceda> (para 95 ff and para 291); greco, Corruption Prevention 
in Respect of Members of Parliament, Judges and Prosecutors, Compliance Report, Switzerland, 
Fourth Evaluation Round, GrecoRc4(2019)2, 22 March 2019, <rm.coe.int/ fourth- evaluation- 
round- corruption- prevention- in- respect- of- members- of/ 168094e860> (para 49– 63, para 
107, and para 109).
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recent years, studies have sought to establish a correlation between judges’ 
affiliation to a political party and the outcome of their decisions (a correla-
tion which judges themselves deny for understandable reasons).719 In October 
2016, the Swiss newspaper Tagesanzeiger published the results of an empiri-
cal study of 29,263 asylum claims brought before the Federal Administrative 
Court. The study shows that left- wing judges are up to three times more likely 
to grant appeals than judges leaning towards the political right.720
The increasing number of popular initiatives aimed at limiting Swiss 
courts’ interpretative freedom shows that judicial decision- making is under 
pressure.721 Especially in the area of criminal law, several initiatives express a 
popular distrust of the judiciary, eg the 2010 vote on the ‘expulsion of foreign 
criminals’722 and its unsuccessful successor, the so- called ‘enforcement initi-
ative’ of 2016.723 Several popular votes have restricted judges’ interpretative 
leeway in cases involving dangerous sexual or violent offenders.724 Finally, the 
initiative on self- determination, rejected in 2018, sought to limit Swiss courts’ 
interpretative freedom in the arbitration of conflicts between domestic and 
international law.725
Given Swiss judges’ mode of selection, it is interesting to take a look at 
the composition of the Swiss Federal Tribunal. A  judge serving on the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal is typically German- speaking, male, white, and leans to-
wards the right. As of June 2019, out of 38 judges serving on the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal, 3 spoke Italian as their main language, 12 French, and 23 
German.726 At the same date, 14 out of the 38 federal judges in office 
were women.727 As of June 2019, 222 out of the 228 former federal judges 
were men (the first female federal judge, Margrith Bigler- Eggenberger, was 
elected in 1972 and became a regular federal judge in 1974), and none of 
the 97 former presidents of the Swiss Federal Tribunal were female.728 The 
 719 Borghi (n 698) para 23. See for instance Albrecht (n 712).
 720 Rau and Skinner (n 285).
 721 fg 2015 7099, at 7102.
 722 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis357.html>.
 723 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis433t.html>.
 724 Art. 123a, 123b, and 123c Cst., adopted by popular votes in 2004, 2008, and 2014, 
respectively.
 725 <www.admin.ch/ ch/ d/ pore/ vi/ vis460t.html>.
 726 <www.bger.ch/ index/ federal/ federal- inherit- template/ federal- richter.htm>.
 727 Ibid.






















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
118 Chapter 3
Swiss Federal Tribunal counts few (if any) members of racial or religious 
minorities.729
As of June 2019, the Court counted 9 members of the Socialist Party and 4 
members of the Green Party. Thus, one third of the Court (13 out of 38 judges) 
leaned towards the left. Twenty- five judges were at the center or on the political 
right: 6 judges were affiliated to the Christian Democratic Party (cvp), 10 to the 
Swiss People’s Party (svp), 7 to the Free Democratic Party (fdp)/ Liberals, 1 to 
the Conservative Democratic Party (bdp), and 1 to the Green Liberal Party.730
4.2.5 The Absence of Separate Opinions
Another idiosyncratic feature of the Swiss judiciary (especially compared to 
common law jurisdictions) is that judgments do not in principle include sepa-
rate opinions, ie, dissents or concurrences. Thus, Swiss courts’ decision- making 
is more of a black box than that of courts in many other States731 and of some 
international courts.732 Contrary to what applies to other jurisdictions,733 it is 
difficult to determine how individual Swiss judges position themselves with 
regard to particular domestic or international interpretative issues, and how 
their political affiliation (supra, 4.2.4) affects their decisions. Whenever courts 
do not deliberate publicly (and they rarely do), one can only analyze the final 
decision, ie, the aggregation of the preferences of the judges involved in a given 
case.734
 729 Bigler and Gonin only mention religious diversity as regards Catholics and Protestants. 
See Gonin and Bigler (n 702) 18. Vera Rottenberg Liatowitsch, elected in 1994, was the 
first Jewish judge to serve on the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
 730 At the time of writing, it was still unclear whether a retiring svp judge of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal’s second public law chamber would be replaced by a judge of the same party or, 
instead, by a cvp judge. The Judicial Committee recommended electing the latter, sup-
posedly to avoid a dominance of the svp (3 instead of 2 judges out of 6) in the chamber 
that addresses conflicts between international law and domestic law. See Fabian Schäfer, 
‘Angst vor der svp:  Hintergrund der umstrittenen Richterwahl sind die Konflikte zwi-
schen Landes – und Völkerrecht’ nzz of 15 June 2019.
 731 In common law jurisdictions, courts usually publish concurrences and dissents and dis-
close the positions of individual judges.
 732 Most international courts allow for dissents and concurrences. The cjeu is an exception 
in this regard.
 733 In the United States: David M O’Brien, ‘More Smoke Than Fire: the Rehnquist Court’s Use 
of Comparative Judicial Opinions in the Construction of Constitutional Rights’ (2006) 22 
Journal of Law and Politics 83; Ryan C Black and others, ‘Upending a Global Debate: An 
Empirical Analysis of the u.s. Supreme Court’s Use of Transnational Law to Interpret 
Domestic Doctrine’ (2014) 103 Georgetown Law Journal 1.
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The Swiss Federal Tribunal for example takes its decisions by majority 
vote.735 Its rulings only reflect the opinion of the majority, and they do not 
disclose the breakdown of the votes.736 A  proposal to introduce dissenting 
opinions in the Swiss Federal Tribunal was rejected by the Swiss parliament 
in 1997.737 In 2014, both chambers of the parliament agreed to task the Federal 
Council with preparing a draft version of the Federal Act on the Swiss  Federal 
Tribunal so that rulings can reflect dissenting opinions.738 At the time this 
book was being finalized (June 2019), the government’s proposal739 had not 
yet been discussed by the two chambers of the federal parliament. The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal is opposed to the aforementioned legislative amendment.740 
When considering whether a legislative amendment is necessary, it is worth 
noting that it is increasingly rare for the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s deliberations 
to be public. In 2012, for instance, only 0.8% of all deliberations were.741 In 
2018, a public deliberation was held in 48 out of 8,040 cases (ie, in 0.6% of 
all cases).742 In light of this development, but also due to other reasons, calls 
for introducing dissenting opinions have become more vocal of late.743 At the 
 735 Art. 21 fa- sft.
 736 Art. 122 fa- sft.
 737 Margrith von Felten, Motion 97.3368, Dissenting opinion in Bundesgerichtsentscheiden, 
20 June 1997, <www.parlament.ch/ fr/ ratsbetrieb/ suche- curia- vista/ geschaeft? AffairId= 
19973368>.
 738 National Council, Legal Affairs Committee, Motion 14.3667, Bundesgericht: Dissenting 
Opinions, 14 August 2014, <www.parlament.ch/ de/ ratsbetrieb/ suche- curia- vista/ 
geschaeft?AffairId=20143667>.
 739 Art. 60(1bis) fa- sft. See fg 2018 4663, at 4664.
 740 ‘Geschäftsbericht des Bundesgerichts 2014’ (2015) 11  <www.bger.ch/ d/ gb_ 2014_ d_ 
bger.pdf>.
 741 Michael Baum, ‘Minderheitsvoten nur selten publiziert’ (2013) 5 plädoyer 64.
 742 <www.bger.ch/ files/ live/ sites/ bger/ files/ pdf/ Publikationen/ GB/ BGer/ de/ BGer- 
BGerGB18_ d.pdf>.
 743 Arnold Marti, ‘Offenlegen von Minderheitsmeinungen (“dissenting opinion”):  Eine 
Forderung von Transparenz und Fairness im gerichtlichen Verfahren’ (2012) Justiz  – 
Justice – Giustizia; Patricia Egli, ‘Dissenting Opinions: Abweichende Richtermeinungen 
im Schweizer Recht’ in Franco Lorandi and Daniel Staehelin (eds), Innovatives 
Recht:  Festschrift für Ivo Schwander (Dike 2011); Andreas Glaser and Arthur Brunner, 
‘Politik in der Defensive:  Zwischen Vorrang des fza und dynamischer Rezeption der 
EuGH- Rechtsprechung’ Jusletter of 18 April 2016 19 f. On this trend, see Mirjam Baldegger, 
‘Der wiederkehrende Ruf nach dissenting opinions am Bundesgericht:  Wünschbarkeit, 
Auswirkungen und Ausgestaltung richterlicher Sondervoten in der Schweiz’ (2017) 
118 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 131. For a recent 
proposal to introduce separate opinions in Swiss courts in public law cases, see Luc 
Gonin, ‘L’opinion dissidente en droit public suisse :  une nécessité pratique et théori-
que’ (2017) 136 Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht / Revue de droit suisse 63. For a 
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cantonal level, only a handful of cantonal judiciaries (Aargau, Geneva, Schaff-
hausen, Vaud, and Zurich) provide for separate opinions;744 this option is 
rarely used in practice, however. When it is, separate opinions usually take the 
form of concise dissents.745
The fact that disagreements among Swiss judges are not reflected in their 
opinions (at least as far as federal courts and most cantonal courts are con-
cerned) obscures the truth. Even a judgment adopted unanimously is not 
monolithic. The ‘tyranny of the majority’ and the flaws of decisions by ma-
jority vote, which are typically criticized in the context of democratic (leg-
islative or popular) decision- making, are equally problematic in the context 
of judicial decision- making.746 Publishing separate opinions can bring to 
light the conflicting considerations involved in the decisions. It provides 
helpful information for future cases and strengthens judicial accountability. 
Together with other factors, the absence of dissents and concurrences also 
explains the style of Swiss judicial opinions. They are, indeed, impersonal 
and relatively short, compared to those of English or American courts, for 
instance.747
On the other hand, it is worth noting that by law, pleadings (when applica-
ble), as well as judges’ oral deliberations and votes whenever a public delibera-
tion is held, must be public.748 This publicity creates difficulties too. It may put 
additional pressure on judges, especially in politically sensitive cases like those 
pertaining to the relationship between international law and constitutional 
am Bundesgericht:  Individuelle Transparenz oder Gefährdung der richterlichen 
Unabhängigkeit?’ (2019) 138 Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht / Revue de droit 
suisse 137.
 744 Ehrenzeller (n 638) 19 f; Marti (n 743); Gonin (n 743) 65 f.
 745 There are exceptions, as Michael Baum points out, inter alia with reference to decision 
hg110192- o of the Commercial Court (Handelsgericht) of the canton of Zurich of 30 
March 2012 (where a 21- page minority opinion is appended to the 8- page- long majority 
opinion), see Baum (n 741).
 746 On this point, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 
115 Yale Law Journal 1346.
 747 Similar to what Gráinne de Búrca notes regarding the cjeu, it could be said about the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal that ‘the collegiate nature of the judgments and the formalis-
tic style of judicial reasoning is very different from the richly textured, individualized 
and often colorful opinions of the [us] Supreme Court justices’. Gráinne De Búrca, 
‘International Law Before the Courts: the eu and the us Compared’ (2015) 55 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 685, 693. For such a colorful example, see Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 u.s. 519 (2012).
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law. This pressure could increase in the future, given recent trends towards a 
greater transparency of judicial proceedings.749
4.2.6 ‘Pragmatic Methodological Pluralism’
One trademark of the Swiss Federal Tribunal is its ‘pragmatic methodological 
pluralism’, as the Court describes its approach to interpretation (see also su-
pra, Chapter 1, section 3).750 The Court articulated this conception of judicial 
interpretation in the 1980s,751 but used it implicitly in earlier rulings.752 It relies 
on it to interpret domestic statutory law, but also other domestic legal acts, as 
well as international law.753 Pragmatic methodological pluralism is regularly 
mentioned by other federal754 and cantonal755 courts, including in the context 
of international law.756 However, the specific implications of the Court’s ec-
lectic method for the interpretation of international law have been neglected 
in Swiss scholarship.757 In the following paragraphs, I unpack the notions of 
 749 In 2014, the National Council rejected the proposal of parliamentarian Martin Schmid 
to livestream proceedings before the Swiss Federal Tribunal (<www.parlament.ch/ fr/ 
ratsbetrieb/ suche- curia- vista/ geschaeft?AffairId=20133660>). Nonetheless, in April 2016, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal started uploading videos of selected public proceedings, see 
<www.bger.ch/ index/ press/ press- inherit- template/ press- mediaplatform/ federal- mediaplatform-  
all- meetings.htm>. As of June 2019, nine videos had been uploaded. The videos only cover 
the Court’s final judgment. It remains to be seen how the Court’s practice will evolve in this 
regard.
 750 Eg bge 140 ii 495, at 2.3.3.
 751 bge 110 Ib 1, at 2 c) cc); bge 114 v 219, at 3 a).
 752 See bge 83 i 173, at 4, a decision of 1957 stating that the Court does not exclude any 
method and  ‘resorts to the interpretative processes that seem the most proper, in the 
particular case, to bring out the true meaning of the norm’. See also bge 59 ii 264, at 
6:  ‘Es geht nun nicht an, mit der Beklagten aus formellen Gründen eine “restriktive” 
Auslegungsmethode zu wählen, die der Sache nicht gerecht wird, sondern es muss 
der Bestimmung der Sinn beigelegt werden, der mit dem gekennzeichneten Ziel der 
Gemeinwesen am besten harmoniert (…)’. The Court transposed this method of stat-
utory interpretation to the Constitution in the 1940s:  Johannes Reich, Grundsatz der 
Wirtschaftsfreiheit: Evolution und Dogmatik von Art. 94 Abs. 1 und 4 der Bundesverfassung 
der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft vom 18. April 1999 (Dike 2011) 33.
 753 Besson and Ammann (n 97).
 754 sfac, judgment A- 5836/ 2015 of 26 May 2016, at 7.1.1.
 755 VwGer- zh, 4th chamber, decision vb.2014.00351 of 21 January 2015, at 3.2.2.1.
 756 sfac, judgment C- 7063/ 2008 of 15 May 2009, at 3.3.1.1.
 757 Virtually all authors focus on pragmatic methodological pluralism in the context of 
domestic law. See, among many others, Marc Amstutz, ‘Ouroboros: Nachbemerkungen 
zum pragmatischen Methodenpluralismus’ in Peter Gauch, Franz Werro, and Pascal 
Pichonnaz (eds), Mélanges en l’honneur de Pierre Tercier (Schulthess 2008); Pichonnaz 
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‘methodological pluralism’ and ‘pragmatism’, before highlighting the advan-
tages and drawbacks of pragmatic methodological pluralism. I  address the 
implications of this approach for international law in Part 3 (Chapters 5 and 
following, infra).
By endorsing ‘methodological pluralism’, the Swiss Federal Tribunal  refuses 
to accept any hierarchy among different interpretative methods.758 In the 
case of written law, the Court acknowledges that textual interpretation is the 
starting point of interpretation, and that the text should not be departed from 
 lightly.759 (On the centrality of textual interpretation, see infra, Chapter  6, 
2.1.1.) The four main methods the Court refers to are the literal, systematic, 
teleological, and historical method.760 Except for teleological interpretation, 
which Friedrich Karl von Savigny considered to be applicable in exceptional 
cases,761 these methods go back to Savigny’s ‘four elements’ doctrine,762 later 
taken up, in a slightly adjusted form, by the Swiss jurist Arthur Meier- Hayoz in 
his commentary of art. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code.763 The four methods are part 
of the first- year curriculum in Swiss law faculties, and they are mentioned in 
most Swiss doctrinal analyses of legal reasoning and interpretation.764 As I will 
show (Chapters 5 and 6, infra), these four methods are used in other States as 
well, even if the terminology is inconsistent,765 and even if not all States draw 
upon Savigny.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal uses ‘pragmatism’ as a synonym for both result- 
oriented and anti- theoretical decision- making. This conception of ‘pragma-
tism’ must hence be distinguished from other (especially philosophical)766 
 758 bge 125 ii 238, at 5 a); bge 134 ii 308, at 5.2; bge 139 ii 49, at 5.3.1; bge 140 v 227, 
at 3.2.
 759 bge 140 ii 495, 2.3.1– 2.3.3.
 760 bge 141 iii 155, at 4.2.
 761 Friedrich Karl von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts (Bei Veit und Comp 
1840) 220.
 762 See ibid 212 ff. Eg Reich (n 752)  19 ff. Savigny’s elements also included ‘logical inter-
pretation’, which today is usually associated with systematic interpretation: von Savigny 
(n 761) 214.
 763 Reich (n 752) 22.
 764 Conformity with international law has sometimes been mentioned as the fifth method, 
eg bge 131 ii 13, at 8.1. Peter Kunz considers that the four methods should not be sup-
plemented by a fifth, ‘comparative law’ method: Peter V Kunz, ‘Umgang mit internatio-
nalem und mit europäischem Recht. Überblick über den “Swiss Approach”’ (2012) 23 
LeGes 265, 270 f.
 765 Systematic interpretation for instance seems to match what Bradley and Goldsmith refer 
to as ‘structuralism’. See Bradley and Goldsmith (n 171) 41 f.
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usages of the term. Pragmatism, according to the Court, requires determin-
ing which interpretive argument(s) ought to be decisive to ascertain the ‘true 
meaning of the provision’,767 based on the circumstances of the case.768 The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has offered various definitions of pragmatic method-
ological pluralism. Some of them emphasize that the starting point must re-
main the wording of the provision,769 or that the legal act must be interpreted 
primarily ‘out of itself ’, ie, pursuant to the four aforementioned methods.770 
Another variation states that the literal meaning can be the basis of the inter-
pretative result only if it yields a ‘just substantive outcome’.771 Yet other rulings 
highlight the need for a ‘satisfactory result of the ratio legis’,772 and the impor-
tance of avoiding subjective value judgments.773 These formulations reveal the 
evaluative nature of the interpretative process.
This result- oriented approach, and the reluctance to endorse ‘grand the-
ories’ of judicial decision- making, are rooted in the Swiss polity and its idi-
osyncrasies. Democratic decision- making (supra, 3.4) and the governmental 
principle of collegiality require finding solutions that can be accepted inter 
alia because they are ‘workable’.774 This is not specific to Switzerland, however. 
In Norway, for instance, courts invoke so- called ‘reelle hensyn’ (‘real considera-
tions’),775 through which they openly take policy considerations into account. 
The importance and ineluctability of such considerations, and lawyers’ reluc-
tance to believe in a ‘heaven of legal concepts’,776 have also been emphasized 
by us judges and legal theorists.777 In English administrative law, scholars have 
 767 bge 140 ii 495, at 2.3.3:  ‘Ist der Text unklar bzw. nicht restlos klar und bleiben ver-
schiedene Interpretationen möglich, muss nach der wahren Tragweite der Bestimmung 
gesucht werden.’
 768 bge 138 i 274, at 1.2. As the Court often states, the norm is not reducible to its wording 
and must be ‘understood and specified with regard to the facts of the particular case’. See 
bge 141 iii 155, at 4.2.
 769 Ie, literal interpretation does enjoy priority unless the wording is not ‘absolutely clear’, see 
bge 131 ii 13, at 7.1; bge 135 v 215, at 7.1; bge 135 v 249, at 4.1; bge 139 ii 49, at 5.3.1; 
bge 139 iii 135, at 4.1; bge 140 ii 495, at 2.3.3; bge 141 iii 444, at 2.1.
 770 bge 140 i 305, at 6.1.
 771 bge 139 iv 270, at 2.2; bge 140 iv 118, at 3.3.
 772 bge 140 i 305, at 6.1.
 773 bge 123 ii 595, at 4 a); bge 140 i 305, at 6.2.
 774 Art. 177(1) Cst.
 775 Tor- Inge Harbo, ‘The European Economic Area Agreement:  A Case of Legal Pluralism’ 
(2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 201, 209 f.
 776 Felix Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 
Columbia Law Review 809.
 777 Holmes (n 22). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 u.s. 45 (1902), and John Dewey, ‘Logical 
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argued that questions of fact must be distinguished from questions of law 
based on a ‘pragmatic’ approach, which they oppose to an ‘analytical’ one.778 
An analytical approach, as Timothy Endicott defines it, is ‘an attempt to under-
stand’, to flesh out the reasons leading to the judicial decision.779 Pragmatists 
dispense with such an analysis. A given interpretation is chosen because it is 
useful, because it ‘will achieve the right outcome’.780 Of course, said Norwegian 
and us doctrines are peculiar to their respective legal, political, and cultural 
context. Their emphasis on policy considerations starkly differs from the lan-
guage that characterizes Swiss judicial reasoning.781 Still, Swiss courts’ ‘prag-
matism’ is arguably not an isolated phenomenon.
Both pluralism and pragmatism can be a virtue, in the sense that judges are 
not straight- jacketed by a specific interpretative philosophy and pay attention 
to the characteristics of each case. This is in line with judges’ duty to abide by 
the law and to be independent and impartial. One could argue that judges may 
make good decisions without adopting an analytical approach in the afore-
mentioned sense, and by sticking to a pragmatic one.782 One could also claim 
that pragmatic methodological pluralism is mandated by international law. 
Indeed, the methods of treaty interpretation, according to the ilc and to the 
drafters of the vclt, must be ‘thrown into the crucible, and their interaction 
[will] give the legally relevant interpretation’.783
On the other hand, pluralism and especially pragmatism can also be a vice. 
They create the risk that interpretative arguments are invoked and relied upon 
opportunistically, depending on the outcome judges seek to achieve, while 
Posner have defended a ‘pragmatic’ view of adjudication: Richard A Posner, ‘Pragmatic 
Adjudication’ (1996) 18 Cardozo Law Review 1. The approach of the us Supreme Court 
to constitutional interpretation has been described as ‘pragmatic’, see Mark Tushnet, 
‘Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting 
Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2006). Emmanuelle Jouannet 
opposes the ‘rationalism’ of French lawyers to the fact that ‘culturally, Americans do not 
like grand, formal, pre- determined structures and distrust the excessive use of legal cat-
egories’. See Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Les visions française et américaine du droit inter-
national :  cultures juridiques et droit international’ in sfdi (ed), Droit international et 
diversité des cultures juridiques (Pedone 2008) 305.
 778 On this issue, see Timothy Endicott, ‘Questions of Law’ (1998) 114 Law Quarterly 
Review 292.
 779 See ibid 308 f.
 780 See ibid 315. See also Walter (n 118).
 781 bge 98 Ib 385, at 2 a); BGer, judgment 4A_ 214/ 2013 of 5 August 2013, at 5.2.2.
 782 This argument is mentioned by Endicott (n 778) 309.
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contrary arguments are ignored. The anti- theoretical flavor of pragmatism may 
also legitimize a lack of judicial candor, and it dispenses judges from giving ar-
ticulate reasons for their decisions. As a matter of fact, Swiss judges tend to cite 
the arguments that support the interpretative result reached by the ruling and, 
therefore, to consider only one part of the argumentative picture. Pragmatic 
methodological pluralism can encourage a form of lawlessness, thereby under-
mining judges’ duty to obey the law. Moreover, as I will argue in more detail, 
pragmatic methodological pluralism may be unsuited to the interpretation of 
international law if it disregards the characteristics of it sources and its inter-
pretative methods (Chapters 5 and following).
References to pragmatism often appear in the practice of other Swiss au-
thorities as well. Pragmatism is frequently invoked in the context of Swiss for-
eign relations.784 Moreover, the consensual nature of Swiss politics785 requires 
finding workable solutions. Finally, ‘pragmatism’ also influences Swiss schol-
arship (supra, Chapter 1, 2.5), which rarely overtly criticizes the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal’s interpretative approach. In the United States, judges and scholars 
often endorse a distinctive interpretative philosophy,786 and they have offered 
elaborate theoretical accounts of legal and judicial interpretation.787 Swiss 
judges and scholars, by contrast, do not usually advocate the superiority of 
one interpretative method, nor do they seek to theorize their interpretative 
approach.788 Swiss constitutional legal scholars describe their field as ‘skepti-
cal towards overly abstract concepts’,789 but they barely dwell on the reasons 
for this skepticism. Few scholars depart from this path to analyze the Court’s 
interpretative methods.790 The handful of authors who have more openly crit-
icized the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ have 
called it a ‘method without method’,791 a ‘principled unprincipledness’,792 a 
 784 fdfa, Swiss Foreign Policy Strategy 2016– 19 (n 300).
 785 The Federal Council for instance is composed of seven ministers belonging to different 
representative political parties.
 786 Examples include originalism, living constitutionalism, or political process theory.
 787 See for instance Richard Fallon, ‘A Constructivist Coherence Account of Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1189.
 788 Walter (n 118).
 789 Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and Schweizer (n 382) 106.
 790 For innovative approaches, however, see Amstutz (n 757); Marc Amstutz, ‘Der Text 
des Gesetzes:  Genealogie und Evolution von Art. 1 zgb’ (2007) 126 Zeitschrift für 
Schweizerisches Recht / Revue de droit suisse 237; Amstutz and Niggli (n 105); Papaux 
(n 105); Keshelava (n 105).
 791 Pichonnaz and Vogenauer (n 105).
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‘tactical eclecticism’,793 ‘a self- service store’,794 and ‘cherry- picking without a 
clear concept’795.796 They have shown that pragmatic methodological plural-
ism hardly constrains the Swiss Federal Tribunal, which is the sole arbiter of 
the results yielded by different methods797 (see infra, Chapter 5, 3.3). They have 
also demonstrated that the Court, which must imperatively reach a decision 
and, in this sense, be result- oriented (‘pragmatic’), is often primarily guided by 
teleology.798
4.2.7 The Legal Authority of Domestic Rulings in the Swiss Legal Order
Lastly, we must clarify the legal authority that court rulings enjoy in the Swiss 
legal order, ie, the extent to which Swiss judicial decisions are a source of do-
mestic law799 (on their legal effect in international law, see infra, Chapter 4, 
section 3). When we talk about judicial lawmaking, what is at stake is not only 
courts’ decisional authority, ie, their authority to settle a particular case, but 
also their (potential) interpretive authority, ie, their legal authority in a given 
legal order beyond this particular dispute (eg in the context of future interpre-
tations of the law).800
Art. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code, which applies to the Swiss legal order, is particu-
larly interesting (though ambiguous) in this regard. It provides that the court, in 
the absence of an applicable legal provision, must decide based on customary 
law ‘and, in the absence [thereof], in accordance with the rule that it would 
make as a legislator’.801 The position Swiss courts and lawyers adopt towards 
judges’ interpretive authority is influenced by the commitment of the Swiss 
 793 Yann Grandjean borrows this expression from French scholar Jean Carbonnier. See 
Grandjean (n 175) 370.
 794 Kramer (n 105) 179.
 795 Kunz, ‘Umgang mit internationalem und mit europäischem Recht. Überblick über den 
“Swiss Approach”’ (n 764) 270.
 796 See also Besson and Ammann (n 97) 339.
 797 Grandjean (n 175) 370.
 798 Pichonnaz and Vogenauer (n 105) 424 f; Grandjean (n 175) 370; Besson and Ammann 
(n 97) 340 ff.
 799 On this issue, see Riccardo Guastini, ‘Les juges créent- ils du droit ? Les idées de Alf 
Ross’ (2014) 24 Revus 99; Jan Komárek, ‘Judicial Lawmaking and Precedent in Supreme 
Courts’ (2011) 4  <eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 38468/ 1/ WPS2011- 04_ Komarek.pdf>; Michel van 
de Kerchove, ‘La jurisprudence revisitée : un retour aux sources’ in Isabelle Hachez and 
others (eds), Les sources du droit revisitées – Vol 2 : Normes internes infraconstitutionnelles 
(Anthémis/Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint- Louis 2012).
 800 On this distinction, see Besson, ‘The Erga Omnes Effect of Judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights – What’s in a Name?’ (n 137).
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polity to the rule of law and legislative supremacy (supra, 3.3 and 3.5). They typi-
cally consider that the law is the basis and limit of Swiss judges’ activity, and that 
judges must apply, not make law.802 In short, they do not deem judicial rulings a 
source of domestic law. Although the Swiss Federal Tribunal does not see itself 
as a ‘juridical machine’ or a ‘subsumption automaton’,803 it often uses mecha-
nistic, non- evaluative language and emphasizes the syllogism that characterizes 
deduction804 without mentioning its creative effect. Swiss scholars have defined 
the judge as a ‘person whose syllogistic reasoning produces legal effects’.805
Still, art. 1(2) of the Swiss Civil Code shows that judicial lawmaking is not 
unfamiliar to the Swiss legal order. In cases pertaining to domestic law, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has acknowledged the need for judges to interpret the 
law ‘in light of [its] general development and of contemporary  circumstances’ 
when legislative intent is indeterminate.806 It has also used the notions of law-
making, law development, adjustment, and gap- filling when describing the 
task of judges.807
The conditions under which the Court engages in dynamic interpretation 
are narrow.808 Nonetheless, the Court has assumed a lawmaking role in some 
areas of domestic law, including in constitutional law. In a way that, mutatis 
mutandis, reminds us of the us Supreme Court’s unenumerated rights ad-
judication,809 the Swiss Federal Tribunal has identified several unwritten 
 802 Karl- Ludwig Kunz, ‘Politisches Engagement und die Unbefangenheit des Richters’ in 
Marianne Heer, Marcel Alexander Niggli, and Marc Thommen (eds), Toujours agité  – 
jamais abattu: Festschrift für Hans Wiprächtiger (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 2011).
 803 Hans Peter Walter, ‘Der Methodenpluralismus des Bundesgerichts bei der 
Gesetzesauslegung’ (1999) 17 recht 157, 157. See however Ehrenzeller, Schindler, and 
Schweizer (n 382) 3049.
 804 bge 98 Ib 385, at 2 a).
 805 Grandjean (n 175) 366.
 806 bge 86 iv 92, at b).
 807 bge 137 v 167, at 3.2; bge 137 v 126, at 4.1; bge 137 v 90, at 5.2; bge 128 v 108, at 
4 b); bge 128 v 199, at 5 b). See also bge 124 v 301, at 5.  In a decision of 2012, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that besides the protection of individuals, the task of 
the judiciary (at least as regards the highest court) is the uniform application of the law, 
as well as law development. See bge 138 v 271, at 3.3. It has also noted that ‘pursuant to 
contemporary conceptions, to apply a prima facie clear legal norm by analogy to a par-
ticular situation at which the norm is not aimed is an act of judicial lawmaking, and not 
an inadmissible interference with legislative power’, see bge 127 v 484, at 3 b) bb).
 808 Thus, in a decision pertaining to guardianship rights, the Swiss Federal Tribunal dismissed 
scholarly criticism according to which the Court had ignored new legal developments, 
stating that it was a ‘law- applying’ authority which could only exceptionally depart from 
the law (bge 123 iii 445, at 2 b)). See also bge 124 v 159, at 4 c).
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fundamental rights810 based on existing provisions of the Federal Constitu-
tion811 and of cantonal constitutions. This case law was subsequently codified 
in the 1999 revision of the Federal Constitution.812 Judges themselves note in 
their writings that interpretation involves evaluation,813 and Swiss scholarship 
increasingly emphasizes the creative dimensions of judicial reasoning.814
The orthodox doctrine based on which courts must remain independent 
from the political branches and especially from the legislature sits uneasily 
with judges’ power to make law in individual cases, and even to influence the 
formation and development of domestic815 law. Yet all three branches of gov-
ernment have lawmaking powers, even if they must exercise them separately 
in their respective domains of activity, without interfering with one another. 
Swiss courts make law in individual cases. In doing so, they also influence fu-
ture interpretations of the law.
5 Conclusion
The Swiss legal order is characterized by a range of specificities that affect and 
constrain Swiss courts’ activity, including when they apply international law. 
 810 Gonin and Bigler (n 702) 22 ff; Andreas Kley, ‘Der Grundrechtskatalog der nachgeführten 
Bundesverfassung:  Ausgewählte Neuerungen’ (1999) 135 Zeitschrift des Bernischen 
Juristenvereins 301; Hertig Randall and Chatton (n 441) 393. One example of such an 
unwritten constitutional right is the right to personal freedom, see bge 89 i 92, at 3 f; Kley 
319 ff. Another example is the right to secure one’s livelihood, see bge 121 i 367, at 2.
 811 The Court has especially relied on the right to equality, protected by art. 4 of the Swiss 
Constitution of 1874. See Gonin and Bigler (n 702) 23.
 812 Federal Council, Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung, 20 November 1996, fg 1997 
i 1, at 115. More generally, a range of constitutional and statutory provisions have been 
enacted or amended to reflect the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law. See for instance 
Federal Council, Botschaft über die Genehmigung und die Umsetzung des Notenaustauschs 
zwischen der Schweiz und der eg betreffend die Übernahme der eg– Rückführungsrichtlinie 
(Richtlinie 2008/ 115/ eg) und über eine Änderung des Bundesgesetzes über die 
Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (Automatisierte Grenzkontrolle, Dokumentenberaterinnen 
und Dokumentenberater, Informationssystem mides), 18 November 2009, fg 2009 
8881, at 8901 (regarding art. 81(2) fa- fn); Federal Council, Botschaft zur Änderung des 
Strafgesetzbuches (Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Einführung und Anwendung des Gesetzes) 
und des Militärstrafgesetzes sowie zu einem Bundesgesetz über das Jugendstrafrecht, 21 
September 1998, fg 1999 ii 1979, at 2000 (on title 2 of the SCrimC), 2062 (regarding art. 
50 SCrimC), and 2087 (regarding art. 62c(2) phrase 2 SCrimC).
 813 Seiler (n 712); Albrecht (n 712).
 814 Ehrenzeller (n 638); Papaux (n 105); Amstutz and Niggli (n 105).
 815 There is an analogous uneasiness vis- à- vis judges’ contribution to the formation of inter-
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Swiss foreign affairs give prominence to some areas of international law, while 
other areas are relatively unimportant in practice. This influences the issues 
likely to be brought before Swiss courts. The monism of the Swiss legal order 
entails that international law can immediately be applied by Swiss courts once 
it becomes binding on their State. Courts hence typically interpret interna-
tional laws that have not gone through a domestic legislative filter. The rank 
of international law in the Swiss legal order is not settled, and in some cases, 
especially in connection with the so- called ‘Schubert Praxis’, courts have made 
domestic laws trump international law. A similar ambivalence can be noticed 
regarding direct effect, which courts interpret in a way that is at times open, 
at times closed towards international law. In this context, courts’ interpreta-
tive reasoning lacks predictability, clarity, and consistency, and it does not 
 demonstrably conform with the interpretative methods of international law.
Courts’ activity, including as regards international legal issues, is 
 conditioned by several principles that structure the Swiss polity. Federalism 
protects the interests and competences of the cantons. Linguistic diversity 
influences the composition of the federal authorities, and it impacts federal 
legislation and judicial proceedings. It may also create interpretative diver-
gence. Another important constraint on Swiss judges is their duty to abide 
by the law and to respect international law, which flows from the Swiss con-
stitutional principle of the rule of law. Instruments of direct democracy give 
Swiss voters the possibility to shape Switzerland’s foreign policy. As a result, 
clashes between domestic and international law may come to the fore in the 
courts. The supremacy of the federal legislature over other Swiss authorities 
explains Switzerland’s weak system of judicial review, and Swiss judges’ defer-
ence towards federal acts, especially when the legislature willingly derogates 
from international law.
The Swiss judiciary has several layers. The Swiss Federal Tribunal has juris-
diction over international legal issues, except for some foreign relations mat-
ters. Nonetheless, the Court often defers to other federal authorities, at least 
with regard to some questions of international law. Swiss courts have the duty 
to apply international law and to respect the State’s international obligations. 
While the Swiss legal order is committed to the rule of law, Swiss judges are not 
insulated from the influence of politics. They are elected by the parliament or, 
in some cases, by the people. Moreover, they are in office for a limited period. 
Yet judges’ accountability towards their constituency is hampered by the fact 
that rulings typically only reflect the opinion of the majority. As regards Swiss 
courts’ interpretative approach, the Swiss Federal Tribunal endorses ‘pragmatic 
methodological pluralism’, which consists in a result- oriented balancing of 
considerations yielded by textual, teleological, systematic, and historical 
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interpretation. Judicial decisions are not typically acknowledged as a source 
of domestic law by the State authorities. However, judicial decisions influence 
the interpretation of the law in subsequent cases. Moreover, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal has contributed to the identification, formation, and modification of 
domestic law, including constitutional law.
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 chapter 4
The Legal Effect of Domestic Rulings in  
International Law
Theories which emphasize the incompleteness of the law usually 
argue that courts have a dual function: to apply law and to create 
new or revise old law. The prevalence of interpretation, however, 
seems to belie this view. Interpretation straddles the divide between 
the identification of existing law and the creation of a new one.816
∵
1 Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the legal effect of domestic rulings in international 
law. I  argue that this effect is both static and dynamic.817 First, domestic 
courts enable States to respect their international obligations. They do so by 
enforcing international law domestically (infra, section 2). Second, from the 
 perspective of the sources of international law, domestic judicial decisions 
also have a  dynamic effect on international law, as they contribute to shaping 
it, on the one hand, and help interpreters ascertain it, on the other hand (infra, 
section 3).818 I explain my reasons for focusing on art. 38 icj Statute in Chap-
ter 2,  section 5 (supra).
Why highlight the legal effect of domestic rulings in international law? 
 Simply put, because a normative argument about how domestic courts must 
interpret international law requires understanding the essence and character-
istics of their activity, and its relevance and stakes. Joseph Raz has observed 
 816 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  
(n 78) 224 f.
 817 I develop this further in Odile Ammann, ‘How Do and Should Domestic Courts Interpret 
International Law? Insights From the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart and Duncan Kennedy’ 
(2019) Transnational Legal Theory (forthcoming).
 818 On this issue, see Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A 
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that answering the question of how interpretation must be conducted (with 
regard to both legal acts and other interpretative objects) must start with an 
account of what interpretation is, and of why it is necessary and important 
(supra, Introduction, section 2).
Part 1 of this book revolved around the question ‘What is interpretation?’, 
and more precisely around the question: what is the nature and essence of 
domestic (especially Swiss) courts’ interpretation of international law? To an-
swer this question, I have defined the scope of my inquiry (Chapter 1), laid its 
conceptual groundwork (Chapter 2), and provided context on the Swiss legal 
order (Chapter 3).
In Part 2, my goal is to address Joseph Raz’s second question – why interpret? 
In other terms, why is legal (and, more specifically, judicial) interpretation 
‘central to legal practices’?819 As Raquel Barradas de Freitas notes, the word 
‘central’ can designate the predominance of legal interpretation in legal prac-
tice, but also (and more convincingly) its instrumental role (ie, ‘its relevance 
to the pursuit of a series of ends’).820 The ‘why’ question is distinct from, and 
prior to, the question of how to interpret.821
While I adopt Raz’s three- pronged structure of inquiry, my endeavor differs 
from his legal philosophical analysis of interpretation (supra, Introduction, 
section 2), and from his approach to the ‘why’ question. Instead of taking the 
perspective of an observer of the practice, as Raz does, I answer the ‘why’ ques-
tion by analyzing the law as a participant in the practice. Unlike Raz, who looks 
at domestic law, my focus lies on international law.
As much of international legal scholarship confirms,822 it is tempting to un-
derstand Raz’s ‘why’ question as one that is about the ‘role’ of domestic courts 
 819 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  
(n 78) 223.
 820 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 45. See also ibid 273 ff. Barradas argues that interpretation 
plays an instrumental role in that it makes the exercise of legal authority possible. By 
making the law intelligible, it helps individuals understand what the law requires, and 
hence be guided by it. See ibid 278.
 821 Joseph Raz states that understanding the importance of legal interpretation is necessary 
‘to evaluate the different [philosophical] accounts of legal interpretation’ provided by 
legal theorists. See Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and 
Practical Reason (n 78) 225.
 822 Weill (n 61); Sloss (n 120); Jonathan I  Charney, ‘International Criminal Law and the 
Role of Domestic Courts’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 120; Henry 
G Schermers, ‘The Role of Domestic Courts in Effectuating International Law’ (1990) 3 
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when they interpret international law.823 The term ‘role’, however, is multifaceted 
and ambiguous. A role can be captured from a descriptive or from a norma-
tive angle.824 It can be analyzed through the lens of domestic or international 
law. It can be defined from a legal perspective (ie, by highlighting courts’ or 
States’ legal duties and authority), but also from a psychological or sociological 
perspective, etc. This role may differ depending on the source, norm, and sub-
stantive area of international law under scrutiny.825 Accordingly, scholarship 
addressing the ‘role’ of domestic courts in the interpretation of international 
legal acts is a thicket that is hard to penetrate.826
A closely related point, and a distinctive feature of recent scholarly analyses, 
is that many authors adopt functionalist approaches. This should not surprise 
us in light of the aforementioned comments, since functionalism is an epis-
temic method that focuses on the role (or purpose) a given object serves – this 
role is deemed to have explanatory value. To illustrate, scholars have enumer-
ated domestic courts’ modes of ‘engagement’827 with international law, or the 
range of ‘functions’ these courts fulfill when interpreting it.828 Functionalist 
approaches have often been used by international lawyers,829 eg with regard 
to international courts,830 and they have also been popular in domestic law.831
 823 This observation has been made by Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational 
Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ 
(n 56) 45.
 824 See ibid 45 ff.
 825 See ibid 47 f.
 826 Besides the sheer quantity of contributions that have dealt with this topic, the terminol-
ogies, taxonomies, and theoretical approaches used to analyze what domestic courts do, 
must do, or should do when interpreting international law are diverse and sometimes 
intermingled. For an overview, see ibid 45 ff.
 827 ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61); ila, ‘Working Session Report of the ila 
Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International 
Law’ (n 61); ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts 
With International Law, Final Report: Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law’ (n 15).
 828 Eg Weill (n 61) 179.
 829 An early advocate of the ‘functional approach’ is Philip Jessup, ‘The Functional Approach 
as Applied to International Law’, Proceedings of the Third Conference of Teachers of 
International Law (Carnegie Endowment 1928).
 830 Gleider Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (Oxford 
University Press 2014).
 831 One illustration is provided by the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘soft originalism’ used by 
some us constitutional legal scholars. On translation, see Lawrence Lessig, ‘Understanding 
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory’ (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 395; Lawrence 
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At first sight, functionalism is attractive because it allows us to draw a 
range of distinctions and to think analytically. Yet one important drawback of 
 functionalism is its indeterminacy. How should we select among the myriad 
‘functions’ courts perform? Why is one function deemed more important than 
 others? Functionalism invites disagreement, as different functions are likely to 
be emphasized depending on the set of beliefs the scholar endorses. While pur-
porting to be descriptive and analytically precise, functionalism substantially 
hinges on more fundamental value judgments.832
Rather than examining the ‘functions’ or causal ‘impact’ of domestic judi-
cial decisions in international law, my aim, in this chapter, is to clarify why 
domestic courts’ interpretations of international law are central (ie, important, 
instrumentally relevant) to the practice of international law. In other terms, 
I examine the legal effect of these rulings in international law.
As usual, caveats apply. First, the two aforementioned aspects (ie, the law- 
applying, ‘static’ facet of domestic courts’ activity, versus its jurisgenerative, ‘dy-
namic’ effect)833 are two sides of the same coin.834 By enforcing  international 
law domestically as international law requires States to do, domestic courts 
inevitably make law. Courts do so with respect to the relationship between 
domestic and international law, but also regarding the content of international 
law, subject to the framework established by art. 38 icj Statute. Second, in this 
chapter I am not yet evaluating domestic courts’ activity. My goal, at this stage, 
is to clarify the legal consequences of their rulings in international law. Third, 
I analyze this effect in general terms, without focusing on particular norms and 
domains of international law. However, the effect of domestic rulings varies 
depending on the norm and substantive area of international law at stake.835 
Fourth, I focus on the effect of domestic rulings in international law. The effect 
of Swiss courts’ rulings in domestic law is addressed in Chapter 3 (supra). Fifth, 
Review 125. On soft originalism, see Cass R Sunstein, ‘Five Theses on Originalism’ (1995) 
19 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 311. For a critique, see Michael J Klarman, 
‘Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil’ (1997) 65 Fordham Law 
Review 1739, 1753 ff.
 832 This point has been brought to my attention by Michael Klarman.
 833 On these two facets, see Edouard Dubout and Sébastien Touzé, ‘La fonction des droits 
fondamentaux dans les rapports entre ordres et systèmes juridiques’ in Edouard Dubout 
and Sébastien Touzé (eds), Les droits fondamentaux : charnières entre ordres et systèmes 
juridiques (Pedone 2009); Besson and Ammann (n 60) 7– 9.
 834 Tzanakopoulos and Methymaki (n 217). See also Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic 
Courts in International Law’ (United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law, 
2016) <legal.un.org/ avl/ ls/ Tzanakopoulos_ IL_ video_ 1.html>.
 835 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
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the way international law is received in domestic legal orders is contingent 
on domestic law (Chapter 3, supra). These features may limit domestic courts’ 
contribution to the sources of international law.
I now turn to the two legal effects of domestic rulings in international law, 
namely to their connecting (infra, section 2) and dynamic effect (infra, sec-
tion 3).
2 Domestic Rulings as Means of Enforcement of International Law
A first legal effect of domestic judicial decisions on international law is that 
they facilitate the reception of international law in the domestic legal order. 
By enforcing international law domestically, they allow States to respect their 
international obligations (subject, of course, to the constraints established by 
domestic law in this respect, Chapter 3, supra).
International law, qua law, aims at being obeyed. This claim is implicit in 
all international legal norms, and explicit in some of them. For instance, the 
customary principle pacta sunt servanda codified in art. 26 vclt provides that 
States must honor their treaty obligations. States cannot in principle rely on 
domestic law to justify a violation of these treaty obligations (art. 27 vclt).836 
States must also respect cil and general principles of international law 
qua sources of international law (art. 38 icj Statute), unless these States are 
 excluded from the scope of their legal authority.837
A State’s violation of its international obligations triggers its international 
responsibility. The conditions of this responsibility are exclusively defined by 
international law.838 The ilc’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts (arsiwa), most of which are customary,839 provide 
 836 See also pcij, case concerning the Greco– Bulgarian ‘Communities’, advisory opinion, pcij 
Series B No 17, 31 July 1930, 4, at 32. States cannot even rely on constitutional law: pcij, 
case concerning the Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or 
Speech in the Danzig Territory, advisory opinion, pcij Series a/ b No 44, 4 February 1932, 
3, at 24; icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 
judgment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 65, para 139.
 837 Eg if States are persistent objectors to a given norm of cil, or in the case of regional 
custom.
 838 icj, case concerning Elettronica Sicula SpA (elsi) (United States v. Italy), judgment, icj 
Reports 1989, 20 July 1989, 15, at 51, para 73.
 839 Some arsiwa provisions remain contested, such as those on serious breaches and coun-
termeasures:  James Crawford, ‘State Responsibility’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
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that State responsibility arises whenever the State commits an internationally 
wrongful act,840 ie, an act incompatible with its international obligations.841 
The decision of a domestic court is always attributable to the State, even when 
it exceeds the court’s competence under domestic law.842 Thus, if domestic 
rulings fail to respect the State’s international obligations, they trigger their 
State’s international responsibility and its duty to provide reparation.843
One corollary of States’ duty to obey international law is their duty to apply 
and enforce international law domestically through their organs, so that in-
ternational law can rule.844 International law is weakly institutionalized and 
lacks an international police force. Therefore, it must primarily rely on the 
State for its domestic enforcement.845 Exceptionally, international law defines 
the modalities of its enforcement, eg in ihrl,846 or in the context of remedies 
for breaches of international law.847
States’ duty to obey international law may be expressed or reinforced by 
more specific positive international legal duties, rights, or powers.848 The ter-
minology used in international law to characterize these duties or  competences 
is diverse and often inconsistent (eg the duty or competence to ‘enforce’, ‘ap-
ply’, ‘interpret’, ‘implement’, or ‘give effect’ to international law, to ‘monitor’ 
its application, etc.), which makes it necessary to interpret each provision to 
 840 Art. 1 arsiwa.
 841 Art. 12 arsiwa.
 842 Art. 4, 7 arsiwa.
 843 pcij, case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), judgment, claim for 
indemnity, merits, pcij Series A No 17, 13 September 1928, 4, at 29.
 844 Leo Gross, ‘States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation’, 
Essays on International Law and Organization (Vol I) (Transnational Publishers, Inc/
Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 378 f.
 845 Even international judges play a limited role with regard to enforcement, see Besson, 
‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication:  Getting Over the Amour 
Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ (n 85)  425. 
Some international bodies monitor the domestic enforcement of international law. One 
example is the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which monitors the 
domestic enforcement of ECtHR rulings, see Samantha Besson, ‘Les effets et l’exécution 
des arrêts de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – Le cas de la Suisse’ in Bernhard 
Ehrenzeller and Stephan Breitenmoser (eds), Die emrk und die Schweiz / La cedh et la 
Suisse (Schulthess 2010) 160 ff.
 846 Frédéric Mégret, ‘Nature of Obligations’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh 
Sivakumaran (eds), International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 101 ff.
 847 icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), judg-
ment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 59 f, para 121.
 848 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
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determine its legal implications. In some cases, international law explicitly re-
quires or empowers States not only to give effect to their international obliga-
tions domestically, but also to interpret them.849
The domestic judicial application and enforcement of international law is 
sometimes explicitly mandated by international law. ihl for instance tasks do-
mestic institutions, including courts,850 with its enforcement. Other examples 
include icl851 or ihrl.852 In international environmental law, access to courts 
is sometimes explicitly mandated.853 The icj has occasionally required that 
specific measures be taken by domestic courts to guarantee domestic com-
pliance with international law,854 although domestic judges have sometimes 
shown resistance.855
While some authors argue that international law increasingly imposes du-
ties upon domestic organs,856 conceptually, it is the State’s (and not domes-
tic courts’) international legal duty to respect international law.857 States are 
free to choose the means by which to give effect to their international obli-
gations. However, the nature and content of some obligations may require 
 849 See ibid. The echr for instance is primarily interpreted by State institutions.
 850 See art. 49(2), art. 50(2), art. 129(2), and art. 146(2) of the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, respectively. On requirements of domestic enforcement in general, see Weill 
(n 61) 7 foonote 17.
 851 Art. 1 icc Statute. See also art. vi of the Genocide Convention of 9 December 1948.
 852 Eg art. 2(3) iccpr. The un treaty bodies have stressed the importance for States to grant 
judicial remedies, so that individuals can invoke relevant international human rights obli-
gations. See the examples mentioned by Künzli, Eugster, and Spring (n 442) 4, note 6.
 853 Art. 9 Aarhus Convention. The importance of judicial review is also stressed in soft 
law instruments, eg the Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law and Sustainable 
Development adopted at the Global Judges Symposium on 18– 20 August 2002.
 854 icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), judg-
ment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 59 f, para 121. See also Fikfak, ‘Reinforcing 
the icj’s Central International Role? Domestic Courts’ Enforcement of icj Decisions and 
Opinions’ (n 63).
 855 A well- known example is the Avena/ Medellín saga. On the other hand, some domestic 
courts explicitly underscore their State’s duty to apply international law domestically. The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal for instance, early on in its case law, emphasized the State’s duty 
to enforce international law through its institutions, eg bge 49 i 188, at 3.  The Court 
especially highlights judicial enforcement with respect to ihrl. See bge 123 ii 595, at 
7 c); bge 117 Ib 367, at 2 e).
 856 Ward Ferdinandusse, ‘Out of the Black- Box? The International Obligation of State Organs’ 
(2003) 29 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 45.
 857 This is also how the icj phrased the issue in the case concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United States), judgment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 60, 
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that States take certain measures to ensure that their courts will give effect to 
 international law.
States’ duty to abide by international law, and thus to implement it do-
mestically and to act as ‘officials of international law’,858 explains why schol-
ars highlight that domestic courts can, do, and/ or should act as ‘enforcers’,859 
‘agents’,860 or ‘faithful trustees’861 of international law. Scholars describe do-
mestic courts as the ‘first port of call’862 to adjudicate international legal issues 
and, when international adjudication is unavailable, as the first and only locus 
of international legal interpretation.863
Of course, the State’s duty to enforce international law via its organs may 
conflict with other duties under domestic and especially constitutional law. 
From the perspective of international law, domestic law is no valid justifica-
tion for disregarding international law, including its interpretative methods.864 
In such cases, courts experience a ‘double bind’,865 as they must respect two 
 858 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?’ 
(2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 315; Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty, 
International Law and Democracy’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 
373, 375.
 859 Rodney Harrison, ‘Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights in Courts of 
Law: Some Recent Developments’ (1995) 21 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1290; Masters 
(n 331); Oona A Hathaway and Scott J Shapiro, ‘Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and 
International Law’ (2011) 121 Yale Law Journal 252; Roberts, ‘Comparative International 
Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (n 59); 
Susan Deller Ross, ‘Enforcing Women’s International Rights at Home:  International 
Law in Domestic Courts’, Women’s Human Rights:  The International and Comparative 
Law Casebook (University of Pennsylvania Press 2008); M Shah Alam, ‘Enforcement of 
International Human Rights Law by Domestic Courts in the United States’ (2004) 10 
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 27; Richard F Oppong and Lisa C 
Niro, ‘Enforcing Judgments of International Courts in National Courts’ (2014) 5 Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 344; Dapo Akande and Sangeeta Shah, ‘Immunities of 
State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’ (2011) 21 European 
Journal of International Law 815; Conforti and Francioni (n 120); Fikfak, ‘Reinforcing 
the icj’s Central International Role? Domestic Courts’ Enforcement of icj Decisions 
and Opinions’ (n 63); Weill (n 61)  117; Schermers (n 822); Karen Knop, ‘Here and 
There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ (2000) 32 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 501, 501, footnote 1.
 860 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47) 8.
 861 Eirik Bjorge, Domestic Application of the echr:  Courts as Faithful Trustees (Oxford 
University Press 2015).
 862 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47) 11 f.
 863 Tzanakopoulos, ‘Domestic Courts in International Law:  The International Judicial 
Function of National Courts’ (n 57) 151.
 864 Art. 27 vclt.
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irreconcilable legal duties of the State. These conflicts faced by domestic 
courts have spilt a lot of ink, although it is important to highlight that in many 
instances, the conflict exists not only between international and domestic law, 
but also within domestic law.866 Scholars have highlighted ‘patterns of  national 
contestation’ of international law, patterns which domestic courts contribute 
to tracing.867 Yet domestic courts also resolve conflicts by giving preference to 
what international law requires. In most areas of international law, contesta-
tion is the exception rather than the rule.868
Existing scholarship on conflicts between domestic and international 
law is chiefly descriptive, in the sense that it primarily maps the existing 
practice and rarely examines how domestic courts must (or should) resolve 
conflicts. This question is complex, because the answer to it depends on 
the provisions at stake and, importantly, hinges on considerations of moral 
and political philosophy. The issue of how conflicts must (or should) be 
resolved is beyond the scope of my study, but my account has implications 
for how courts must handle such conflicts. The thesis I defend is that courts 
must use specific methods to ascertain international law (ie, textual, sys-
tematic, purposive and, if applicable, historical interpretation), and that 
they should strive to reason predictably, clearly, and consistently. They 
must do so regardless of how they resolve clashes between domestic and 
international law.
 866 For an example, see bge 139 i 16.
 867 Raffaela Kunz, ‘Judging International Judgments Anew? The Human Rights Courts 
Before Domestic Courts’ European Journal of International Law (forthcoming); Mikael 
Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak, and Micha Wiebusch, ‘Backlash Against International 
Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts’ (2018) 14 
International Journal of Law in Context 197; Machiko Kanetake and André Nollkaemper 
(eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestations and Deference 
(Hart Publishing 2015). Curtis Bradley argues that the us Supreme Court is a ‘filter’ 
between international and us law that ensures that international law fits ‘the structure 
and values of the constitutional system’, see Bradley (n 70) 102. André Nollkaemper uses 
the metaphors of ‘safety valve[s] or gate- keeper[s]’, see Nollkaemper, National Courts and 
the International Rule of Law (n 47) 303. Harold Koh views domestic actors (including 
courts) as a ‘transmission belt’ which mediates between international law and the domes-
tic legal order: Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 
106 Yale Law Journal 2599, 2651. Contra Knop (n 859) 505.
 868 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Why Do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? 
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3 Domestic Rulings as Contributors to the Sources and  
Interpretation of International Law
States’ duty to apply and enforce international law domestically, including via 
their courts, is not the only reason why domestic courts’ interpretations are 
central to international law. First, from the perspective of the sources of inter-
national law, domestic rulings can collectively contribute to the formation and 
modification of international law (infra, 3.1). Second, from the perspective of 
any domestic or international interpreter of international law, domestic judi-
cial decisions are auxiliary means (or ‘subsidiary means’, as per art. 38(1)(d) icj 
Statute) that assist her in her interpretative task (infra, 3.2). Of course, domes-
tic rulings have an analogous effect in domestic legal orders (supra, Chapter 3, 
4.2.7). They can even, under certain conditions and in some States, exercise 
domestic legal authority beyond the particular case. Yet in this section, I focus 
on the place of domestic rulings in international law.
While domestic and international law increasingly overlap in terms of their 
respective subject matters and of the authorities that apply them, international 
and domestic lawmaking processes remain distinct (supra, Chapter 1, section 6). 
Even this distinction is not as sharp as it might seem, however. The sources of 
domestic and international law are intertwined due to the fact that States have 
the power to collectively create international law. When two or more States con-
clude a treaty, for instance, they make international law.869 States also collec-
tively provide evidence of the two constitutive elements of cil, State practice 
and opinio juris. Furthermore, their acts can be a manifestation of the domestic 
recognition of at least some general principles of international law, ie, those 
applied in foro domestico. What differs between domestic and international law-
making processes is that the latter involve States qua primary lawmakers.
The place of domestic rulings in the sources of international law is ambig-
uous in practice and in scholarship. While there is agreement (and rightly so) 
that domestic rulings are not a source of international law (infra, 3.1.1– 3.1.3),870 
 869 Gross (n 844) 379.
 870 Some courts explicitly reject the idea that domestic rulings do and/ or should have legal 
authority (qua source) on the international plane:  icj, ‘Public sitting held on Monday 
12 September 2011, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the 
case concerning Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece interven-
ing)’, <www.icj- cij.org/ docket/ files/ 143/ 16677.pdf>, at 21, cited in Weill (n 61) 157. See 
also icty (Trial Chamber ii), Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić and Others, trial judgment, 
Case No it- 95- 16- t, 14 January 2000, para 540, cited in Aldo Zammit Borda, ‘The Use 
of Precedent as Subsidiary Means and Sources of International Criminal Law’ (2013) 18 
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their precise categorization is often left open (see also supra, Chapter 1, 2.3). 
Legal scholars and practitioners often mention that domestic courts ‘contrib-
ute’ to the ‘development’ of international law,871 or that they may ‘facilitate the 
determination of the contents of [international] obligations’.872 They  consider 
that their rulings ‘may be relevant’ from the perspective of the identification 
of international law.873 The ila Study Group on Domestic Courts notes that 
domestic courts, ‘as organs of the State, necessarily affect the content of norms 
of international law whenever they engage with them. They serve as agents 
of development (or corrosion and decay) of international law norms’.874 The 
role of domestic courts as ‘agents of development’875 of international law 
has been highlighted with regard to general international law (eg the law of 
international responsibility876 or the international law of jurisdiction),877  
pointed out that they should not make law for other subjects of international law, includ-
ing other States. See Lord Hoffmann in Jones v. Ministry of Interior Al- Mamlaka Al- Arabiya 
AS Saudiya, (2006) ukhl 26, para 63, cited in Weill (n 61) 157.
 871 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47)  10; Tams and 
Tzanakopoulos (n 147); Veronika Fikfak, ‘Judicial Strategies and Their Impact on 
the Development of the International Rule of Law’ in Machiko Kanetake and André 
Nollkaemper (eds), The Rule of Law at the National and International Levels: Contestations 
and Deference (Hart Publishing 2016); Iovane (n 182); Harmen van der Wilt, ‘Domestic 
Courts’ Contribution to the Development of International Criminal Law:  Some 
Reflections’ (2013) 46 Israel Law Review 207; Jennings (n 40); Venzke, How Interpretation 
Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (n 126) 16. See also 
Devika Hovell, ‘A Dialogue Model: The Role of the Domestic Judge in Security Council 
Decision- Making’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 579, 592. For a legal 
practitioner’s view, see Gérard V La Forest, ‘The Expanding Role of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in International Law Issues’ (1996) xxxiv Canadian Yearbook of International 
Law 89, 100.
 872 Nollkaemper, National Courts and the International Rule of Law (n 47) 10.
 873 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ 
(n 185) 3, para 4.
 874 ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61) 13.
 875 Tams and Tzanakopoulos (n 147).
 876 Simon Olleson, ‘Internationally Wrongful Acts in the Domestic Courts: The Contribution 
of Domestic Courts to the Development of Customary International Law Relating to the 
Engagement of International Responsibility’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 615. See however, with regard to State responsibility:  Stephan Wittich, ‘Domestic 
Courts and the Content and Implementation of State Responsibility’ (2013) 26 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 643.
 877 Roger O’Keefe, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of the International Law of 
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ihl,878 icl,879 and ihrl.880 Scholars have also discussed the role domestic 
courts can play in ‘closing gaps’ in international law, for instance in the law of 
immunities.881
Although most international lawyers acknowledge a de facto ‘influence’ of 
domestic rulings on international law, domestic judicial lawmaking is often 
obfuscated or presented as an oblique phenomenon. Hersch Lauterpacht has 
probably endorsed the boldest position in this respect, suggesting that their 
decisions are a ‘source’ of international law.882 Only few scholars use such 
forceful terminology.883 Apart from these exceptions, the reluctance to deem 
domestic rulings authoritative on the international plane likely goes back to 
the controversial nature of judicial lawmaking in domestic law (infra, Chap-
ter 5, 4.2). Moreover, as previously mentioned, the entrenchment of domestic 
rulings in art. 38 icj Statute is equivocal. Finally, the effect of domestic courts’ 
interpretation on the formation and evolution of international law is not mon-
olithic. It depends on the source of international law at stake, on whether the 
scope of a given norm is inter- or intrastate, on whether mechanisms of inter-
national adjudication restrict domestic courts’ interpretative freedom and, of 
course, on courts’ rights, duties, and authority in domestic law.884 Therefore, 
the effect of these rulings must be assessed carefully.
In this section, my goal is to show that domestic rulings, despite States’ and 
international lawyers’ reluctance to acknowledge it, contribute to the forma-
tion, modification, and ascertainment of international law. I analyze the legal 
effect of these rulings with regard to treaty law (3.1.1), cil (3.1.2), and general 
 878 Yaël Ronen, ‘Silent Enim Leges Inter Arma – but Beware the Background Noise: Domestic 
Courts as Agents of Development of the Law on the Conduct of Hostilities’ (2013) 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law 599.
 879 van der Wilt (n 871).
 880 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56); Iovane (n 182).
 881 August Reinisch, ‘To What Extent Can and Should National Courts “Fill the Accountability 
Gap”?’ (2013) 10 International Organizations Law Review 572. See also Karel Wellens, 
‘Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing an Accountability Regime for 
International Organizations:  The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap’ (2004) 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1159.
 882 Lauterpacht, ‘Municipal Decisions as Sources of International Law’ (n 50).
 883 Hovell (n 871) 582, 591 ff. See also Jennings (n 40) 3 f. André Nollkaemper, in an article 
on icl, assesses whether domestic courts are ‘sources’ of international law: Nollkaemper, 
‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice 
of the icty’ (n 182).
 884 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
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principles of international law (3.1.3). I also highlight the assistance domestic 
rulings provide to other interpreters in future interpretations of international 
law, pursuant to art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute (3.2).885
Of course, domestic rulings also constitute State practice in a different re-
spect, on which I do not focus here:  like every act of a State organ, they are 
attributable to the State for the purposes of international responsibility.886
3.1 Domestic Rulings in the Sources of International Law  
(Art. 38(1)(a)– (c) icj Statute)
3.1.1 Treaties
Art. 31– 33 vclt are widely held to codify the cil of treaty interpretation (on 
this issue, see infra, Chapter 6). Of particular interest for the purposes of this 
study is art. 31(3)(b) vclt, which states that ‘There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context [of the treaty]:  […] b. Any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation’.
The ilc’s Special Rapporteur on ‘subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice’, Georg Nolte, addressed the ‘legal significance’ of domestic case law in 
a report published in 2016.887 Nolte merely observes that domestic rulings qua 
subsequent practice ‘do not raise specific problems’.888 Indeed, given that such 
rulings are attributable to the State,889 they can, together with other instances 
of domestic and foreign State practice, constitute subsequent practice in the 
sense of art. 31(3)(b) vclt.890 This constitutive aspect is arguably less central 
 885 See already ibid 49 f.
 886 Art. 4 arsiwa; ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, 
‘Final Report: Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ (2000) 17 <www.ila- hq.org/ index.php/ committees?committeeID=22>.
 887 ilc, ‘Fourth Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
the Interpretation of Treaties by Georg Nolte, Special Rapporteur’ (2016) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 
694 36 ff para 95 ff.
 888 See ibid 37 para 96.
 889 Gerhard Hafner, ‘Subsequent Agreements and Practice: Between Interpretation, Informal 
Modification, and Formal Amendment’ in Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent 
Practice (Oxford University Press 2013) 113.
 890 Rosanne van Alebeek, ‘Domestic Courts as Agents of Development of International 
Immunity Rules’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 559, 562; Marcin 
Kaldunski, ‘The Law of State Immunity in the Case Concerning Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State (Germany v. Italy)’ (2014) 13 The Law and Practice of International Courts 
and Tribunals 54, 99; ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law: The 
Role of Decisions of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and 
Tribunals of a Universal Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary 
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for treaty law than what is the case with cil, as custom cannot exist without 
its constitutive elements, namely State practice and opinio juris. This also ex-
plains why domestic judicial decisions are described by the ilc as elements 
providing evidence of State practice of opinio juris,891 contrary to the termi-
nology that is typically used to describe the contribution of domestic rulings 
to the identification of treaty law and general principles of international law. 
Still, subsequent practice, when it exists, forms an integral, constitutive part of 
treaty law too.
This link between domestic rulings and subsequent practice is also reflected 
in the practice of international law. International criminal tribunals in par-
ticular have referred to domestic rulings qua subsequent practice,892 albeit not 
always explicitly. Two examples of implicit versus explicit references to sub-
sequent treaty practice mentioned by André Nollkaemper are the rulings of 
the icty Trial Chamber in Krstić and Jelisić.893 In Krstić, the Chamber referred 
to art. 31 f vclt when ‘look[ing] for guidance in the practice of States, espe-
cially their judicial interpretations and decisions’.894 In Jelisić, it mentioned 
that it had ‘taken into account’ ‘[t] he practice of States, notably through their 
 national courts’ after citing the vclt’s treaty interpretation provisions.895 It re-
ferred (without providing any details) to the Eichmann ruling of the Supreme 
Court of Israel, as well as to judgments of Equatorial Guinean, Vietnamese, 
 Ethiopian, and German courts.896 While the Chamber did not mention art. 
31(3)(b) vclt in Krstić, it did note the relevance of domestic courts qua ‘subse-
quent practice’ in Jelisić.897
of Domestic Courts With International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement 
of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 15) 3. See also Besson, ‘Human Rights’ 
Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication:  A Peripheral Case of Domestic Courts as 
International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56).
 891 Draft conclusions 6(2) and 10(2), ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, With Commentaries’ (2018) un Doc a/ 73/ 10 119.
 892 ilc, ‘First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
Treaty Interpretation by Georg Nolte, Special Rapporteur’ (2013) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 660 
18 f para. 41.
 893 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 280.
 894 icty (Trial Chamber i), Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, Case No it- 98- 33- t, judgment, 2 
August 2001, para 541, cited by Nollkaemper, ibid.
 895 icty (Trial Chamber), Prosecutor v.  Goran Jelisić, Case No it- 95- 10- t, judgment, 14 
December 1999, para 61, cited by Nollkaemper, ibid 279.
 896 Ibid, para 61, footnote 80.
 897 Ibid, para 61. See also Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of 
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The ilc commentary to the vclt does not specify how subsequent practice 
is to be ascertained. However, art. 31(3)(b) vclt makes it clear that domestic 
rulings reflect subsequent treaty practice if they establish the understanding 
of the parties. Hence, they cannot merely be a manifestation of the unilateral 
(auto- )interpretation of the treaty by one State. It is not necessary for the prac-
tice to express the understanding of all the parties, however, as the word ‘all’ 
was deliberately omitted by the ilc in the drafting process.898
International lawyers often limit themselves to general remarks as to the 
requirements this practice must fulfill to be relevant from the perspective of 
the vclt, eg that it must reflect ‘a certain constant pattern of state conduct’.899 
To ensure predictability, clarity, and consistency in the way subsequent prac-
tice is ascertained, it seems helpful to interpret the notion of practice of art. 
31(3)(b) vclt in light of the notion of State practice in cil. Like State practice 
in cil (see also infra, 3.1.2), subsequent treaty practice must reach a minimal 
threshold of coherence (or uniformity), constancy (or regularity), and general-
ity (or representativeness).900 Otherwise, it cannot express the parties’ under-
standing. These requirements (coherence, constancy, generality) entail that 
domestic rulings, to constitute subsequent practice, must (i)  not contradict 
the practice of other State organs (so that the practice is coherent), (ii) not be 
isolated rulings, but belong to an established practice, and (iii) emanate from 
the courts of a sufficiently large number of States. The requirements are even 
stricter for multilateral treaties.901 Of course, some differences with State prac-
tice in cil do exist. Subsequent treaty practice pertains to the interpretation 
of written norms upon which the parties have previously agreed, and it must 
establish ‘the agreement of the parties’ (art. 31(3)(b) vclt).
Assessing whether the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled indisputably 
involves discretion. International courts have not always been careful when 
ascertaining subsequent practice on the basis of domestic rulings.902 It is also 
important to note, along with Samantha Besson, that ‘the effects of domestic 
courts’ judicial interpretation on the interpreted norm [ie, on customary in-
ternational legal norms and general principles] are greater than they are in 
the case of treaties’903 because of the process through which these norms are 
 898 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 222.
 899 Hafner (n 889) 113.
 900 On these three requirements: Besson and Ammann (n 60) 110 ff.
 901 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 280.
 902 See ibid.
 903 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
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created and changed. This explains why domestic courts have been  relatively 
neglected in the ascertainment of subsequent treaty practice. Nonetheless, 
domestic rulings can be constitutive of this practice and must be examined 
carefully.
3.1.2 Customary International Law
Besides reflecting subsequent treaty practice (supra, 3.1.1), domestic rulings 
can help determine (or, to use the ilc’s terminology,904 provide evidence of) 
State practice and/ or opinio juris, the two constitutive elements of cil.905
As previously pointed out, the contribution of domestic judicial decisions 
to the formation and evolution of cil is more central than with respect to trea-
ties (supra, 3.1.1) and general principles (infra, 3.1.3). Indeed, the very existence 
of custom depends on the presence of its constitutive elements. Treaties, by 
contrast, exist before a subsequent treaty practice develops. The absence of 
such a practice does not yield the conclusion that there is no treaty norm. As 
regards general principles, their domestic recognition does not suffice to estab-
lish their existence in international law, which must be determined through 
analogical reasoning. Moreover, some general principles of international law 
exist regardless of their recognition in foro domestico (on these two types of 
general principles, see infra, 3.1.3).
When do domestic rulings provide evidence of State practice and/ or opinio 
juris in the context of cil? The ilc’s recent work on custom shows that many 
aspects of the identification of cil remain unsettled. Still, some are widely 
established. State practice and opinio juris must satisfy the requirements of co-
herence (or uniformity), constancy (or regularity), and generality (or represent-
ativeness).906 The terminology used to refer to these different requirements is 
 904 Draft conclusion 3, ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International 
Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891). The ilc notes that the term ‘evidence’ is to be under-
stood in a broad sense, and that it does not refer to a formal procedure in which evidence 
is produced and assessed. See footnote 263, in ilc, ‘Report on the Sixty- Eighth Session 
(2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016)’ (2016) un Doc a/ 71/ 10 84.
 905 Art. 24 ilc Statute states the following: ‘The Commission shall consider ways and means 
for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available, such as 
the collection and publication of documents concerning State practice and of the deci-
sions of national and international courts on questions of international law […]’ (emphasis 
added).
 906 Eg ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 20 
ff; James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2012) 24 f. See also draft conclusions 7– 8 in ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on 
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highly inconsistent,907 however, and the practice (both domestic and interna-
tional) tends not to take them seriously enough (infra, Chapters 6 and 8).908
The ilc cites domestic rulings among the forms of evidence of both State 
practice and opinio juris.909 The Special Rapporteur’s analysis of the authority 
of domestic rulings from the perspective of cil is very brief, and he only men-
tions their relevance qua State practice.910 In 2016, the ilc’s Secretariat con-
ducted a comprehensive survey of international courts’ reliance on domestic 
rulings to identify custom.911 Indeed, international courts such as the pcij and 
its successor, the icj,912 the ictr,913 and especially the icty,914 have referred 
to domestic rulings qua State practice and/ or opinio juris. Courts seldom dis-
tinguish between the two constitutive elements of cil in this context.915 As 
 907 For an attempted clarification: Besson and Ammann (n 60) 110 ff.
 908 On the icty:  Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International 
Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 285. On the Swiss practice: Besson 
and Ammann (n 60).
 909 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, With 
Commentaries’ (n 891). See draft conclusions 5, 6(2), and 10(2).
 910 ilc, ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Special 
Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (n 578) 42 para 58.
 911 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ (n 185).
 912 pcij, case concerning the s.s. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), judgment, pcij 1927 Series A No 
10, 7 September 1927, 25 ff; icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; 
Greece intervening), judgment, icj Reports 2012, 3 February 2012, 99, at 122 f, para 55; 
125, para 61; and especially 131 ff, para 72 ff; see also 141 f, para 96; 143, para 101.
 913 See the ilc Secretariat’s remarks:  ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary 
International Law:  The Role of Decisions of National Courts in the Case Law of 
International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal Character for the Purpose of the 
Determination of Customary International Law’ (n 185) 28 ff para 44 ff.
 914 As of 1 December 2015, the icty had referred to domestic rulings when identifying cil in 
49 out of 81 rulings: ibid 21, para 36. See also Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts 
as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 281 ff. 
For references to domestic case law, see icty (Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v. Dražen 
Erdemović, judgment, Case No it- 96- 22- a, 7 October 1997, joint and separate opinion of 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para 50 and 55; icty (Trial Chamber ii), Prosecutor 
v.  Anto Furundžija, judgment, Case No it- 95- 17/ 1- t, 10 December 1998, para 194 ff; 
icty (Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v.  Duško Tadić, opinion and judgment, Case No 
it- 94- 1- t, 7 May 1997, para 641 f (where the Court deemed French case law ‘instructive’, 
but of lesser relevance given that it concerned domestic law).
 915 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ 
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the ilc Secretariat notes, some never refer to domestic rulings when identi-
fying cil, eg the itlos916 or the wto Appellate Body.917 Domestic rulings are 
typically one piece of evidence among others which courts use to determine 
the existence of cil.918 The domestic practice also occasionally uses domestic 
rulings qua evidence of the constitutive elements of cil, ie, State practice and 
opinio juris.919 Scholars accept this as well,920 although some emphasize State 
practice only.921
Domestic case law is, of course, not the only basis for ascertaining cil.922 
When it is inconsistent, scarce, or not representative of a longa consuetudo, 
other instances of domestic (legislative or executive) practice and/ or opinio 
juris may be used. The lack of domestic ‘judicial custom’923 is thus not neces-
sarily the end of the matter with regard to cil.
Should rulings that conflict with the position of the other branches of gov-
ernment be deemed an expression of State practice and/ or opinio? While some 
consider that what is decisive is whether the body at stake has the final author-
ity on a given issue under domestic law924 (which is not always clear,925 see 
 916 See ibid 18 f para 31 ff. However, individual judges of the itlos have done so, see ibid 19, 
para 34.
 917 See ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law: The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ 
(n 185) 20, para 35.
 918 Eg ibid 24, para 39.
 919 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 77 f.
 920 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 281 f; Ingrid Wuerth, ‘International Law in Domestic 
Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 819, 3. See also Javier Dondé Matute, ‘International Criminal Law 
Before the Supreme Court of Mexico’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 
571, 575.
 921 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 18. See 
also the following statement of the ila Study Group on Domestic Courts, in its 2014 
Working Session Report:  ‘The traditional position in international law is that domestic 
courts engage in state practice, and thus they effectively make international law, at least 
on a micro- level’. ila, ‘Working Session Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on 
the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 61) 3.
 922 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 285.
 923 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56) 60.
 924 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 284.
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eg Chapter 3, 2.1.2 and 4.2.2, supra), others give preference to the executive’s 
view.926 The ila Study Group on Domestic Courts considers that domestic rul-
ings, to constitute State practice and/ or opinio, must be accepted (or ‘not “re-
jected”’,927 as the Study Group puts it) by the executive. The ilc, on the other 
hand, states that domestic judgments ‘will count less if they are reversed by 
the legislature or remain unenforced because of concerns about their compat-
ibility with international law’.928 Yet it seems that especially when it comes to 
ascertaining opinio juris,929 ie, the fact that an act is performed out of a sense 
of legal obligation, judicial decisions should carry more weight than the acts 
of other State organs.930 Indeed, courts’ institutional position requires them 
to base their rulings on legally relevant (as opposed to strategic)931 reasons. It 
is worth stressing that this question arises if courts contradict the executive or 
the legislature, and vice versa, which is atypical in Switzerland (supra, Chap-
ter 3, 4.2.2).
3.1.3 General Principles of International Law
Besides treaties and cil, another source of international law consists in the 
‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ (art. 38(1)(c) icj Stat-
ute).932 The German translation of the icj Statute uses the term ‘ Kulturvölker’. 
The term ‘civilized’ reflects an imperialistic view of international law.933 It 
needs to be deleted given the commitment of international law to sovereign 
 926 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 18. On 
this question, see Wuerth (n 920) 3 ff.
 927 ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law, Final Report:  Mapping the Engagement of Domestic Courts With 
International Law’ (n 15) 4.
 928 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, With 
Commentaries’ (n 891) 128 para 5.
 929 Ingrid Wuerth suggests that courts’ institutional independence also justifies placing par-
ticular emphasis on their views to identify State practice: Wuerth (n 920) 19.
 930 Eg ibid 9.
 931 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 5.
 932 It is worth pointing out that, conceptually, it is these principles’ recognition (qua social 
fact) that constitutes a source of international law, not the principle itself.
 933 On the imperialistic roots of international law, see eg Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the 
Peripheries:  Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth- Century International Law’ 
(1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1; Martti Koskenniemi, Walter Rech, and 
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equality. However, proposals to amend the Statute in this sense have been 
 unsuccessful.934
Unlike the ‘subsidiary means’ of art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute, general principles 
are a source of international law, but they are often considered of secondary 
importance compared to treaties and custom. They are deemed ‘gap- fillers’ 
that come into play when an issue is left open by other sources.935 General 
principles are of two types: some are idiosyncratic to international law (like 
sovereign equality), while others originate from domestic practices (like good 
faith).936 In the present study, the latter type of general principles, identified in 
foro domestico, is of particular interest.
How to identify general principles of domestic origin (ie, ‘general principles 
of law’, as opposed to ‘general principles of international law stricto sensu’)937? 
While general principles of this kind are ‘traced to state practice’,938 including 
to ‘judicial law’,939 it is important to note that this requirement of a practice of 
recognition is looser than the test applied to identify State practice and opinio 
juris in cil. The existence of general principles of law primarily hinges on their 
recognition by States.
International courts (eg in icl or ihrl) have identified general principles 
of law on the basis of national practices through analogical and/ or compara-
tive legal reasoning, although the methods they employ are not always trans-
parent and comprehensive.940 Sometimes, they have used domestic court 
 934 Giorgio Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Online Edition) (Oxford University Press 2013) para 2 <opil.ouplaw.com>.
 935 Samantha Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law:  Whose Principles?’ in 
Samantha Besson and Pascal Pichonnaz (eds), Les principes en droit européen / Principles 
in European Law (Schulthess 2011) 39, 48 ff; Filippo Fontanelli, ‘The Invocation of the 
Exception of Non- Performance:  A Case- Study on the Role and Application of General 
Principles of International Law of Contractual Origin’ (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 119, 127.
 936 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law: Whose Principles?’ (n 935) 33. See also 
Gaja (n 934) para 7 ff; Wolfgang Weiss, ‘Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze des Völkerrechts’ 
(2001) 39 Archiv des Völkerrechts 394, 397 ff. See also art. 21(1)(b) and (c) icc Statute.
 937 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law: Whose Principles?’ (n 935) 33.
 938 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 906) 37.
 939 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law: Whose Principles?’ (n 935) 28. See also 
d’Aspremont, ‘The Permanent Court of International Justice and Domestic Courts:  A 
Variation in Roles’ (n 240) 230 f.
 940 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law:  Whose Principles?’ (n 935)  36 f; Jain 
(n 73). For an example, see Judge Bruno Simma’s separate opinion in icj, case concern-
ing Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States), judgment, merits, icj Reports 2003, 6 November 
2003, 324, at 354, para 66 ff. I am grateful to León Castellanos- Jankiewicz for drawing my 















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
The Legal Effect of Domestic Rulings in International Law 153
decisions.941 In general, however, the pcij and icj rarely apply general prin-
ciples as a source of international law.942 The icty has been cautious in using 
domestic case law to ascertain general principles of international law. In Tadić, 
it deemed reliance on ‘national legislation and case law’ justified only if ‘most, 
if not all, countries adopt the same notion of common purpose’. The court 
 added that ‘it would be necessary to show that, in any case, the major legal 
systems of the world take the same approach’ to the issue at stake.943 Yet refer-
ring to so- called ‘major legal systems’ is problematic, as more weight is given to 
some States based on opaque criteria. As a matter of fact, Nollkaemper notes 
that the icty uses domestic case law selectively to identify general principles 
of international law.944
To conclude, domestic rulings help determine States’ recognition of general 
principles of law. The weight of these rulings depends on how they fit with 
other domestic legislative and executive practices, analogously to what applies 
to cil (supra, 3.1.2). The two- tiered test of State practice and opinio juris used 
for cil does not need to be satisfied for general principles, which merely have 
to be ‘general’ and ‘recognized’ domestically.945 This does not mean that such 
principles can be invoked to circumvent the two- tiered test of cil.946
3.2 Domestic Rulings as Auxiliary Means (Art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute)
If in a given case, domestic rulings do not fulfill the criteria of subsequent 
treaty practice, State practice, and/ or opinio juris in the context of cil, or the 
domestic practice of recognition that generates some general principles of 
 941 pcij, case concerning the Factory at Chorzów, claim for indemnity, jurisdiction, pcij 
Series A No 9, 26 July 1927, 4, at 31, cited by Gaja (n 934) para 9.
 942 d’Aspremont, ‘The Permanent Court of International Justice and Domestic Courts:  A 
Variation in Roles’ (n 240) 230 f; Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law – Whose 
Principles?’ (n 935) 39; Sienho, ‘Article 38 of the icj Statute and Applicable Law: Selected 
Issues in Recent Cases’ (n 73) 488.
 943 icty (Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić, judgment, Case No it- 94- 1- a, 15 July 
1999, para 225. See also icty (Trial Chamber ii), Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreškić and Others, 
trial judgment, Case No it- 95- 16- t, 14 January 2000, para 680; icty (Trial Chamber ii), 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, judgment, Case No it- 95- 17/ 1- t, 10 December 1998, para 177.
 944 See, with reference to icty (Trial Chamber i), Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, sentencing 
judgment, Case No it- 96- 22- t, 29 November 1996, para 19: Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of 
National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis of the Practice of the icty’ 
(n 182) 289.
 945 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law: Whose Principles?’ (n 935) 60.
 946 Pierre d’Argent, ‘Les principes généraux à la Cour internationale de Justice’ in Samantha 
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international law (supra, 3.1), domestic case law may still be used qua ‘sub-
sidiary means for the determination of rules of [international] law’ (art. 38(1)
(d) icj Statute).947 I prefer to call them auxiliary means, for reasons I set out 
below. The use of domestic rulings qua auxiliary means pursuant to art. 38(1)
(d) icj Statute by interpreters of international law stands on a different level 
than these rulings’ contribution to the sources of international law of art. 38(1)
(a)– (c) icj Statute (supra, 3.1).948 While the difference is frequently blurred in 
practice,949 distinctive tests apply in these two contexts.
The uncertainties surrounding art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute and, more generally, 
the place of judicial decisions in the sources of international law, reflect the 
amour impossible950 between the orthodox doctrine of the sources of interna-
tional law and the effect judicial decisions (both domestic and international) 
have in practice (supra, Chapter 1, 2.3).951 Given the practical significance of 
judicial decisions in international law, scholarly analyses of art. 38(1)(d) icj 
Statute are surprisingly scarce.952 International lawyers often mention the pro-
vision in passing, without analyzing the legal authority of domestic rulings.
International lawyers generally agree that ‘subsidiary means’ are concep-
tually distinct from the sources of international law listed in art. 38(1)(a)– (c) 
icj Statute.953 On the other hand, judicial decisions are sometimes qualified 
as an ‘indirect source’954 or a ‘subsidiary source’.955 These expressions are 
 947 Nollkaemper notes that the icty has sometimes ‘endowed national decisions with an 
apparent quasi- independent authority that cannot be reduced to a constituent ele-
ment of either customary international law or a general principle of (international) law’. 
Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 290.
 948 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 69 f.
 949 Eg ibid 80.
 950 Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication:  Getting Over the 
Amour Impossible Between International Law and International Adjudication’ (n 85). 
The expression was originally used by Ascensio (n 85).
 951 Antonio Cassese highlights this tension between the law in the books and the law in prac-
tice by referring to the ‘wise’ versus the ‘wild approach’ of international judges towards 
‘subsidiary means’:  Antonio Cassese, ‘The Influence of the European Court of Human 
Rights on International Criminal Tribunals:  Some Methodological Remarks’ in Morten 
Bergsmo (ed), Human Rights and Criminal Justice for the Downtrodden: Essays in Honour 
of Asbjørn Eide (Brill/ Nijhoff 2003).
 952 See however Aldo Zammit Borda, ‘A Formal Approach to Article 38(1)(d) of the icj 
Statute From the Perspective of the International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ (2013) 
24 European Journal of International Law 649; Zammit Borda (n 870).
 953 See Zammit Borda (n 870) 68 f; Sienho (n 73) 491; Wolfrum (n 271) para 9.
 954 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Vol I: Peace (9th 
edn, Longman 1996) 41.
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misleading: either something is a source of law, or it is not. ‘Subsidiary means’ 
are not sources, but material that assists decision- makers in ascertaining norms 
stemming from the sources of international law. The term ‘subsidiary means’ 
erroneously suggests a hierarchy or chronological priority between sources 
and ‘subsidiary means’,956 instead of acknowledging that the latter help ‘elu-
cidate’957 the former.958 Because judicial decisions are auxiliary means, they 
cannot usurp the authority of the ‘antecedent source’ of the law they ‘pro-
pound’.959 As noted by the Asian- African Legal Consultative Organization 
(aalco), they are ‘no more than guideposts on the road to the destination, not 
the destination itself ’.960 In this regard, the French version of the icj Statute is 
more precise than the English one, as it refers to ‘auxiliary’ means, ie, to means 
that are ‘offering or providing help’.961 Hence, the term auxiliary means seems 
more appropriate (see also supra, Chapter 2, 5.4).962
While there are exceptions,963 most international lawyers consider do-
mestic rulings to fall under the ‘subsidiary means’ of art. 38.964 This view is 
reflected in the ilc’s draft conclusions on cil.965 It is supported by the fact 
that in the drafting process of the pcij Statute, the initial reference to in-
ternational judicial decisions was changed to ‘judicial decisions’.966 More-
over, especially in the context of cil, international courts967 and arbitral 
 956 See Zammit Borda’s statement that ‘subsidiary means’ should ‘supplement’ a given inter-
pretation: Zammit Borda (n 870) 70.
 957 Pellet and Müller (n 187) 944 para 305.
 958 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 906) 41; Wood (n 14) 12.
 959 Jennings and Watts (n 954) 41.
 960 Sienho Yee, ‘Report on the ilc Project on “Identification of Customary International 
Law”’ (2015) 14 Chinese Journal of International Law 375, 384.
 961 See the definition of ‘auxiliary’ in <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ auxiliary>.
 962 See also Pellet and Müller (n 187) 944 f para 306.
 963 See ibid 953 para 323.
 964 Hovell (n 871)  592; Jennings and Watts (n 954)  41 f; Higgins (n 365)  208. See also, 
for further references: Ammann, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
Interpretation of International Legal Norms:  To Be or Not to Be a “Domestic” Court?’ 
(n 140) 158, footnote 18.
 965 Conclusion 13(2), ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International 
Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
 966 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ 
(n 185) 6 para 10; Zammit Borda (n 952) 652.
 967 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
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tribunals968 seem to use domestic rulings qua auxiliary means, even if they 
do not always explicitly say so.969 As mentioned, it is often unclear in practice 
whether such rulings are cited based on art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute, or qua ele-
ment of determination of international law.970
The word ‘subsidiary’, according to André Nollkaemper, ‘reflects the fact 
that no formal system of precedents exists [in international law], let alone a 
principle of stare decisis’.971 Absent such doctrines, however, interpreters are 
left with little guidance as to the weight of domestic rulings. Yet relying on 
domestic rulings in an erratic way stands in a tension with lawful, predictable, 
clear, and consistent judicial reasoning.972 Domestic judicial decisions are not 
a convenient ‘shortcut’ or ‘a “quick fix” solution’.973 They are interpretative aids 
that should be used with ‘intellectual discipline’,974 not based on convenience 
or result- oriented cherry- picking.
International lawyers explain that in practice, judicial decisions are usually 
relied on ‘for their persuasive value’.975 Alain Pellet and Daniel Müller for in-
stance write:
[P] recisely as ‘there are awards and awards, some destined to become 
ever brighter beacons, others to flicker and die near- instant deaths’, there 
are judgments and judgments. Central to the question is the persuasive-
ness of the legal reasoning.976
 968 See ibid 7 para 13.
 969 See ibid 16 ff para 28 ff. The icty too refers to domestic rulings qua auxiliary means, 
although it gives prefers to cite international rulings if they are available. See ibid 25 ff 
para 41 ff. The ictr has occasionally used domestic rulings qua auxiliary means, see 
ibid 30 f para 47. On these two courts’ ‘wild approach’ to auxiliary means, see Cassese 
(n 951) 21 ff.
 970 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 80.
 971 Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An Analysis 
of the Practice of the icty’ (n 182) 291.
 972 Aldo Zammit Borda rejects the use of domestic rulings as a ‘direct souce’, as they would be 
relied upon in a ‘lax, uncritical’ way: Zammit Borda (n 870) 66. See also Cassese 21.
 973 See ibid 82.
 974 Jennings uses this expression with regard to international rulings: Jennings (n 40) 10, 12.
 975 Zammit Borda (n 870) para 7.
 976 Pellet and Müller (n 187)  947 para 312. The authors are quoting Jan Paulsson, 
‘Report: International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration 
and International Law’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration 
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The notion of persuasive authority is frequently used in common law coun-
tries. Grant Lamond defines it as ‘non- binding but legally relevant considera-
tions’.977 As Lamond explains, persuasive authority is a theoretical type of au-
thority. It provides reasons to believe X, as opposed to reasons to do X, which is 
characteristic of practical authority.978
The notion of persuasiveness can be misleading. It can for example suggest 
that a decision is cited and followed in later cases simply because of its rhetor-
ical force. Persuasiveness does not capture the fact that some judgments are 
cited in later cases (and hence have a legal effect beyond the particular case) 
because they are considered to offer lawful, high- quality reasoning. In this 
context, Samantha Besson’s distinction between decisional and interpretive 
authority is helpful. According to Besson, judicial decisions have ‘decisional 
authority’ for the parties to the dispute, but also, in some cases, ‘interpretive 
authority’ by guiding future interpretations of the law.979
In relation to this issue, it is important to note that the question of other 
interpreters’ (subjective) reliance on a given judgment (as authorized by art. 
38(1)(d) icj Statute) is distinct from the question of the place of this judgment 
in the sources of international law (eg in international law, with respect to art. 
38(1)(a)– (c) icj Statute, supra, 3.1). It also differs from the question of the (ob-
jective) legal authority of this ruling, be it vis- à- vis its addressees, in the legal 
order, or for a given court (qua precedent).
When should domestic rulings be used as auxiliary means pursuant to art. 
38(1)(d) icj Statute? The answer partly follows from the two criteria I use to 
evaluate the practice of domestic courts (supra, Introduction, section 3). One 
criterion is courts’ use of the interpretative methods of international law, as it 
indicates that a decision was made in conformity with what the law requires. 
A  second one is the quality of the court’s reasoning.980 As mentioned, the 
 977 Grant Lamond, ‘Persuasive Authority in the Law’ (2010) 17 Harvard Review of Philosophy 
16, 16.
 978 See ibid 18. See also Joseph Raz, ‘Normativity:  The Place of Reasoning’ (2015) 25 
Philosophical Issues 144, 146.
 979 Besson, ‘The Erga Omnes Effect of Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights – What’s in a Name?’ (n 137); Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International 
Adjudication:  Getting Over the Amour Impossible Between International Law and 
International Adjudication’ (n 85) 420, 422. See also von Bogdandy and Venzke (n 174); 
van de Kerchove (n 799) 698.
 980 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  The Role of Decisions 
of National Courts in the Case Law of International Courts and Tribunals of a Universal 
Character for the Purpose of the Determination of Customary International Law’ 
(n 185) 34 para 56; ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International 
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predictability, clarity, and consistency of judicial decisions are indicators of 
high- quality legal reasoning. They suggest – but do not guarantee – that the 
interpretation was not reached on a whim, but after a careful, thorough exam-
ination. Third, domestic case law that is not well established provides scant 
support for a given solution. In this context, the requirements of coherence, 
constancy, and generality of State practice in the context of cil offer guid-
ance. These requirements are not decisive, however, and may need to be rela-
tivized when the case law on a given issue is limited. Fourth, domestic rulings 
that have been quashed or contradicted by higher domestic courts carry little 
weight, even if the requirement of internal consistency applicable in the con-
text of cil does not strictly apply to auxiliary means. By contrast, the warrant 
of rulings that have withstood the test of higher judicial instances is stronger. 
Fifth, the domestic context of the judicial decision must be taken into account, 
including the court’s jurisdiction, its composition, resources, and expertise 
(see also the criteria highlighted in Chapter 3, supra). These characteristics es-
pecially help determine whether the court’s reasoning is generalizable. Sixth, 
obiter dicta arguably carry less weight than the ratio decidendi.
While the aforementioned criteria are not exhaustive and do not offer hard 
and fast rules on when domestic rulings provide conclusive auxiliary means, 
they provide guidelines for this assessment.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that domestic rulings on international law are central to in-
ternational law in two main respects. First, domestic courts, through their 
 interpretations, can enforce international law domestically and avert their 
State’s international responsibility (supra, section 2). Second, they can (col-
lectively) contribute to the formation and evolution of international law, and 
hence provide indications as to its content (supra, 3.1), and they can be used by 
interpreters of international law qua auxiliary means (supra, 3.2).
Since domestic rulings, besides having domestic legal authority (supra, 
Chapter 3, 4.2.7), are central to international law in these two respects, it is im-
portant to clarify the international legal frame that constrains domestic courts’ 
interpretations. Part 3 of this study is devoted to this question, which overlaps 
with Raz’s third question on interpretation, namely: how to interpret?
and Diversity in International Law’ in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), A Farewell to 
Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Cambridge University 
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 chapter 5
The Need for Interpretative Methods 
in International Law
Misuse of international law by national jurisdictions may have far- 
reaching negative consequences beyond the specific facts of the 
case over the long term. Such misuse as this promotes development 




In Parts  1 and 2, I have analyzed what interpretation is, and why domestic 
courts’ interpretations are central to international law. I  now move on to a 
third question: how must domestic courts interpret international law?
In the third part of this book, I argue that international law requires States to 
use specific methods to interpret these obligations, including via their courts, 
and that there are good reasons for imposing such a requirement on them. 
These reasons are primarily connected to the importance of lawful interpreta-
tion. However, they can also be linked to the virtues of predictable, clear, and 
consistent legal reasoning (supra, Introduction, section 3).
While the aforementioned claim may seem obvious and uncontroversial, 
States’ duty to respect interpretative methods is often misunderstood, disre-
garded, or swept aside in practice and scholarship, as I will show. Many schol-
ars (and even judges) express skepticism about interpretative methods. They 
argue that methods are vague and cannot constrain judges, that they are de-
fined by the very actors whose powers they are supposed to harness, and that 
an emphasis on method neglects interpretative outcomes. In this chapter, I ar-
gue that such skepticism is unwarranted.
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162 Chapter 5
The chapter is structured as follows. First, I compare judicial interpretation 
to interpretation in other domains. This will help me show why legal interpre-
tation in particular needs to be governed by specific methods (2). I also briefly 
retrace the development of interpretative methods in domestic and interna-
tional law (3). I then provide arguments for having mandatory interpretative 
methods in domestic and international law (4), examine several objections 
that have been raised against interpretative methods (5), and conclude (6).
In this chapter, I do not yet examine the specific methods States and their 
courts must use. This issue is analyzed in Chapter 6 (infra). Nor do I examine 
whether methods are legitimate or morally justified all things considered. Still, 
the reasons I cite for requiring States and officials to respect the law’s methods 
provide elements of such a theory of legitimacy.
2 Why Does the Law Need Interpretative Methods? a Comparison  
With Interpretation Outside the Law
(Dis)analogies between legal (and especially judicial) interpretation and oth-
er interpretative practices – eg the interpretation of religious texts, artworks, 
and social relationships – are frequently relied upon to conceptualize the in-
terpretation of domestic law.982 Such parallels have also been drawn regard-
ing international law.983 These comparisons are insightful. They can help us 
understand why constraining judicial interpretation through methods is so 
 important.
Many analogies have been used in legal scholarship to highlight the am-
bivalence of judicial interpretation. It is an activity that is both constrained 
and free. On the one hand, legal (and especially judicial) interpretation is 
constrained, both legally and otherwise.984 This diagnosis also applies to 
 982 Dworkin (n 77) 7; Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities (Harvard University Press 1980); Cover (n 208); von Savigny (n 761) 212; 
Pierre Moor, ‘Dire le droit’ (1997) 35 Revue européenne des sciences sociales 33; 
Bankowski and others (n 132) 12 f; Frankfurter (n 4); Barradas de Freitas (n 127).
 983 Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ (n 93); Michael Waibel, ‘Demystifying the Art of 
Interpretation’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 571. For a recent piece 
on the use of metaphors in international law in general, see Maks Del Mar, ‘Metaphor 
in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry’ (2017) 86 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 170.
 984 ‘L’argumentation des juristes et ses contraintes (2)’ (2012) 55 Droits; ‘L’argumentation 
des juristes et ses contraintes (1)’ (2011) 54 Droits; François Ost, ‘L’interprétation des 
lois :  un jeu sous contraintes’ (2011) <www.philodroit.be/ IMG/ pdf/ Ost.pdf>; Troper, 
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international law,985 and it is shared by most legal scholars.986 To emphasize 
legal (and other) constraints on interpretative freedom, the metaphor of the 
game (which, like the law, is a rule- [or, to put it more accurately, a norm- ]
governed activity) has attracted both domestic987 and international legal 
theorists.988 François Ost for instance argues that statutory interpretation is 
‘a game within constraints’.989 Hart shows that most games are governed by 
predetermined rules, and that playing them is not equal to playing ‘scorer’s 
discretion’.990 On the other hand, interpretation is also characterized by the 
freedom judges enjoy within the ‘rules of the game’. Kelsen notes that ‘the law 
to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are 
possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame’.991 Methods are 
‘a frame without a picture’992 that limits, but also empowers interpreters. In 
the international realm, the ilc has famously emphasized that treaty interpre-
tation is ‘to some extent an art, not an exact science’.993
Scholars have voiced concerns about hasty analogies between legal interpre-
tation and interpretation outside the law994 – and rightly so. Analogies risk ob-
fuscating rather than facilitating analytical thinking. They can overlook what 
makes legal interpretation unique. The widespread use of analogies may be a 
sign that we struggle to understand legal interpretation. However, analogies 
are also useful to stimulate analytical thinking.995 We can better understand 
 985 Bianchi, Peat, and Windsor (n 126).
 986 Eg Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ (n 75).
 987 Eg Michel Troper, Véronique Champeil- Desplats, and Christophe Grzegorczyk, 
‘Introduction’ in Michel Troper, Véronique Champeil- Desplats, and Christophe 
Grzegorczyk (eds), Théorie des contraintes juridiques (lgdj/Bruylant 2005) 2 f.
 988 Bianchi, Peat, and Windsor (n 126); Lorenzo Gradoni, ‘The International Court of Justice and 
the International Customary Law Game of Cards’ in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), 
A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2015); Emer de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle 
appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains (Librairie de Guillaumin 
et Cie 1863) 465. For a critique, see Odile Ammann, ‘International Legal Interpretation as a 
Game: A Compelling Analogy?’ (2016) Harvard International Law Journal (online edition).
 989 Ost (n 983).
 990 Hart (n 78) 142.
 991 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press 1967) 351.
 992 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Dilemma of Ignorance:  pga Tour, Inc. v Casey Martin’ (2001) 
2001 Supreme Court Review 267, 267.
 993 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 218.
 994 Eg Richard A Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Harvard University 
Press 1988); Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions (Southern Illinois 
University Press 1992). See also Jan Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining 
Importance of Travaux Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?’ (2003) 50 Netherlands 
International Law Review 267, 272.
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judicial interpretation, and why it needs to be governed by methods, by care-
fully comparing (2.1) and contrasting it (2.2) with interpretation outside legal 
practice.
2.1 Similarities
Legal (and especially judicial) interpretation and the interpretation of other 
objects than laws share four main similarities: (i) they are constrained by con-
text, (ii) they are governed by idiosyncratic methods, (iii) they leave room for 
different interpretative results, and finally, (iv) they are accompanied by rea-
sons stating why a given interpretation is correct.
First, interpretation does not occur in a vacuum, but is constrained by con-
text. Ludwig Wittgenstein has famously pointed out that ‘meaning is use’, and 
that it hinges on the canons that a practice generates. Susan Sontag notes that 
photographers are ‘haunted by tacit imperatives of taste and conscience’.996 
This applies to interpretation in the arts more generally.997 In the legal realm, 
the legal norms that require courts to use specific methods are secondary 
norms and therefore, before anything else, customary norms (on the Hartian 
notion of secondary norms, see infra, 3.2). Moreover, what constitutes high- 
quality judicial reasoning is defined by legal practice, besides being a corollary 
of the legal and moral principle of the rule of law (see also supra, Introduction, 
section 3).998
Secondly, different interpretative domains have different idiosyncratic 
methods. A method is ‘a systematic procedure, technique, or mode of inquiry 
employed by or proper to a particular discipline or art’ (emphasis added).999 
Methods are ways through which the interpreter can achieve good results by 
the standards of this interpretative practice, even if this does not rule out legit-
imate disagreement about how the object must be interpreted. Early treatises 
of general hermeneutics, for instance, intended to help interpreters exclude 
‘wrong’ meanings and select ‘true’ ones.1000 In international law, Hugo Grotius 
 996 Susan Sontag, On Photography (Picador 1977) 6.
 997 Eg Kendall L Walton, Marvelous Images: On Values and the Arts (Oxford University Press 
2008) 204 f.
 998 Michael Klarman argues that ‘the principal constraints on constitutional interpretation 
derive from social and political context, not from constitutional text or tradition’, see 
Klarman (n 831) 1742. François Gény writes that ‘we [lawyers] are dominated, without 
our knowledge, by authority and tradition, and, if I may say so, by this professional hered-
ity, which envelops and embraces us like some sort of shirt of Nessus’. See François Gény, 
Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif (2nd edn, lgdj 1919) 51.
 999 <www.merriam- webster.com/ dictionary/ method>.
 1000 Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal, ‘Hermeneutics’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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and his followers considered methods necessary to solve disputes and to deter-
mine the true meaning of international law.1001
Thirdly, even within a given context, there are typically different ways to 
interpret an object while remaining within the constraints defined by the 
context. One method (eg textual interpretation) may be applied differently by 
different interpreters, with different results. Moreover, there are often various 
ways of choosing among the results yielded by different methods to determine 
the meaning of the interpretative object. Even within a given ‘interpretive 
community’,1002 there can be various good conceptions of what a good inter-
pretation is1003 and, therefore, different incompatible, yet good interpretations 
of a given object.1004 Of course, methodological disagreement does not neces-
sarily yield incompatible interpretations, and vice versa. Disputes about inter-
pretative methods already divided the Roman jurists,1005 and methods have 
also been ‘the subject of acute debate and controversy’ in international law.1006 
While these divergences hinge on deeper disagreements about issues of moral 
philosophy, they primarily express themselves via methodological feuds.1007 It 
is important to emphasize that there may be (i) ‘interpretations’ that are not 
actually interpretations, even if they are presented as such, and (ii) bad inter-
pretations. Thus, not every disagreement is a legitimate one, unless it involves 
incompatible, yet good interpretations.
 1001 David J Bederman, ‘Grotius and His Followers on Treaty Construction’ (2001) 3 Journal of 
the History of International Law 18, 22.
 1002 According to Stanley Fish, an interpretive community is formed by ‘those who share 
interpretive strategies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their prop-
erties’. See Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities  
(n 982) 5.
 1003 Raz, ‘Normativity: The Place of Reasoning’ (n 978) 146. See also Sontag (n 996) 115 f; 
173 f; Monroe C Beardsley and William K Wimsatt, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ in Joseph 
Margolis (ed), Philosophy Looks at the Arts (3rd edn, Temple University Press 1987).
 1004 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  
(n 78) 231.
 1005 This is illustrated by the antagonism between the Sabinians (who endorsed an early form 
of formalism) and the Proculians (whose conception of legal interpretation was more 
pragmatic). See Peter Stein, ‘Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law’ (1995) 
70 Chicago- Kent Law Review 1539, 1544 f.
 1006 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 
1951– 4:  Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (1957) 33 British Yearbook of 
International Law 203, 204. See also (regarding cil) Petersen (n 73) 6 ff.
 1007 Sunstein, ‘There Is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is’ (n 207); Robert Post, ‘Theories of 
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Lastly, the merits of an interpretation cannot be evaluated unless the in-
terpretation is accompanied by reasons explaining why this interpretation is 
correct.1008
2.2 Differences
Three differences between legal (and more specifically judicial) interpreta-
tion and interpretation outside the law explain why interpretative methods 
and predictable, clear, and consistent reasoning are particularly important in 
judicial decision- making. These differences concern (i)  the respective stakes 
of these activities, (ii) the authority of judicial interpretation, and (iii) judges’ 
duty to settle disputes.
First, the stakes of judicial interpretation differ from those of interpretation 
in other domains. As Robert Cover notes, ‘legal interpretation takes place in 
a field of pain and death’.1009 Laws regulate virtually every aspect of human 
life,1010 and domestic rulings can have implications for the entire legal order. 
They often settle controversial moral issues, and they can have far- reaching 
implications for the law’s subjects, eg in terms of social security, economic pol-
icy, or fundamental rights. This explains why constitutional interpretation has 
been a central preoccupation in legal theory. Interpretation outside the law, by 
contrast, does not play a comparable part in structuring the life of a society.
Second, judicial interpretations are legally authoritative for the parties to 
the dispute (and, in some jurisdictions, beyond the particular case). They aim 
at guiding the behavior of their subjects, and they exclude other reasons to act 
that these subjects might have. In non- legal domains, interpretations do not 
share this preemptive, exclusionary normative force. In the arts, interpreters 
claim that their interpretations are valid, but they can merely strive (if at all) 
to ‘woo the consent of everyone else’.1011
Third, judges are dispute settlers. We disagree about the meaning of plays, 
books, paintings, and the law. Yet in the latter case, ‘a common basis for action 
 1008 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation:  On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  
(n 78) 230. See also Timothy Endicott, ‘Interpretation and Indeterminacy: Comments on 
Andrei Marmor’s Philosophy of Law’ (2014) 10 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 46.
 1009 Robert M Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1601.
 1010 Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 46.
 1011 This expression is used by Hannah Arendt, ‘The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political 
Significance’, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (Penguin Books 
2006)  222; David Luban, ‘Arendt at Jerusalem’ (2015) 30. See Immanuel Kant, Kant’s 
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has to be forged in the heat of our disagreements’.1012 Granted, outside the 
law, interpretive communities rely on epistemic authorities to ascertain the 
meaning of interpretative objects. Hume for instance deemed experts the ‘real 
 judges’ of an artwork’s aesthetic quality.1013 Yet expert opinions do not cordon 
off other interpretations, as judicial interpretations do.
Due to the high stakes, legal authority, and finality of judicial interpretation, 
judges yield tremendous institutional power. This explains why domestic and 
international law seek to harness this power through interpretative norms.
3 The Origins of Interpretative Methods in Domestic and  
International Law
In this book, I argue that States and their courts must respect the interpreta-
tive methods of international law, and that they should meet the standards of 
good (high-quality) legal reasoning. When making such an argument, it seems 
essential to have at least a basic understanding of how interpretative meth-
ods have developed in domestic and international law, and of the relationship 
between the respective methods of these two bodies of law. It is important 
to clarify at the outset that a comprehensive historical account is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Excellent research already exists on this topic.1014 My 
goal is merely to show that interpretative methods are nothing new. They per-
vade legal practice. This account will be particularly helpful when analyzing 
arguments in favor of, and criticisms raised against, interpretative methods 
(infra, sections 4– 5). As mentioned, I  do not yet examine specific methods. 
I address this issue in Chapter 6 (infra).
How did legal norms prescribing the use of interpretative methods emerge? 
As Samantha Besson writes, ‘one might reasonably suppose that many of 
the questions of legal philosophy are best approached in the first instance 
via their application to municipal state legal systems, which are both more 
familiar and more highly developed, before advancing to their international 
 1012 Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (n 746)  1370. See also Hart’s 
observation that uncertainty in particular cases makes primary norms inefficient: Hart 
(n 78) 93.
 1013 David Hume, ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ in Charles W Eliot (ed), English Essays: From Sir 
Philip Sidney to Macaulay – The Harvard Classics, Vol 27 (Collier 1910).
 1014 For a historical analysis of interpretative methods in domestic law, see Benoît Frydman, 
Le sens des lois : Histoire de l’interprétation et de la raison juridique (Bruylant 2005). For 
international law, see David J Bederman, Classical Canons: Rhetoric, Classicism and Treaty 
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counterparts’.1015 I hence examine the aforementioned issue for both domestic 
(3.1) and international law (3.2). I also clarify the relationship between inter-
pretative methods in domestic and international law (3.3).
3.1 Domestic Law
Domestic interpretative methods have existed for centuries, and scholarship 
on how to interpret domestic laws – a traditional question of legal theory and 
philosophy – is prolific. In continental Europe, the first scholarly efforts to spell 
out the ‘methods’ of domestic legal interpretation date back to the 19th century. 
These efforts were based on the conception of law as a ‘science’, with a methodol-
ogy of its own right.1016 Savigny’s ‘four elements’ doctrine,1017 which is at the root 
of the methods Swiss and other domestic courts1018 use to interpret domestic 
laws (including in common law countries),1019 builds upon the understanding 
of law as a scientific endeavor (‘Rechtswissenschaft’).1020 While this conception 
is less compelling today, it still surfaces in contemporary scholarship.1021 Savi-
gny’s four methods aim at helping the interpreter ascertain domestic laws.1022 
François Gény, in his early 20th- century analysis of the interpretation of French 
private law, notes that these ‘traditional’1023 methods developed alongside pro-
cesses of codification.1024 Many of them ensure judicial accountability towards 
the legislature. Calls for a renewal of legal and judicial methods increased after 
 1015 Samantha Besson, ‘Moral Philosophy and International Law’ in Florian Hoffmann and 
Anne Orford (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Legal Theory (Oxford University 
Press 2016) 387. International law and domestic constitutional law, in particular, share 
more features than is often assumed:  Jack L Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, ‘Law for 
States:  International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law’ (2009) 122 Harvard Law 
Review 1791. HLA Hart even considered that a ‘range of principles, concepts, and meth-
ods which are common to both municipal and international law, […] make the lawyers’ 
technique freely transferable from the one to the other’. Hart (n 78) 237.
 1016 Gény (n 998); Frydman (n 1014) 20.
 1017 von Savigny (n 761) 212 ff.
 1018 Michal Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (Oxford University 
Press 2013).
 1019 The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 12.
 1020 von Savigny (n 761) 206 ff. See also Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (3rd edn, JCB Mohr 1840).
 1021 Ernst Kramer, ‘Konvergenz und Internationalisierung der juristischen Methode’ in Académie 
des privatistes européens (ed), A l’Europe du troisième millénaire : Mélanges offerts à Giuseppe 
Gandolfi à l’occasion du dixième anniversaire de la fondation de l’Académie (Giuffrè 2014) 167.
 1022 von Savigny (n 761) 207.
 1023 For a critique of this characterization: Frydman (n 1014) 17.
 1024 Gény (n 998) 23. See also Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation: Developed for and 
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the traumatic experience of Nazi and communist dictatorships1025 and their 
‘dreadful jurists’.1026
In the United States, methods of legal (and especially constitutional) 
 interpretation are deemed means for ‘domesticating the judges’ personal 
preferences’.1027 These methods were developed by the courts which, espe-
cially in the years that followed their creation, had to secure their institution-
al legitimacy. After some bold yet widely acclaimed decisions of the Warren 
Court,1028 many jurists felt the urge to demonstrate that such rulings were ‘law, 
not just politics’,1029 ie, that they were in accordance with the law and based 
on  predictable, clear, and consistent judicial reasoning. us lawyers associate 
the requirement to follow interpretative methods with courts’ duty to protect 
the rule of law,1030 ‘to say what the law is’.1031 Some methods are acceptable, 
while others ‘are not part of [us] legal grammar’.1032 Robert Summers and Neil 
 MacCormick list eleven ‘argument types’1033 that courts in the United States 
and elsewhere use in statutory interpretation. These argument types fall into 
four categories: linguistic, systemic, teleological/ evaluative, and ‘transcategori-
cal’ (or ‘argument from intention’).1034 In England as well, methods of statutory 
interpretation are judge- made.1035
This short account suggests that interpretative methods are part of domes-
tic legal practice. They are used as guides by officials1036 and by those who 
evaluate their practice.1037
 1025 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht’ (1946) 1 
Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 105.
 1026 Peter Gauch, ‘Juristisches Denken. Wie denken Juristen?’ in Heinrich Honsell and others 
(eds), Privatrecht und Methode: Festschrift für Ernst A. Kramer (Helbing & Lichtenhahn 
2004) 179 f.
 1027 Tushnet (n 777) 50.
 1028 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 u.s. 294 (1955); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
u.s. 479 (1965).
 1029 Owen M Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739, 741.
 1030 Brewer (n 213).
 1031 Marbury v. Madison, 5 u.s. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), at 177.
 1032 Bobbitt (n 171) 6.
 1033 This meaning of the word ‘argument type’ differs from the one used in Chapter  2, 5.5 
(supra).
 1034 D Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers, ‘Interpretation and Justification’ in D Neil 
MacCormick and Robert S Summers (eds), Interpreting Statutes:  A Comparative Study 
(Aldershot 1991).
 1035 The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 14.
 1036 Michael J Klarman, ‘Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History’ (2001) 89 
California Law Review 1721, 1723.
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A seminal contribution to the understanding of interpretative methods is 
Hart’s account of law as a union of primary and secondary norms.1038 In this 
formulation, primary norms are directed towards legal subjects and create 
rights and obligations. Secondary norms are customary norms that ‘are all con-
cerned with the primary rules themselves’1039: they clarify how primary norms 
are created, changed, and interpreted,1040 and they are addressed to legal of-
ficials. According to Hart, secondary norms, unlike primary norms, are not 
rights- conferring or duty- imposing, but ‘power- conferring’ norms. Yet Hart ne-
glects that duty- imposing secondary norms do exist.1041 Norms that prescribe 
the use of specific interpretative methods do not merely confer powers: they 
constrain legal officials, even if these officials retain some degree of interpre-
tative freedom.
Importantly for our purposes, Hart argued that international law lacked sec-
ondary norms.1042 Since secondary norms include norms about interpretative 
methods, and since Hart’s position was that international law was not a system 
but a ‘set of rules’, his scholarship probably reinforced many in the idea that 
international law was defective compared to domestic law.1043
It is true that the vclt’s methods of treaty interpretation are the result of 
a ‘difficult gestation process’, and that the lack of a systematic, consistent in-
ternational practice on the issue rendered their codification controversial.1044 
The ilc has codified some methods (eg, most recently, the methods for iden-
tifying customary law),1045 and in 2015, the ila set up a ‘Study Group on the 
 1038 Hart (n 78) ch vi. While Hart refers to ‘rules’, the umbrella term of ‘norms’ seems more 
accurate, as norms governing judicial interpretation include principles (Chapter 2, 5.2 
and 5.3, supra). The union of primary and secondary norms constitutes a legal system, as 
opposed to a set of rules lacking common criteria of validity and modification, ibid 94.
 1039 See Hart (n 78) 94.
 1040 Eg Thomas M Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American 
Journal of International Law 705, 751– 752; Axel Marschik, ‘Too Much Order? The Impact 
of Special Secondary Norms on the Unity and Efficacy of the International Legal System’ 
(1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 212, 212.
 1041 I am grateful to Timothy Endicott for bringing this point to my attention.
 1042 Hart (n 78) 214.
 1043 Mehrhad Payandeh, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of 
International Law 967.
 1044 Jean- Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré- Eveno, ‘Article 31’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein 
(eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties:  A Commentary, Vol I (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 806 f.
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Content and Evolution of the Rules of Interpretation’.1046 Yet international law 
does have (and has always had) secondary norms,1047 an obvious example be-
ing the century- old norm pacta sunt servanda.
Granted, State practice pertaining to the formation and amendment of in-
ternational law is scarce, barely detailed, and often inconsistent,1048 as is the 
practice of international courts,1049 but such difficulties also exist in domes-
tic law. States (and their courts)1050 and international judges1051 do rely on 
textual, historical, systematic, and teleological interpretation, even if the use 
of these methods does not always satisfy the virtues of predictability, clarity, 
and consistency. International rulings are evaluated based on their interpre-
tative methods, and methodological ‘laxness’ is frowned upon.1052 The icj for 
instance has been criticized for its ‘delphic’ methodology.1053 Similar bench-
marks are applied to the practice of other international courts,1054 regional 
courts,1055 to States and domestic rulings,1056 and even to non- state actors.1057
 1046 ila, ‘Preliminary Report of the ila Study Group on the Content and Evolution of the 
Rules of Interpretation’ (n 231).
 1047 Murphy (n 84) 154 f; Waldron, ‘International Law: “A Relatively Small and Unimportant” 
Part of Jurisprudence?’ (n 79).
 1048 Gradoni (n 988) 383 f.
 1049 See ibid 394 ff.
 1050 Bond v. United States, 572 u.s. 844 (2014) (treaty law); bge 138 ii 524, at 3 and 4 (treaty 
law); bge 132 iii 661, at 4.4 (cil).
 1051 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The History of Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice: The Journey From the Past to the Present’ in Samantha Besson and Jean 
 d’Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 19 f.
 1052 Zammit Borda (n 870) 66; Talmon (n 73).
 1053 Sienho (n 73) 480. The expression was originally used by Mendelson (n 73) 67, 72.
 1054 Marc Schack and Astrid Kjeldgaard- Pedersen, ‘Striking the Balance Between Custom 
and Justice:  Creative Legal Reasoning by International Criminal Courts’ (2016) 16 
International Criminal Law Review 913.
 1055 On the ECtHR: Letsas (n 79). On the IACtHR: Lukas Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by 
the Inter- American Court of Human Rights:  Expansionism at the Service of the Unity 
of International Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of International Law 585. On the 
cjeu: Odermatt (n 140); Kuijper (n 179).
 1056 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Overcoming the Hurdle of State Immunity in the Domestic Enforcement 
of International Human Rights’ in Benedetto Conforti and Francesco Francioni (eds), 
Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Brill/Nijhoff 1997) 405, 407; 
Aust and Nolte (n 47); Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 140); Iovane (n 182).
 1057 On the icrc and unhcr, respectively, see John B Bellinger and William J Haynes, ‘A us 
Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary 
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Long before the adoption of the vclt, international lawyers used to em-
phasize the importance of States being methodical in their interpretations.1058 
Hugo Grotius considered that methods were necessary to provide guidance to 
interpreters in finding the proper meaning of treaties. Like the ancient Greeks, 
on whose work he relied,1059 he thought that methods would reduce the likeli-
hood that States would interpret agreements in a ‘sophistic’ way.1060 These ra-
tionales were subsequently endorsed by scholars such as Samuel Pufendorf,1061 
Christian Wolff,1062 and Emer de Vattel.1063 All of them (perhaps somewhat 
unrealistically) believed that treaty interpretation ought to be governed by 
‘definite’, ‘precise’ ‘rules’.
In the late 19th and early 20th century, international lawyers still empha-
sized interpretative methods, but the rationales had changed. The 19th century 
heralded the increasing dominance of legal positivism. Instead of focusing on 
good faith and other principles of justice, legal positivists emphasized proce-
dure and methodology, and they endeavored to develop the law’s scientific 
credentials.1064 Although more convincing reasons for requiring States to re-
spect interpretative methods have gained traction since (infra, section 4), this 
scientism has not entirely disappeared.1065
 1058 On the ‘distant origins’ of the vclt’s interpretative principles, see Alain Pellet, ‘Canons of 
Interpretation Under the Vienna Convention’ in Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko, and 
Constantinos Salonidis (eds), Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and Other 
Principles of Interpretation in Public International Law (Kluwer Law International 2018).
 1059 It is worth noting that some rules of logic (such as ejusdem generis and generalia specia-
libus non derogant) can be traced back to Roman law. See Michael Waibel, ‘The Origins 
of Interpretive Canons in Domestic Legal Systems’ in Joseph Klingler, Yuri Parkhomenko, 
and Constantinos Salonidis (eds), Between the Lines of the Vienna Convention? Canons and 
Other Principles of Interpretation in Public International Law (Kluwer Law International 
2018) 27.
 1060 Bederman (n 1001) 25. See also ibid 34.
 1061 Pufendorf (n 177) 793 f.
 1062 Christian Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (Clarendon Press/H Milford 
1934) 194.
 1063 de Vattel (n 988) 461.
 1064 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of 
International Law 4, 6; Jochen von Bernstorff, ‘German Intellectual Historical Origins 
of International Legal Positivism’ in Jean d’Aspremont and Jörg Kammerhofer (eds), 
International Legal Positivism in a Post- Modern World (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
See also Anne Orford, ‘Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law’ (2014) 
25 European Journal of International Law 369; Gradoni (n 988) 387 ff.
 1065 ilc, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:  Difficulties Arising From the Diversification 
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In 1949, Hersch Lauterpacht recommended that the ilc include the law 
of treaties ‘within the orbit of codification’1066 of international law. Codifi-
cation, in his opinion, would systematize the methods of treaty interpreta-
tion. He considered that treaty interpretation was ‘overgrown with the weed 
of technical rules of construction which can be used – and are frequently 
used – in support of opposing contentions’.1067 Lauterpacht combined nat-
ural lawyers’ emphasis on good faith and the need to constrain State discre-
tion with the legal positivists’ concern to derive such constraints from State 
practice.1068 The work of the other Special Rapporteurs on the law of treaties 
(especially Gerald Fitzmaurice1069 and Humphrey Waldock)1070 confirms 
that interpretative methods were deemed valuable, and that they were re-
flected in international legal practice at the time. The ilc’s work led to the 
adoption of the vclt, which includes three provisions on treaty interpreta-
tion.1071 The Convention’s approach to interpretation, based on which dif-
ferent interpretative arguments are ‘thrown into the crucible’,1072 preserves 
flexibility, thereby responding to States’ concerns.1073 At the same time, it 
clarifies the principles of treaty interpretation, and hence defines interpre-
tative constraints.
As is the case with treaty law, State practice shows that cil too is ascer-
tained based on interpretative canons, even if this practice can be criticized 
 1066 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification 
of the International Law Commission, Memorandum Submitted by the Secretary- General 
of the United Nations’ (1949) 52.
 1067 See ibid.
 1068 Legal positivists such as Lassa Oppenheim emphasized that interpretative methods 
were to be derived from the practice of States (as opposed to principles of natural law), 
although they also thought that such methods were valuable and ‘enable[d] a universally 
recognized construction of the treaties concerned’. See Lassa Oppenheim, ‘The Science of 
International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 American Journal of International Law 
313, 350.
 1069 ilc, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’ 
(1957) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 107; ilc, ‘Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G.  G. 
Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’ (1959) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 120; Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951– 4: Treaty Interpretation and Other 
Treaty Points’ (n 1006) 210– 212.
 1070 ilc, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur’ 
(1964) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 167 and Add. 1– 3 54.
 1071 Art. 31– 33 vclt.
 1072 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 220.
 1073 ilc, ‘Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur’ 
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for being scarce and evasive.1074 The decisions of international courts (again, 
as imperfect as they are)1075 also contain references to such canons.1076 In 
2012, the topic of the ‘formation and evidence of customary international 
law’, subsequently changed to ‘identification of customary international law’, 
was  added to the ilc’s agenda.1077 The ilc’s work, which was completed in 
2018,1078 provides insights into the concerns that interpretative methods are 
expected to address in international law. It follows on from previous efforts 
to clarify these methods.1079 Starting from the assumption that those who ap-
ply cil need an understanding of the process by which custom is created, the 
ilc’s goal is, similar to the goals of previous ilc projects,1080 ‘to produce au-
thoritative guidance for those called upon to identify customary international 
law, including national and international judges’.1081 On the other hand, the 
Commission cautions against being ‘overly prescriptive’, and it does not expect 
to come up with ‘hard- and- fast rules’ of identification.1082 It therefore seeks to 
find a middle ground between freedom and constraint.1083
No comparable project of codification exists with regard to general princi-
ples of international law, which makes it difficult to inquire into the origins of 
the canons governing their identification. However, as I will show, such canons 
apply to general principles as well (infra, Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, section 3).
 1074 August Reinisch and Peter Bachmayer, ‘Customary International Law in Austrian Courts’ 
(2013) <papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2289788>; Besson and Ammann 
(n 60).
 1075 Gradoni (n 988) 394 ff; Talmon (n 73).
 1076 icj, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening), judgment, 
icj Reports 2012, 3 February 2012, 99, at 122 ff, para 54 ff.
 1077 For an overview, see <legal.un.org/ ilc/ guide/ 1_ 13.shtml>.
 1078 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, With 
Commentaries’ (n 891). For a diachronic account of the doctrine of cil, see Jean 
 d’Aspremont, ‘The Four Lives of Customary International Law’ (2019) 21 International 
Community Law Review 229.
 1079 Eg ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886).
 1080 See ibid 4.
 1081 ilc, ‘Recommendation of the ilc Working- Group on the Long- Term Programme of 
Work, Annex A: Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law (Mr. Michael 
Wood)’ (2011) un Doc a/ 66/ 10, 305, para 4.  See also ilc, ‘First Report on Formation 
and Evidence of Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ 
(n 185) 6, para 14.
 1082 See ilc, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law by 
Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (n 185) 7, para 18.
 1083 ilc, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, 
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To conclude, and as is the case with domestic law (supra, 3.1), interpretative 
methods are reflected in the practice of international law. This practice origi-
nally developed them and has sought (and is still seeking) to systematize them. 
Some norms prescribing the use of methods have been (or are being) codified. 
Codification increases the predictability, clarity, and consistency of interpre-
tation in international law, while preserving States’ interpretative freedom. 
States, the primary interpreters of international law, refer to such methods and 
seek to demonstrate that they are guided by them. Interpretative methods are 
also used by scholars and practitioners to evaluate specific interpretations.
3.3 The Relationship between the Interpretative Methods of Domestic  
and International Law
As emerges from the previous subsections (supra, 3.1 and 3.2), interpreta-
tive methods guide the practice of both domestic and international law. To 
slightly adjust Matthias Goldmann’s conclusion regarding the sources of the 
law, ‘thinking in terms of sources’1084 and methods is not peculiar to either 
domestic or international law: both do. Importantly, and unlike what is often 
assumed, there is no fundamental difference between interpretative meth-
ods in domestic and international law,1085 as I will show in more detail (infra, 
Chapter 6). The basic methods prescribed by the vclt, for instance, are the 
same as those that govern statutory and constitutional1086 interpretation (ie, 
textual interpretation, systemic interpretation, teleological interpretation, and 
historical interpretation).1087 Nor do interpretative methods fundamentally 
 1084 Matthias Goldmann, ‘Sources in the Meta- Theory of International Law:  Exploring the 
Hermeneutics, Authority, and Publicness of International Law’ in Samantha Besson and 
Jean d’Aspremont (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Sources of International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 5.
 1085 See also bge 130 i 312, at 4.1; bge 135 v 339, at 5.3, and ‘Appendix 7. The Interpretation 
of Treaties, Seventh International Conference of American States, 1933’ (1935) 29 
American Journal of International Law 1225. Contra André Nollkaemper, ‘Grounds for 
the Application of International Rules of Interpretation in National Courts’ in Helmut 
Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by Domestic 
Courts: Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016).
 1086 Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, in their textbook on us foreign relations law, list the 
methods of constitutional interpretation that are ‘most relevant to foreign relations law’, 
ie, originalism, burkeanism/ historical gloss, structuralism, prudentialism, and stare deci-
sis. See Bradley and Goldsmith (n 171) 40.
 1087 In its commentary of the vclt, the ilc notes that ‘statements can be found in the deci-
sions of international tribunals to support the use of almost every principle or maxim of 
which use is made in national systems of law in the interpretation of statutes and con-
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vary from one domestic legal order to the other.1088 What varies is mainly the 
interpretative object and its characteristics, which must be taken into account 
in the interpretative process.
4 Three Reasons for Requiring States to Use Interpretative Methods
The use of, and value attached to, interpretative methods is reflected in do-
mestic and international law (supra, section 3). But what is the rationale for 
requiring States (including courts) to use specific methods when interpreting 
the law?
In this section, I mention three compelling reasons why it is necessary to 
harness the judiciary through interpretative methods (and, one might add, for 
requiring it to strive to achieve predictability, clarity, and consistency in its rea-
soning). These reasons pertain to the frequent vagueness of laws (4.1), to the 
‘counter- majoritarian difficulty’ created by judicial review (4.2), and to courts’ 
interpretative power (4.3). These arguments apply (with slight adjustments) to 
domestic and international law.
By using words such as ‘rationale’, ‘reasons’, or ‘arguments’, I am not eval-
uating the legitimacy or moral justification of legal norms that prescribe in-
terpretative methods.1089 Instead, my aim is to show that there are weighty 
(empirical, but also legal) reasons for legally requiring States and their courts 
to use specific methods to interpret domestic and international law, inde-
pendently from the moral justification of such a legal requirement. However, 




One compelling reason why domestic courts must resort to methods to decide 
cases is that domestic law is often vague when applied to particular issues. 
Hart famously stated that the law is open textured,1090 and that it inevitably 
becomes indeterminate in practice.1091 As Timothy Endicott writes, vagueness 
 1088 MacCormick and Summers (n 1034). On the domestic origins of international interpre-
tative norms (especially rules of logic), see Waibel, ‘The Origins of Interpretive Canons in 
Domestic Legal Systems’ (n 1059).
 1089 On the methodology of the present study, see supra, Introduction, sections 2 and 3.
 1090 Hart borrowed this expression from Waismann; see Waismann (n 153) 123.
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is no pathology, but a feature of the law.1092 Vagueness in law is not only a 
symptom of linguistic indeterminacy.1093 It is, as Scott Brewer notes, ‘relative 
to term, language user(s), time of application of term, and “application group” 
(the set of objects to which the term might be applied)’.1094
Domestic constitutions, in particular, are frequently vague. First of all, they are 
drafted at a high level of generality, since they aim at setting out the basic norms of a 
given polity without reaching ‘the prolixity of a legal code’.1095 Second, as  Michael 
Klarman observes, ‘the debate over permissible sources of [constitutional] 
interpretation is […] inconclusive’.1096 Third, constitutions are usually difficult to 
amend. This can create gaps between their text and contemporary  circumstances, 
gaps which judges may feel compelled to fill through interpretation.
Vagueness, as Timothy Endicott notes, means that ‘judicial decisionmaking 
will in some cases be unconstrained by the law’.1097 This should not surprise us, 
as every domestic polity, in establishing judicial review, accepts at least implic-
itly that judges will make choices when applying the law. Few would argue that 
adjudication is value- free, or that the judge is a ‘subsumption automaton’.1098 
Georg Friedrich Puchta’s and Bernhard Windscheid’s ‘Begriffsjurisprudenz’ and 
the French ‘école de l’exégèse’ have fallen out of favor, at least in their extreme 
(and often exaggerated) readings. Endorsing what Hart called conceptualism, 
which consists in denying the existence of interpretative latitude,1099 may be 
tempting for courts wary of securing the social acceptance of their rulings. Yet 
conceptualism is counter- factual, as it ignores the choices and creativity that 
characterize judicial decision- making. Worse, it allows courts to hide these 
choices behind an alleged ‘clarity’ of the law. If vagueness is negated, courts are 
less accountable to the polity that has granted them their adjudicatory power.
Does the fact that vagueness cannot be eliminated from the law (and 
that judges are hence rarely fully constrained) mean that the rule of law is 
unattainable?1100 Vagueness, Endicott explains, is not necessarily ‘a deficit’ in 
 1092 Endicott (n 80) 1.
 1093 See ibid 5; Brian Bix, Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy (Clarendon Press 1993).
 1094 Brewer (n 213) 993.
 1095 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 u.s. 316 (1819), at 407.
 1096 Klarman (n 1036) 1724.
 1097 Endicott (n 80) 4.
 1098 Regina Ogorek, Aufklärung über Justiz:  Richterkönig oder Subsumtionsautomat? Zur 
Justiztheorie im 19. Jahrhundert (2nd edn, Vittorio Klostermann 2008). See also 
Frankfurter (n 4) 541.
 1099 Hart (n 78) 129.
 1100 On this issue, see Timothy Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’, Vagueness in 
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the rule of law. However, it can become one ‘when it enables authorities to ex-
empt their actions from the reason of the law, or when it makes it impossible 
to conceive of the law as having any reason distinguishable from the will of the 
officials’.1101 Hence, if judges can demonstrate that their decisions are guided 
by the interpretative methods the law requires them to use, they are better 
equipped to rebut such charges.
4.1.2 International Law
As mentioned (4.1.1, supra), vagueness has several different causes. The magni-
tude of these causes is arguably even greater in international law. This  increases 
the discretion of its interpreters.
First, international law is often vague because the sources from which it 
stems, and the characteristics of these sources, leave room for  indeterminacy.1102 
There can be uncertainty as to whether an ‘agreement’ qualifies as a ‘treaty’ 
under the vclt, for instance.1103 The ascertainment of unwritten law is even 
less determinate, given the absence of a textual interpretative basis and given 
the scarce guidance provided by art. 38 icj Statute. State practice is difficult 
to  access1104 and to review comprehensively. Moreover, the sources of inter-
national law are not hierarchical,1105 which leaves interpreters with little guid-
ance when norms originating from distinct sources clash.
Second, the fact that States often differ in their legal structure, political or-
ganization, socio- cultural characteristics, interests, and policies increases the 
likelihood of interpretative divergence.1106 Of course, diversity does not nec-
essarily generate disagreement. Still, Philip Allott has observed that a treaty 
is ‘a disagreement reduced to writing’,1107 and Detlev Vagts notes that vague 
treaty provisions are often ‘designed to postpone insoluble problems’.1108 
 1101 Endicott (n 80) 5.
 1102 Oliver Diggelmann, ‘Anmerkungen zu den Unschärfen des völkerrechtlichen 
Rechtsbegriffs’ (2016) 26 Swiss Review of International and European Law 381.
 1103 Art. 2(1)(a) vclt.
 1104 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 3.
 1105 See however Institut de droit international, ‘Problèmes découlant d’une succession de 
conventions de codification du droit international sur un même sujet’ (1995) <www.idi- 
iil.org/ idiF/ resolutionsF/ 1995_ lis_ 01_ fr.pdf>, conclusion 11.
 1106 Hessler (n 154).
 1107 Philip Allott, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 31, 43.
 1108 Detlev F Vagts, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the New American Ways of Law Reading’ (1993) 
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International law applies, by definition, to various jurisdictions, and its con-
textualization is likely to vary depending on the characteristics of these legal 
orders.
A third cause of vagueness arises with the passage of time. The costs of amend-
ing a treaty are high, as such changes require the consent of all parties.1109 Yet the 
context and circumstances in which treaties are interpreted may evolve drasti-
cally over time. Judges face vagueness when examining whether the law can be 
adjusted to contemporary circumstances. The passage of time also creates inter-
pretative challenges when it comes to identifying unwritten international law.
Vagueness is also encouraged by the institutional features of international 
law, which is governed by the principle of auto- interpretation. In the absence 
of an international court empowered to adjudicate international legal disputes, 
States interpret their obligations without being bound by the interpretations 
of other international legal subjects. The lack of an overarching interpretative 
authority creates interpretative uncertainty.1110
After highlighting these causes of vagueness in international law, some ad-
ditional remarks about vagueness are in order. First, vagueness can be either 
deliberate or fortuitous. It is intentional when States collectively enact norms 
that require further interpretation and, therefore, allow for domestic contextu-
alization, like the provisions of the echr. Vagueness is not entirely contingent 
on the features of the law. Often (although not always), it also results from 
the interpretative work judges perform (infra, 4.3). Second, in some cases, in-
ternational law can be precise. This applies, for instance, to treaties aimed at 
harmonizing an area of the law, eg in trade law, air and space law, or maritime 
law. The diagnosis of vagueness should not be applied to international law 
across the board, given the great diversity of its norms. Third, the vagueness 
of international law can be reduced or prevented, be it on the international 
plane,1111 or in the context of the domestic application of international law.1112 
As Timothy Endicott stresses, increasing legal determinacy does not necessar-
ily serve justice: precise regulations can be more arbitrary than vague ones.1113 
 1109 Art. 39 ff vclt.
 1110 Paul Guggenheim, ‘What Is Positive International Law?’ in George A Lipsky (ed), Law and 
Politics in the World Community: Essays on Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory and Related Problems 
in International Law (University of California Press 1953) 29.
 1111 (Subsidiary) organs of ios (eg the ilc) and private bodies (eg the Institut de droit interna-
tional, the ila, or Harvard Law School) have produced documents that aim at clarifying 
(and supporting the codification of) international law.
 1112 The (non- binding) us Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, for example, provides guid-
ance for the domestic practice of international law.
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However, if vague laws can be interpreted without any constraints, ie, without 
following a method set out in advance, then vagueness facilitates departures 
from legality.
To conclude, methods are one way of handling vagueness in domestic and 
international law. Although they rarely determine interpretative outcomes and 
do not preclude window- dressing, methods constrain interpreters by requiring 
them to use specific techniques known to all.
4.2 Counter- Majoritarian Decisions
4.2.1 Domestic Law
While there are many competing conceptions of legitimacy,1114 democratic le-
gitimacy is a well- established1115 yardstick against which judicial decisions are 
measured by lawyers and non- lawyers alike. Few would deny that in a democ-
racy, ‘uncabined judicial rule’1116 is a specter that should be driven away. The 
need to constrain judicial decision- making (eg by requiring that it conforms 
to specific methods, but also through other democratic checks) is often traced 
back to the famous ‘counter- majoritarian difficulty’.1117 In short, in a democracy, 
unelected judges cannot usurp the powers of the lawmaker and overrule deci-
sions taken by the legislative majority. Instead, they must respect the law.
Interpretative methods require judges to focus on specific features of the 
law, ie, its wording, purpose, drafting history, and place in the broader legisla-
tive scheme. In doing so (and, arguably, especially via textual and historical in-
terpretation), judges show respect for legislative enactments, thereby reducing 
their own democratic deficit.
4.2.2 International Law
Judicial interpretations of international law have counter- majoritarian traits 
when they disregard sovereign equality (and especially States’ equal voice in 
international lawmaking), or when they ignore other features of the sources 
of international law. In such cases, judges lack accountability towards the law-
making States. This risk exists with regard to all sources of international law, ie, 
treaty law, cil, and general principles of international law.1118
This lack of accountability is encouraged by the characteristics of inter-
national lawmaking. Written domestic law is, as French jurist Emile Boutmy 
 1114 Goldsworthy (n 777) 1.
 1115 Of course, the way of assessing democratic legitimacy is deeply controversial.
 1116 Klarman (n 831) 1752.
 1117 Bickel (n 697) 16 ff.
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notes, like ‘the work of art that is dated and signed’,1119 namely an object that 
can be traced back to a single author. International lawmaking, by contrast, 
involves at least two States (sometimes in the framework of an io). It often 
occurs in a decentralized, dispersed, and incremental fashion, which compli-
cates the interpretative process. Even when international lawmaking is insti-
tutionalized (eg when a treaty is adopted after a process of negotiations), in 
most cases, no permanent international lawmaking body can react to States’ 
(or domestic courts’) interpretations by changing the law. Moreover, as previ-
ously mentioned, States cannot amend treaties unless all parties consent.
Requiring States and their courts to abide by specific methods when they in-
terpret international law is one way of enhancing their accountability. Methods 
narrow the scope of what constitutes a lawful interpretation, and they compel 
States to respect the sources of international law.
4.3 Judicial Politics
4.3.1 Domestic Law
Partly due to the vagueness of domestic (and especially constitutional) law (supra, 
4.1) and to judges’ institutional independence from the legislature (4.2), courts en-
joy discretion1120 when it comes to deciding cases, and they may be tempted to 
abuse it.
Courts may settle on what can be perceived as bold interpretations. They some-
times interpret domestic laws contra legem, and they have created rights based 
on ambiguously worded provisions.1121 us constitutional legal scholars such as 
 Michael Klarman even argue that some us Supreme Court decisions are explica-
ble ‘only in terms of the […] majority’s partisan political preferences’,1122 although 
the Justices (like judges in other countries) forcefully deny it.1123
Critical legal scholars have highlighted the creative features of adjudication. 
Duncan Kennedy for instance challenges Hart’s distinction between the law’s 
‘core of settled meaning’, within which the law is precise, and its ‘penumbra 
of doubt’, ie, the cases in which the law becomes indeterminate.1124 Kennedy 
 1119 Emile Gaston Boutmy, Des rapports et des limites des études juridiques et des études poli-
tiques (Armand Colin 1889) 8.
 1120 On judicial discretion and its relationship to interpretation, see Barradas de Freitas 
(n 127) 190.
 1121 Griswold v.  Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965). On Swiss courts, see Hertig Randall and 
Chatton (n 441) 393.
 1122 Klarman (n 1036) 1724. See also the references in footnote 10 in Petersen (n 73).
 1123 Klarman (n 1036) 1724.
 1124 Kennedy, ‘A Left/ Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/ Kelsen Theory of Legal 
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argues that the boundary between the core and the penumbra is not inherent 
in the features of the law. Rather, in many cases, it is the result of judicial inter-
pretation. The judge is analogous to a worker on a field that is ‘open to manipu-
lation’: she can, up to a certain extent, ‘shape’ the law to make it fit the purpose 
she has in mind.1125 While interpretative solutions are presented as objectively 
correct, objectivity is partly defined by judges themselves.
Kennedy’s (and other scholars’) critique of adjudication is a powerful re-
minder of the conscious and unconscious biases of judicial decision- making. 
It draws attention to, and cautions against, the reality of the practice and the 
phenomenology of judicial decision- making. It also highlights the need to 
harness judicial discretion and to prevent arbitrariness, a necessity most legal 
scholars acknowledge.
One way to move closer to this goal is, again, to require judges to use inter-
pretative methods as guides in their decision- making. Interpretative methods 
aim at bringing light upon the black box of judicial discretion. They provide 
a benchmark against which exercises of judicial power can be evaluated and 
anticipated with reasonable certainty. While methods do not eliminate biases, 
they make it more difficult for courts to decide based on their own ‘sweet will 
and whims’.1126
4.3.2 International Law
In international law, the risk of arbitrary interpretations is arguably even 
 greater than in domestic law. International law is, as already mentioned, gov-
erned by the principle of auto- interpretation: in the absence of international 
dispute settlement bodies that have the authority to review domestic inter-
pretations, States interpret their own obligations without being bound by the 
interpretations of other subjects of international law. Two States’ divergent 
interpretations are equal in the sense that none trumps the other. Their legal 
authority is confined to both States’ respective legal orders.
Auto- interpretation is a principle with notable exceptions. In some cases, 
international and regional courts have the power to review States’ interpre-
tations, subject to the specific relationship of authority that exists between a 
Kennedy, and on the implications of their work for domestic courts’ interpretations 
of international law, see Ammann, ‘How Do and Should Domestic Courts Interpret 
International Law? Insights From the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart and Duncan Kennedy’ 
(n 817).
 1125 Kennedy, ‘Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology’ (n 75).
 1126 Timothy Endicott, ‘The Coxford Lecture: Arbitrariness (in Judicial and Public Authority 
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given international adjudicatory body and States.1127 Nonetheless, while inter-
national courts have been ‘proliferating’1128 in recent decades, giving rise to an 
equally prolific scholarship,1129 the practical significance of auto- interpretation 
should not be underestimated.
Auto- interpretation increases the interpretative discretion of States and 
their courts in several respects. First, the fact that States are judges in their own 
cause creates risks of partiality. Realist scholars consider it irrational for States 
to interpret their obligations in a way that jeopardizes their own interests.1130 
Courts too can be tempted to base their decisions on prudential considerations. 
 Congyan Cai writes about the Chinese ‘judicial policy toward international 
law’,1131 and similar tendencies exist in other domestic courts.1132 Another risk 
is that of bootstrapping, or of self- referential interpretations: courts may ascer-
tain international law primarily based on their own (or their State’s) practice, as 
opposed to also referring to the practice of other States.1133
Second, and relatedly, States and their organs might disregard the  sources 
of international law (see Chapters  7 and 8, infra).1134 Such flaws are deeply 
problematic, given that States, in such cases, are no longer interpreting the law 
under consideration. Taking interpretative methods seriously means account-
ing for the essential features of international law and for the process by which 
it came into being. While auto- interpretation leaves room for divergent inter-
pretations, it does not entail that States can freely choose their interpretative 
methods. States must respect secondary norms of international law if they are 
to interpret international law, as opposed to doing something else.
 1127 The icj’s jurisdiction is conditional upon a declaration of the parties pursuant to art. 36 
icj Statute, the icc’s jurisdiction is complementary to that of domestic institutions (art. 
17 icc Statute), and interventions of the ECtHR are subsidiary to those of domestic insti-
tutions (art. 35(1) echr; see also Protocol 15 to the echr (yet to enter into force)).
 1128 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Foreword: Is the Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals 
a Systemic Problem?’ (1999) 31 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 679.
 1129 Cesare Romano, Karen Alter, and Yuval Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2014).
 1130 Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2005). See also Gross (n 844) 287.
 1131 Congyan (n 44) 270.
 1132 Medellín v. Texas, 552 u.s. 491 (2008).
 1133 Besson and Ammann (n 60). This tendency has been confirmed by empirical work, 
see Bart MJ Szewczyk, ‘Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation:  An 
Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law Review 
1118, 1133. See also Chapters 7– 8 (infra).
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To conclude, given the vagueness of international law (4.1), the counter- 
majoritarian features of judicial interpretation (4.2), and the prevalence of 
auto- interpretation (4.3), the interpretation of international law needs ‘shared 
standards for estimating which professional work is valuable’.1135 It needs them 
just as – and arguably even more than – the interpretation of domestic law and 
other interpretative practices do.
5 Three Objections against Interpretative Methods
While there is a case for constraining the power of courts through interpreta-
tive methods (supra, section 4), many lawyers and scholars are, for various rea-
sons, skeptical about interpretative methods, and therefore also about efforts 
to clarify and emphasize them. Skepticism has especially increased under the 
influence of legal realism and, in continental Europe, with the rise of post-
modern thought, although many scholarly strands highlight the weaknesses 
of interpretative methods.1136 Once again, common critiques raised in interna-
tional law roughly mirror the domestic ones.
Mainstream challenges against interpretative methods pertain to the fact 
that norms prescribing the use of interpretative methods are just as vague as 
other laws (5.1), that they are self- defeating, because they are shaped by the 
very actors they are supposed to constrain (5.2), and that an emphasis on 
methods neglects interpretative outcomes (5.3). I  refer to these objections 
as the ‘vague methods’ objection, the ‘self- made methods’ objection, and the 
‘outcome over process’ objection. The three objections are more complex than 
what can be elucidated here, and they do not exhaust the challenges raised 
against interpretative methods. For reasons of scope, I focus on these common 
critiques, and I respond to each of them.
5.1 The ‘Vague Methods’ Objection
Many theorists of domestic law doubt that methods can constrain judi-
cial reasoning. They consider that methods provide judges with conven-
ient legitimizing devices that these judges can twist. Hart himself notes 
that methods cannot prevent judicial discretion, since methods, like 
any law, need to be interpreted.1137 This observation is made by many 
 1135 Donald G Marshall, ‘Literary Interpretation’ in Joseph Gibaldi (ed), Canonicity and 
Textuality (Modern Languages Association of America 1992) 173.
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scholars,1138 eg by Stanley Fish1139 in response to Owen Fiss’s account of so- 
called ‘disciplining rules’ in interpretation, both inside and outside the law.1140 
The legal realists (like the ‘political realists’)1141 have stressed that methods do 
not determine the outcome of judicial decision- making, that they leave room 
for considerations of policy,1142 and that judges use methods for the purpose of 
post hoc rationalization.1143 Critical legal scholars also highlight the influence 
of ‘ideological’ considerations on judicial decisions.1144 Postmodern thinkers 
view the interpreter (and the interpretative object) as a matrix of meaning. 
Jacques Derrida for instance emphasizes the radical indeterminacy of inter-
pretative objects, and he describes the interpretative process as an infinite re-
gress from one text to another.1145 Such views have been influential beyond 
literary theory,1146 including in legal scholarship.1147 Without necessarily being 
skeptical, scholars have shown the pitfalls and ‘leading vices’1148 of interpreta-
tive reasoning. Even conservative legal scholars emphasize that judicial deci-
sions result from ‘interpretive choice’.1149
In international law, interpretative methods leave room for discretion as 
well. Martti Koskenniemi argues that the sources of international law can-
not be identified in an apolitical way.1150 Common norms do not eliminate 
the need for evaluation, and hence reliance on ‘essentially contested – politi-
cal – principles’.1151 International law, according to Helmut Aust, only requires 
 1138 Karl N Llewellyn, ‘Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules and 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed’ (1950) 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395; 
Bankowski and others (n 132) 15.
 1139 Stanley Fish, ‘Fish v. Fiss’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 1325.
 1140 Fiss (n 1029).
 1141 On this topic, see Evan Criddle, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in u.s. 
Treaty Interpretation’ (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 431, 470 f.
 1142 Holmes (n 22); Tushnet (n 777) 50.
 1143 Klarman (n 831).
 1144 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (n 78).
 1145 Eg Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, événement, contexte’, Communication au Congrès inter-
national des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française (Montreal 1971). See also Jacques 
Derrida, ‘Le langage (Le Monde au téléphone)’ Le Monde Dimanche (Spring 1982); Jacques 
Derrida, Mémoires : pour Paul de Man (Galilée 1988). I am grateful to Yousif M. Qasmiyeh 
for drawing my attention to these other pieces.
 1146 Sontag (n 996) 106.
 1147 Amstutz and Niggli (n 105).
 1148 MacCormick and Summers (n 1034) 539 ff.
 1149 Vermeule (n 76).
 1150 See (with regard to cil): Koskenniemi (n 1064) 25 f.
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‘convergence at a very high level of abstraction’.1152 The ascertainment of the 
object and purpose1153 of a treaty, for instance, is viewed by some scholars as 
an ‘enigma’.1154 Similar difficulties apply to other methods listed in the vclt. 
Regarding unwritten international law, Jean d’Aspremont observes that today, 
‘the intellectual prison of custom seems to be gradually transformed into a 
large dance floor where (almost) every step and movement is allowed or, at 
least, tolerated’.1155 Custom is deemed an ‘untid[y] ’ source,1156 and the ilc’s 
draft conclusions on custom have been criticized for being too vague, and 
therefore of limited practical use.1157
These various criticisms and observations touch upon an important is-
sue: norms about interpretative methods limit judicial discretion only up to 
a certain point. Even the General State Laws for the Prussian States did not 
succeed in regulating every possible case in advance. As Mark Tushnet points 
out, ‘there are no institutional mechanisms for committing judges to particu-
lar interpretive methods’.1158 Courts enjoy some leeway at all stages of the in-
terpretative process, be it when choosing what methods to use at what stage 
of their reasoning, when applying these methods, when weighing the results 
yielded by different methods and, finally, when drafting their rulings.1159
What the critique overlooks is, first, that the fact that methods are elastic 
and that judges might (and sometimes do) bend them does not demonstrate 
that they are not worth imposing on judges. People break the law, yet States 
have laws nonetheless. Of course, there is room for improvement as regards 
States’ use of interpretative methods.1160 I am not arguing that interpretative 
methods are risk- free. However, judges’ fallibility does not demonstrate that 
interpretative constraints should be discarded.
 1152 Helmut Philipp Aust, ‘Between Universal Aspiration and Local Application: Concluding 
Observations’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of 
International Law by Domestic Courts:  Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University 
Press 2016) 337.
 1153 Art. 31(1) vclt.
 1154 Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ 
(1998) 3 Austrian Review of International & European Law 311.
 1155 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Customary International Law as a Dance Floor:  Part I’ (ejil:  Talk!, 
2014) <www.ejiltalk.org/ customary- international- law- as- a- dance- floor- part- i/ >.
 1156 Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 59.
 1157 Sienho (n 960) 8 f.
 1158 Tushnet (n 777) 51.
 1159 Judicial decisions may or may not accurately reflect actual processes of deliberation. See 
ibid 48.
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Secondly, the critique rightly highlights that evaluative judgments cannot 
be eliminated from judicial decision- making. In fact, they are even necessary 
to prevent tyranny. On the other hand, the objection neglects that such  value 
judgments must be kept in bounds. Requiring that courts respect specific 
methods is one way of doing so. While methods do not eliminate the risk of 
arbitrariness, they marginalize at least some justifications that could be sub-
mitted by courts in support of a given decision. Methods also provide a basis to 
appraise, contest, and defend judicial decisions.
Thirdly, and paradoxically, the objection demands too much from interpre-
tative methods. It forgets that judges’ compliance with the law cannot merely 
be achieved through interpretative norms. Compliance also depends on the 
attitude of the law’s interpreters,1161 and on the stringency with which other 
participants in the practice (including scholars) criticize deviations from these 
mandatory canons.
5.2 The ‘Self- Made Methods’ Objection
Interpretative methods also trigger skepticism because States (and judges) 
at least partly define the constraints that limit their own interpretations. In 
domestic law, Duncan Kennedy points out that the distinction between the 
Hartian ‘penumbra of doubt’ and ‘core of settled meaning’ is often drawn (and 
can potentially be shifted) by the judge.1162 This also applies to interpreta-
tive methods, which – just like the rules of a game can be used to the player’s 
 advantage – can be bent to fit the interpreter’s preferences and to support a 
given outcome. In many legal orders, interpretative methods are the product of 
judicial lawmaking, not of legislative action (supra, 3.1).1163 Because methods 
can constrain interpreters but also, to some extent, be shaped and adjusted by 
them, their use can be a virtue as well as a vice.
Similarly, in international law, methods are shaped by the very entities they 
are primarily supposed to limit, namely States. ‘[T] he closer to state practice 
an argument is, the less normative and the more political it seems’, Martti 
 Koskenniemi writes.1164 But then, Ingo Venzke asks, ‘[h]ow can we understand 
 1161 On judicial integrity, see Hannah Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture’ 
(1971) 38 Social Research 417.
 1162 Kennedy, ‘A Left/ Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/ Kelsen Theory of Legal 
Interpretation’ (n 176).
 1163 For codifications of these methods, however, see art. 6 of the Austrian Civil Code of 1 June 
1811; art. 12 of the Italian Civil Code of 16 March 1942. See also the references in Waibel, 
‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation:  Developed for and Applied by National Courts?’ 
(n 183) 27 f.
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interpretation as constrained by rules if it is that same practice that creates the 
rules?’1165
The aforementioned criticism underlines an important feature of interpre-
tative methods. Methods, qua secondary norms, are first and foremost custom-
ary. They are shaped by those whose legal duty it is to apply and to respect the 
law. As regards methods that have been codified, States and their officials are 
involved in the codification process as well. On the other hand, the critique 
neglects a range of points.
First, it is doubtful that other actors are better placed than State institutions 
when it comes to defining interpretative methods. This is especially the case 
in international law, where State sovereignty is a pressing concern. Granted, 
methods should be such that they can truly constrain official (and judicial) 
decision- making, rather than being vulnerable to being bent by those they are 
meant to constrain. However, their constraining effect depends not only on 
their content and on the way these methods are established, but also – and 
 arguably even more so – on the mechanisms deployed to monitor their respect.
Second, in international law, methods are shaped by States collectively. They 
cannot be defined by one State unilaterally. Moreover, the ilc has codified and 
systematized interpretative methods in international law, thereby imposing an 
external constraint on States.
Third, there are checks on the way interpretative methods are applied, even 
in international law, and despite the fact that these checks are informal and 
decentralized. Interpretative methods are one of the main yardsticks by which 
domestic rulings are evaluated on the international plane.
Fourth, auto- interpretation is not synonymous with an ‘auto- determination 
of interpretative methods’.1166 Granted, States are relatively free within their 
own jurisdiction, and it is doubtful that international law has ‘one true mean-
ing’ that must be ascertained by domestic courts ‘untrammeled by notions of 
[their] national culture’.1167 The methods of the vclt, for instance, do not aim 
at harmonizing the outcome of treaty interpretation. This notwithstanding, 
there are methods that international law requires States to follow when they 
interpret their obligations.
 1165 Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative 
Twists (n 126) 54 f.
 1166 Besson and Ammann (n 97).
 1167 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Adan R v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department Ex Parte Aitseguer, R v. [2000] ukhl 67; [2001] 2 wlr 143; [2001] 1 
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5.3 The ‘Outcome Over Process’ Objection
Without necessarily being skeptical of interpretative methods, it can be ar-
gued that regardless of the methods domestic courts use, what matters is the 
interpretative result.
In domestic law, some Swiss lawyers believe that theorizing judicial inter-
pretation is a superfluous academic exercise. The pragmatic methodology 
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, they claim, has proven itself.1168 In the United 
States, Michael Klarman considers it plausible that ‘history’s verdict on a [us] 
Supreme Court ruling depends more on whether public opinion ultimately 
supports the outcome than on the quality of the legal reasoning or the crafts-
manship of the Court’s opinion’.1169 In the United Kingdom as well, it is ‘not 
infrequent[ly] suggest[ed] that what is important is not what the courts say 
about statutory interpretation, but what they in fact decide in regard to the 
statutes which come before them’.1170 A  related argument consists in saying 
that what matters is that the judgment achieves a specific result, eg (depending 
on what normative position one endorses), that it precludes grave  violations 
of fundamental rights or that it protects democratic decisions. A strict adher-
ence to methodological standards may, in some cases, prevent such a result. 
This argument is reflected in John Dewey’s claim that interpretation must be 
informed by policy, and that legal norms are tools that must be in service of 
social needs.1171 Focusing on interpretative methods could hence be criticized 
for dealing solely with ‘façade legitimation’,1172 and not with legitimacy in the 
proper sense, however legitimacy is defined.
From the perspective of international law as well, it can be argued that what 
matters for international law is less the interpretative process than the result 
reached by States (inter alia via their courts). Pursuant to the idea that in inter-
national law, the State is a ‘black box’,1173 what matters from the vantage point 
of international law is that States abide by their international obligations.1174 
How they choose to do so, however, is left for them to decide.
The ‘outcome over process’ objection raises  – once again  – concerns 
that should not be hastily swept aside. Focusing on the outcome of judicial 
decision- making is helpful, as it prevents losing sight of the consequences of 
 1168 Walter (n 118).
 1169 Klarman (n 1036) 1722. See also ibid 1747 ff.
 1170 The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 5.
 1171 Dewey (n 777).
 1172 Bankowski and others (n 132) 16.
 1173 Ferdinandusse (n 856).
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these decisions. Domestic rulings, to be socially accepted and to be obeyed in 
the long run, need to deliver more than mere conformity to methodological 
standards.
Still, the ‘outcome over process’ criticism seems exaggerated on more than 
one count. First, process and outcome are not disconnected: they are two sides 
of the same coin. Using interpretative methods that are required by law can 
influence the interpretative outcome, even if this is not always the case. Even 
when the outcome remains unchanged, the interpretative process is impor-
tant, as it explains and seeks to justify the interpretative result. The concept of 
‘interpretation’ itself refers both to the interpretative process and to its result.
Second, international law is not blind to interpretative outcomes. The 
vclt’s methods emphasize the parties’ duty to interpret treaties in ‘good faith’, 
holistically, and so as to avoid ‘ambiguous or obscure’ and ‘manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable’ interpretative results.1175 Thus, the vclt regulates both the 
interpretative process and its outcome.
Third, the pervasiveness of disagreement in interpretation, judicial inter-
pretation, and international law makes it essential to agree on common meth-
ods in order to evaluate the merits of incompatible decisions.
6 Conclusion
Standard objections to having methods of judicial interpretation should not be 
dismissed quickly. They recall aspects related to the phenomenology of judi-
cial decision- making. They also raise the difficult and controversial question of 
the outcome that judicial decisions should achieve. Yet little is gained by aban-
doning methodological imperatives in judicial decision- making and, thus, by 
opening the door of the courtroom wider to arbitrary decision- making. Of 
course, interpretative methods are not a panacea. Interpreters need to choose 
among competing interpretative results yielded by different methods. Meth-
ods must be applied in a predictable, clear, and consistent way. If they are not, 
they become convenient yet deceitful ‘judicial marketing’ tools.1176 In short, we 
should not overestimate what interpretative methods can achieve, nor should 
we downplay their contribution to legality in domestic and international law.
 1175 Art. 31 f vclt.
 1176 Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the wto Appellate Body’ (2010) 21 
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 chapter 6
The Interpretative Methods of International 
Law: What Are They, and Why Use Them?
[I] nterpretation is not a mere technical device, but a political mat-
ter of the utmost importance: it may eventually depend on which 
interpretative method is applied whether a state (or any other ac-
tor, for that matter) can be accused of an internationally wrongful 




In Chapter 5 (supra), I have stressed that interpretative methods guide domes-
tic and international legal practice, and that there are good reasons for requir-
ing judges to abide by them. I have not yet examined the specific interpreta-
tive methods of international law, and the reasons for using these methods in 
 particular.
The present chapter is devoted to these issues. These questions matter be-
cause States (including courts) must know what methods the law requires 
them to apply, and because the addressees of legal decisions must know by 
which standards States and their authorities should be held accountable. 
Moreover, it is essential to grasp the importance of each and every method, 
and the relationship between all of them.
In this chapter, I claim that States, to honor their international obligations, 
must use the interpretative methods of international law, namely textual, sys-
tematic, teleological, and historical interpretation. Trivial and uncontroversial 
as this point may seem, it is too often discarded or overlooked by scholars and 
 1177 Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories:  The Declining Importance of Travaux 
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courts. This neglect of interpretative methods jeopardizes the legality and the 
predictability, clarity, and consistency of judicial reasoning.
My goal, in this chapter, is two- fold. First, I identify the interpretative meth-
ods that must be used to interpret international law. These methods, I argue, 
apply to all sources of international law. Second, I explain why there are good 
reasons1178 for using these methods. Interpretative methods should not be ne-
glected, even if this is often the case in practice.
I do not argue for the priority of one method over others (ie, for the validity 
of one particular normative interpretative theory, supra, Chapter 2, 5.1). Karl 
Llewellyn, by noting that every ‘parry’ comes with a ‘thrust’, has shown that 
every interpretative canon can be countered by another contradictory one.1179 
Methods point in different directions, and all these directions, I claim, deserve 
attention. My endeavor thereby differs from that of scholars who have put for-
ward a full- fledged theory of interpretation of international law.1180
2 The Interpretative Methods of International Law
To obtain a better understanding of the methods required by international 
law, it is useful to rely on insights gained in domestic law. Contrary to what 
is often assumed, the interpretative methods of domestic and international 
law share the same traits (supra, Chapter 5, 3.3). What differs between domes-
tic and international law are some features of their lawmaking processes.1181 
These differences may have some implications for their respective interpreta-
tive methods,1182 but the basic characteristics of these methods are the same.
To identify the interpretative methods of international law, I  consult the 
vclt and the ilc’s draft conclusions on identification of cil.1183 One could 
 1178 I will not examine whether the use of these methods makes an interpretation legitimate 
all things considered. As previously mentioned, this question is beyond the scope of my 
study (supra, Introduction, section 3). However, some of the claims I make in this chapter 
do provide elements for such a theory of legitimacy.
 1179 Llewellyn (n 1138). Sean D. Murphy has transposed Llewellyn’s theory to international 
law: Murphy (n 163) 16 f.
 1180 One example is the theory developed by Letsas (n 79).
 1181 Eg the fact that international lawmaking requires the involvement of at least two States.
 1182 Eg in treaty interpretation, a broader definition of context encompassing, inter alia, 
other international legal acts and the practices of the treaty parties. See art. 31(3)(b) and 
(c) vclt.
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argue that the ilc’s mandate consists not only in the codification, but also in 
the ‘progressive development’ of international law.1184 One could also contend 
that the customary status of the methods of the vclt is controversial. Thus, 
these two instruments might arguably not reflect customary methods or serve 
as useful interpretative guides. However, I submit that there are good reasons 
for relying on them.
First, both documents seem the most obvious starting point for an analy-
sis of the interpretative methods of international law. The customary status 
of the vclt’s methods was, indeed, controversial at the time the Convention 
was adopted,1185 and the icj affirmed it only gradually.1186 In the early 1930s, 
scholars considered that treaty interpretation was ‘among the most confused 
subjects in international law’.1187 However, at the time of their drafting, the 
relevant provisions of the vclt triggered few comments by States, who mainly 
disagreed about the weight to be given to these methods,1188 and hence about 
normative interpretative theories (supra, Chapter 2, 5.1). Admittedly, art. 31 f 
vclt catalyzed the formation of customary law on treaty interpretation, which 
was still embryonic at that time.1189 Yet today, and for at least the past three 
decades, an overwhelming majority1190 of States, domestic and international 
courts (including the icj), and international lawyers deem the vclt a reflec-
tion of customary methods of treaty interpretation.1191
As to the ilc’s draft conclusions on identification of cil, which were final-
ized in 2018, one could argue that it is too early to consider them a reliable 
reflection of customary methods. The draft conclusions can be criticized for 
 1184 Art. 1(1) ilc Statute.
 1185 Gardiner (n 359) 76. See also Yves Le Bouthillier, ‘Article 32’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre 
Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Vol I (Oxford 
University Press 2011) 843 f.
 1186 Gardiner (n 359) 13 ff.
 1187 Yi-Ting Chang, The Interpretation of Treaties by Judicial Tribunals (Columbia University 
Press 1933) 19, cited by ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 939.
 1188 Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 815 f.
 1189 See ibid 806. See also ibid 810 f.
 1190 By contrast, the cjeu is more reluctant to do so, see Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 822.
 1191 Gardiner 146 ff; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by 
Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International 
Legal Order’ in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of 
International and National Courts and the (De- )Fragmentation of International Law (Hart 
Publishing 2012)  151. See also the references to the icj’s case law on art. 31 vclt in 
Petersen (n 73)  n 53. Some scholars press for a redrafting of the vclt’s interpretative 
provisions: Chang- fa Lo, Treaty Interpretation Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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predominantly drawing on the practice of the icj and other international 
courts. Moreover, some scholars deem them minimalistic and removed from 
practical considerations.1192 However, there are good reasons for relying on the 
draft conclusions as a starting point: they have not met with fundamental crit-
icism on the part of States;1193 the ilc endeavored to collect information from 
States regarding their practice;1194 and the conclusions are the most recent 
statement of the methods of identification of customary law elaborated in an 
inclusive, public, and international forum.
A second reason for relying on these two resources is, of course, that as-
certaining State practice and opinio juris from scratch with regard to the 
 interpretative methods of treaty law, cil, and general principles is an extraor-
dinarily laborious task that is beyond the scope of this study. In addition to 
these two documents, I draw upon the comments made by the governments 
of the States involved in their drafting process1195 (except for documents un-
available in French or English) or by international or regional organizations 
such as the aalco.1196 I also build on the efforts of other bodies than the ilc 
to clarify the interpretative methods of treaty law and cil,1197 and on inter-
national legal scholarship. When relying on these resources, it is essential to 
focus, whenever possible, on expressions of State practice and opinio juris, 
since norms about mandatory interpretative methods are customary norms. 
 1192 Stefan Talmon, ‘Determining Customary International Law: The icj’s Methodology and 
the Idyllic World of the ilc’ (ejil: Talk!, 2015) <www.ejiltalk.org/ determining- customary- 
international- law- the- icjs- methodology- and- the- idyllic- world- of- the- ilc>.
 1193 See the comments submitted by governments at <legal.un.org/ ilc/ guide/ 1_ 13.shtml>. As 
indicated by Noora Arajärvi, governmental statements made in the un General Assembly 
can be retrieved on <papersmart.unmeetings.org>: Arajärvi (n 37) 19, footnote 49. See 
however the forceful critique of BS Chimni, ‘Customary International Law: A Third World 
Perspective’ (2018) 112 American Journal of International Law 1.
 1194 ilc, ‘Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty- Fourth Session (7 May– 1 June 
and 2 July– 3 August 2012)’ (2012) un Doc a/ 67/ 10 8. The document forming the basis 
for Switzerland’s submission is Besson and Ammann (n 60).
 1195 These comments are included in the ilc’s analytical guides on the law of treaties 
(‘Comments by Governments’, <legal.un.org/ ilc/ guide/ 1_ 1.shtml>, especially <legal.
un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ documentation/ english/ a_ cn4_ 182.pdf&lang=EF>) and on the 
identification of cil (‘Comments by Governments’, <legal.un.org/ ilc/ guide/ 1_ 13.shtml>).
 1196 Sienho (n 960); Sufian Jusoh, ‘A Dialogue Between un and aalco Experts on Identification 
of Customary International Law’ (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 1.
 1197 On the law of treaties, see Institut de droit international, ‘Interprétation des traités’ (1956) 
<www.idi- iil.org/ idiF/ resolutionsF/ 1956_ grena_ 02_ fr.pdf>; ‘Harvard Draft Convention 
on the Law of Treaties’ (1935) 29 American Journal of International Law 657. On cil, see 
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It is important to concede that these means cannot replace such a compre-
hensive survey of State practice and opinio juris.
Although I start from the vclt and from the ilc’s work, the methods these 
documents identify should not be taken for granted.1198 The fact that most 
States and other actors deem a method customary does not prove its custom-
ary status. Both documents should therefore be approached critically, contrary 
to what is often the case in scholarship. In this chapter, I will examine whether 
there are compelling reasons to doubt these methods’ customary character, 
but also to require States to use these methods.
The interpretative methods of international law fall into four categories: tex-
tual (2.1), systematic (or contextual) (2.2), purposive (or teleological) (2.3), and 
historical (2.4).1199 They are congruent with the four methods of statutory in-
terpretation identified by Friedrich Karl von Savigny. Scholars have noted that 
Savigny’s methods ‘can be observed in every national methodology’,1200 even if 
States’ terminology to describe them is inconsistent (especially between com-
mon law and civil law jurisdictions). I analyze the relationship between the 
four methods in the last section of this chapter (2.5).
One important claim that I make in this  chapter – and which is in disagree-
ment with mainstream scholarship – is that the aforementioned four methods 
 1198 This is what the great bulk of international legal scholarship seems to do, at least regard-
ing art. 31 f vclt. For an iconoclast position, see d’Aspremont, ‘The International Court 
of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the Lines Between Sources and Interpretation’ 
(n 224) 1030. See also Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’ (n 93). Klabbers seems to sug-
gest that the vclt’s methods are not customary (i)  because interpretation is not gov-
erned by rules, which conflates the question of the source of interpretative methods 
with the type of obligations these methods create; (ii) because there were proponents 
of different approaches to interpretation before the vclt was adopted, an argument 
that disregards the distinction between interpretative methods and normative interpre-
tative theories (supra, Chapter  2, 5.1); (iii) because in international legal practice, no 
sanction is attached to the violation of interpretative methods. Yet methods are duty- 
imposing secondary norms, regardless of how the law addresses departures from them. 
Moreover, the customary character of a norm does not hinge on whether this norm is 
assorted with a sanction. Klabber’s third argument also seems to contradict his own state-
ment in Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories: The Declining Importance of Travaux 
Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?’ (n 994) 274.
 1199 See also Schlütter (n 179) 97.
 1200 Larry A DiMatteo and André Janssen, ‘Interpretive Methodologies in the Interpretation of 
the cisg’ in Larry A DiMatteo (ed), International Sales Law: A Global Challenge (Cambridge 
University Press 2014)  83. See also Stefan Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in 
England und auf dem Kontinent: eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung und 
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govern the interpretation of treaties, but also of cil1201 and general principles 
of international law. Analyses of the methods of identification of cil largely 
focus on State practice and opinio juris.1202 These elements are not methods, 
however, but constitutive elements of custom that require to be ascertained – 
and doing so requires using specific methods. The four methods also apply 
to general principles. The few rulings and scholarly writings available have 
highlighted the importance of (careful) analogical reasoning1203 and compara-
tive1204 reasoning for the purposes of ascertaining general principles, but they 
have rarely talked about interpretative methods. Given the scarce practice per-
taining to general principles of international law, my comments on them will 
primarily draw from scholarly writings.
Before moving on to the analysis, some final caveats are in order. First, by 
analyzing the aforementioned four methods, I  do not exclude the existence 
(present or future) of other (or more specific) customary interpretative meth-
ods. However, the four methods highlighted in this chapter deserve particular 
emphasis. The four methods of art. 31 f vclt are the least disputed interpreta-
tive methods in international law. Of course, this agreement in principle does 
not preclude disagreements about the proper application of these methods, 
nor does it rule out inconsistencies and mistakes in their application, or even 
occasional departures from them. Importantly, the four methods are broad 
 1201 See (with many practical examples) Merkouris (n 199); Merkouris (n 231). My position on 
the applicability of the vclt’s methods to cil somewhat differs from that of Merkouris, 
who argues that the vclt’s methods apply to cil once this custom has been ascertained. 
Contra Schlütter (n 179)  90. See also icj, case concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), merits, icj Reports 1986, 
14, at 95, para 178. However, the Court’s statement that treaty law and customary law 
‘are distinguishable by reference to the methods of interpretation and application’ points 
to the ‘institutions or mechanisms [established] to ensure implementation of the rule’ 
rather than to differences in terms of interpretative methods as understood in this book.
 1202 For such a finding, see Merkouris (n 231). For a recent example, see ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions 
on Identification of Customary International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891). See also 
Niels Petersen, ‘Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of State 
Practice in International Norm Creation’ (2007) 23 American University International 
Law Review 275; Arajärvi (n 37).
 1203 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law: Whose Principles?’ (n 935) 36; Jaye Ellis, 
‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International 
Law 949, 958 f; Thirlway (n 1156) 97 f; Weiss (n 936) 407 f.
 1204 Besson, ‘General Principles in International Law:  Whose Principles?’ (n 935)  36; Ellis 
(n 1203)  955 ff; Thirlway (n 1156)  95; Stephan W Schill, ‘General Principles of Law 
and International Investment Law’ in Tarcisio Gazzini and Eric De Brabandere (eds), 
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enough to encompass a number of more specific ones. Evaluating these meth-
ods can hence yield useful insights about these more specific methods as well.
A second caveat is that I argue from the assumption that there are general 
interpretative methods, namely methods that apply to all international legal 
acts regardless of their subject matter. Some authors argue that selected sub-
stantive regimes of international law are governed by ‘special’ or ‘specialized’ 
methods that depart from the ‘general’ interpretative methods (eg the meth-
ods of the vclt).1205 Yet what varies between these so- called ‘general’ versus 
‘special’ methods is not the method per se, but the type of interpretative ma-
terial that is available in different regimes of international law. This point also 
applies to cil1206 and to general principles of international law.
Third, some topics are excluded from this chapter. I do not address States’ 
duty to interpret treaties ‘in good faith’,1207 which is an axiological interpreta-
tive principle (supra, Chapter 2, 5.2) rather than an interpretative method. Nor 
do I focus on the interpretation of multilingual treaties (art. 33 vclt), which 
is not a method, but a rule addressing specific difficulties liable to arise in con-
nection with textual interpretation.
2.1 Textual Interpretation
2.1.1 Domestic Law
Textual (or literal) interpretation is the use of the ordinary meaning of written 
acts to ascertain the law. What does domestic legal theory tell us about this 
method? Is it legally required in domestic legal orders? If so, are there good 
reasons for requiring its use?
Few lawyers would dispute that the text is the starting point to ascertain 
the meaning of written laws (eg statutes). In fact, it is difficult to imagine how 
they could, since the text is the most straightforward feature of written law. 
Textual interpretation is the first method in Savigny’s ‘four elements’ doctrine 
and the first method courts refer to.1208 Textual interpretation, called the ‘plain 
 1205 Catherine Brölmann, ‘Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation:  International 
Organizations’ in Duncan Hollis (ed), The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University 
Press 2012). Contra Eirik Bjorge, ‘Different Regimes, Different Methods of Interpretation?’ 
in Mads Andenas and Eirik Bjorge (eds), The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties 
(Cambridge University Press 2014).
 1206 Wood (n 14) 9. See also Wood’s observation that the different regimes of cil are inter-
connected: ilc, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law 
by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (n 185)  7 f, para 19; ilc, ‘Second Report on 
Identification of Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ 
(n 578) 11 ff, para 28.
 1207 Art. 31(1) vclt.
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meaning rule’ in us law, and the ‘literal rule’ in English law, is also a standard 
method in common law jurisdictions.1209
Hence, some might even argue that textual interpretation is on a different 
level than other methods, which are subordinated to it. Other methods, one 
might claim, are only ways of interpreting wording: since we are always look-
ing at words, textual interpretation is not a self- standing method.
It is true that interpreters, because they are embedded in a communicative 
practice, cannot help but look at ordinary meaning. Yet textual interpretation 
is an autonomous method, even if other methods may require textual inter-
pretation as well, and vice versa. The focus on ordinary meaning, as banal (and 
central) as it may seem, is a distinctive way of ascertaining the law. Moreover, 
in legal interpretation, the interpretandum is not the text itself, but a social fact 
that is (in most cases, but not always)1210 expressed in words.
Textual interpretation is warranted on several grounds. First, it limits the 
discretion of decision- makers by forcing them to consider the wording  adopted 
by the legislature. Savigny for instance deemed the text a mediator between 
the legislature and its subjects.1211 Second, the text is easily identifiable and 
accessible, even if there can be reasonable disagreement about its meaning. 
Ascertaining the purpose, legislative history, and context of legal acts may re-
quire extensive research; the text is usually straightforward.
Textual interpretation can be criticized on various counts. First, it is only 
helpful if the wording is determinate. Some even contest the concept of ‘plain’, 
‘ordinary meaning’; in their view, texts are never determinate, and their mean-
ing, like a chameleon, changes with the context.1212 Undoubtedly, we often dis-
agree about the meaning of texts, the ambiguity of which can be deliberate or 
fortuitous. Yet legal texts are not radically indeterminate. They are embedded 
in our social communicative practices. As Aharon Barak puts it, ‘[w] ords do 
have meaning. A cigarette is not an elephant’.1213
 1209 See the so- called ‘semantic’ and ‘syntactic canons’ described by Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
A Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (Thomson/ West 2012).
 1210 cil, for instance, can be expressed in non- verbal acts. Of course, to interpret these acts, 
the interpreter is likely to use written materials of some sort, but the interpretandum itself 
is not expressed in words.
 1211 von Savigny (n 761) 213.
 1212 Derrida, ‘Signature, événement, contexte’ (n 1145). See also Amstutz (n 790). Stanley Fish 
argues that the meaning of texts differs from one interpretive community to another. See 
Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (n 982) 5.
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A second objection is that textual interpretation only applies to written law. 
Yet this disregards that unwritten law is often ascertained via verbal acts, eg 
auxiliary means.
Third, one might observe that there are different methods for ascertaining 
the ordinary meaning of texts.1214 Hence, textual interpretation arguably cre-
ates more difficulties than it purports to solve. True, methods do not state how 
they should be employed, and textual interpretation, like any method, can be 
conducted in light of other methods. Yet this does not make textual interpre-
tation useless. Any approach to textual interpretation is a normative position 
that must be argued for. Methods are not interpretative theories (supra, Chap-
ter 2, 5.1). We cannot expect them to solve problems they cannot tackle.
Fourth, textual interpretation can be (and is often) criticized when it dis-
regards other interpretative methods. Yet the fact that one- sided, ‘textualist’ 
approaches are misguided does not lead to the conclusion that textual inter-
pretation is flawed. Using textual interpretation does not require endorsing 
originalism, for instance (supra, Chapter 2, 5.1).
To conclude, there are good reasons for using textual interpretation in 
full awareness of its strengths and weaknesses, together with other methods 
(2.2– 2.4).
2.1.2 International Law
Like in domestic law, textual interpretation is so pervasive in international 
law that doubts about its customary character seem redundant. Textual in-
terpretation is the starting point of treaty interpretation,1215 a treaty being, 
by definition, written.1216 The determination of cil often requires textual in-
terpretation, as State practice and opinio juris are mainly reflected in verbal 
acts.1217 Pursuant to the ilc’s draft conclusions, treaties, resolutions of ios, and 
 1214 Eg based on the drafters’ intention or based on the ordinary meaning of the text at the 
time of its enactment. These two solutions reflect the distinction some authors draw 
between two types of originalism, namely intentionalism and textualism, see Letsas 
(n 79) 60.
 1215 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783)  219 f; Fatima 
(n 45) 83 f. Textual interpretation is mentioned in art. 31(1) and (4) vclt.
 1216 See art. 2(1)(a) vclt.
 1217 Draft conclusions 6 and 10, ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891). For a critique: Sienho (n 960) 385 f. See 
also Tullio Treves, ‘Customary International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Online Edition) (Oxford University Press 2008)  <opil.ouplaw.com>. 
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auxiliary means (ie, judicial decisions and scholarship) can all be used to iden-
tify custom.1218 Similarly, general principles of international law are primarily 
ascertained based on States’ practice of recognition, treaties, custom,1219 and 
auxiliary means.
The practice of treaty interpretation (and, most importantly, the practice 
of States)1220 suggests that textual interpretation is a customary interpretative 
method.1221 Only few analyses and draft conventions on treaty interpretation 
neglect textual interpretation.1222 As regards cil, decision- makers, in the vast 
majority of cases, rely on verbal, written acts to ascertain it.1223 The impor-
tance of verbal acts is also reflected in the ila’s work on the issue.1224 Such acts 
are further used in the few international rulings where general principles of 
international law are ascertained.1225
Several reasons explain States’ duty to use textual interpretation in inter-
national law. First, this method helps respect the intentions of the lawmaking 
States,1226 which the text is presumed to reflect.1227 With regard to unwritten 
 1218 Draft conclusions 11 ff in ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891). On treaties as means of identification 
of cil, see ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law 
(n 886) 43 ff.
 1219 Ottavio Quirico, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law and Their Relevance to 
Africa’ (2011) 17 African Yearbook of International Law Online 139, 152 ff.
 1220 On the practice of domestic courts, see Fatima (n 45) 83 f; Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty 
Interpretation: Developed for and Applied by National Courts?’ (n 183) 20.
 1221 See also the references to the icj’s case law in ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties 
With Commentaries’ (n 783) 220 f. See also Institut de droit international, ‘Interprétation 
des traités’ (n 1197); Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 817 ff.
 1222 The Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1935 does not expressly refer to 
textual inerpretation qua interpretative method, but mentions it in its commentary, see 
‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 947 ff. See however ibid 940.
 1223 See the comments submitted by the governments of El Salvador, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, South Korea, and Finland at the ilc’s 66th and 67th session, <legal.un.org/ 
ilc/ guide/ 1_ 13.shtml>. On English courts, see Fatima (n 45) 414 ff. On domestic courts 
in continental Europe, see Jan Wouters, ‘Customary International Law Before National 
Courts: Some Reflections From a Continental European Perspective’ (2004) 4 Non- State 
Actors and International Law 25, 28 ff.
 1224 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 14 f.
 1225 icty (Trial Chamber i), Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, sentencing judgment, Case No 
it- 96- 22- t, 29 November 1996, at para 27 ff. See also icty (Appeals Chamber), 
Prosecutor v.  Dražen Erdemović, judgment, Case No it- 96- 22- a, 7 October 1997, joint 
and separate opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para 56 ff.
 1226 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951– 4: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (n 1006) 204.
 1227 Institut de droit international, ‘Interprétation des traités’ (n 1197); ilc, ‘Draft Articles on 
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international law as well, the use of verbal acts secures fidelity to the inten-
tions States have expressed through these acts. Second, the text of interna-
tional law is its most immediately cognizable feature (except for laws that are 
not easily accessible).
Of course, textual interpretation also triggers criticism. First, is there a 
shared ordinary meaning on the international plane? Is resort to dictionary 
definitions warranted in circumstances of linguistic pluralism? Has there ever 
been a ‘meeting of the minds’,1228 save for an agreement on wording? Even if 
the parties’ respective intentions are congruent, the text may not reflect their 
intentions. Yet these critiques fail to show that textual interpretation is mis-
guided. By agreeing on the text, States accept the uncertainties of linguistic 
communication. Even if they leave room for imprecision and disagreement, 
texts remain the most practicable way for States to bind themselves.
Second, one could argue that textual interpretation is of no assistance to 
interpret unwritten international law. This objection is easily rebutted: it ne-
glects the practical importance of verbal statements (and hence of textual in-
terpretation) to ascertain custom and general principles of international law, 
eg via official statements and auxiliary means.
Third, there are different interpretative approaches to textual interpreta-
tion. Even if the parties use the same method, they may disagree about the 
way of going about it.1229 This challenge does not defeat textual interpreta-
tion, however. It merely (and rightly) criticizes the endorsement of a specific 
approach to the text that does not offer compelling arguments in its support.
Lastly, textual interpretation has been criticized for disregarding non- textual 
features of international law.1230 Yet this argument is only relevant if the in-
terpreter systematically focuses on the text’s ordinary meaning in  priority or 
to the exclusion of other interpretative methods.1231 Such a one- sided ap-
proach does not respect the interpretative methods of international law, and 
it would be a mistake to conflate textual interpretation and textualism (supra, 
 1228 This is suggested by Allott’s description of treaties as ‘disagreement[s] reduced to writ-
ing’: Allott (n 1107) 43.
 1229 Eg Stanley Fish, ‘Response:  Interpretation Is Not a Theoretical Issue’ (1999) 11 Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 509, 510 f.
 1230 Andrea Bianchi, ‘Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of 
(In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning’ in Pieter HF Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer, and 
Michael Waibel (eds), Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy: Essays in 
Honour of Detlev Vagts (Cambridge University Press 2010).
 1231 For an example of such a textualist approach to treaty interpretation, see Andrew Tutt, 
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2.1). On this last point, criticizing the vclt’s allegedly ‘textualist’ flavor,1232 or 
considering that it commands textualism,1233 is misguided. The Convention 
was explicitly designed to allow for a flexible approach to interpretation based 
on different interpretative methods and, as Richard Gardiner notes, ‘[o] ne has 
to start somewhere’.1234
In short, it is fair to say that textual interpretation is pervasive, customary, 
and mandatory in international law.
2.2 Systematic Interpretation
2.2.1 Domestic Law
Savigny describes the ‘systematic’ (contextual) element as the ‘inner linkage 
which connects all legal institutes and legal rules so as to form one unitary 
whole’.1235 Context, on his account, is limited to legal acts and institutions. It 
does not encompass elements such as the socio- cultural milieu in which inter-
pretation occurs. Savigny’s understanding of context presupposes that the law 
is a unitary, coherent (‘systematic’) whole, and not an aggregate of legal acts 
that can all be interpreted in isolation.
Systematic interpretation is a common interpretative method in all juris-
dictions that have adopted Savigny’s four methods. It is also used in common 
law countries.1236
Several reasons warrant looking at the law’s context. First, if reading the text 
of the law is, intuitively, the first interpretative step, paying attention to its con-
text is the second one. A legal provision is part of a broader regulatory scheme. 
Even unwritten laws do not exist in a vacuum. They belong to a pattern of 
 1232 See famously Myres S McDougal, ‘The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles 
Upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus’ (1967) 61 American Journal of International 
Law 992.
 1233 JG Merrills, ‘Two Approaches to Treaty Interpretation’ (1969) 4 Australian Year Book 
of International Law 55, 78; Martin Ris, ‘Treaty Interpretation and icj Recourse to 
Travaux Préparatoires:  Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1991) 14 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 111, 117.
 1234 Gardiner (n 359) 181.
 1235 von Savigny (n 761) 214.
 1236 Scalia and Garner (n 1209). Another example is the ‘golden rule’ used in English law, see 
Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 hl Cas 61, 106; 10er 1216, 1234: ‘in construing statutes, as well 
as in construing all other written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the 
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or inconsistence with 
the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words 
may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency, but no further’ (emphasis 
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rights and duties. Second, officials must abide by the law. If judges interpret 
a legal act in isolation, they might violate other legal norms. Such interpreta-
tions might also impose contradictory obligations on the law’s subjects.
Systematic interpretation does not come without a series of criticisms. First, 
it may require judges to overstep their institutional powers. If the legislature 
adopts two contradictory laws (as it often does, whether deliberately or not), 
it is arguably not for judges to step in. However, this objection can be flipped 
by saying that good judicial reasoning mandates predictability, clarity and, im-
portantly, consistency.
Second, one could object on the basis that coherence is not an end in it-
self, and that it may not always be warranted.1237 The need for coherence may 
be outweighed by other considerations, eg reliance interests or fundamental 
rights. Yet this objection neglects the fact that using context does not mean 
that context must necessarily and always prevail.
Third, one could object on the grounds that systematic interpretation is 
indeterminate. Should the interpretation of a given legal act cohere with the 
substantive area of the law to which it belongs? With the legal system as a 
whole?1238 However, the fact that the proper way of achieving systematicity is 
controversial only shows that systematic interpretation must be accompanied 
by a careful justification. It does not demonstrate that striving for systematicity 
(however we define it) is unwarranted per se.
Fourth, systematicity arguably imposes a disproportionate burden on 
 judges. Law is messy, one could argue, and it may be impossible for courts to 
disentangle it to secure coherence.1239 Yet the practical difficulties of achieving 
coherence do not mean that coherence is not worth striving for.
To conclude, systematic interpretation is an established interpretative 
method in domestic law, and there are compelling reasons to call for its use.
2.2.2 International Law
Systematic (or contextual) interpretation matters on the international plane 
as well. Regarding treaty interpretation, art. 31(1) vclt mandates contextual 
interpretation. Art. 31(2) vclt specifies the notion of context, and art. 31(3) 
vclt identifies elements to be ‘taken into account, together with the context’, 
ie, subsequent agreements (a), subsequent practice (b), and international law 
 1237 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain:  Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Clarendon Press 1994) ch 13. See also Dickson (n 78) para 3.3.
 1238 On local versus global coherence, see Dickson (n 78) para 3.5.
 1239 Under Swiss law, for instance, a popular vote can lead to the adoption of a constitutional 
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applicable to the treaty parties (c). The circumstances surrounding the conclu-
sion of the treaty are ‘supplementary means of interpretation’ (art. 32 vclt). 
Systematic interpretation is also relevant to identify cil.1240 It is required in 
order to examine if State practice is sufficiently coherent, constant, and gener-
al, or when treaties are used to ascertain custom. The ilc’s draft conclusions on 
custom mention context several times,1241 as does the ila’s project on cil.1242 
General principles of international law must also be interpreted in a  contextual 
fashion. While general principles identified in foro domestico require that inter-
preters go beyond the purely domestic context in which a domestic practice 
has developed, as they need to establish whether this practice expresses a gen-
eral principle of international law,1243 this domestic context cannot be ignored 
in the first place.1244 General principles of international law stricto sensu must 
also be identified by considering the context in which they have emerged.
Context is regularly mentioned by States and their courts when they inter-
pret treaties,1245 although references to art. 31(2) and (3) vclt are relatively 
rare.1246 Context is also prominent in the Harvard Draft Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.1247 The ilc has analyzed the principle of systemic integra-
tion1248 in its report on the fragmentation of international law.1249 Moreover, 
 1240 d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic 
Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal Order’ (n 1191) 
151 ff; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Articulating International Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law: Conciliatory Interpretation Under the Guise of Norms- Resolution’ in 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris (eds), The Interpretation and Application of the 
European Convention of Human Rights: Legal and Practical Implications (Martinus Nijhoff 
2013). Contra Philippe Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom, and the Cross- Fertilization of International 
Law’ (1998) 1 Yale Journal of International Development Law 85, 94.
 1241 Draft conclusions 3(1), 6(2), 7(1), and 10(2), ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of 
Customary International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
 1242 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 17. See 
at 9:  ‘The practice of the executive, legislative and judicial organs of the State is to be 
considered, according to the circumstances, as State practice’. See also at 21.
 1243 Ellis (n 1203) 961 f.
 1244 Jain (n 73) 137 ff.
 1245 On the practice of English courts, see Fatima (n 45) 114 ff.
 1246 For an example to the contrary regarding domestic courts’ reliance on subsequent prac-
tice in treaty interpretation, see ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 968.
 1247 See art. 19(a), ‘Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (n 1197).
 1248 Art. 31(3)(c) vclt.
 1249 ilc, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 296) paras 410– 480. See also Anne van Aaken, 
‘Defragmentation of Public International Law Through Interpretation: A Methodological 
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in 2018, the ilc adopted a set of draft conclusions on subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice.1250 Context is frequently mentioned in the case law 
of international courts. These courts refer to context both stricto sensu (as 
per art. 31(1) and (2) vclt) and lato sensu (pursuant to art. 31(3) and art. 32 
vclt).1251 Scholars also stress the importance of the interpretative context.1252 
States likewise mention context when ascertaining custom, though less fre-
quently than in treaty interpretation.1253 Ireland for instance, when com-
menting on the ilc’s work on cil, stated that ‘the weight which can be given 
to a particular statement varies greatly depending on the circumstances in 
which it was made’.1254 Regarding the use of context to ascertain general prin-
ciples of international law, domestic and international practice is scarce. In 
some cases, however, international courts have engaged in a comprehensive 
contextual survey of national practices by analyzing how an issue is addressed 
in different legal orders.1255
Why require States and their courts to use context when interpreting in-
ternational law? The reasons echo those in domestic law. First, contextual 
 1250 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice’ (2018) un 
Doc a/ 73/ 10 12.
 1251 See the references in Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044)  817 ff. See also d’Aspremont, 
‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges 
as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal Order’ (n 1191) 149 ff. 
Eg icj, case concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v.  United States), judgment, merits, icj 
Reports 2003, 6 November 2003, 161, at 182, para 41; icj, case concerning the Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continuous Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), advisory opin-
ion, icj Reports 1971, 21 June 1971, 16, at 31 f, para 53. On the circumstances of 
the conclusion of the treaty, see icj, case concerning Legality of Use of Force (Serbia 
and Montenegro v.  Belgium), judgment, preliminary objections, icj Reports 2004, 
15 December 2004, 279 (see especially at 318, para 100, and at 323 f, para 113). 
Evolutive interpretation, which characterizes the case law of regional human rights 
courts, is allowed by art. 31(3)(b) vclt. On this issue, see Daniel Moeckli and Nigel D 
White, ‘Treaties as “Living Instruments”’ in Dino Kritsiotis and Michael Bowman (eds), 
Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Modern Law of Treaties (Cambridge 
University Press 2018).
 1252 Bianchi (n 1230) 41 ff.
 1253 For an example in the practice of English courts, see Fatima (n 45) 419.
 1254 Ireland,  <legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ sessions/ 66/ pdfs/ english/ icil_ ireland.
pdf&lang=E>, at 2.
 1255 See some of the examples regarding international criminal tribunals discussed by Fabián 
Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal Courts and 
Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 84 ff. The pcij and icj have not conducted such com-
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interpretation is a matter of ‘both common sense and good faith’.1256 Several 
laws are applicable to a dispute, and courts must consider them all (provided, 
of course, that this is consistent with the court’s jurisdiction and procedural 
law). Second, using context helps ensure that the law does not impose contra-
dictory obligations on its addressees. The pcij for instance has linked the con-
textual element with the need to avoid ‘unreasonable or absurd results’.1257 The 
icj has even considered that context, jointly with the text, takes precedence 
over other interpretative methods if it allows ‘mak[ing] sense [of the relevant 
words]’.1258 This stands in continuity with the pcij’s statement that context 
helps limit the number of possible interpretations of a given text and is ‘the 
final test’ of ordinary meaning.1259
In international law, context excludes the acts of one State that have not 
been endorsed by a sufficient number of other States.1260 In 2014, the icj re-
fused to apply art. 31(3)(a) and (b)  vclt to resolutions of the International 
Whaling Commission that had not been adopted with the support of all par-
ties to the Whaling Convention.1261 Yet in its advisory opinion on Namibia, the 
icj invoked the practice of the Security Council to support its interpretation of 
 1256 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 221.
 1257 pcij, case concerning the Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Poland v. High Commissioner of 
the League of Nations and Free City of Danzig), advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 11, 16 
May 1925, 6, at 39.
 1258 icj, Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, 
advisory opinion, icj Reports 1950, 3 March 1950, 4, at 8. See also pcij, case concerning 
the Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Poland v. High Commissioner of the League of Nations 
and Free City of Danzig), advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 11, 16 May 1925, 6, at 39.
 1259 pcij, Competence of the ilo in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of the 
Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 3, 12 August 
1922, 8, at 23, 35.
 1260 Regarding cil, see the comments submitted by the United Kingdom, <legal.un.org/ docs/ 
?path=../ ilc/ sessions/ 66/ pdfs/ english/ icil_ uk.pdf&lang=E>, at 44 (stating that ‘it would 
be both inappropriate and undesirable for a domestic court to make a unilateral ruling, 
identifying a new rule of corporate liability based on customary international law’). See 
however Austria, <legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ sessions/ 67/ pdfs/ english/ icil_ austria.
pdf&lang=E>, p. 20 (in favor of extending the scope of actors with the authority to con-
tribute to the formation of cil). For an example, see icj, case concerning Sovereignty 
Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v.  Malaysia), judgment, merits, icj 
Reports 2002, 17 December 2002, 625, at 650, para 47.
 1261 icj, case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan; New Zealand interven-
ing), judgment, icj Reports 2014, 31 March 2014, 226, at 257, para 83. On this judgment, 
see d’Aspremont, ‘The International Court of Justice, the Whales, and the Blurring of the 
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the un Charter, in spite of the abstention of some of the Council’s permanent 
members.1262
Systematic interpretation has various drawbacks. First, one might argue 
that context, and especially the principle of systemic integration of art. 31(3)(c) 
vclt, can require judges to overstep their powers. Given the decentralized cre-
ation of international law, there are likely to be tensions between States’ vari-
ous rights and duties. By considering subsequent agreements and subsequent 
practice, judges might depart from the lawmakers’ original intentions.1263 This 
arguably clashes with their legal duty to obey the law.1264 Yet as previously 
mentioned (supra, 2.2.1), this argument can be flipped, since respecting all ap-
plicable legal acts is precisely what this duty requires from judges.
Second, one could contend that the systematicity of international law is a 
normative claim that needs to be argued for.1265 The same applies to the claim 
that judges should be ‘architects of the consistency of the international legal 
order’.1266 Yet this objection targets systematic interpretative theories (supra, 
Chapter 2, 5.1). Systematic interpretation is, per se, agnostic about whether in-
ternational law is (or should be) a system or not.
Third, it can be argued that context, and the requirement that other related 
elements ‘shall be taken into account’1267 in conjunction with it, leaves ample 
space for indeterminacy and, potentially, for judicial cherry- picking. This state-
ment disregards the fact that context is conceptually distinct from the ‘circum-
stances of […] conclusion’ of the treaty (art. 32 vclt). Art. 31(3)(c) vclt has for 
example been called the ‘passe- partout’ of international law.1268 However, its 
 1262 icj, case concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continuous Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970), advisory opinion, icj Reports 1971, 21 June 1971, 16, at 22, para 22.
 1263 icj, case concerning Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), judgment, 
merits, icj Reports 2009, 13 July 2009, 213, at 242, para 64.
 1264 As previously mentioned, this duty is primarily domestic, but it can also be a corollary of 
States’ international obligations.
 1265 Peter Staubach, ‘The Interpretation of Unwritten International Law by Domestic Judges’ 
in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law by 
Domestic Courts: Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016) 120.
 1266 d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic 
Courts:  Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal 
Order’ (n 1191).
 1267 Art. 31(3) vclt.
 1268 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of 
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wording does not allow courts to take any possible provision of international 
law into account.
Fourth, the inconsistencies that exist between a given international legal 
act and its context are sometimes irreconcilable. The difficulty this argument 
points at is not intrinsic to contextual interpretation, but is instead a result of 
the limitations of systematic normative theories.
In short, while contextual interpretation does not answer all interpretative 
questions, good reasons explain why States do and must interpret internation-
al law in its context.
2.3 Teleological Interpretation
2.3.1 Domestic Law
Savigny defined the law’s purpose as ‘the effect that the law is intended to 
achieve’.1269 He considered that purposive interpretation ought to be conducted 
exceptionally and only ‘with great caution’.1270 Today, in civil law jurisdictions 
like Switzerland, purposive interpretation stands on a par with other interpre-
tative methods. It is also used in common law jurisdictions.1271 Some domestic 
judges even endorse purposive interpretative theories.1272
Why require that interpreters use the purpose of a legal act to interpret it? 
First, purposive interpretation is a way of deferring to legislative choices. If 
the legislature demonstrably intended a given legal act to achieve purpose X, 
interpreting this act by postulating that its purpose is Y disregards legislative 
intent. By the same token, by deferring to X, judicial decision- makers respect 
the law’s intended purpose.
At the same time, purposive interpretation instils flexibility into the inter-
pretative process without necessarily disregarding legislative intent. If the leg-
islative purpose is defined at a sufficient level of generality, teleology allows 
taking new circumstances into account without departing from this legislative 
intent lato sensu.1273
 1269 von Savigny (n 761) 217.
 1270 See ibid 220.
 1271 In the United Kingdom, for instance, the mischief rule of statutory interpretation requires 
that judges identify the ‘mischief ’ that led to the enactment of a given piece of legislation 
in order to ‘cure’ it. See The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 14.
 1272 Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005).
 1273 Some us scholars advocate reading the drafters’ intentions at a higher level of general-
ity, eg Lessig, ‘Understanding Changed Readings:  Fidelity and Theory’ (n 831); Lessig, 
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Purposive interpretation is problematic in several respects. First, identifying 
the purpose of a legal act raises evidentiary difficulties. One challenge, in this 
context, is collective intentionality. What common objective did an aggregate 
of legislators aim for, if at all, and how can this objective be ascertained? The 
purpose of legal acts can be highly indeterminate, and its identification leaves 
ample room for disagreement. Second, in light of these evidentiary challenges, 
purposive interpretation can easily be criticized for being unconstrained. Given 
the indeterminacy of the purpose of a legal act, judges will likely be frowned 
upon for reading their own values in the law. One illustration of this challenge 
is the disagreement between Justice Chase and Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull 
as to the weight that ought to be given to natural law arguments.1274
Yet the fact that purposive interpretation is not always straightforward 
and leaves space for interpretative discretion does not mean that it should be 
abandoned. Rather, teleology must be handled with care, and used jointly with 
 other interpretative methods.
2.3.2 International Law
Purposive interpretation is also prominent in international law. It is the third 
method of treaty interpretation mentioned by art. 31(1) vclt. While some au-
thors argue that the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty refer to two conceptually 
distinct features of the treaty, namely to its content and to the goal the parties 
wanted to achieve through it,1275 this distinction has not gained any clout in in-
ternational legal practice. Another provision linked to teleology is art. 31(3)(b) 
vclt, which allows resorting to subsequent treaty practice (and hence to 
changing circumstances).1276 Purposive interpretation is the first method 
mentioned in the 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, where 
it is emphasized twice.1277 It is also relevant for the ascertainment of cil. Al-
though the ilc’s draft conclusions do not mention the notion of ‘purpose’, 
they provide that when ascertaining cil, ‘regard must be had to the overall 
context, the nature of the rule, and the particular circumstances in which the 
evidence in question is to be found’1278 (emphasis added). This leaves room for 
 1274 Calder v. Bull, 3 u.s. 386 (1798).
 1275 Buffard and Zemanek (n 1154) 325– 326. Contra Hervé Ascensio, ‘Article 31 of the Vienna 
Conventions on the Law of Treaties and International Investment Law’ (2016) 31 icsid 
Review 366, 370.
 1276 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951– 4: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (n 1006) 210.
 1277 Art. 19(a), ‘Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (n 1197).
 1278 Draft conclusion 3(1) in ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
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teleological considerations,1279 as the nature of an object cannot be defined 
without considering its purpose (and vice versa). The ‘nature of the act’ is also 
mentioned by the ila as a relevant element to determine whether a given act 
belongs to comity, as opposed to being required by cil.1280 Finally, purposive 
interpretation comes into play to identify general principles of international 
law. Scholars note that extracting a general principle from domestic practices 
requires reflecting upon the goal these practices aim at achieving.1281 Stephan 
Schill, who analyzes general principles of international investment law, argues 
that the purpose of a given substantive area of international law determines 
the material based on which such principles ought to be identified.1282 This is 
confirmed by Sir Arnold McNair’s often quoted statement in the South- West 
 Africa case that domestic legal concepts should not be ‘directly import[ed]’ 
into international law ‘lock, stock and barrel’ qua general principles of interna-
tional law. Instead, features of international law that are reminiscent of domes-
tic legal concepts should be taken ‘as an indication of policy and principles’.1283
The purposive element is particularly present in the practice of treaty in-
terpretation. It is often mentioned in the Swiss case law on treaty law, for in-
stance,1284 and by other domestic courts.1285 The Harvard Draft Convention on 
the Law of Treaties gives purposive interpretation a central place.1286 Teleology 
is also frequently used by international courts to interpret treaties.1287 It has 
for instance been relied upon by the pcij in the framework of the doctrine 
of implied powers of ios,1288 and it is frequently invoked to interpret consti-
tutive treaties of ios.1289 It is also a common feature in the interpretation of 
 1279 See also Yves Le Bouthillier’s argument pursuant to which the ‘nature of the treaty’, ie, the 
purpose for which it was concluded, is a circumstance of conclusion of the treaty as per 
art. 32 vclt: Le Bouthillier (n 1185) 860.
 1280 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 35.
 1281 Ellis (n 1203) 959 ff.
 1282 Schill (n 1204) 148.
 1283 Separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair in icj, case concerning the International Status of 
South- West Africa, advisory opinion, icj Reports 1950, 11 July 1950, 146, at 148.
 1284 See the references in Besson and Ammann (n 97) 341 f.
 1285 Fatima (n 45)  118 ff; Waibel, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation:  Developed for and 
Applied by National Courts?’ (n 183) 23, 25.
 1286 ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 938.
 1287 Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 832 ff.
 1288 Eg pcij, Competence of the ilo to Regulate, Incidentally, the Personal Work of the Employer, 
advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 13, 23 July 1926, 6, at 18.
 1289 On this topic, see Denys Simon, L’interprétation judiciaire des traités d’organisations 
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international human rights treaties.1290 In this context, scholars underscore 
the ‘visceral attachment’1291 that some international courts, especially human 
rights courts such as the ECtHR1292 or the IACtHR, show to the teleological 
method.1293 States sometimes resort to purposive considerations to identify 
cil. Purposive interpretation has for example been used by the BVerfG1294 and 
by Swiss courts to determine cil.1295 Finally, teleology has been relied on with 
regard to general principles of international law, which must be ascertained 
based on the ratio legis of national laws and the specificities of international 
law.1296
Why use the object and purpose of international legal acts? First, this method 
is in line with judges’ duty to obey the law. The ilc considers that purposive 
interpretation is required by ‘both common sense and good faith’,1297 and Yves 
Le Bouthillier notes that it is often necessary to determine whether an inter-
pretation leads to a ‘manifestly absurd or ambiguous result’ (art. 32 vclt).1298 
Judges who, through their interpretations, defeat the purpose of a legal act, 
disregard the law. A treaty that mandates the unification or harmonization of 
an area of the law,1299 for instance, cannot be interpreted like an international 
human rights treaty governed by the principle of subsidiarity, as the respective 
purposes of these instruments differ. Second, purposive interpretation leaves 
room for evolutionary interpretation (even if there is no necessary connec-
tion between them). Through teleology, judges can take evolving social needs 
and circumstances into account without being straightjacketed by the text’s 
 1290 Some authors advocate applying the ‘living instrument’ metaphor beyond ihrl, eg 
Moeckli and White (n 1251).
 1291 Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 833.
 1292 Eg ECtHR, Al- Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App No 61498/ 08 (echr Reports 
2010), 2 March 2010, at para 127.
 1293 See also icj, case concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, advisory opinion, icj Reports 1951, 28 May 1951, 
15, at 23 f.
 1294 Staubach (n 1265) 120 f.
 1295 BGer, judgment 1A.63/ 2002 of 9 April 2002, at 2.1.
 1296 icty (Trial Chamber ii), Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, judgment, Case No it- 95- 17/ 1- t, 
10 December 1998, para 178. See also the separate and dissenting opinion of Judge 
Stephen in icty (Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v. Dražen Erdemović, judgment, Case No 
IT- 96- 22- A, 7 October 1997, para 63.
 1297 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 221.
 1298 Le Bouthillier (n 1185) 850.
 1299 Eg the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
by Air of 12 October 1929, or the un Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
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original textual meaning (although teleology can also be an argument for stick-
ing to the originally envisaged purpose).
Purposive interpretation can be criticized in various respects. One weighty 
difficulty is the indeterminacy that often surrounds the ‘enigmatic’1300 notion 
of object and purpose, as many authors note in the context of the vclt.1301 The 
overall object and purpose of a treaty can be in tension with that of  specific 
provisions. Moreover, a treaty often pursues several goals.1302 Consequently, 
the way the object and purpose are interpreted is likely to be influenced by the 
personal views of the judicial decision- maker. The same point has been made 
about purposive interpretation to ascertain general principles of international 
law.1303 This objection must be taken seriously: purposive interpretation must, 
indeed, be used with caution, and it cannot, on its own, form the basis of a 
judicial decision.1304 This does not mean that teleology should be discarded 
altogether. Rather, judges must demonstrate that States did actually pursue a 
given object and purpose, ie, that teleology can be (and is) determinate.
Second, purposive interpretation is often criticized for disregarding the par-
ties’ original intent.1305 The ECtHR for instance considers that purposive inter-
pretation justifies that the text of the echr should not be interpreted in an orig-
inalist fashion, ie, based on the parties’ original intent.1306 This position is often 
met with skepticism on the part of States. However, purposive interpretation 
does not require purposivism. Moreover, the ECtHR’s rationale for  interpreting 
the European Convention in an evolutionary way is often mischaracterized. 
Evolutionary interpretation is, in most cases, warranted because of the so- 
called ‘European consensus’ that has formed on a given issue. Hence, it is not 
disconnected from States’ (present) intentions, nor from States’ past intentions 
to protect individual rights (unless this past intention is defined very narrowly). 
Both originalism and purposivism are normative interpretative theories that 
 1300 Buffard and Zemanek (n 1154).
 1301 Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ (1997) 8 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138. See the eight different uses of ‘object and 
purpose’ highlighted by David S Jonas and Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose 
of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods’ (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 565.
 1302 For an example, see icj, case concerning Kasikili/ Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), 
judgment, merits, icj Reports 1999, 13 December 1999, 1045, at 1074, para 45.
 1303 Ellis (n 1203) 959 f.
 1304 For a similar argument, see Besson and Ammann (n 97) 349.
 1305 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951– 4: Treaty 
Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’ (n 1006) 204, 207 f.
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must be argued for. Neither of them, per se, precludes resorting to purposive 
interpretation.
To summarize, there are good reasons for considering that purposive in-
terpretation is a customary and good interpretative method in  international 




Savigny defines historical interpretation as the reliance on the circumstances 
prevailing at the time a given law came into effect.1307 Based on Savigny’s work, 
some continental legal systems, such as the Swiss or the German legal system, 
distinguish between objective and subjective historical interpretation.1308 The 
distinction roughly mirrors that between textualism and intentionalism in us 
constitutional law. In common law jurisdictions as well, historical interpreta-
tion is a well- known (though, in some States, debated) interpretative method. 
In the United States, originalism (and more specifically one of its subtypes, 
intentionalism)1309 is a prominent interpretative theory. English courts accept 
the potential relevance of legislative history in ascertaining statutory law, but 
did not allow it before 1992.1310 The conditions for using this method remain 
controversial.1311 While most jurisdictions consider that recourse to preparatory 
work may be permissible, they diverge on the conditions of its use.1312
The main reason why judges should – at least in some circumstances – con-
sult legislative history is that their duty to obey the law is arguably best served 
if they respect legislative intent. Using legislative history is an effective way of 
doing so.
On the other hand, the historical method is vulnerable to a number of criti-
cisms. First, it raises evidentiary difficulties. Assuming that a reasonably homo-
geneous legislative intent even exists, there are different ways of ascertaining 
and assessing historical evidence.1313 Yet the fact that appraising this type of 
 1307 von Savigny (n 761) 214.
 1308 Fleischer (n 156) 404 ff.
 1309 Originalism is an umbrella term that includes textualism and intentionalism. See Letsas 
(n 79) 60.
 1310 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1992] ukhl 3, ac 593.
 1311 On this issue, see The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 31 ff. See also Fleischer (n 156).
 1312 Noting the disparity of domestic case law in this regard:  ‘Article 19. Interpretation of 
Treaties’ (n 121) 958.
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evidence is difficult does not mean that legislative history should simply be 
ignored.1314 It only means that judges must appraise it carefully.
Second, history is irrelevant when it gives no insight into the actual reasons 
that led the legislature to adopt a law. The English and Scottish Law Commis-
sions have noted that legislative history is potentially unreliable because leg-
islators, when debating a bill, primarily aim at persuading their audience.1315 
This difficulty is not exclusive to historical interpretation, however. The text 
too can be a skewed reflection of legislative intent. Again, the objection only 
leads us to recognize that judges must appraise historical evidence carefully, 
and that they must also rely on other methods.
Third, resorting to legislative history is arguably undemocratic, since pre-
paratory work has not been validated by the legislative process. This objection 
explains why judges like Antonin Scalia reject such extraneous, non- textual 
evidence.1316 Relatedly, one could argue that courts, by using legislative  history, 
encroach upon the competences of the legislature.1317 Yet these critiques can 
be flipped, as refusing to look into legislative history can lead to a departure 
from what was democratically decided. An inquiry into the law’s ordinary 
meaning at the time of its enactment that ignores legislative intent (as advo-
cated by textualists such as Scalia) might fail to yield a clear- cut solution.1318 In 
such cases, legislative history may bring clarity.
In short, there are good reasons for relying on legislative history when inter-
preting domestic law (at least in some cases), and this method is used in many 
jurisdictions.
2.4.2 International Law
Historical interpretation exists in international law as well. As regards treaty 
interpretation, art. 32 vclt, entitled ‘supplementary means of interpretation’, 
provides that the travaux préparatoires1319 may be used to confirm a specific 
interpretation (a), or to avoid manifestly absurd or ambiguous results (b). This 
last point resembles the ‘golden rule’ in English statutory interpretation. The 
 1314 ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 958.
 1315 The Interpretation of Statutes (n 54) 32 f.
 1316 Fleischer (n 156) 424 f.
 1317 Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1992] ukhl 3, ac 593, at 606 f.
 1318 According to Lord Denning, precluding judges from using legislative history is tanta-
mount to saying that judges ‘should grope about in the dark for the meaning of an Act 
without switching on the light’. See Davis v. Johnson [1979] ac 264, at 276.
 1319 The circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty, which are also mentioned in art. 32 
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ilc abstained from defining the travaux, as it considered that such a definition 
would be underinclusive.1320 Importantly, the travaux must be public1321 and 
reflect the parties’ common intentions, not an isolated position1322 or one that 
was subsequently abandoned.1323 Many courts (including the icj)1324 do not 
rigorously respect these conditions, however. One difficulty in this context is 
that cil is not enacted through an institutionalized deliberative process like 
treaties.1325 Instead, it emerges based on State practice and opinio juris. Yet acts 
providing evidence of these two constitutive elements are analogous to the 
travaux, as they shed light on the process by which a custom has emerged. The 
material that can be considered for this purpose is defined in the ilc’s draft 
conclusions 6(2) and 10(2).1326 Similar lists are found in the ila Resolution of 
2000.1327 Evidence that only documents the practice and opinio juris of one 
(or few) States is, of course, insufficient. The requirement of publicity applies 
to these acts as well.1328 Historical interpretation is also relevant to ascertain 
general principles of international law. General principles identified in foro do-
mestico are determined based on domestic practices. This requires an under-
standing of how these practices have emerged.1329
The practice suggests that historical interpretation is, indeed, a customary 
interpretative method in international law. Hersch Lauterpacht noted in 1934 
 1320 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 223.
 1321 See ibid. See also pcij, case concerning the Competence of the European Commission of 
the Danube Between Galatz and Braïla, advisory opinion, pcij Series B No 14, 8 December 
1927, 6, at 32.
 1322 See for example icj, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), judgment, preliminary 
objection, icj Reports 1952, 1 July 1951, 28, at 45.
 1323 See the examples mentioned by Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Les travaux préparatoires et l’inter-
prétation des traités’ (1934) 48 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 799 
ff. See also Ris (n 1233) 112– 113.
 1324 See Ris (n 1233) 133.
 1325 As a matter of fact, some scholars have criticized the imbalances that this unorderly pro-
cess generates. See eg Chimni (n 1193).
 1326 For a critique of the forms of State practice admitted by the ilc’s draft conclusions on 
CIL: Sienho (n 960) 385 f.
 1327 ila Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law (n 886) 13 ff.
 1328 Art. 24 ilc Statute reads:  ‘The Commission shall consider ways and means for making 
the evidence of customary international law more readily available […]’. See also ilc, 
‘Fourth Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, 
Special Rapporteur’ (n 294) 13 ff para 38 ff; ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary 
International Law: Ways of Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More 
Readily Available’ (2019) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 710/ Rev.1.



















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
216 Chapter 6
that while States diverged in their approach to the travaux in the context 
of contractual and statutory interpretation,1330 they converged in accepting 
that the travaux could be used to interpret treaties.1331 While this method is 
the most controversial of all four methods when it comes to the conditions 
of its application, including in international law,1332 States have frequent-
ly relied on preparatory work for the purposes of treaty interpretation.1333 
This practice is also reflected in the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1935, pursuant to which interpreters ought to consider ‘the histor-
ical background of the treaty [and] travaux préparatoires’.1334 International 
courts have likewise relied on the travaux,1335 as have arbitral tribunals.1336 
Jan Klabbers notes that ‘most international lawyers will almost automatically 
include a discussion of preparatory works in legal argument, and will consider 
it vital to do so’.1337 States also rely on historical interpretation to ascertain 
cil,1338 namely when they identify State practice and opinio juris.1339 Re-
garding general principles of international law, courts must establish that 
States have recognized a general principle for a sufficient period of time. Oc-
casionally, they have hence examined the origins and development of these 
 principles.1340
 1330 Lauterpacht, ‘Les travaux préparatoires et l’interprétation des traités’ (n 1323) 733.
 1331 See ibid 743.
 1332 Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 248) 55.
 1333 Fatima (n 45) 131 ff.
 1334 Art. 19(a). See ‘Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (n 1197).
 1335 Le Bouthillier (n 1185) 845; ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 962 ff.
 1336 Eg ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 121) 959 ff.
 1337 Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories:  The Declining Importance of Travaux 
Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?’ (n 994)  268. For an empirical assessment, see 
Yahli Shereshevsky and Tom Noah, ‘Does Exposure to Preparatory Work Affect Treaty 
Interpretation? An Experimental Study on International Law Students and Experts’ 
(2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1287.
 1338 Regarding the practice of us and English courts:  ‘Article 19. Interpretation of Treaties’ 
(n 121) 965.
 1339 ilc, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael Wood, 
Special Rapporteur’ (n 294) 21 ff.
 1340 Italia Nostra v.  Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Intervening), 
Appeal Judgment, Case No 3154/ 2008, ildc 1138 (it 2008), 23 June 2008, Italy; Council 
of State [Council of State], at 4.4; Kiobel and Others (on Behalf of Kiobel and Tusima) 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co and Others, Appeal judgment, Docket No 06- 4800- cv, Docket 
No 06- 4876- cv, 623 F3d 111 (2d Cir 2010), ildc 1552 (us 2010), 17 September 2010, 
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In domestic law,1341 the historical approach usually1342 stands on equal foot-
ing with other canons, but its use is sometimes assorted with caveats. In in-
ternational law, the historical method can only be used if specific conditions 
are fulfilled. As regards treaty interpretation, art. 32 vclt provides that the 
travaux are merely ‘supplementary means of interpretation’. This supplemen-
tary character had been stressed by international courts before the adoption 
of the vclt,1343 but the point was controversial in the drafting process of the 
Convention.1344 The hierarchy between art. 31 and art. 32 vclt clashes with 
the phenomenology of judicial decision- making,1345 and this hierarchy is of-
ten blurred in practice. The icj and pcij have often used preparatory work 
even when the conditions of art. 32 vclt were not fulfilled.1346 The ECtHR 
 1341 Hersch Lauterpacht considered that international law needed to establish ‘its own 
rules’ on this issue: Lauterpacht, ‘Les travaux préparatoires et l’interprétation des traités’ 
(n 1323) 780.
 1342 See however Stéphane Beaulac, ‘No More International Treaty Interpretation in Canada’s 
Statutory Interpretation:  A Question of Access to Domestic Travaux Préparatoires’ in 
Stéphane Beaulac and Mathieu Devinat (eds), Interpretatio non cessat : Mélanges en l’hon-
neur de Pierre- André Côté / Essays in Honour of Pierre- André Côté (Yvon Blais 2011).
 1343 ECtHR, Lawless v. Ireland (No 3), judgment, merits, App No 332/ 57 (echr Reports Series 
A No 3), 1 July 1961, para 14.
 1344 Some States, such as Israel, Hungary, and the United States, considered that art. 32 
vclt ought to be on the same level as the methods of art. 31. See Sorel and Boré- Eveno 
(n 1044) 814. Documents like the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties give 
the travaux a more prominent role, see art. 19(a), ‘Harvard Draft Convention on the Law 
of Treaties’ (n 1197).
 1345 Merrills (n 1233) 61; Le Bouthillier (n 1185) 847.
 1346 icj, case concerning Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), icj Reports 2014, 27 January 2014, 
4, at 30, para 66; icj, case concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia v.  Malaysia), judgment, merits, icj Reports 2002, 17 December 2002, 625, 
at 653 ff, para 53– 58; icj, case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico 
v. United States), judgment, icj Reports 2004, 31 March 2004, 12, at 48 f, para 86. Contra 
(although the Court’s reasoning is not explicit on this issue):  icj, case concerning the 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v.  Serbia and Montenegro), judgment, icj Reports 2007, 26 
February 2007, 43, at 109 ff, para 160– 165; icj, case concerning the Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, advisory opinion, icj 
Reports 2004, 9 July 2004, 136, at 174 ff, para 94– 101. See also pcij, case concerning 
Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq), advi-
sory opinion, pcij Series B No 12, 21 November 1925, 6, at 22 f; pcij, case concerning the 
s.s. ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), judgment, pcij 1927 Series A No 10, 7 September 1927, 4, 
at 16 f; icj, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), judgment, preliminary objection, 
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has not been perfectly consistent in its practice either.1347 Some States have 
also stressed the supplementary character of historical interpretation in the 
context of cil.1348
There are compelling reasons for resorting to historical interpretation in 
international law, at least in some cases, as this method is arguably a way of 
deferring to the lawmaking States. By taking into account how an  international 
legal norm has come about, interpreters respect its sources and, therefore, 
States qua primary lawmakers.
However, like in domestic law, the historical method has raised criticism 
in international law (and this partly explains its supplementary role). First, 
historical interpretation can be challenged for being indeterminate. Ascer-
taining the intentions of an aggregate of States poses significant evidentiary 
difficulties. Moreover, there are different methods of ascertaining legisla-
tive history, depending on whether one defends an objective or a subjective 
approach to legislative history.1349 This indeterminacy creates the risk that 
the travaux will be invoked opportunistically. Some domestic courts hence 
only consider preparatory work deemed unequivocal. In Lord Steyn’s words, 
‘[o] nly a bull’s eye counts. Nothing less will do’.1350 The problem of indeter-
minacy also exists in cil, given the range of materials that can provide evi-
dence of State practice and opinio juris. Yet this objection – and the caution 
required in appraising the travaux – does not mean that historical interpre-
tation is always indeterminate or misguided, and that it should not be taken 
seriously.
Second, legislative history (when it is available at all)1351 can be irrelevant. 
The records of treaty negotiations, for instance, may be inaccurate or incom-
plete.1352 They may not include ‘last- minute negotiations, early in the morning 
after a sleepless night’.1353 The ilc also affirmed that the travaux were often 
‘incomplete and misleading’, which justified according them a supplementary 
 1347 ECtHR, Witold Litwa v. Poland, judgment, merits, App No 26629/ 95 (echr Reports 2000- 
iii), 4 April 2000, at para 33– 39, where the Court mentioned the travaux in the context 
of the applicable law.
 1348 Ireland,  <legal.un.org/ docs/ ?path=../ ilc/ sessions/ 66/ pdfs/ english/ icil_ ireland.
pdf&lang=E>, p. 4.
 1349 Olivier Corten has demonstrated that the vclt leaves room for either of these approaches, 
see Corten (n 247).
 1350 Effort Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Linden Management sa (1998) ac 605, 623.
 1351 Klabbers, ‘International Legal Histories:  The Declining Importance of Travaux 
Préparatoires in Treaty Interpretation?’ (n 994) 280.
 1352 Ris (n 1233) 113.
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character.1354 As regards cil, the positions adopted by States in the framework 
of ios may be motivated by strategic considerations, and hence not be relevant 
for the purposes of ascertaining opinio juris.1355 Yet this objection only points 
to the evidentiary challenges raised by historical interpretation. It does not 
demonstrate that historical interpretation should be abandoned.
Third, resorting to the travaux is arguably misguided because no agreement has 
yet been reached at the negotiations and drafting stage.1356 Le Bouthillier notes 
that the travaux were given a supplementary role in the vclt to avoid strategic 
conduct by the parties. Otherwise, States might have been tempted to strengthen 
their position in the event of future interpretative disputes by ensuring that their 
own view was included in the travaux.1357 However, the point of resorting to leg-
islative history is precisely to identify what led to the enactment of a given law. 
While not all considerations made in this context are relevant, a fair amount of 
them yield insights into the process by which a provision was adopted.
Fourth, a common criticism is that the use of legislative history neglects 
that some States who became parties to the agreement at a later stage did not 
participate in the drafting process. This criticism should be taken seriously. It 
partly justifies why historical interpretation can only supplement other meth-
ods, pursuant to art. 32 vclt. On the other hand, States that become parties 
at a later stage must be aware of the considerations underlying the agreement 
that is at stake. While they can – and should – contribute to shaping future in-
terpretations of the treaty, they must acknowledge past interpretative choices 
of their treaty partners.
To conclude, historical interpretation is a customary method in  international 
law, and rightly so, even if it must be used with caution.
2.5 The Relationship between the Various Interpretative Methods
In the previous subsections (2.1– 2.4), I  have focused on four interpretative 
methods of international law, ie, the textual, systematic, purposive, and his-
torical method. I  have analyzed whether these methods are indeed used in 
practice. I have also examined whether there are good reasons for using them. 
 1354 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 220.
 1355 On this point, see Stephen Mathias, ‘Editorial Comment – The Work of the International 
Law Commission on Identification of Customary International Law:  A View From the 
Perspective of the Office of Legal Affairs’ (2016) 15 Chicago Journal of International Law 
17, 25.
 1356 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 220.











Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
220 Chapter 6
It is fair to say that all of them are customary, and that every method has its 
virtues and its vices.
Interpretative methods are not a panacea: while they do contribute to the 
legality and quality of judicial decision- making, they do not guarantee it (su-
pra, Chapter 5).1358 Jean- Marc Sorel and Valérie Boré- Eveno close their analysis 
of art. 31 vclt by stating:
The absence of hierarchy between the different means of interpretation, 
their malleability, and the multiple ways of combining them, leave the 
door open to countless variations in this complex operation that consti-
tutes treaty interpretation. Interpretation and legal integrity therefore 
at times seem antonymic, so great is the freedom left to interpreters 
who are left ample room to demonstrate creativity in their handling of 
texts.1359
The fact that no method guarantees legal and predictable, clear, and consistent 
judicial decisions does not mean that we should discard these methods. States 
(including courts) must use them, and for good reasons. On the other hand, all 
methods have drawbacks. Hence, the various methods must be used jointly, 
not in isolation, both in domestic and in international law.
This finding accords with domestic and international practice and scholar-
ship. In domestic law, Friedrich Karl von Savigny states that decision- makers 
must use all four interpretative methods, although in some cases, it seems su-
perfluous to explicitly mention them all.1360 The fact that all methods must be 
used is also stressed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.1361 Similarly, in  international 
law, one of the arbitrators’ findings in the Lake Lanoux case was that interna-
tional law ‘consecrates no absolute and rigid system of interpretation’.1362 In 
treaty law, for instance, the ilc deems the vclt a ‘crucible’ in which all meth-
ods of the Convention are ‘thrown […], and their interaction [will] give the 
legally relevant interpretation’.1363 Regarding cil, the ilc’s draft conclusions 
 1358 Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties’ (n 248) 53.
 1359 Sorel and Boré- Eveno (n 1044) 836.
 1360 von Savigny (n 761) 215.
 1361 bge 142 v 442, at 5.1.
 1362 Translated from French. See case concerning Lake Lanoux (Spain, France), award of 16 
November 1957, Recueil des sentences arbitrales des Nations Unies, Vol xii, 281– 317, at 
301, 2.
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provide that State practice and opinio juris must be ascertained carefully and 
holistically, based on various pieces of evidence.1364 The aalco stresses that 
custom must be identified ‘based on a rigorous and systematic approach’.1365 
Similar remarks apply to general principles of international law.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ (supra, 
Chapter 3, 4.2.6) conforms to these requirements to the extent the Court ana-
lyzes a case exhaustively, based on all interpretative methods. However, it does 
not if the Court chooses its methods ‘à la carte’,1366 and if its decisions only 
reflect one part of the argumentative picture.1367
3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I  have argued that textual, systematic, teleological, and his-
torical interpretation are common (and, arguably, customary) interpretative 
methods in both domestic and international law. They apply to all sources of 
international law, ie, treaty law, cil, and general principles of international 
law. Specific adjustments may be required depending (inter alia) on the source 
at hand, and especially depending on the subject matter at stake.
Interpretative methods contribute to the legality of judicial interpretations 
of international law. They also reinforce their quality. Whether methods suc-
ceed in meeting these two goals ultimately depends on the way they are used 
by judges. The legality and quality of judicial reasoning are two aspects that 
often overlap and influence one another. While a predictable, clear, and con-
sistent approach to interpretative methods strengthens the quality of a judicial 
decision and is more likely to secure its conformity with the sources of interna-
tional law, an unpredictable, unclear, and inconsistent one opens the door to 
bad judicial reasoning and, potentially, to a disregard for the law.
In the remaining chapters, I examine how Swiss courts interpret acts stem-
ming from various sources of international law. Chapter 7 is devoted to treaty 
interpretation. Chapter 8 concerns cil and general principles of international 
 1364 See especially draft conclusions 3, 6, 7, and 10, ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification 
of Customary International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
 1365 Sienho (n 960) 382. See also, concurring: Wood (n 14) 9.
 1366 Gardiner (n 359) 147.
 1367 For an example, see Marc- André Renold, ‘An Important Swiss Decision Relating to the 
International Transfer of Cultural Goods:  The Swiss Supreme Court’s Decision on the 
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law. In the conclusion, I  summarize the findings of this study, and I  suggest 
how the practice can be improved.
By focusing on the sources of international law, my analysis can be criticized 
for neglecting other angles that determine how international law must be (and 
is) interpreted. Such angles1368 include the law’s addressees and beneficiaries, 
the institutional apparatus that monitors or reviews its interpretation and, 
perhaps most importantly, the substantive area at stake.1369
While these angles must undoubtedly be taken into account to understand 
and evaluate the domestic judicial practice of international law, such a com-
prehensive study is beyond the scope of this book. Although it goes without 
saying that States (and, therefore, their courts) must respect the  idiosyncratic 
interpretative State practice that has developed on the international plane 
with regard to specific substantive regimes of international law, an in- depth 
analysis of these interpretative peculiarities would require a significant expan-
sion of the scope of my study. My aim is not to provide a textbook- like overview 
of the Swiss judicial practice, nor is it to offer a comprehensive account of this 
practice based on the various acts courts routinely interpret and the regimes 
these acts belong to. Instead, I evaluate the legality and quality of the Swiss 
judicial practice overall.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that I am not developing a general theory 
of the legitimacy of international law, of domestic law, or of Swiss  judges’ in-
terpretations thereof (see also supra, Introduction, section 3). However, some 
of the normative propositions I defend in this study can be elements of a good 
theory of legitimacy. Indeed, I do defend views as to how judges must decide 
cases. I analyze the methods Swiss judges use to interpret treaties, cil, and 
general principles of international law, and I evaluate the extent to which this 
practice conforms to the interpretative methods of international law and con-
stitutes predictable, clear, and consistent reasoning.
 1368 A range of relevant features can be found in Besson and Ammann (n 60).
 1369 On two important substantive areas in the Swiss judicial practice, namely the inter-
pretation of the echr and the interpretation of the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons, see Odile Ammann, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and 
Swiss Politics:  How Does the Swiss Judge Fit In?’ in Marlene Wind (ed), International 
Courts and Domestic Politics (Cambridge University Press 2018); Odile Ammann, ‘La 
non- discrimination, principe charnière d’interprétation :  l’exemple de l’art. 2 alcp’ in 
Samantha Besson and Andreas R Ziegler (eds), Egalité et non- discrimination en droit inter-
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 chapter 7
Swiss Courts and Treaty Interpretation
Those who draft Conventions, and those of us who comment upon 
them, would do well to remember that the canons of interpretation 
[…] are every bit as worthy of our efforts as the substantive rules of in-
ternational law on which attention has been more liberally lavished.1370
S’agissant de l’interprétation des traités, la Convention de Vienne 
du 23 mai 1969 sur le droit des traités (rs 0.111) pose des principes 
directeurs, qui sont relativement semblables aux méthodes d’inter-
prétation valant pour les règles générales et abstraites en droit in-
terne, au nombre desquelles figurent les traités internationaux qui, 
en Suisse, sont introduits dans l’ordre juridique national dès leur 
entrée en vigueur sur le plan du droit international (cf. atf 135 v 
339 consid. 5.3; atf 130 i 312 consid. 4.1 p. 325). Sur le plan interne, la 
loi s’interprète selon sa lettre, son esprit et son but, ainsi que selon 
les valeurs sur lesquelles elle repose, conformément à la méthode 
téléologique; si la prise en compte d’éléments historiques n’est pas 
déterminante pour l’interprétation, cette dernière doit néanmoins 
s’appuyer en principe sur la volonté du législateur et sur les juge-
ments de valeur qui la sous- tendent de manière reconnaissable (cf. 
atf 135 iii 20 consid. 4.4 p. 23).1371
∵
1 Introduction
The law of treaties represents the great bulk of the domestic judicial practice 
of international law. This also applies to the Swiss practice, as empirical find-
ings show.1372
 1370 Foxton (n 188) 291.
 1371 Swiss Federal Tribunal, bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.2.
 1372 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
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Treaties ratified by Switzerland span a wide number of substantive areas,1373 
including ihrl, migration, diplomatic relations, copyright, civil aviation, and 
investment protection, and including both public and private international 
law.1374 Treaties can be bilateral or multilateral. They can provide short- term 
answers to specific issues, or establish long- term cooperative schemes. They 
can generate interstate or intrastate rights and duties.
‘[T] reaties’, Philip Muntz reportedly said in the House of Commons in 1871, 
‘like piecrusts, […] were made to be broken, and always had been broken when 
opportunities presented themselves to the aggrieved parties to renounce the 
obligations they imposed’.1375 Due to the characteristics of international law-
making and adjudication and to the frequent vagueness of international law, 
including treaty law, domestic courts, when they interpret treaties, may disre-
gard the interpretative methods required by international law (on these meth-
ods, see Chapter 6, supra). It is also important to recall that domestic rulings 
provide evidence of the constitutive elements of cil and, hence, of customary 
methods of treaty interpretation. Courts may therefore be tempted to (erro-
neously)1376 rely on their own case law when stating what these interpretative 
methods require.
In this chapter, I examine the extent to which Swiss courts (i) respect the 
methods of treaty interpretation required by international law and (ii) inter-
pret treaties in a predictable, clear, and consistent way.1377 I  show that their 
practice sometimes runs afoul of these criteria and virtues. In the concluding 
section of this book (infra, Conclusion and Recommendations), I suggest ways 
in which this practice must (from the perspective of international law) and 
should (from the perspective of good judicial reasoning) be improved.
Many of the difficulties pointed out in this chapter are not unique to the 
Swiss judiciary: similar problems exist in other jurisdictions. I briefly refer to 
this foreign practice to put the Swiss case law into perspective (infra, section 2). 
Given how laborious a study of the case law in other States would be, I mostly 
rely on scholarly syntheses and on the ildc database.
 1373 <www.eda.admin.ch/ eda/ de/ home/ aussenpolitik/ voelkerrecht/ internationale- 
vertraege/ datenbank- staatsvertraege.html>.
 1374 As previously mentioned, this study primarily focuses on public international law, while 
taking private international law into account (supra, Chapter 2, section 5).
 1375 HC Deb 30 March 1871, vol 205, cols 894– 976, at 927. The authorship of this quote is 
disputed: some attribute it to Lenin, others to Jonathan Swift.
 1376 The practice of one court, to become legally authoritative on the international plane, 
must be part of a coherent, constant, and general practice.
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I first provide a short (and, given the breadth of the issue, inevitably sche-
matic) overview of domestic courts’ approach to treaty interpretation in gen-
eral (2). I then zoom in on Swiss courts. I expose and assess the methods they 
use, and the reasons they provide in support of their interpretations (3). I close 
with a general evaluation of their case law (4), based on the aforementioned 
criteria of legality and quality.
It is difficult to do justice to Swiss courts’ multi- faceted practice of treaty 
interpretation in one chapter. I  hence focus on the features of the case law 
that are the most prominent and problematic from the perspective of my two 
criteria of evaluation. I will not dwell upon the status, rank, and direct effect of 
treaties in the Swiss legal order. This question has been addressed in Chapter 3 
(supra).
The present chapter takes the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal into 
account. It also includes – subject to availability – rulings of other federal and 
cantonal courts, ie, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, the Swiss Federal 
Criminal Court, the highest courts of the cantons of Geneva, Zurich, Basel- 
Stadt, and Bern, and decisions of the Swiss military tribunals. (On the structure 
of the Swiss judiciary, see supra, Chapter  3, 4.1.) For the purposes of my in-
quiry, I relied on these courts’ official websites. For the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
I mainly worked with the database of rulings published in the Court’s official 
compendium since 1954, and with its expert search mode.1378 I also included 
rulings not published in the official compendium and issued since 2000.1379 
I used the advanced search function of the Swisslex database,1380 which con-
tains, inter alia, cantonal decisions published in Swiss law journals, and which 
makes it possible to look up decisions mentioning art. 31 f vclt. The case law 
on which this chapter is based reflects the state of courts’ online databases or 
websites in June 2019.
Apart from the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Swiss rulings 
I  analyze are fairly recent, either because only newer rulings are accessible 
online (which applies to cantonal courts), or because the institutional history 
 1378 I searched for terms such as ‘Auslegung AND 20 Wiener AND 20 Staatsvertrag’, or 
‘Auslegung AND 25 Staatsvertrag’, which brought up citations of these keywords when 
the keywords were separated by at most 20 (or 25) words. In addition, I restricted the time 
period of my search (from 1954 to 1980, from 1980 to 1990, and from 1990 onwards), in 
accordance with the three phases in the Swiss case law studied in section 3.
 1379 On this database, see Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an 
Empirical Lens:  The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Practice of International Law in Figures’ 
(n 5). The database can be accessed at <www.bger.ch/ index/ juridiction/ jurisdiction- 
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of some judicial bodies is relatively short (this concerns federal courts other 
than the Swiss Federal Tribunal, see supra, Chapter 3, 4.1.1.2– 4.1.1.3). My study 
is hence selective, and its findings pertaining to the practice of the abovemen-
tioned Swiss courts cannot be extrapolated to the entire Swiss practice (and, 
of course, even less to that of domestic courts across the globe) without the 
necessary caveats.
2 Domestic Courts and the Methods of Treaty Interpretation
2.1 Introductory Remarks
In this section, my goal is two- fold. First, I determine whether domestic courts 
respect the interpretative methods required by international law when inter-
preting treaties. I  also evaluate the quality of their interpretations. The two 
perspectives will often be intermingled. I do not to conduct a full- fledged study 
in comparative law. My aim is simply to put Swiss courts’ practice of treaty 
interpretation into perspective (infra, 3.6).
To evaluate the legality and quality of the practice of domestic courts in 
various States is a daunting task. As of June 2019, the un counted 193 Mem-
ber States, and each of them is connected to other subjects of international 
law through an array of treaties. Instead of offering a comprehensive overview 
of this treaty practice, I discuss and assess its characteristics in broad brush-
strokes. Moreover, I  merely analyze courts’ general hermeneutic approach. 
Reasons of scope, and the lack of detailed scholarship on the issue, preclude 
looking at domestic courts’ use of individual methods.
For the purposes of this study, I  use several scholarly syntheses. I  focus 
on work published in 2000 or later, as it is more likely to take into account 
changes that have occurred in the practice across time. In most cases, the 
works I  rely on describe a State’s judicial practice in general, and not with 
regard to specific areas of international law.1381 To provide an overview of 
 1381 Some of the analyses on which I  rely concern a particular substantive area of interna-
tional law, eg Sanzhuan Guo, ‘Implementation of Human Rights Treaties by Chinese 
Courts:  Problems and Prospects’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 161; 
Marochkin and Popov (n 183); Izelle Du Plessis, ‘Some Thoughts on the Interpretation 
of Tax Treaties in South Africa’ (2012) 24 South African Mercantile Law Journal 31; 
Bernhardt Laurentius Johannes, The Interpretation of South African Double Taxation 
Agreements Under International Law (University of Pretoria 2013); Urs Linderfalk, ‘When 
the International Lawyers Get to Be Heard: The Story of Tax Treaty Interpretation as Told 
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domestic case law that is as geographically balanced as possible, I look at schol-
arship pertaining to African,1382 Asian,1383 European,1384 North1385 and South 
 1382 Dire Tladi, ‘Interpretation of Treaties in an International Law- Friendly Framework: The 
Case of South Africa’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation 
of International Law by Domestic Courts: Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University 
Press 2016); Dugard (n 360); Nicholas Wasonga Orago, ‘The 2010 Kenyan Constitution 
and the Hierarchical Place of International Law in the Kenyan Domestic Legal System: A 
Comparative Perspective’ (2013) 13 African Human Rights Law Journal 415; Du Plessis 
(n 1381); Johannes (n 1381).
 1383 Congyan (n 44); Sanzhuan (n 1381); Yukiko Takashiba, ‘Gingerly Walking on the vclt 
Frontier? Reflections From a Survey on the Interpretive Approach of the Japanese 
Courts to Treaties’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of 
International Law by Domestic Courts:  Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University 
Press 2016); Vivek Kanwar, ‘Treaty Interpretation in Indian Courts: Adherence, Coherence, 
and Convergence’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of 
International Law by Domestic Courts:  Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University 
Press 2016); Marochkin and Popov (n 183); William E Butler, ‘Russian Federation’ in 
David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement:  A Comparative 
Study (Cambridge University Press 2009); David Kretzmer, ‘Israel’ in David L Sloss (ed), 
The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement:  A Comparative Study (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); Nihal Jayawickrama, ‘India’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of 
Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 
2009); Bianca Karim, ‘Bangladesh’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and Domestic 
Legal Systems:  Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University Press 
2011); Jerry Z Li and Sanzhuan Guo, ‘China’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and 
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University 
Press 2011); Farshad Rahimi Dizgovin, ‘Enforcement of International Treaties by Domestic 
Courts of Iran: New Developments’ (2018) 58 Virginia Journal of International Law 227.
 1384 Fatima (n 45); Anthony Aust, ‘United Kingdom’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic 
Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2009); 
Callista Harris and Krishna Kakkaiyadi, ‘Treaty Interpretation Before the Supreme Court’ 
(2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 113; Lily Alexandra 
Hands, ‘From Assange to Zentai:  Interpretative Conjunctions Between International 
and Domestic Extradition Law in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2015) 15 Oxford 
University Commonwealth Law Journal 223; Lech Garlicki and Małgorzata Masternak- 
Kubiak, ‘Poland’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2009); André Nollkaemper, ‘The 
Netherlands’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A 
Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2009); Christian Djeffal, ‘Dynamic and 
Evolutive Interpretation of the echr by Domestic Courts? An Inquiry Into the Judicial 
Architecture of Europe’ in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation 
of International Law by Domestic Courts: Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University 
Press 2016); Elisabeth Handl- Petz, ‘Austria’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International Law and 
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford University 
Press 2011); Linderfalk (n 1381).
 1385 Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 140); Criddle (n 1141); David L Sloss, ‘United States’ in 
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American,1386 and Oceanian1387 jurisdictions. Of course, the domestic con-
stitutional frameworks governing the relationship between domestic and in-
ternational law and other features of domestic law (supra, Chapter 3) explain 
some variations in courts’ methods and create issues of comparability across 
jurisdictions.
My analysis is incomplete because it is largely dependent on preexisting schol-
arly work, to the extent this work is accessible, both linguistically and practically. 
Moreover, many scholars do not focus on methods of treaty interpretation.1388 
Such analyses are needed to provide a comprehensive picture of the domestic 
case law beyond the ‘usual suspects’, ie, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and other dominant Western States.
Drawing parallels based on foreign scholarship, on the one hand, and 
Swiss rulings and doctrine (infra, section 3), on the other, raises issues of 
(Cambridge University Press 2009); Gib van Ert, ‘Canada’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of 
Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 
2009); Stéphane Beaulac and John H Currie, ‘Canada’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International 
Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford 
University Press 2011); McIntyre (n 72).
 1386 Alejandro Rodiles, ‘The Law and Politics of the Pro Persona Principle in Latin America’ 
in Helmut Philipp Aust and Georg Nolte (eds), The Interpretation of International Law 
by Domestic Courts:  Unity, Diversity, Convergence (Oxford University Press 2016); José 
Antonio Viera Gallo Quesney and Valeria Lübbert Álvarez, ‘Los tratados sobre derechos 
humanos en la jurisprudencia chilena’ (2012) 44 Estudios Internacionales 87; Francisco 
José Eguiguren Praeli, ‘Aplicación de los tratados internacionales sobre derechos 
humanos en la jurisprudencia constitucional peruana’ (2003) 9 Ius et Praxis 157; Marisol 
Peña Torres, ‘Los tratados internacionales en la jurisprudencia constitucional’ (2003) 1 
Estudios constitucionales 593.
 1387 Donald R Rothwell, ‘Australia’ in David L Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty 
Enforcement:  A Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press 2009); Patrick Wall, ‘A 
Marked Improvement: The High Court of Australia’s Approach to Treaty Interpretation 
in “Macoun v Commissioner of Taxation” [2015] hca 44’ (2016) 17 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 170; Alice de Jonge, ‘Australia’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), International 
Law and Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation, and Persuasion (Oxford 
University Press 2011); Hands (n 1384); McIntyre (n 72).
 1388 Joseph Fleuren, ‘The Application of Public International Law by Dutch Courts’ (2010) 
57 Netherlands International Law Review 245; Chilenye Nwapi, ‘International Treaties 
in Nigerian and Canadian Courts’ (2011) 19 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 38; Maripe (n 354); Andreas L Paulus, ‘Germany’ in David L Sloss (ed), 
The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement:  A Comparative Study (Cambridge 
University Press 2009); Amos O Enabulele, ‘Implementation of Treaties in Nigeria and 
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comparability. I  therefore also consulted rulings on treaty interpretation1389 
that had been reported in the ildc database1390 as of June 2019. I  did this 
(to the extent possible) for the jurisdictions for which I  had found relevant 
scholarship. My goal was not only to have at least roughly comparable units of 
analy sis, but also to corroborate the findings of selected scholarly writings, as 
one or two scholarly articles are insufficient to draw meaningful conclusions 
on a State’s overall judicial practice.
2.2 Exposing and Evaluating the Practice
When analyzing the domestic case law, I distinguish between jurisdictions that 
are parties to the vclt (2.2.1), and those that are not (2.2.2). Indeed, although 
the vclt’s methods bind all States qua cil, the ratification of the Convention 
may influence the State’s judicial practice. I also identify cross- cutting trends 
that apply regardless of this distinction (2.2.3).
2.2.1 Courts of States That Are Parties to the vclt
Courts in States that have ratified the vclt usually mention, and/ or acknowl-
edge that they must apply, the Convention’s methods of treaty interpreta-
tion.1391 Gib van Ert for instance notes that the power of Canadian courts 
to apply these methods is ‘well established and uncontroversial’.1392 English 
courts have stressed that in principle, domestic law is irrelevant to interpret 
treaties.1393 In Russia, the higher courts have ordered that the lower courts ap-
ply the methods of the vclt,1394 and the Supreme Court mentions specific 
methods in some of its decrees.1395 In specific dualist States such as Canada, 
 1389 The search was facilitated by the ‘treaty interpretation’ filter and by the jurisdictional fil-
ters provided by the database.
 1390 One could argue that ildc entries are scholarly syntheses too. Yet the case summaries, 
which often consist in a translated or paraphrased version of the ruling, are separate from 
the scholarly analysis included in the entry.
 1391 Rothwell (n 1387)  151 f; van Ert (n 1385)  175; Nollkaemper (n 1384)  361; Aust (n 
1384) 483; de Jonge (n 1387) 40; Handl- Petz (n 1384) 84; Fatima (n 45) 81 f; Aldrin De 
Zilva, ‘Treaty Interpretation and Australia’s Pre- cgt Tax Treaties’ (2002) 31 Australian 
Tax Review 163, 165. Though it would be excessive to cite them all here, many ildc 
entries confirm this statement.
 1392 van Ert (n 1385) 181.
 1393 Fatima (n 45) 102 ff.
 1394 Butler (n 1383) 418. See also (regarding ‘the operation of treaty rules in time and space’) 
ibid 423.
 1395 See Butler (n 1383)  442. See also the Constitutional Court in Group of Deputies of the 
State Duma of the Russian Federation, Constitutional proceedings, Judgment No 21- P, 
ildc 2455 (ru 2015), 14 July 2015, Russian Federation; Constitutional Court, and the 
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judges consider that the vclt’s methods also apply to statutes giving effect to 
treaty obligations.1396
Courts do not systematically refer to the vclt’s methods.1397 André 
 Nollkaemper notes that Dutch courts seldom mention them, and that they do 
not consider themselves bound by them.1398 Polish courts ‘do not directly in-
voke Article 31 of the Vienna Convention’, even if they start from the ordinary 
meaning of a treaty provision and use many methods the vclt prescribes.1399 
In Canada, Stéphane Beaulac and John Currie write that the Supreme Court 
has not cited art. 31 f vclt for decades because the Court uses the same meth-
ods to interpret domestic law.1400 In Japan as well, Yukiko Takashiba observes 
that the State’s international legal duty to respect the vclt’s methods (and to 
respect interpretative methods in general) is not addressed in the case law.1401 
In Mexico, the Supreme Court does not consistently acknowledge the manda-
tory character of the vclt’s methods.1402
When courts cite the vclt’s methods, they rarely demonstrably follow 
them1403 or provide details as to what methods they are using.1404 Many do 
not dwell on their interpretative approach.1405 Courts often apply or empha-
size only specific methods, which jeopardizes the predictability, clarity, and 
( Joining), Supervision instance, No 15497/ 12, ildc 2719 (ru 2013), 23 April 2013, 
Russian Federation; Supreme Commercial Court.
 1396 van Ert (n 1385) 176.
 1397 Eg regarding Irish courts: Djeffal (n 1384) 183. On the recent practice of the High Court 
of Australia: Wall (n 1387) 171.
 1398 Nollkaemper (n 1384) 362. For a ruling that conforms to the vclt’s methods without 
explicitly mentioning them, see A v.  Secretary of State for Justice, Appeal judgment, 
ljn: aa8384, awb 99/ 6851, jv 2000, 285, ildc 395 (nl 2000), 26 September 2000, 
Netherlands; The Hague; District Court. For an explicit mention, see Secretary of State 
for Finance v.  X Incorporated, Final appeal judgment, Case No 35398, ljn:  aa7995, 
ildc 1073 (nl 2000), bnb 2001/ 19, 1 November 2000, Netherlands; Supreme 
Court [hr].
 1399 Garlicki and Masternak- Kubiak (n 1384)  387 ff. See also Patent Office of the Republic 
of Poland v. bc Plc, Final appeal judgment, ii gsk 54/ 05, ONSAiWSA 2006/ 4/ 96, ildc 
1528 (pl 2006), 8 February 2006, Poland; Supreme Administrative Court; Question of 
Law Regarding the Interpretation of Article 17(2) of the Treaty on Extradition Between 
the Republic of Poland and Australia, Re, Reference to Supreme Court on Preliminary 
Question, i kzp 47/ 02, ildc 273 (pl 2003), 19 February 2003, Poland; Supreme Court.
 1400 Beaulac and Currie (n 1385) 133 f.
 1401 Takashiba (n 1383) 219. See however ibid 228.
 1402 Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 140) 95.
 1403 Kretzmer (n 1383) 298; Hands (n 1384) 231. See also the critique of the uk Supreme 
Court’s approach to subsequent practice in Harris and Kakkaiyadi (n 1384) 117 ff.
 1404 van Ert (n 1385) 180 f.
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transparency of their reasoning. They especially stress the ‘primacy of the text’ 
based on art. 31(1) vclt,1406 and they fall back on the text when other meth-
ods (eg history)1407 are inconclusive. While some have deemed the travaux 
relevant, they have been prudent in appraising them.1408 In jurisdictions with 
separate opinions, the judges’ methodological disagreements have come to 
the fore.1409 Courts tend to rely on their own precedents on treaty interpreta-
tion.1410 They rarely conduct comprehensive analyses of foreign practice.1411
The sophistication of courts’ approach varies from one substantive area of in-
ternational law to the other.1412 Japanese courts, for instance, are more diligent in 
the area of ihrl,1413 while Canadian courts are particularly careful with regard to 
issues of international tax law.1414 One possible reason for this uneven treatment 
is the domestic separation of powers, and the fact that in some domains, courts 
defer to the other branches. Moreover, cases in some substantive areas of interna-
tional law are litigated by lawyers who are experts in domestic law, but not neces-
sarily in international law (eg tax experts in cases involving dtas).1415 The level of 
detail also likely hinges on the stakes of the case, and on its degree of complexity.
More generally, the case law is uneven. As Juliette McIntyre notes with re-
gard to the Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia, ‘[t] here 
are ebbs and flows’;1416 she shows that the case law of these two bodies ‘is far 
from consistent, either internally or vis- à- vis each other’.1417
2.2.2 Courts of States That Are Not Parties to the vclt
The practice of courts in States that have not ratified the vclt ranges from an 
endorsement of the Convention’s methods qua cil to their utter neglect. This 
spectrum of attitudes even exists within the same jurisdiction.1418 In Israel and 
 1406 Rothwell (n 1387) 151; de Jonge (n 1387) 40 f; Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 140) 94; 
Harris and Kakkaiyadi (n 1384) 114 ff.
 1407 van Ert (n 1385) 176.
 1408 Rothwell (n 1387) 152, footnote 155; van Ert (n 1385) 176.
 1409 See van Ert (n 1385) 175 ff; Kretzmer (n 1383) 295.
 1410 van Ert (n 1385) 177, 180.
 1411 See ibid 181.
 1412 Eg Wall (n 1387) 184 f. See also Congyan (n 44) 277.
 1413 Takashiba (n 1383) 227.
 1414 van Ert (n 1385) 182.
 1415 On tax lawyers’ and international lawyers’ divergent understandings of treaty interpreta-
tion, see Linderfalk (n 1381).
 1416 McIntyre (n 72) 64.
 1417 See ibid 63.
 1418 For a decision deemed ‘unusually thorough for a us appellate court’, see Ehrlich and 
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India, for instance, courts occasionally refer to the Convention’s methods.1419 
In Iran, the judicial practice is inconsistent.1420 Paradoxically, while Indian 
courts acknowledge that art. 31 ff vclt are customary, they do not seem to view 
them as obligatory.1421 In South Africa, the vclt’s methods are not explicitly 
endorsed.1422 References to them are rare, even if South African courts know 
of their existence and occasionally mention them.1423 In the United States, the 
lower courts (both state courts and federal courts) ‘routinely’ apply the vclt’s 
methods qua cil, but the us Supreme Court is reluctant to do so.1424 Scholars 
have shown that the us practice has evolved together with the domestic legal 
and political context.1425 They have also highlighted an increasing deference 
of us courts to the executive over time.1426 At the far end of the spectrum, 
in States such as Bangladesh, ‘[c] ourts do not apply the international rules of 
treaty interpretation and most judges are not aware of these rules’.1427
As already noted for States that are parties to the vclt (supra, 2.2.1), the 
practice of domestic courts is often uneven from one area of international law 
to another. In India, for instance, courts have almost exclusively referred to 
(2d Cir 2004), No 02- 9462, ildc 2193 (us 2004), 8 March 2004, United States; Court of 
Appeals (2nd Circuit) [2d Cir]. See however the predominantly purposive approach taken 
(on the basis of the vclt) in Gandara v. Bennett and Others, Appeal judgment, 528 F3d 
823 (11th Cir 2008),  ildc 2135 (us 2008), 22 May 2008, United States; Court of Appeals 
(11th Circuit) [11th Cir], the primarily textual approach taken in Yapp v. Attorney General, 
Appeal judgment, 26 F3d 1562 (11th Cir 1994), ildc 2008 (us 1994), 3 August 1994, 
United States; Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) [11th Cir], or – according to the reporter – 
the Court’s premature recourse to the travaux contrary to the conditions stated in art. 32 
vclt in Wigley v. Hares, Appeal judgment, 82 So.3d 932 (Fla. Dist. App. 2011),  ildc 1827 
(us 2011), 27 July 2011, United States; Florida; 4th District (West Palm Beach); District 
Court of Appeal [Fla Dist App].
 1419 Eg Kretzmer (n 1383) 295 ff; Kanwar (n 1383).
 1420 Dizgovin (n 1383) 233.
 1421 See Kanwar (n 1383) 244.
 1422 Dugard (n 360) 464. The cases discussed by other authors do not suggest otherwise, see 
Du Plessis (n 1381); Johannes (n 1381).
 1423 Tladi (n 1382) 145 ff.
 1424 Criddle (n 1141)  434. See Ehrlich and Ehrlich v.  American Airlines, Incorporated and 
Others, Appeal judgment, 360 F3d 366 (2d Cir 2004), No 02- 9462, ildc 2193 (us 2004), 
8 March 2004, United States; Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) [2d Cir]. See however Abel 
v. Minister of Justice of South Africa and Others, Initial application, Cr 5242/ 97, (2000) 4 
All sa 63 (C), ildc 286 (za 2000), 18 July 2000, South Africa; Western Cape High Court 
[wc- hc].
 1425 Criddle (n 1141).
 1426 Aust, Rodiles, and Staubach (n 140) 86 ff.
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(and followed) the methods of the vclt when interpreting dtas.1428 This sug-
gests that the stakes of the case largely determine the diligence of domestic 
courts.
2.2.3 Cross- Cutting Trends
Regardless of whether States have ratified the vclt or not, the case law of their 
courts displays some common features.
First, when courts do not refer to the vclt’s methods, their practice is 
sometimes in line with what the Convention requires, but not necessarily in 
every respect. Courts tend to prioritize some methods, while neglecting oth-
er aspects of this methodological frame. In India, for instance, courts some-
times rely on at least some of the Convention’s methods.1429 However, they 
 generally consider the broader circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty, 
as well as facts loosely connected to it, beyond what art. 32 vclt permits.1430 
Moreover, they sometimes refer to domestic legislative history, contrary to 
what art. 32 vclt allows.1431 In Japan, courts tend to use the concepts and cat-
egories of domestic law, and domestic precedents.1432 They primarily engage 
in textual interpretation, sometimes to the exclusion of other methods, and 
without paying attention to the specificities of international lawmaking.1433 
Still, their practice sometimes conforms to the vclt, even when they do not 
explicitly mention the Convention.1434 In South Africa, the textual method is 
central as well, sometimes to the detriment of other methods, which are not 
demonstrably used.1435 South African courts occasionally use context, but far 
from systematically.1436 In Mexico and Colombia, courts rely on teleological 
considerations in order to justify what has been called an activist practice.1437
A second cross- cutting trend is that the case law is generally of uneven qual-
ity within the same jurisdiction (see 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, supra). As we will see, this 
heterogeneity can also be witnessed in the case of Switzerland (infra, sections 
3 and 4).
 1428 Kanwar (n 1383) 254 ff. For a counterexample, see ibid 262.
 1429 See Kanwar (n 1383) 244. Kanwar talks about Indian courts’ use of ‘similar principles of 
treaty interpretation’.
 1430 See ibid 250.
 1431 See ibid.
 1432 Takashiba (n 1383) 229 ff.
 1433 See ibid.
 1434 See ibid 233 ff.
 1435 Tladi (n 1382) 144 f.
 1436 See ibid 151 f.
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Third, as regards auxiliary means, which can be used in connection with 
all four interpretative methods, courts often consult materials stemming from 
their own jurisdiction to interpret treaties. Some judges are open to consid-
ering the decisions of foreign and international courts on treaty interpreta-
tion,1438 but they do not necessarily follow through.1439 Others are less willing 
to consider foreign and international materials.1440
Fourth, some courts are reluctant to apply treaties in the first place, often 
because domestic constitutional law constrains them.1441 Sergei  Marochkin 
and Vladimir Popov report that Russian courts sometimes vaguely refer to 
‘international treaties’ without specifying the agreements that are being 
 considered.1442
To conclude, the domestic case law presents a number of difficulties from 
the perspective of its legality and of the quality of its reasoning. The uneven 
level of detail of the case law is particularly problematic from the angle of le-
gality. It also jeopardizes the predictability, clarity, and consistency of judicial 
reasoning. As I will show, these difficulties largely overlap with those found in 
the Swiss practice (infra, 3.6).
3 Swiss Courts and the Methods of Treaty Interpretation
What approach do Swiss courts take to treaty interpretation? What can be said 
about the legality and quality of their interpretations?
To answer these questions, it seems apposite to break down the case law 
into three temporal stages. The first period includes rulings issued before 1980. 
It pertains to the time during which the vclt (‘the treaty on treaties’)1443 had 
not come into effect due to an insufficient number of ratifications (3.1). During 
 1438 Eg (especially regarding international rulings) van Ert (n 1385) 183 ff. See also Dugard 
(n 360) 470; Tladi (n 1382) 145 f. For a consideration of the practice of other State par-
ties, see Ehrlich and Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Incorporated and Others, Appeal judg-
ment, 360 F3d 366 (2d Cir 2004), No 02- 9462, ildc 2193 (us 2004), 8 March 2004, 
United States; Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) [2d Cir].
 1439 Wigley v.  Hares, Appeal judgment, ildc 1827 (us 2011), 82 So.3d 932 (Fla. Dist. 
App. 2011), 27 July 2011, United States; Florida; 4th District (West Palm Beach); District 
Court of Appeal [Fla Dist App].
 1440 Sanzhuan (n 1381) 167.
 1441 Marochkin and Popov (n 183) 226, 235 ff; Enabulele (n 1388) 330 ff; Congyan (n 44) 269, 
330 ff; Sanzhuan (n 1381) 165; Orago (n 1382). See however Sanzhuan (n 1381) 166.
 1442 See Marochkin and Popov (n 183) 232 f.
 1443 Richard D Kearney and Robert E Dalton, ‘The Treaty on Treaties’ (1970) 64 American 
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the second phase (1980– 1990), the Convention was in force on the interna-
tional plane, but had not yet been ratified by Switzerland (3.2). The third stage 
(1990– 2016) begins with the Convention’s entry into force in Switzerland, on 6 
June 1990 (3.3).
After this survey of the practice, I analyze the parallels between the methods 
Swiss courts use to interpret treaties and written domestic laws, respectively 
(3.4). I also compare the practice of various Swiss courts among themselves 
(3.5), before studying the similarities and contrasts between the Swiss judicial 
practice and that of other domestic courts (3.6). Finally, I provide an overall 
evaluation of the practice (4).
The two first chronological stages in the Swiss practice (3.1 and 3.2) are stud-
ied based on the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law. Other Swiss courts either 
did not exist at the time (which is the case for other federal courts), or do not 
offer online access to their case law for this period (which is the case for can-
tonal courts). The third period (3.3) includes the case law of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, but also that of other federal courts, selected cantonal courts, and 
military tribunals (Chapter 3, 4.1, supra). As regards the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
the present chapter includes rulings published in the Court’s official compen-
dium (bge), but also rulings outside this compendium, subject to their online 
availability (ie, dating from 2000 onwards).1444
3.1 The Swiss Federal Tribunal and Treaty Interpretation before the  
vclt’s Entry into Force (1954– 1980)
The Swiss Federal Tribunal already referred to the interpretative methods of 
the Vienna Convention before the Convention entered into force on the inter-
national plane, in 1980.1445 However, in this early period, the Court did not nec-
essarily comply with all of the Convention’s requirements, and it sometimes 
failed to provide compelling reasons for its interpretations. The case law hence 
displays occasional deficiencies in terms of both the legality and the quality of 
the Court’s reasoning.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal cited art. 31 f vclt as early as 1971, in a case per-
taining to a treaty on railway transport concluded in 1858 between the Swiss 
Confederation, the canton of Schaffhausen, and the Grand Duchy of Baden.1446 
The case is remarkable in light of the detailed justification offered by the Court, 
 1444 <www.bger.ch/ index/ juridiction/ jurisdiction- inherit- template/ jurisdiction- recht/ 
jurisdiction- recht- urteile2000.htm>.
 1445 The vclt was ratified by Switzerland ten years later. It entered into force in Switzerland 
on 6 June 1990.
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its careful application of the various interpretative methods, and the richness 
of auxiliary means used. Yet the Court’s approach differs, in some respects, 
from the methods prescribed by the Convention. Although the Court rejected 
the notion of ‘clear meaning’ and emphasized the treaty’s object and purpose, 
it endorsed the ‘primacy of the text’, presumed to reflect the parties’ common 
intentions. It considered that departing from the treaty’s literal meaning was 
only justified if the context or the travaux demonstrated that the parties’ inten-
tions differed from the text.1447 While the Court relies on many methods of the 
vclt, the weight given to the various methods is idiosyncratic.
Most decisions dating from this period do not mention the Vienna Conven-
tion, although many employ the methods prescribed by art. 31 f vclt. How-
ever, these methods, when they are used, are generally mentioned in passing, 
and not based on a predictable, clear, and consistent interpretative scheme,1448 
which is detrimental to the quality of the Court’s reasoning. Moreover, the case 
law is often riddled with references to domestic legal practices and other ma-
terials that are not mandated by the methods of treaty interpretation. In the 
landmark Frigerio decision of 1968, for instance, the Court noted that treaties 
needed to be interpreted if their text was ‘not clear’ or led to absurd results, 
and that the travaux were relevant if they provided clear evidence of the in-
tentions of the contracting States. Relying on its own case law (as it often does 
in treaty interpretation), the Court added that treaties were bona fidei negotia 
to be interpreted pursuant to the reliance theory (‘Vertrauenstheorie’) of Swiss 
contract law.1449 The Court also relied on purposive and systematic interpre-
tation,1450 and it mentioned the subsequent practice of the Swiss government 
and of German and Swiss shipping companies.1451 While the Court relies on 
the four methods of the Convention, it does so in response to the arguments 
raised by the Swiss government, rather than in application of clearly spelled out 
 1447 Ibid.
 1448 bge 101 Ib 160 (regarding the Swiss– us dta of 1951); bge 94 iii 83 (regarding the 
treaty of 1869 on judicial jurisdiction (‘Gerichtsstandsvertrag’) between France and 
Switzerland); bge 94 iii 35 (on the Hague Convention of 1954 on Civil Procedure, and 
the establishment and consular agreement between Switzerland and Italy of 1868 and 
its Protocol of 1969); bge 100 ii 230, at 1 (regarding the 1892 Swiss– German treaty on 
the mutual protection of patents, design rights, and trademarks); bge 89 i 115 (on the 
dta of 1951 between Switzerland and the United States); bge 101 Ia 533, at 5 b) (on the 
extradition treaty of 1900 between Switzerland and the United States); bge 105 ii 49, at 
3 a) (on the Swiss– eec Free Trade Agreement).
 1449 bge 94 i 669, at 4. See also bge 97 i 359, at 5.
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interpretative principles. The Court’s reasoning with regard to the methods of 
treaty interpretation is not detailed, and it is based on Swiss legal concepts and 
practices. Moreover, the auxiliary means the Court relies on essentially consist 
of Swiss legal scholarship. The (primarily textual) reasoning of Frigerio was reit-
erated in a range of other cases predating the vclt’s entry into force.1452
What also emerges from the case law is that the Court rarely mentions all 
four interpretative methods, that the level of detail of its reasoning is uneven, 
and that the Court’s approach frequently does not satisfy the virtues of predict-
ability, clarity, and consistency. While the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s reasoning is 
sometimes relatively thorough,1453 the devil is often in the details. Concern-
ing historical interpretation, for example, the Court has noted that the nego-
tiations leading to the conclusion of the treaty must be taken into account to 
the extent that they clearly reflect the intention of the contracting States.1454 
Though the Court referred to written statements of the Swiss government ad-
dressed to Germany to interpret the Swiss– German Social Security Agreement 
of 1964, it did not mention Germany’s practice, contrary to art. 32 vclt.1455 An-
other difficulty is that the Court sometimes explicitly uses domestic legal con-
cepts, categories, and practices, while neglecting international legal practice. In 
Dal- Bosco and Walther (1971), for instance, the Swiss Federal Tribunal invoked 
Frigerio when mentioning the principles of treaty interpretation ‘applicable in 
Switzerland’.1456 The Court stated that Switzerland enjoys more interpretative 
freedom when interpreting domestic law than with regard to treaties.1457 Still, 
its approach suggests that when interpreting treaty law, it consults its own case 
law rather than international law.
At this early stage, one can already identify distinctive approaches taken by 
the Court to interpret treaties belonging to specific substantive areas of inter-
national law. The Court has for example refused to use Swiss constitutional law 
 1452 bge 97 v 35, at 3; bge 105 v 13, at 2 b); bge 109 v 224, at 3 b); bge 111 v 117, at 1 b); 
bge 113 v 98, at 2 b). Frigerio has also been cited in connection with the statement that 
a treaty is ‘a closed structure of reciprocally negotiated concessions with an inner equilib-
rium’, see bge 97 v 35, at 4.
 1453 Eg bge 97 i 359, at 6 a), regarding a Treaty on Rail Transport concluded between the 
Swiss Confederation (respectively the canton of Schaffhausen) and the Grand Duchy 
of Baden and dating from 1858. In this case, the Court largely endorsed Vattel’s famous 
maxim in claris non fit interpretatio, even if it acknowledged its limitations (see at 3). For 
a critique of this maxim, see Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 35 f.
 1454 bge 90 ii 121, at 2.
 1455 bge 97 v 42, at 2.
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to interpret the 1929 Swiss– German Convention on Enforcement (‘Vollstre-
ckungsabkommen’),1458 and it has stressed the importance of interpreting 
treaties independently from domestic legal concepts and categories in the 
context of the Swiss– eec Free Trade Agreement.1459 In other cases, the Court 
is more willing to rely on domestic law.
It is worth noting that already in this early phase, the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
has applied principles of treaty interpretation to intercantonal agreements.1460 
This case law, which was confirmed in several later cases (infra, 3.2), suggests 
that the Court considers these methods to apply to legal interpretation in gen-
eral, and at least outside treaty interpretation (on this issue, see Chapter  6, 
supra).
3.2 The Swiss Federal Tribunal and Treaty Interpretation after the 
vclt’s Entry into Force and before Its Ratification by Switzerland  
(1980– 1990)
The Swiss Federal Tribunal kept mentioning the methods of the vclt after the 
Convention had entered into force for its State parties in 1980, and before it 
came into effect in Switzerland in June 1990.1461 However, during this period as 
well, the Court’s use of interpretative methods frequently lacked predictability, 
clarity, and consistency.
During this second phase, the Court’s confident, explicit endorsement of 
the vclt’s methods – despite Switzerland not being a party to the Convention 
at the time – is noteworthy. In some decisions, the Court did not even clarify 
that Switzerland had not ratified the vclt, or whether the methods of the Con-
vention reflected cil.1462 A decision of 1986 provides an explanation for this 
approach. In this case, the Court noted that Switzerland had not ratified the 
vclt because it disagreed with its provisions on dispute settlement, though 
it approved of its other provisions. The Court concluded that vclt provisions 
reflecting cil could be applied by Swiss courts.1463
Many rulings dating from 1980 to 1990 do not mention the Convention, in 
continuity with Frigerio. While the Court, in most of these cases, uses many 
of the vclt’s methods, it does not adopt a predictable, clear, and consistent 
 1458 bge 98 Ia 314, at 1.
 1459 bge 105 ii 49, at 3 a).
 1460 bge 96 i 636, at 4 c); bge 100 Ia 418, at 5.
 1461 bge 112 v 337; bge 109 Ia 217, at 4 b) bb).
 1462 bge 110 Ib 287, at 4 (on the Swiss– Dutch dta).
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interpretative approach.1464 Only a handful of decisions are of higher qual-
ity, such as a particularly detailed ruling dating from 1987 pertaining to the 
Warsaw Convention,1465 or a decision of 1988 concerning the treaty on judicial 
jurisdiction (‘Gerichtsstandsvertrag’) between France and Switzerland.1466 It 
is worth noting that in line with its earlier case law (supra, 3.1), the Swiss Fed-
eral Tribunal has applied principles of treaty interpretation to intercantonal 
 agreements.1467
3.3 Swiss Courts and Treaty Interpretation after the vclt’s Entry into  
Force in Switzerland (1990– 2016)
Contrary to the previous sections (supra, 3.1 and 3.2), which exclusively con-
cerned the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the present section also includes the case 
law of other Swiss courts.1468 Scope precludes analyzing the entire case law 
of the mcc available online and dating from 1915 onwards.1469 Only decisions 
of the mcc dating from 2006 and later published on the website of the Swiss 
authorities have been taken into account.1470
3.3.1 The Swiss Federal Tribunal
3.3.1.1 The Court’s Interpretative Approach in General
Since 1990, the Court has been adopting a more predictable, clear, and consist-
ent approach to treaty interpretation and its methods. Several decisions are 
even remarkably detailed and thorough.1471 However, some difficulties remain 
with regard to both the legality and the quality of the Court’s reasoning.
One characteristic of this practice is the Court’s explicit endorsement of the 
vclt’s methods as a reflection of cil. The Court has noted that these methods 
 1464 bge 113 Ib 276 (on the European Convention on Extradition); bge 112 v 16 (on the 
social security agreement of 1969 between Turkey and Switzerland); bge 110 v 72 (per-
taining to several bilateral social security agreements).
 1465 bge 113 ii 359.
 1466 bge 114 ii 265, at 3.
 1467 bge 112 Ia 75, at 4; bge 110 Ia 123, at 1. See also (on the more general applicability of 
international law to intercantonal agreements) bge 106 Ib 154, at 3.
 1468 This is due to the fact that this case law is accessible online for these more recent years 
(which applies to cantonal courts), or that these courts have been established after 1990 
(this concerns federal courts other than the Swiss Federal Tribunal).
 1469 <eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/ view/ delivery/ 41BIG_ INST/ 12329504630001791# 
main- carousel>.
 1470 <www.oa.admin.ch/ de/ entscheidungen- militaerjustiz.html>.
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already applied qua cil before being codified.1472 According to the Court, they 
also govern treaties ratified by Switzerland before the adoption of the vclt.1473 
The Court is sometimes more cautious in its formulations, eg when it consid-
ers that the vclt is ‘essentially’ a codification of cil.1474 It is worth noting that 
the Court also applies the methods of the vclt to treaties concluded between 
Switzerland and subjects of international law other than States, eg the un, the 
ilo, and the wipo.1475 It has even applied them to the Swiss– Persian Treaty of 
Establishment of 1934.1476 This could suggest that the Court considers that the 
vclt’s methods were already customary at that time. The Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal uses the Convention’s methods as legally binding guides. In (rare) cases, 
it has sought to demonstrate that a case had (or had not)1477 been decided in 
conformity with the vclt.1478
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has acknowledged that the vclt’s entry into 
force requires making some adjustments to the Swiss case law on treaty inter-
pretation. One main change is that courts must ascertain the ‘international’ 
meaning of social security agreements, instead of applying concepts of Swiss 
social security law by analogy.1479 Yet this alleged change does not follow from 
a fundamental difference between the interpretative methods of domestic and 
international law. Rather, it is a corollary of the idiosyncratic features of in-
ternational lawmaking (on this issue, see supra, Chapter 5, 3.3). As a matter 
of fact, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has stated that the methods of the Vienna 
Convention are ‘relatively similar to the interpretative methods that apply to 
general and abstract rules in domestic law’.1480 It has also asserted that these 
 1472 bge 138 ii 524, at 3.1. See also bge 141 ii 447, at 4.3.1; BGer, judgment 4P.114/ 2006 of 
7 September 2006, at 5.4.1.
 1473 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 c). Examples include the Swiss– Danish dta of 1974 (BGer, judg-
ment 2A.239/ 2005 of 28 November 2005, at 3.4.1), the Free Trade Agreement between 
Switzerland and the eec of 1972 (BGer, judgment 2C_ 907/ 2013 of 25 March 2014, at 
2.2.7), the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, 
which came into effect in Switzerland in 1970 (bge 138 iii 708, at 3.1), and the 1955 
Swiss– Italian Agreement on Border and Field Traffic (bge 138 ii 524, at 3).
 1474 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 c); BGer, judgment 4P.114/ 2006 of 7 September 2006, at 5.4.1.
 1475 BGer, judgment 2P.36/ 2004 of 9 May 2005, at 5.6.
 1476 BGer, judgment 5A_ 197/ 2007 of 31 August 2007, at 3.1 ff.
 1477 BGer, judgment 2A.460/ 1999 of 26 April 2000, at 3 b) cc) (although the Court itself mis-
takenly refers to the domestic travaux).
 1478 BGer, judgment 9C_ 602/ 2015 of 7 January 2016, at 3.4.
 1479 Compare bge 124 v 225, at 3 a), bge 117 v 268, at 3 b), or bge 119 v 98, at 6 a), with bge 
111 v 117, at 1 b); bge 112 v 145, at 2 a).
 1480 bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.2. The continuity between domestic and international methods in 
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methods match its own previous approach to treaty interpretation,1481 which 
glosses over the fact that this earlier practice was, in most cases, unpredictable, 
unclear, and inconsistent in terms of the methods used (supra, 3.1 and 3.2). 
Moreover, as the present study shows, even more recent cases are not devoid 
of inconsistencies.
When it does refer to the interpretative methods of treaty law codified in the 
vclt, the Swiss Federal Tribunal applies them to a wide range of treaties. The 
Court regularly notes that the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons must be interpreted pursuant to the vclt,1482 at least to the extent 
that its provisions do not contain concepts of eu law.1483 The Court has also 
relied on the vclt to justify the need to interpret the Swiss– eu Agreement 
independently from domestic law. Paradoxically, based on this argument, the 
Court closely follows the case law of the cjeu.1484 While scope precludes ad-
dressing this issue in more detail, it is important to stress that for cjeu case law 
predating the signature of the Agreement, adherence to the cjeu’s rulings is 
commanded neither by the vclt nor by the Agreement.1485 In some decisions 
pertaining to the Swiss– eu Agreement1486 and to other treaties between Swit-
zerland and the eu,1487 the Court has not referred to the vclt. These omissions 
are further indications that the Court’s interpretative method is guided by eu 
law, and not by international law.
The Court has applied the vclt’s methods to the echr, while stressing 
that its characteristics as an international human rights treaty and as a ‘liv-
ing instrument’ must influence its interpretation.1488 It also uses the vclt 
to interpret other treaties, including the Lugano Convention,1489 the Aarhus 
Convention,1490 the Swiss– us dta1491 and other dta s,1492 the Headquarters 
 1481 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 c); BGer, judgment 4P.114/ 2006 of 7 September 2006, at 5.4.1.
 1482 bge 132 v 423, at 9.5.1; bge 135 v 339, at 5.3; bge 138 v 258, at 5.3; bge 139 ii 393, at 
4.1.1; bge 142 ii 35, at 3.2; BGer, judgment 2C_ 301/ 2016 of 19 July 2017, at 2.2.
 1483 bge 140 ii 167, at 5.5.2.
 1484 bge 142 ii 35, at 3.2. See also bge 132 v 423, at 9.1, 9.2 and 9.5; bge 136 ii 65, at 3.1.
 1485 Art. 16(2) of the Swiss– eu Agreement. On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 97). For 
a different view, see Benedikt Pirker, ‘Zu den für die Auslegung der Bilateralen Abkommen 
massgeblichen Grundsätzen: Gedanken zu bge 140 ii 112 (Gerichtsdolmetscher)’ (2015) 
116 Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 295.
 1486 bge 140 ii 460, at 4.1; bge 136 ii 5, at 3.4.
 1487 bge 138 ii 536 (on the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Taxation of Savings Income).
 1488 bge 139 i 16, at 5.2.2. See also bge 137 i 284, at 2.1.
 1489 bge 131 iii 76, at 3.2; bge 131 iii 227, at 3.1.
 1490 bge 141 ii 233, at 4.3.3.
 1491 bge 139 ii 404, at 7.2.1.
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Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Bank for International 
Settlements, and a related exchange of letters,1493 the New York Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,1494 and the 
Energy Charter Treaty.1495
While the Court’s recent interpretative approach is – at least as a matter 
of principle  – more predictable, clear, and consistent, it also displays signs 
of repetitiveness and superficial engagement with the various interpretative 
methods. Moreover, the fact that the vclt’s methods are acknowledged as 
customary and that they are mentioned as the starting point of interpretation 
does not mean that they are followed in practice.
Art. 31(1) vclt is the most frequently quoted provision of the vclt in the 
Swiss case law. The Court often neglects the fact that the ‘general rule’ of art. 31 
is not limited to its first paragraph.1496 While in rare cases, the Court cites art. 
31 f vclt integrally,1497 this does not detract it from focusing on its preferred 
method(s) and from neglecting others.1498 This is a fortiori the case when the 
Court merely cites art. 31(1) vclt at the beginning of the interpretative pro-
cess.1499 When interpreting the Swiss– Persian Establishment Treaty of 1934, 
for instance, the Court has emphasized the purposive method.1500 In  another 
decision on the Swiss– Portuguese Social Security Convention of 1975, the 
Court stated that it had no reason to depart from the ordinary and clear mean-
ing of the treaty.1501 Occasionally, however, the Court has applied the different 
methods of the vclt in a more predictable, clear, and consistent way,1502 going 
beyond art. 31(1) vclt to mention its paragraphs 2 and 3.1503
 1493 bge 140 v 385, at 4.2.
 1494 bge 138 iii 520, at 5.4.
 1495 bge 141 iii 495, at 3.5.1.
 1496 Ibid (Energy Charter Treaty); bge 139 ii 393, at 4.1.1 (Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free 
Movement of Persons); bge 131 iii 76, at 3.3 (Lugano Convention); bge 122 ii 234, 
at 4 c) (Agreement between Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
Road between Lörrach and Weil am Rhein on Swiss Territory). See also BGer, judgment 
6B_ 274/ 2009 of 16 February 2010, at 3.1.2.1 (un Convention Against Torture).
 1497 bge 138 ii 524, at 3.1 (Convention between Switzerland and Italy on border and field 
traffic); bge 132 v 423, at 9.5.1 (Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons); 
bge 139 ii 404, at 7.2.1 (interpretation of the Swiss– us dta).
 1498 bge 138 ii 524, at 4.3 (focus on object and purpose); BGer, judgment 4A_ 736/ 2011 of 11 
April 2012, at 3.3 (focus on object and purpose).
 1499 BGer, judgment 5A_ 467/ 2014 of 18 December 2014, at 2.3.
 1500 BGer, judgment 5A_ 197/ 2007 of 31 August 2007, at 3.1 ff.
 1501 BGer (Swiss Federal Insurance Court), judgment i 99/ 03 of 17 November 2003, at 3.2.
 1502 BGer, judgment 2C_ 436/ 2011 of 13 December 2011, at 3.3 ff; BGer, judgment 2C_ 498/ 
2013 of 29 April 2014, at 5.1 ff (although the Court uses, inter alia, the domestic travaux).
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Some trends noticed for the Court’s earlier case law (supra, 3.1 and 3.2) are 
still present in this recent practice. One such tendency is self- referentiality. In 
many rulings, the Court has relied on the Swiss practice to interpret treaties, 
including the practice of the Swiss authorities pertaining to the ratification 
of a treaty. It especially relies on the dispatch of the Federal Council, ie, the 
official statement issued by the federal government before the domestic parlia-
mentary approval of a treaty.1504 Yet the Court seems biased, in the sense that 
it only highlights the Swiss practice, but not that of Switzerland’s treaty part-
ners. It has for example rejected the invocation of foreign (French) legislative 
materials by one of the parties to a dispute.1505 The Court also frequently relies 
on auxiliary means to interpret treaties. It especially uses scholarly writings 
and, more rarely, foreign and international judicial decisions.1506 Only Swiss 
judicial decisions are often cited.1507
Overall, references to the vclt’s methods are more frequent in recent dec-
ades. However, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has far from systematically referred 
to the Vienna Convention in the context of treaty interpretation, which can be 
problematic from the perspective of the legality and quality of its rulings.
Some decisions that do not mention the vclt explicitly point to some of 
the Convention’s methods. In a case of 2016, the Court stressed the importance 
of interpreting the Lugano Convention independently from domestic law.1508 
While the Court did not refer to the vclt, it stated that the four ‘customary in-
terpretative methods’ had to been relied on, before applying them to the case 
at hand.1509 In an earlier decision dating from 1997, the Court mentioned that 
the Lugano Convention had to be interpreted based on the ‘classic interpreta-
tive criteria’ (by which it supposedly meant the customary methods codified in 
the vclt), while also accounting for ‘the characteristics of a unified interna-
tional legal order’.1510
 1504 BGer, judgment 6B_ 274/ 2009 of 16 February 2010, at 3.1.2.1; BGer, judgment 2A.460/ 
1999 of 26 April 2000, at 3 b) cc); BGer, judgment 2A.260/ 2000 of 21 November 2000, at 
3 g); BGer, judgment 2C_ 498/ 2013 of 29 April 2014, at 5.1 ff.
 1505 BGer, judgment 4A_ 616/ 2015 of 20 September 2016, at 3.2.2.
 1506 BGer, judgment 6B_ 274/ 2009 of 16 February 2010, at 3.1.2.1.
 1507 BGer, judgment 2C_ 752/ 2014 of 27 November 2015, at 3.3.2 (the Court also mentions 
the practice of the States parties to another dta than the one at stake); bge 144 iii 
368, at 3 (regarding the Hague Convention of 2 October 1973 on the Law Applicable to 
Maintenance Obligations).
 1508 bge 142 iii 420, at 2.3.1. See also bge 142 iii 466, at 4.2.1 and 6.1.2; bge 135 iii 185, 
at 3.4.1.
 1509 bge 142 iii 420, at 2.3.1. See also at 2.3.2.
















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
244 Chapter 7
Other decisions that do not mention the Vienna Convention are less clearly 
in line with the Convention’s methods. This is particularly problematic from 
the perspective of the legality of the Court’s reasoning. In a decision of 1999, 
for instance, the Court had to interpret the Swiss– German Social Security 
Agreement of 1964. It did not use the vclt but, instead, its own (primari-
ly textual) case law on treaty interpretation,1511 as it did in other decisions 
pertaining to social security agreements.1512 Whether it failed to mention the 
vclt because these agreements all predated the Vienna Convention’s entry 
into force in Switzerland in 1990 is unclear. The primacy of the text was also 
applied to other treaties.1513
Another problematic tendency from the perspective of the Court’s methods 
and the quality of its reasoning is that the vclt is hardly ever mentioned in some 
interpretative contexts. The Court has not cited the vclt with regard to the two 
un Covenants.1514 It has rarely used it when interpreting host State agreements,1515 
or treaties concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe.1516 It has also 
failed to mention it when interpreting the Government Procurement Agreement 
of the wto.1517 In a judgment of 2018 pertaining to the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the Court cited a block of text on 
interpretative methods which it regularly uses in relation to the interpretation of 
domestic law, without referring to the vclt.1518
The Court adopts distinctive approaches with regard to specific treaties, 
which reinforces this impression of path dependence. In connection with 
the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by 
Road,1519 the trips Agreement,1520 the Hague Convention on the Protec-
tion of Minors,1521 or the Lugano Convention,1522 the Court has stressed the 
 1511 bge 125 v 503, at 4 b).
 1512 bge 140 v 476, at 3.3.1; bge 124 v 145, at 3 a); bge 122 v 381, at 5.
 1513 Examples include the Patent Cooperation Treaty between Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
(bge 127 iii 461, at 3 b), where the Tribunal applied its approach developed in the Baden 
Railway Transport Case, supra, 3.1), the European Patent Convention (bge 117 ii 480, at 
2 b)), and the Lugano Convention (bge 121 iii 336, at 5 c)).
 1514 bge 126 i 240, at 2 g) (on the icescr).
 1515 bge 136 iii 379 (no mention of the vclt); see however bge 140 v 385, at 4.2.
 1516 bge 133 ii 136, at 5.2.1 (regarding the European Convention on Transfrontier Television); 
bge 141 iv 108 (an otherwise remarkably detailed judgment regarding the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime).
 1517 bge 142 ii 369, at 3.
 1518 BGer, judgment 5A_ 576/ 2018 of 31 July 2018, at 4.3.2.
 1519 bge 138 iii 708, at 3.4.
 1520 bge 130 iii 267, at 4.1.
 1521 bge 138 iii 11, at 5.1.
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importance of limiting hermeneutic divergence and of fostering uniform inter-
pretation. With regard to specific treaties, such as dtas, the Court  frequently 
stresses States’ duty to interpret treaties in good faith, and to avoid absurd or 
abusive interpretations.1523
Even relatively recent decisions do not mention the methods of the vclt, at 
least not all of them, and not in a predictable, clear, and consistent way.1524 In-
stead of using the vclt, the Court – as previously emphasized – tends to rely on its 
own case law on treaty interpretation.1525 This confirms the risk of circularity that 
exists when domestic courts interpret international law.1526 A cluster of examples 
is provided by cases on the Lugano Convention, in which the Court refers to its 
own practice of following the cjeu’s case law.1527 The level of detail of the Court’s 
reasoning is uneven. This may reflect an unpredictable, unclear, and inconsistent 
approach. Of course, it may also be due to the fact that some cases do not raise 
difficult interpretative issues.
While the majority of the Court’s decisions issued after the Convention’s entry 
into force in Switzerland do not mention the vclt, some decisions, in addition 
to citing the Convention’s methods, are particularly detailed and carefully justi-
fied.1528 Moreover, the Court was already referring to the vclt’s methods within a 
few days of the Convention coming into effect in Switzerland.1529
3.3.1.2 The Court’s Use of the Four Interpretative Methods
The richness of the Court’s case law makes it possible to analyze its use of the four 
interpretative methods (supra, Chapter 6, section 2).
In the Court’s practice, the text often limits the reach of other interpre-
tative arguments. The presumption it establishes regarding the meaning 
of the treaty cannot be easily rebutted.1530 Occasionally, the Court uses lan-
guage dictionaries to ascertain the treaty text,1531 and sometimes specialized 
 1523 BGer, judgment 2A.416/ 2005 of 4 April 2006, at 3.1; bge 143 ii 136.
 1524 bge 135 iii 574, at 3; bge 140 ii 305.
 1525 bge 140 v 493, at 3.
 1526 On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 60) 125 ff.
 1527 bge 141 iii 382, at 3.3.
 1528 bge 119 v 98, and more recently: bge 141 ii 233; BGer, judgment 4A_ 736/ 2011 of 11 
April 2012, at 3.3; BGer, judgments 2C_ 64/ 2013 and 2C_ 65/ 2013 of 26 September 2014, 
at 3.3.3 ff.
 1529 bge 116 iv 262, at b) cc), issued on 14 June 1990, eight days after the vclt’s entry into 
force in Switzerland.
 1530 bge 134 iii 555, at 2.4 ff.
 1531 bge 122 v 381, at 5 b) (Le Grand Robert); BGer, judgment 2P.36/ 2004 of 9 May 2005, at 
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dictionaries.1532 It regularly relies on the notion of ‘clear text’,1533 which is con-
sistent with its earlier case law (eg supra, 3.1) and its approach to domestic 
law.1534 This notion expresses the fact that the Court has no doubt (or con-
siders that it has no margin of appreciation) regarding the meaning of a le-
gal norm. Yet as is well- known, clarity is the result of an evaluative judgment. 
Moreover, clarity (from the interpreter’s perspective) does not rule out the 
need for interpretation (eg to explain the meaning of the law to others).1535 
The notion of ‘clear text’ must hence be used with parsimony, and it must be 
carefully justified.
The context is sometimes decisive in the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s prac-
tice, especially when the Court prioritizes interpretative coherence (or even 
uniformity) or constancy (ie, hermeneutic continuity over time). In a case 
of 1996 pertaining to the Swiss– Yugoslav Social Security Agreement, for in-
stance, the Court has, without citing the vclt, given weight to systematic 
interpretation and to ‘the interest in a coherent interpretation of the inter-
national treaty’.1536 As previously mentioned, the Court rarely goes beyond 
citing the first paragraph of art. 31 vclt. Still, it has occasionally referred to 
art. 31(2) vclt, which defines the notion of context,1537 and especially to art. 
31(3) vclt, which  pertains to subsequent agreements, subsequent practice, 
and systemic integration.1538 This last paragraph has been cited by the Court 
to emphasize the relevance of other treaties1539 and of foreign judicial prac-
tice.1540 The Court has also noted that art. 31(3)(a) vclt can be used to reach 
a level of interpretative uniformity.1541 The Court has also referred to the par-
ties’ subsequent treaty practice without expressly mentioning the vclt.1542 
In many cases, however, subsequent agreements and subsequent practice are 
not prominent in the Court’s case law.
 1532 See the Abacha case, in which the Court referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, to Dahl’s Law 
Dictionary, and to the Navarre Economic and Legal Dictionary: bge 129 ii 268, at 3.4.1.
 1533 bge 135 ii 243, at 3.2.
 1534 See recently bge 140 ii 202, at 5.1.
 1535 On this point, see Barradas de Freitas (n 127) 35 f.
 1536 bge 122 v 381, at 5 b).
 1537 bge 130 iii 430, at 3.5.
 1538 Eg bge 141 ii 233, at 4.3.4 (art. 31(3)(a) and (b) vclt); bge 123 i 112, at 4 d) cc) (art. 
31(3)(b) and (c) vclt).
 1539 Eg bge 131 iii 227, at 3.1; bge 128 ii 305, at 3.1.
 1540 bge 138 iii 708, at 3.1.
 1541 bge 130 iii 267, at 4.1.
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Purposive interpretation often occupies a central place in the Court’s 
reasoning. Among the methods prescribed by art. 31 f vclt, the Court fre-
quently emphasizes the treaty’s object and purpose.1543 It does so to interpret 
the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, the purpose of 
which, according to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, is to ensure free movement 
‘based on the provisions in force within the European Union’, and hence to 
guarantee an interpretation of the Agreement that is ‘parallel’ to the law of 
the eu.1544 Yet given the difficulty of ascertaining the object and purpose of 
a treaty, and in light of art. 16(2) of the Agreement, the Court’s approach is 
problematic.1545 Teleology also played a crucial role in a high- profile case de-
cided in 2018, which involved Russia and several Ukrainian companies, and 
which was linked to Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula.1546 An-
other interesting example is a case on the New York Arbitration Convention, 
in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal mentioned that because the purpose of 
the Convention is to ensure the recognition and enforcement of foreign ar-
bitral awards, judges must interpret this treaty in a way that is ‘pragmatic, 
flexible, and not formalistic’.1547 Yet to equal purposive interpretation with 
result- oriented reasoning is misguided and neglects the constraining effect 
of teleology.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal seldom refers to historical interpretation in 
the context of treaty interpretation. In line with its emphasis on the text, the 
Court has stated that the travaux can only be used to interpret a treaty be-
yond its wording if the text does not reflect the parties’ intentions.1548 When 
it does engage in historical interpretation, the Court, as previously mentioned, 
 frequently refers to the practice of the Swiss authorities pertaining to the rat-
ification of a treaty, especially to the Federal Council’s dispatch.1549 This ap-
proach is at odds with what art. 32 vclt permits.
 1543 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 d); bge 138 ii 524, at 3.1 and 4.3; BGer, judgment 4A_ 736/ 2011 of 
11 April 2012, at 3.3.3.
 1544 Eg bge 140 ii 364, at 5.3.
 1545 On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 97). See also Ammann, ‘La non- discrimination, 
principe charnière d’interprétation : l’exemple de l’art. 2 alcp’ (n 1369).
 1546 bge 144 iii 559, at 4.4.5.
 1547 bge 138 iii 520, at 5.4.3.
 1548 bge 135 v 339, at 5.3.
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3.3.2.1 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court
While the case law of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (sfac) is only 
available from 2007 onwards, it provides interesting insights into the methods 
of treaty interpretation. The sfac’s practice is often more detailed and com-
prehensive than the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s, especially when the Court inter-
prets dtas and the so- called 2009 ‘ubs Agreement’1550 between Switzerland 
and the United States.
Given the short timeframe over which this case law spans, a chronological 
categorization is unwarranted. Instead, the rulings can be classified based on 
whether they do or do not mention the interpretative methods of the vclt.
A number of decisions of the sfac do not mention the vclt, are not based 
on a predictable, clear, and consistent interpretative scheme, and invoke pre-
vious judicial decisions on treaty interpretation. One example is a case of 2010 
pertaining to a treaty concluded in 1974 between Switzerland and Spain on 
the protection of indications of source, appellations of origin, and similar ap-
pellations.1551 In this case, the Court mentioned several interpretative meth-
ods, including context and teleology,1552 albeit not in a systematic way. The 
Court almost exclusively referred to the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law on 
the issue (including to cases dealing with the interpretation of other, similar 
agreements),1553 in addition to citing its own previous decisions and cantonal 
cases.1554
Another case in which the Court did not refer to the vclt pertained to ubs 
and a us request for administrative assistance in the framework of the Swiss– 
us dta.1555 In this case, the Court referred to the text, context, and teleology, 
again not in a predictable, clear, and consistent way. It also relied on Swiss case 
law.1556
Some cases that do not mention the vclt are even more clearly at odds 
with what the Convention and/ or high- quality judicial reasoning require. In a 
 1550 Agreement Between the United States and the Swiss Confederation on the Request for 
Information From the Internal Revenue Service of the United States Regarding ubs ag, a 
Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss Confederation, available in English 
at <www.irs.gov/ pub/ irs- drop/ us- swiss_ government_ agreement.pdf>.
 1551 sfac, judgment B- 30/ 2009 of 8 April 2010. See also judgment B- 1295/ 2015 of 22 
August 2016.
 1552 sfac, judgment B- 30/ 2009 of 8 April 2010, at 3.8.
 1553 Ibid, at 3.5.
 1554 Ibid, at 5.2.
 1555 sfac, judgments A- 7342/ 2008 and A- 7426/ 2008 of 5 March 2009, at 2.
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case pertaining to the Aarhus Convention, for instance, the sfac ( contrary to 
what art. 32 vclt allows) relied on the practice of the Swiss authorities con-
cerning the ratification of a treaty.1557 Paradoxically, it did so right before ac-
knowledging that treaties must be interpreted independently from domestic 
law.1558 Similarly, in a ruling pertaining to the 2012 Swiss– Austrian treaty on co-
operation in tax matters and financial markets, the Court mentioned  textual, 
systematic, and purposive interpretation, as well as the practice of the Swiss 
authorities concerning the ratification of a treaty,1559 again contrary to what 
art. 32 vclt permits (on this issue, see also infra). Some rulings merely cite 
the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal on treaty interpretation.1560 In other 
cases, the Court refers to its own case law on the issue and to the primacy of 
the text.1561 It is worth noting that in some cases that do not refer to the vclt, 
the Court has mentioned the principle of auto- interpretation, which rarely ap-
pears in the Swiss practice.1562
In contrast with the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, a great number of 
rulings of the sfac mention art. 31 f vclt and describe their content (including art. 
31(2) and (3) vclt).1563 The vast majority of these rulings refer to the ubs Agree-
ment and to dtas.
The Court often notes that the vclt codifies the customary methods of 
treaty interpretation,1564 and it has even stated that these methods are ‘inher-
ent in every legal order’.1565 Hence, according to the Court, the vclt’s meth-
ods apply to (and can be applied by)1566 States that have not (yet) ratified 
 1557 sfac, judgment A- 4186/ 2015 of 28 January 2016, at 7.5.3.1.
 1558 Ibid, at 7.5.4.1.
 1559 sfac, judgment A- 7010/ 2015 of 19 May 2016, at 5.1 ff.
 1560 sfac, judgment B- 1217/ 2012 of 5 September 2012, at 5.1.1.
 1561 sfac, judgment A- 2744/ 2008 of 23 March 2010, at 3.9, with reference to judgment 
A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010.
 1562 sfac, judgment C- 2205/ 2008 of 26 May 2010, at 5.5 (on the Social Security Agreement 
of 1984 between Switzerland and Israel).
 1563 The sfac’s official website makes it convenient to search for rulings citing art. 31 f vclt 
(in addition to the fact that such rulings are easier to locate than those that do not men-
tion art. 31 f vclt). The website includes an index of the legal provisions cited in the 
Court’s rulings. Contrary to what applies to the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, this 
index is available for the Court’s entire case law (<www.bvger.ch/ publiws/ pub/ index.jsf>).
 1564 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5; sfac, judgment A- 7663/ 2010 of 
28 April 2011 (regarding the methods of art. 31 vclt); sfac, judgment A- 6633/ 2010 of 6 
June 2011, at 2.2 and 4.2.3 (regarding the interpretative methods of the vclt in general).
 1565 sfac, judgment A- 6159/ 2010 of 10 February 2011, at 3.4.
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the Convention.1567 The Court also uses these methods to interpret treaties 
concluded before the vclt’s entry into force.1568 Like the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal, the Court has used the methods of the vclt in connection with trea-
ties concluded between Switzerland and subjects of international law other 
than States, eg to the 1972 Free Trade Agreement between Switzerland and 
the eec.1569 The Court likewise relies on these methods to interpret the oecd 
Model Tax Convention and its commentaries.1570
Compared to the abovementioned examples, the Court is sometimes more 
cautious when assessing the customary character of the methods of the 
vclt. It seems to consider that the vclt has crystallized cil, ie, that it has 
 contributed to the emergence of customary law, and not simply codified it. 
The sfac has for instance stated that the methods of the vclt codify cil ‘in 
their essential content’.1571 A particularly informative example is a case on the 
Treaty of Turin of 1816 in which the Court analyzed the methods of treaty in-
terpretation. The Court cited doctrinal analyses published in the 18th, 19th, and 
early 20th century,1572 and an advisory opinion of the pcij on the issue.1573 It 
concluded that the methods of the vclt already existed in an ‘analogous, al-
though possibly less elaborate’ form in the 18th century, and when the Treaty of 
Turin was concluded.1574 Another symptom of the Court’s cautious appraisal 
of the customary character of the Convention’s methods is the frequent men-
tion of the date at which the vclt entered into force in Switzerland,1575 as if it 
were necessary to demonstrate that the methods of the Convention are indeed 
 1567 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5; sfac, judgment A- 2677/ 2007 
of 16 January 2009, at 3.2.1, 4.1.1; sfac, judgment A- 6633/ 2010 of 6 June 2011, at 4.2.3; 
sfac, judgment C- 6631/ 2010 of 15 June 2012, at 5.1.
 1568 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.6.1; sfac, judgment A- 2708/ 2013 
of 28 August 2013, at 3.3.1. Regarding the 1951 Refugee Convention, for instance, the 
Court has stated that the methods of the vclt apply ‘not directly, but qua expression of 
the general rules of international law’. See sfac, judgment C- 7063/ 2008 of 15 May 2009, 
at 3.3.1.1.
 1569 sfac, judgment A- 2708/ 2013 of 28 August 2013, at 3.3.1.
 1570 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.6.2.
 1571 sfac, judgment A- 340/ 2015 of 28 November 2016, at 4.1.3.2; sfac, judgment A- 2677/ 
2007 of 16 January 2009, at 3.2.2 (‘in ihrem wesentlichen Gehalt’). See however ibid, 
at 4.1.1.
 1572 sfac, judgment A- 340/ 2015 of 28 November 2016, at 4.1.3.4.
 1573 Ibid, at 4.1.3.5.
 1574 Ibid, at 4.1.3.6.
 1575 sfac, judgment A- 4110/ 2010 of 9 May 2011, at 4.1; sfac, judgment A- 2677/ 2007 of 
16 January 2009, at 3.2.1; sfac, judgment A- 6920/ 2010 of 21 September 2011, at 3.4.1; 
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applicable to treaties ratified by Switzerland. This conclusion would already 
follow from their customary source.
An interesting insight is that the Court has referred to the notion of ‘prag-
matic methodological pluralism’ (see supra, Chapter  3, 4.2.6) in the context 
of treaty interpretation.1576 This confirms a trend that is often implicit in the 
practice, namely that this approach is used by Swiss courts with regard to both 
domestic and international law.1577
The sfac often cites the methods of the vclt to stress that treaties must be 
interpreted independently from domestic law. The Court has pointed this out 
in numerous cases (the content of which is highly repetitive) pertaining to the 
ubs Agreement and its Protocol.1578 As previously noted, this does not mean 
that the methods of the vclt are structurally different from those of domestic 
law, but only that interpreters cannot disregard the characteristics of interna-
tional lawmaking. The vclt is also mentioned when the conditions set out in 
art. 3(2) oecd Model Tax Convention (which specifies when courts may resort 
to domestic legal concepts to interpret tax treaties) do not apply.1579 Relatedly, 
the Court regularly mentions the vclt, sometimes with an emphasis on art. 26 
vclt, to stress the importance of interpreting treaties in good faith (‘[frei] von 
Spitzfindigkeiten und Winkelzügen’).1580
The Court has mentioned the methods of the vclt when referring to the 
principle of auto- interpretation. It has done so several times in connection 
with the interpretation of the Swiss– us dta,1581 but also with regard to the 
Free Trade Agreement of 1972 between Switzerland and the eec.1582 As regards 
 1576 sfac, judgment C- 7063/ 2008 of 15 May 2009, at 3.3.1.1.
 1577 In a case concerning the ubs Agreement, for instance, the Court has noted that interpre-
tation pursuant to art. 31 vclt is a ‘unitary operation’, and that the various methods are 
on equal footing. This is consistent with pragmatic methodological pluralism. See sfac, 
judgment A- 6927/ 2010 of 13 October 2011, at 8.1 f. See also sfac, judgment A- 6938/ 2010 
of 14 July 2011, at 5.1.4.4; sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.1.
 1578 sfac, judgment A- 6179/ 2010 of 3 March 2011, at 2.3.1. See also SFAC, judgment 
A- 6677/ 2010 of 6 June 2011, at 3.2; SFAC, judgment A- 7397/ 2010 of 19 August 2011, 
at 4.2; SFAC, judgment A- 6941/ 2010 of 11 August 2011, at 4.2; sfac, judgment A- 6927/ 
2010 of 13 October 2011, at 9.2.
 1579 sfac, judgment A- 6638/ 2010 of 9 May 2011, at 4.1; sfac, judgment A- 3425/ 2010 of 11 
April 2011, at 4.1; sfac, judgment A- 6944/ 2010 of 7 September 2011, at 8.3.3.
 1580 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.3. The Court has also stated that 
this duty merely applies to the relationship between the treaty parties. See sfac, judg-
ment A- 4013/ 2010 of 15 July 2010, at 8.1.
 1581 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 6.5.2. See also sfac, judgment 
A- 6939/ 2010 of 27 June 2011, at 4.3; sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, 
at 5.3; sfac, judgment A- 6792/ 2010 of 4 May 2011, at 6.3.
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252 Chapter 7
the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, however, the 
Court – like the Swiss Federal Tribunal (supra, 3.3.1.2) – considers that it must 
in principle be interpreted in ‘parallel’ to the cjeu’s case law.1583
Interestingly, the Court has noted that courts are ‘the primary – and probably 
sole – addressees’ of the vclt’s methods,1584 as they are the instances to which 
States and ios have delegated the competence of settling their disputes.1585  Strictly 
speaking, however, the duty bearers of art. 31 and 32 vclt are States. Moreover, 
other State organs, and especially the executive, need to resort to the vclt as well.
In rare instances, the Court has mentioned the practice of the State au-
thorities (and especially of the courts) of Switzerland’s treaty partners when 
interpreting treaties.1586 In an overwhelming majority of cases, however, it 
primarily relies on legal scholarship and on Swiss case law (mostly its own 
and that of the Swiss Federal Tribunal) to underpin its statements regarding 
art. 31 f vclt.1587 Through this self- referential and even circular tendency, the 
Court neglects the primarily interstate nature of international lawmaking.
While many rulings refer to art. 31 f vclt in an exhaustive fashion, the level 
of detail of the Court’s case law on treaty interpretation is uneven. While this 
may be due to the fact that not every dispute raises equally salient interpreta-
tive issues, it can jeopardize the quality of judicial reasoning. The Court often 
cites the vclt’s provisions on interpretation pro forma, without subsequently 
applying its different methods.1588 In some cases, however, it has been remark-
ably thorough when applying these methods, eg in a case pertaining to the dta 
between Switzerland and Singapore,1589 and in a case pertaining to the ubs 
Agreement,1590 but also in human rights cases, eg in a ruling of 2010 on the 
Refugee Convention.1591
 1583 sfac, judgments C- 4032/ 2014 and C- 7520/ 2014 of 3 November 2016, at 2.3. On the 
problems connected to this approach, see Besson and Ammann (n 97); Ammann, ‘La 
non- discrimination, principe charnière d’interprétation :  l’exemple de l’art. 2 alcp’ 
(n 1369).
 1584 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.
 1585 sfac, judgment A- 1735/ 2011 of 21 December 2011, at 2.2.
 1586 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 6.5.2; sfac, judgment A- 6159/ 2010 
of 10 February 2011, at 3.4.2 (which pertains to the interpretation of us constitutional 
law by us courts).
 1587 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5; sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 
12 December 2011, at 7.1.3.
 1588 sfac, judgment A- 6179/ 2010 of 3 March 2011, at 2.3.1 ff; sfac, judgment A- 4110/ 2010 
of 9 May 2011, at 4.1; sfac, judgment C- 7063/ 2008 of 15 May 2009, at 3.3.1.1 ff.
 1589 sfac, judgment A- 4683/ 2010 of 12 May 2011, at 6.3.
 1590 sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 2010 of 18 July 2011, at 4.4.4 ff.
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The Court adopts distinctive approaches for specific treaties. This feature of 
the case law is not necessarily problematic, as long as the basic interpretative 
methods are used, and as long as these hermeneutic peculiarities are identified 
based on a predictable, clear, and consistent assessment. In connection with 
the ubs Agreement, for instance, the Court has noted that the vclt applies 
unless the treaty contains special interpretative provisions.1592 Another exam-
ple of lex specialis are provisions drafted based on art. 3(2) of the oecd Model 
Tax Convention.1593 The Court has also noted that whether the concept of effet 
utile applies to tax treaties is disputed.1594 The Court hereby neglects that the 
relevance of effet utile to treaty interpretation in general is controversial. The 
ilc explicitly refrained from including effet utile in the vclt.1595
A related issue that is problematic from the perspective of legality and qual-
ity is that the Court’s statements pertaining to the methods of art. 31 f vclt are 
detailed, but highly repetitive. This suggests that the Court does not actually 
examine every method and its implications in every case but, instead, uncriti-
cally relies on blocks of text used in earlier cases. This tendency is corroborated 
by the fact that most of these detailed rulings date from 2011 and 2012 and per-
tain to the ubs Agreement and to dtas concluded by Switzerland.
The sfac’s case law on treaty interpretation is prolific enough to examine 
how the Court approaches the four methods of treaty interpretation, regard-
less of whether the Court explicitly refers to the vclt or not.
The Court considers that the text is the starting point of treaty interpreta-
tion,1596 and that it must be interpreted ‘out of itself ’, based on its ordinary 
meaning.1597 The sfac has occasionally relied on dictionary definitions in the 
context of textual interpretation.1598 It has noted that a term’s ordinary mean-
ing does not necessarily coincide with the ordinary use of language, and that 
it can be based on specialized terminology.1599 The use of a term in the legal 
 1592 sfac, judgment A- 6927/ 2010 of 13 October 2011, at 8.1 f.  On lex specialis, see sfac, 
judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.6.1 and 5.3; sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 
2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.5, 7.1.1.
 1593 sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.5 and 7.1.1. However, according 
to the Court, such provisions must themselves be interpreted based on art. 31 f vclt. See 
ibid, at 4.5; sfac, judgment A- 1951/ 2017 of 22 August 2018, at 3.2.4.
 1594 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2.
 1595 ilc, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties With Commentaries’ (n 783) 219.
 1596 sfac, judgment E- 4207/ 2006 of 11 September 2008, at 6.2.
 1597 sfac, judgment A- 8261/ 2010 of 15 August 2011, at 3.2; sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 2010 of 
18 July 2011, at 4.4.5.1.
 1598 sfac, judgment A- 6159/ 2010 of 10 February 2011, at 3.4.1.
 1599 sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, at 6. See also sfac, judgment A- 8261/ 
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orders of the treaty parties provides evidence of this ordinary meaning.1600 
While the text often limits the reach of other methods, such as teleology,1601 
the opposite is true as well, eg when the Court notes that textual interpretation 
should not be ‘excessively formalistic’ by leading to the neglect of other meth-
ods.1602 Like the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the sfac uses the infelicitous (supra, 
3.3.1.2) expression of ‘clear meaning’.1603 In a large number of rulings, the Court 
has referred to its own case law based on which the vclt commands a pri-
marily textual interpretation of treaties.1604 This shows that the Court tends to 
reason in a self- referential and even circular way, instead of consulting inter-
national legal practice.
The Court interprets the notion of context of art. 31(2) vclt narrowly.1605 It 
has held that the context excludes circumstances relevant to the conclusion of 
the treaty (art. 32 vclt), as well as non- textual elements.1606 This last point is 
unduly restrictive. According to the Court, the context encompasses the text, 
preamble, and appendices to the treaty, as well as any agreement that occurred 
between the parties when the treaty was concluded.1607 The Court rightly con-
siders that there is no hierarchy between art. 31(2) and art. 31(3) vclt.1608 Few 
cases deal with subsequent agreements (art. 31(3)(a) vclt). However, in a 
very detailed ruling, the Court has mentioned them with regard to dtas.1609 
Subsequent practice (art. 31(3)(b) vclt) has been cited occasionally.1610 Ex-
ceptionally, the Court has even gone beyond art. 31(3)(b) vclt to refer to the 
practice of States that were not parties to the treaty.1611 Regarding systemic in-
tegration (art. 31(3)(c) vclt), the Court has noted that it includes every inter-
national legal act applicable between the parties.1612 The Court’s approach in 
 1600 sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, at 6.
 1601 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2.
 1602 sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 2010 of 18 July 2011, at 4.4.7.
 1603 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.7.2.
 1604 sfac, judgment A- 6903/ 2010 of 23 March 2011, at 4.2.1.
 1605 sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.3.
 1606 sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, at 5.1.2.
 1607 Eg a protocol or an exchange of letters. See sfac, judgment A- 7017/ 2010 of 16 June 2011, 
at 8.1.4.
 1608 sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.3; sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 
2010 of January 10, 2011, at 5.1.2. Art. 31(3) vclt, according to the Court, pertains to 
the so- called ‘external context’. See sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, 
at 3.5.4.
 1609 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.7.10.
 1610 sfac, judgment E- 4207/ 2006 of 11 September 2008, at 6.1.
 1611 sfac, judgment A- 813/ 2010 of 7 September 2011, at 7.4.2.4.
 1612 sfac, judgment A- 2866/ 2011 of 12 December 2011, at 4.3; sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 
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the aforementioned cases contradicts its narrow interpretation of context in 
connection with art. 31(2) vclt.
The Court’s attitude towards teleology displays some contradictions as well. 
The Court has stated that the treaty’s object and purpose concerns the goals the 
parties intended to (and can)1613 achieve through the treaty.1614  Surprisingly, 
the sfac considers that whether teleological considerations can be relied on 
in the context of purposive interpretation is disputed.1615 The Court has held 
that the ubs Agreement aims at resolving a ‘sovereignty conflict’ between 
Switzerland and the United States,1616 but also that the political circumstances 
of its adoption are irrelevant to determine its object and purpose.1617 It views 
the treaty text (or its ordinary meaning)1618 as a constraint on purposive in-
terpretation,1619 but it has highlighted a treaty’s object and purpose to justify 
dynamic interpretations.1620 The Court has noted that the title and preamble 
of the treaty can be helpful to identify its object and purpose,1621 but also, on 
the other hand, that the vclt does not clarify how the object and purpose 
ought to be determined.1622 As mentioned, the Court occasionally mentions 
the concept of effet utile,1623 although the ilc intentionally excluded it from 
art. 31 vclt.
Historical interpretation is often conducted inconsistently with art. 32 vclt. 
The Court sometimes conflates historical interpretation with the  circumstances 
surrounding the treaty’s conclusion.1624 Like the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 
the sfac has erroneously mentioned the practice of the Swiss authorities 
of systemic integration of art. 31(3)(c) vclt, see also sfac, judgment A- 813/ 2010 of 7 
September 2011, at 7.4.2.4; sfac, judgment A- 6159/ 2010 of 10 February 2011, at 3.4.5.2; 
sfac, judgment A- 4013/ 2010 of 15 July 2010, at 5 and 6.
 1613 sfac, judgment A- 6258/ 2010 of 14 February 2011, at 11.1.2.
 1614 The Court has stressed that dtas do not pursue the same goal as agreements that aim 
at combating tax fraud. See sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, at 5.1.3; 
sfac, judgment A- 4911/ 2010 of 30 November 2010, at 4.1.3.
 1615 sfac, judgment A- 1735/ 2011 of 21 December 2011, at 2.2.2.
 1616 sfac, judgment A- 4013/ 2010 of 15 July 2010, at 8.1; sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 2010 of 18 
July 2011, at 4.4.6.2.
 1617 sfac, judgment A- 4013/ 2010 of 15 July 2010, at 8.1.
 1618 sfac, judgment A- 6258/ 2010 of 14 February 2011, at 11.1.4, 11.3.5.
 1619 sfac, judgment A- 8261/ 2010 of 15 August 2011, at 3.4.
 1620 sfac, judgment E- 4207/ 2006 of 11 September 2008, at 6.4.2 (Refugee Convention).
 1621 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2; sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 
of 10 January 2011, at 5.1.3.
 1622 See sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2.
 1623 sfac, judgment C- 7063/ 2008 of 15 May 2009, at 3.3.1.1.
 1624 sfac, judgment A- 6053/ 2010 of 10 January 2011, at 5.1.2. See however sfac, judgment 
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pertaining to the ratification of a treaty in connection with art. 32 vclt,1625 
although it has stressed the irrelevance of such domestic preparatory work in 
other cases.1626 The Court does not strictly examine whether the conditions for 
resorting to the subsidiary means of art. 32 vclt are indeed fulfilled, although 
it acknowledges their existence.1627 It is worth noting that the Court takes the 
oecd Model Tax Convention and its commentaries into account from the per-
spective of art. 32 vclt to interpret dtas drafted based on the oecd Model Tax 
Convention.1628 Moreover, in the context of the Refugee Convention, it consults 
the unhcr Guidelines, again in the framework of art. 32 vclt.1629
The Court’s references to the vclt cut both ways: they either highlight the 
advantages or the drawbacks of a given method. This confirms that all methods 
must be used jointly (supra, Chapter 6, 2.5). To illustrate, the sfac sometimes 
cites the methods of the vclt to emphasize purposive interpretation,1630 but 
 1625 sfac, judgment A- 3003/ 2017 of 1 May 2019, at 4.1.2 (mentioning the dispatch of 
the Swiss Federal Council on the approval of the Swiss– French dta); sfac, judgment 
A- 8400/ 2015 of 21 March 2016, at 6.3.1.5 (where the Court accepted the possibility to 
rely on the protocol of the debates and final decision of the federal parliament to rat-
ify the Swiss– Dutch dta under the heading of art. 32 vclt); sfac, judgments A- 4407/ 
2014, A- 4414/ 2014, and A- 4415/ 2014 of 8 December 2014, at 3.1.1 (mentioning the 
dispatch of the Swiss Federal Council on the approval of the Swiss– Dutch dta); see also 
sfac, judgment A- 8400/ 2015 of 21 March 2016, at 6.3.1.5 (on the parliamentary debates 
on the Swiss– Dutch dta); sfac, judgment A- 1735/ 2011 of 21 December 2011, at 5.4 
(mentioning the dispatch of the Swiss Federal Council on the approval of the Swiss– eu 
Bilateral Agreements of 2004); sfac, judgment A- 4683/ 2010 of 12 May 2011, at 6.3.4, 
and sfac, judgment A- 4677/ 2010 of 12 May 2011, at 6.3.4 (mentioning the dispatch of 
the Federal Council on the approval of the dta between Switzerland and Singapore). See 
also (mentioning the dispatch of the Federal Council on the approval of the Swiss– us 
ubs Agreement): sfac, judgment A- 6641/ 2010 of 11 March 2011, at 5.2.2; sfac, judg-
ment A- 6159/ 2010 of 10 February 2011, at 3.3.1; sfac, judgment A- 8261/ 2010 of 15 
August 2011, at 4.4; sfac, judgment A- 3830/ 2010 of 29 April 2011, at 3.4.5; sfac, judg-
ment A- 6792/ 2010 of 4 May 2011, at 8.3.3.
 1626 sfac, judgment C- 6631/ 2010 of 15 June 2012, at 5.3.
 1627 sfac, judgment A- 6962/ 2010 of 18 July 2011, at 4.4.4.
 1628 sfac, judgment A- 6537/ 2010 of 7 March 2012, at 3.2.4; sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 
of 21 January 2010, at 3.6.2; sfac, judgment A- 1246/ 2011 of 23 July 2012, at 3.3.4. 
See also sfac, judgment A- 813/ 2010 of 7 September 2011, at 7.4.2.4 (mentioning the 
oecd commentary and a ‘Technical Explanation’ pertaining to the us Model Income Tax 
Convention of 1996).
 1629 sfac, judgment E- 4207/ 2006 of 11 September 2008, at 6.1.
 1630 sfac, judgment A- 6179/ 2010 of 3 March 2011, at 2.3.2. See also SFAC, judgment A- 6677/ 
2010 of 6 June 2011, at 3.3; SFAC, judgment A- 7397/ 2010 of 19 August 2011, at 4.3; SFAC, 
judgment A- 6941/ 2010 of 11 August 2011, at 4.2; sfac, judgment A- 6680/ 2010 of 27 
September 2011, at 4.2; sfac, judgment A- 6927/ 2010 of 13 October 2011, at 9.2, 10.2; 
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also the limits that the text imposes on teleology.1631 In some cases, it has em-
phasized systematic interpretation1632 and, in others, its limited reach.1633
3.3.2.2 The Swiss Federal Criminal Court
Strikingly, since the beginning of its activity in 2004, the Swiss Federal Crimi-
nal Court (sfcc) has referred to the vclt’s interpretative methods only once, 
and very briefly.1634 However, it has mentioned other provisions of the Conven-
tion,1635 and it does occasionally apply treaty law,1636 including treaties that 
are barely applied by other Swiss courts.1637 Only a few cases on international 
law are more detailed, eg the Nezzar case pertaining to the law of immuni-
ties.1638 This case is primarily of interest from the perspective of cil (infra, 
Chapter 8, 2.2.2.2).
The Court’s case law on treaty interpretation is too scarce to enable an 
analysis of the sfcc’s use of the different interpretative methods. Moreover, 
the Court does not dwell on the methods it uses to interpret the law (be it 
 1631 sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2.
 1632 sfac, judgment A- 8358/ 2010 of 25 October 2011, at 8.4. Interestingly, in sfac, judgment 
A- 7789/ 2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.5.2, the Court notes that teleological interpretation 
is not explicitly mentioned in art. 31 vclt.
 1633 Eg when stressing that a treaty must be interpreted independently from other treaties. 
See sfac, judgment A- 6927/ 2010 of 13 October 2011, at 8.2, 10.2.
 1634 sfcc, judgment rr.2017.338 of 17 July 2018, at 3.4.1 (status as of June 2019).
 1635 As of June 2019, the Court’s database (<bstger.weblaw.ch/ index.php?method= 
gesreg&f=0>) referenced 1 ruling mentioning art. 18 vclt, 16 rulings mentioning art. 26 
vclt, 2 rulings mentioning art. 27 vclt, and 2 rulings mentioning art. 30 vclt. Many 
of these rulings are repetitive (ie, they reiterate what has already been said in a previous 
decision).
 1636 According to the Court’s official website, the Court has applied 20 different international 
agreements since 2004 (the two versions of the Lugano Convention are counted as one 
agreement, as well as the Swiss– us Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters and its Appendix). See <bstger.weblaw.ch/ index.php?method=gesreg&f=0>. The 
list does not include all treaties mentioned in the Court’s case law, however; see for instance 
judgment rr.2013.229 of 16 October 2013, which mentions the un Convention Against 
Corruption. Moreover, the database appears to contain errors:  judgment bb.2015.17 of 
6 October 2015, which deals with the Federal Act on dna Profiles (sr 363), has been 
miscategorized as referring to the European Agreement Concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways (adn Treaty, sr 0.747.208).
 1637 Examples include the Geneva Conventions i, ii, and iii, or the European Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism. Other conventions that frequently appear in the sfcc’s case 
law are also applied by other courts, eg the 1990 Convention of the Council of Europe on 
Money Laundering, which regularly appears in the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal.
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domestic or international). Only a few observations can be made about the 
Court’s practice.
First, contrary to that of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and of the sfac, the 
sfcc’s jurisdiction is narrow. Therefore, its case law is specialized. This may 
explain why the judges of the sfcc do not analyze the methods of treaty in-
terpretation. Second, when interpreting treaties, the Court frequently cites 
its own case law,1639 which is in line with the self- referential practice of oth-
er federal courts. The Court also mentions the case law of other Swiss courts, 
especially rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal,1640 and the practice of other 
Swiss authorities, eg the Swiss Federal Council and, more generally, the Swiss 
federal administration.1641 It rarely refers to rulings of international courts.1642 
In  Nezzar, the sfcc cited the icrc commentary and the website of a Belgian 
think tank in connection with art. 3 ap ii to the Geneva Conventions.1643 The 
use of such materials is exceptional in the Swiss case law, and is probably due 
to the political sensitivity of the case. Third, the Court frequently relies on 
scholarly writings.1644 While using such materials undoubtedly serves judicial 
economy, it may prevent a thorough engagement with the issue at stake. In 
Nezzar, for instance, the Court relied on scholarly analyses of the relationship 
between some provisions of domestic criminal law and other treaties ratified 
by  Switzerland.1645 It stated that the domestic provision created ‘a conflict with 
the Geneva Conventions, of which Switzerland is the depositary’. It did so based 
on scholarly writings and on the fact that ‘no scholar argue[d] otherwise’,1646 a 
 1639 sfcc, judgment rr.2013.229 of 16 October 2013, at 3.1 (regarding the European 
Convention on Extradition of 1957); sfcc, judgments rr.2011.144– 148 of 26 January 
2012, at 6.1 (regarding the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters of 1959).
 1640 sfcc, judgment rr.2013.229 of 16 October 2013, at 6.1 and 8.1 (regarding the echr), 
and at 8.4 (regarding the principle of good faith between States); sfcc, judgments 
rr.2011.144– 148 of 26 January 2012, at 6.4.3 (regarding the European Convention on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1959).
 1641 sfcc, judgment bb.2011.140 of 25 July 2012, at 3.4 and 3.6 (regarding the implementa-
tion of the icc Statute), and 5.3 (regarding the vcdr).
 1642 sfcc, judgment rr.2013.229 of 16 October 2013, at 8.3, and sfcc, judgment rr.2009.163 
of 22 July 2009, at 3.6 (citing the case law of the ECtHR on the echr); sfcc, judgment 
bb.2011.140 of 25 July 2012, at 3.5 (regarding the case law of the icj, used in connection 
with the interpretation of art. 3 ap ii).
 1643 sfcc, judgment bb.2011.140 of 25 July 2012, at 3.5.
 1644 sfcc, judgment rr.2013.229 of 16 October 2013, at 3.1 (regarding the European 
Convention on Extradition of 1957).
 1645 Ie, the Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions. See sfcc, judgment 
bb.2011.140 of 25 July 2012, at 3.3.1.
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statement which fails to convince. In this case, the Court also used scholarship 
to interpret the vcdr1647 and the icc Statute.1648
3.3.3 Cantonal Courts
Cantonal courts have referred to the methods of the vclt in some cases dealing 
with treaties. This subsection analyzes the case law of the Supreme Court of the 
canton of Geneva (3.3.3.1), the High Court and Administrative Court of the can-
ton of Zurich (3.3.3.2), the Court of Appeals of the canton of Basel- Stadt (3.3.3.3), 
and the High Court and Administrative Court of the canton of Bern (3.3.3.4) (on 
the reasons for this focus, see supra, Chapter 3, 4.1.2). Relevant case law is scarce 
(though not as meagre as that of the sfcc, for instance, see supra, 3.3.2.2), which 
makes it difficult to assess how these courts use the methods of treaty interpreta-
tion. The following paragraphs hence merely address their overall approach.
3.3.3.1 The Supreme Court of the Canton of Geneva
Out of the four cantonal courts under scrutiny, it is the Supreme Court of the 
canton of Geneva that most frequently refers to treaty law. It mostly cites the 
Vienna Convention in administrative law cases. The Court’s Civil, Criminal, and 
Constitutional Chambers never appear to cite the vclt’s methods,  contrary 
to its Administrative Chamber and, occasionally, its Social Insurance Cham-
ber. The Court has used the vclt’s methods to interpret dtas, the Swiss– eu 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, and Social Security Agreements. 
I analyze these three clusters of cases in turn.
The Court’s approach to the methods of treaty interpretation has been par-
ticularly detailed – albeit modelled on the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law – 
with regard to dtas.1649 The Court has referred to the case law of the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal to justify the applicability of the vclt’s methods.1650 The 
Court rarely cites the methods of the vclt in a predictable, clear, and consist-
ent way.1651 It considers the text to be the starting point of the interpretation 
 1647 Ibid, at 5.3.
 1648 Ibid, at 5.3.5.
 1649 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 434/ 2016 of 24 May 2016, at 5; cj- ge, 
Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 270/ 2011 of 3 May 2011, at 6; cj- ge, Chambre 
administrative, judgment ata/ 238/ 2011 of 12 April 2011, at 10; cj- ge, Chambre admin-
istrative, judgment ata/ 328/ 2004 of 27 April 2004, at 5 c).
 1650 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 434/ 2016 of 24 May 2016, at 5 a); cj- ge, 
Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 270/ 2011 of 3 May 2011, at 6; cj- ge, Chambre 
administrative, judgment ata/ 238/ 2011 of 12 April 2011, at 10.
 1651 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 270/ 2011 of 3 May 2011, at 6. See how-
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of dtas, and that the main purpose of these agreements is to avoid double 
taxation, as opposed to avoiding taxation altogether.1652 The Court has also 
cited a Swiss scholarly treatise on the issue.1653 Interestingly, and although 
this could have been avoided easily, the Court even cited this treatise in dis-
putes where the author of the book was also the lawyer of one of the par-
ties.1654 The Court has sometimes relied on the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case 
law to determine the object and purpose of dtas.1655 Contrary to what art. 32 
vclt provides, the Court has referred to the Swiss travaux pertaining to some 
dtas.1656
The Court regularly notes that the methods of the Vienna Convention apply 
to the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, and that Swiss 
judges must interpret the Agreement independently from the cjeu’s case law, 
at least when this case law was issued after the Agreement’s signature by the 
parties (art. 16(2) of the Agreement).1657 Despite this reference to the vclt, 
the Court has not applied the Convention’s methods to the Swiss– eu Agree-
ment on the Free Movement of Persons in a predictable, clear, and consistent 
way.1658 To interpret it, the Court has cited the case law of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal and its own case law, as well as scholarship.1659
 1652 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 434/ 2016 of 24 May 2016, at 5 c).
 1653 Ibid, at 5  b). See also cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 328/ 2004 of 27 
April 2004, at 5 c).
 1654 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 434/ 2016 of 24 May 2016, at 5 b).
 1655 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 289/ 2000 of 9 May 2000, at 4 a).
 1656 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 434/ 2016 of 24 May 2016, at 5 c) (regard-
ing the Swiss– Israeli dta of 2003); cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 238/ 
2011 of 12 April 2011, at 15 (regarding the dta between Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland of 1993).
 1657 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 551/ 2012 of 21 August 2012, at 8 
b); cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 43/ 2011 of 25 January 2011, at 9; 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 633/ 2009 of 1 December 2009, at 11; 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 152/ 2009 of 24 March 2009, at 23; 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 23/ 2014 of 14 January 2014, at 9 b); 
cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 909/ 2013 of 19 Septembre 
2013, at 6 d); cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 503/ 2014 of 10 
April 2014, at 6 c).
 1658 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 23/ 2014 of 14 January 2014, at 9 b); 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 551/ 2012 of 21 August 2012, at 8 b).
 1659 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 23/ 2014 of 14 January 2014, at 9 b); 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 551/ 2012 of 21 August 2012, at 8 b); 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 43/ 2011 of 25 January 2011, at 9  ; 
cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 633/ 2009 of 1 December 2009, at 11; 
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The Court has also applied the vclt’s methods to the Swiss– us Social Security 
Agreement. In line with the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s practice (supra, 3.3.1.1), it has 
noted that the vclt introduced some changes in the methods used by the highest 
court to interpret such treaties, especially because it requires that treaty terms be 
in principle interpreted independently from domestic law.1660 The Court has also 
stated that the interpretation of an exchange of letters between the Swiss govern-
ment and the who is governed by the vclt.1661
Overall, hardly any ruling of the Court uses the methods of the vclt in a pre-
dictable, clear, and consistent way. The methods of the Convention are often refer-
enced at the beginning of the interpretative process, but they are seldom applied 
in a rigorous fashion.
3.3.3.2 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich
The High Court and Administrative Court of the canton of Zurich do not fre-
quently refer to the methods of the vclt. Some decisions of the High Court follow 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law on treaty interpretation and, thereby, the 
methods of the vclt,1662 though often implicitly.1663 In several judgments dating 
from 2018 and pertaining to the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of 
Persons, the High Court held that the treaty was not to be interpreted based on 
domestic law, but ‘out of itself, in good faith, and in light of its object and purpose’, 
yet the Court did not mention the vclt.1664 Only a handful of cases deal with the 
methods of treaty interpretation, and the courts’ approach is not always in line 
with the broader Swiss and international practice and/ or with the vclt.
A High Court decision of 1997 highlights, in addition to restrictive interpre-
tation, that treaty interpretation aims at identifying the intentions of the par-
ties.1665 These two positions are somewhat dated, and they are not commonly 
 1660 cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 507/ 2017 of 15 June 2017, at 
9; cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 495/ 2016 of 23 June 2016, 
at 10 c).
 1661 cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 813/ 2015 of 28 October 
2015, at 5.
 1662 ‘Obergericht, II. Zivilkammer, Beschluss vom 8.  April 2002’ (2002) 101 Blätter für 
Zürcherische Rechtsprechung 276, para 3.1.
 1663 See however VwGer- zh, judgment sb.2012.00088 of 18 December 2013, at 20.
 1664 oger- zh, judgment sb170315 of 16 January 2018, at 2 b); oger- zh, judgment sb180164 
of 5 October 2018, at 2 c); oger- zh, judgment sb180165 of 5 October 2018, at 2 c); 
oger- zh, judgment sb180235 of 5 October 2018, at 7.2. An indirect reference to the vclt 
can be found in a later case in which the Court quotes the Swiss Federal Tribunal: oger- 
zh, judgment sb180098 of 26 February 2019, at 6.2.
 1665 ‘Obergericht, I. Zivilkammer, Beschluss vom 11. April 1997’ (1997) 96 Blätter für 
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adopted in the Swiss case law. Some decisions stress the importance of ‘auton-
omous interpretation’.1666
The Administrative Court has inquired into the intentions of the treaty par-
ties as well.1667 In a ruling of 2003 pertaining to the Swiss– eu Agreement on 
the Free Movement of Persons, it stressed the wording, object and purpose, 
and context of the agreement.1668 Contrary to what art. 31 f vclt allow, it also 
emphasized the ‘Swiss perspective’ on the agreement’s object and purpose.1669 
In another decision of 2003, the Administrative Court highlighted the object 
and purpose of the Swiss– eu Agreement, noting that Switzerland had ‘not 
been able to carry through its position’ on some aspects and had ‘de facto been 
forced to adopt eu law’.1670 These statements could suggest that the Court is 
influenced by partisan motives. By contrast, in a ruling of 2013, the Court men-
tioned the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal to state that dtas must be in-
terpreted based on the vclt’s methods.1671 It is worth noting that it sometimes 
merely recites the provisions of a treaty without interpreting them.1672
3.3.3.3 The Court of Appeals of the Canton of Basel- Stadt
As a reminder, the Court of Appeals of the canton of Basel- Stadt is the high-
est judicial body of the canton in civil, criminal, administrative, and constitu-
tional matters (supra, Chapter 3, 4.1.2.3). Deciding in its administrative court 
capacity, the Court of Appeals has relied on art. 31 f vclt and on the case law 
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal to interpret an agreement between the bis and 
the canton of Basel- Stadt.1673 In a judgment of 2018 pertaining to the un Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Court stressed 
that interpreters had to take the international character of the Convention into 
account. It mentioned the four interpretative methods of international law, as 
well as the comparative law method. The Court further emphasized the impor-
tance of aiming for ‘practicable’ interpretative outcomes.1674 Overall, however, 
 1666 ‘Obergericht, II. Zivilkammer, Beschluss vom 30. September 2005’ (2005) 106 Blätter für 
Zürcherische Rechtsprechung 33, para 1.
 1667 Eg VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2013.00274 of 4 September 2014, at 6.3.4.
 1668 VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2003.00175 of 22 October 2003, at 2– 4.
 1669 Ibid, at 4 h).
 1670 VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2002.00405 of 19 March 2003, at 3 d).
 1671 VwGer- zh, judgment sb.2012.00088 of 18 December 2013, at 20. See also VwGer- zh, 
judgment sb.2016.00118 of 31 May 2017, at 2.2.1.
 1672 Eg VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2013.00274 of 4 September 2014.
 1673 ‘Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts vom 17.8.2001 in Sachen Ehegatten X.- Y’. (2003) Basler 
Juristische Mitteilungen 214, para 2 c).
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very few cases deal with treaties in the first place, let alone with their interpre-
tative methods.
3.3.3.4 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Bern
As a general matter, very little case law of the High Court and Administrative Court 
of the canton of Bern that is available online deals with the methods of  treaty in-
terpretation, although treaties are mentioned in some decisions. The High Court 
hardly ever refers to the vclt’s methods. The Administrative Court has noted that 
the Swiss– eu bilateral agreements must be interpreted ‘autonomously’, pursuant 
to the methods of the vclt.1675 However, only very few of its rulings refer to the 
vclt and to its methods. In a detailed judgment pertaining to the Swiss– Thai dta, 
and based on the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and legal scholarship, 
the Administrative Court stated that dtas must be interpreted pursuant to cil 
and the vclt. It especially referred to textual and systemic interpretation (with 
unusually copious references to other dtas concluded by  Switzerland),1676 insist-
ing on the fact that its interpretation was consistent with the Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal’s case law.1677 In another, equally detailed judgment of 2018 pertaining to 
the Swiss– Thai dta, the Court stated that unilateral declarations issued by one 
of the treaty partners were not part of the context of the treaty as per art. 31(2) 
vclt, thereby rejecting the argumentation of the federal tax authorities.1678 Such 
rulings are exceptional occurrences in the case law.
3.3.4 Military Tribunals
Many decisions of the mcc1679 concern alleged failures of members of the mil-
itary to comply with their duty to serve. As regards the mcc’s interpretative 
 1675 ‘Urteil des Verwaltungsgerichts (Sozialversicherungsrechtliche Abteilung) vom 28. 
Dezember 2012 in Sachen B. gegen Gemeinsame Einrichtung kvg (vge 200.2012.892)’ 
(2013) Bernische Verwaltungsrechtsprechung 487, para 3; ‘Auszug aus dem Urteil 
des Verwaltungsgerichts (Sozialversicherungsrechtliche Abteilung) vom 14. Januar 
1999 in Sachen P.K.  gegen Arbeitslosenkasse AdU (AlV 53180)’ (1999) Bernische 
Verwaltungsrechtsprechung 373, para 5 a).
 1676 VwGer- be, judgment 100 2014 12 of 20 April 2016, at 5.1 ff.
 1677 Ibid, at 5.5.
 1678 VwGer- be, judgment 100 2017 27 of 1 May 2018, at 5.2 (pertaining to VwGer- be, judg-
ment 100 2014 12 of 20 April 2016). See also VwGer- be, judgment 100 2017 24 of 29 
June 2018, at 4.3.1.
 1679 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the present analysis includes the decisions of the Military 
Court of Cassation (mcc) accessible online since 2006, see <www.oa.admin.ch/ de/ 
entscheidungen- militaerjustiz.html>. Scope precluded a systematic analysis of the 
Court’s comprehensive database (available at <eu.alma.exlibrisgroup.com/ view/ delivery/ 
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methods in general, the Court has endorsed the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s ‘prag-
matic methodological pluralism’.1680 Overall, the mcc mentions treaties very 
rarely.1681 One of the few cases in which treaty law was applied is a decision of 
2011 pertaining to the 2007 Swiss– Italian Convention on the military service of 
dual nationals.1682 The Court only lists a number of provisions of the Conven-
tion. It does not provide insights into the methods of treaty interpretation. The 
same applies to another case of 2012 pertaining to the same treaty.1683 While 
some decisions of the mcc mention the echr, they primarily use the case law 
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal to interpret the Convention.1684 In a decision of 
2013, the Court interpreted art. 5 echr based on scholarly writings.1685
A landmark case in which the Court applied international law is the 
 Niyonteze judgment, decided in 2001.1686 The case mainly pertained to com-
mon art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol ii (ap ii). 
The Court also interpreted the former art. 109 of the Swiss Military Criminal 
Code (smcc), which sanctioned violations of ihl treaties.1687  Unfortunately, 
the case does not reveal the methods based on which these treaty provisions 
must be interpreted. To interpret common art. 3, the Court referred to the 
 icty’s case law1688 and to the icrc commentary on ap ii.1689 It also relied 
on the ictr’s practice to establish the existence of a non- international armed 
conflict pursuant to common art. 3.1690 To clarify the notions of intentional 
homicide or murder under ihl, the Court mentioned a dispatch of the Federal 
courts were not surveyed systematically, although I occasionally mention rulings deemed 
relevant. Given the absence of a search engine that can identify relevant decisions of the 
military courts, the survey of the mcc’s recent decisions was complemented by scholar-
ship and case reports by ngos or other private or public bodies.
 1680 mcc, judgment of 14 December 2012, dmc Vol 13 No 34, at 2 b); mcc, judgment of 19 
September 2013, dmc Vol 13 No 39, at 3.2.1.
 1681 For a case presenting an international dimension, but in which no treaty between 
Switzerland and Turkey had been concluded, see mcc, judgment of 10 December 2009, 
dmc Vol 13 No 17, at 2 a). See however ibid, at 2 d) (reference to treaties with other States 
than Turkey).
 1682 mcc, judgment of 21 September 2011, dmc Vol 13 No 28.
 1683 mcc, judgment of 14 December 2012, dmc Vol 13 No 35, at 3.2.
 1684 mcc, judgment of 24 April 2007, dmc Vol 13 No 3, at 3, and mcc, judgment of 24 April 
2007, dmc Vol 13 No 4, at 3; mcc, judgment of 20 June 2013, dmc Vol 13 No 38, at 3.2.
 1685 mcc, judgment of 8 February 2013, dmc Vol 13 No 36, at 2 b) aa).
 1686 mcc, judgment of 27 April 2001, dmc Vol 12 No 21 (the decision is available at <eu.alma.
exlibrisgroup.com/ view/ delivery/ 41BIG_ INST/ 12329504630001791>).
 1687 See also art. 110 ff smcc (as of 1 January 2019).
 1688 mcc, judgment of 27 April 2001, dmc Vol 12 No 21, at 3 c).
 1689 Ibid, at 9 a).






















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
Treaty Interpretation 265
Council.1691 It noted that as the highest military court, it had to interpret art. 
109 smcc autonomously.1692 Whether it was alluding to its hierarchical posi-
tion in the Swiss military judiciary or to its autonomy from international courts 
is unclear.1693
3.4 Relationship with Interpretative Methods under Swiss Law
How do the methods used by Swiss courts to interpret treaties relate to those they 
employ to interpret Swiss law? Given the richness and influential character of the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law regarding domestic interpretative methods, the 
Court constitutes my focus in this subsection.
In the context of domestic statutory1694 and constitutional1695 interpretation, 
but also with regard to other domestic legal acts1696 (and even before their formal 
adoption),1697 the Swiss Federal Tribunal uses the same four interpretative meth-
ods as those governing the interpretation of international law (supra, Chapter 6, 
section 2). This is true even though the way in which these methods are used can 
vary, inter alia depending on the legal source at stake.1698 It is important to ac-
knowledge that in domestic interpretation as well, the legality and quality of the 
Court’s reasoning are sometimes problematic.1699
The Swiss Federal Tribunal has explicitly acknowledged that the basic 
methods of treaty interpretation and the methods of domestic statutory in-
terpretation1700 (and, more generally, the interpretative methods of ‘general 
and abstract rules of domestic law’)1701 are the same. Given the monism of the 
 1691 Ibid, at 9 a).
 1692 Ibid, at 9 d).
 1693 The remarks of the mcc suggest that it is probably the former, as the Court then stated 
that there was no reason not to adopt the criteria used by the ictr to determine whether 
common art. 3 and ap ii had been violated. See ibid, at 9 d).
 1694 bge 141 iii 155, at 4.2; bge 140 iv 28, at 4.3.1; bge 123 ii 595, at 4 a).
 1695 bge 83 i 173, at 4 (interpretation of a cantonal constitution); bge 118 Ib 187, at 4, and 
bge 116 Ia 359, at 5 c) (interpretation of the Cst.).
 1696 Eg bge 137 i 31, at 2, and bge 140 i 2, at 4 (interpretation of an intercantonal agree-
ment); bge 102 ii 401, at 3, and bge 137 iii 337, at 3 (interpretation of a federal ordi-
nance); bge 140 iii 349, at 2.3 (interpretation of the bylaws of large corporations).
 1697 bge 124 i 107, at 5 b) (interpretation of a cantonal popular initiative).
 1698 In the context of constitutional interpretation, for instance, the Court is more cautious to 
use evolutive (teleological) interpretation. See bge 115 Ia 127, at 3 a) (where the Court 
also distinguishes between so- called organic provisions and provisions protecting funda-
mental rights).
 1699 For a critique, see Pichonnaz and Vogenauer (n 105). See also Chapter 3, 4.2.6 (supra).
 1700 Eg bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.2.
 1701 bge 130 i 312, at 4.1; bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.2. See also bge 135 v 339, at 5.3. The Court 
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Swiss legal order (Chapter 3, 2.2.1, supra), this conception is also reflected in 
the Court’s statement that the four methods (textual, systematic, teleological, 
and historical, see also Chapter 6, supra) apply in the domestic legal order at 
large.1702 Though some cases could suggest a difference (or only a ‘relative sim-
ilarity’)1703 between the methods of treaty interpretation and those of domes-
tic law,1704 there is no indication in the case law that these methods are actu-
ally different. Rather, the disjunction to which the Court alludes concerns the 
idiosyncratic features of domestic and international lawmaking, respectively.
As a matter of fact, many features of the Court’s case law on domestic 
methods confirm this convergence. In the domestic context, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal considers that the various methods do not stand in any hierarchical 
relationship.1705 However, a provision cannot be interpreted contra legem,1706 
unless weighty reasons justify it.1707 The Court has noted that it relies on the 
text alone in exceptional cases, when its meaning leaves no room for doubt.1708 
It also relies on systematic1709 and teleological1710 arguments. It has  highlighted 
the importance of subsequent interpretative practice to identify the meaning 
of written legal acts.1711 This feature is reminiscent of the subsequent practice 
that is relevant in the context of treaty interpretation, as per art. 31(3)(b) vclt. 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal acknowledges that historical interpretation is not 
decisive, but an ‘interpretative aid’.1712 This position is consistent with the sta-
tus of ‘auxiliary means’ of the travaux pursuant to art. 32 vclt.
The case law confirms that interpretative methods are the same in domestic 
law and treaty law, even if some differences exist between domestic and inter-
national lawmaking (eg the characteristics of lawmaking bodies in domestic 
and international law, respectively). The fact that the Swiss Federal Tribunal, at 
applicable to contractual interpretation, although it applies the methods of statutory 
interpretation to the bylaws of large corporations, see bge 140 iii 349, at 2.3.
 1702 bge 83 iv 121, at 2.
 1703 bge 136 i 290, at 2.3.2; bge 135 v 339, at 5.3; bge 130 i 312, at 4.1.
 1704 bge 110 Ia 123, at 1.
 1705 bge 141 iii 155, at 4.2; bge 139 iii 225, at 2.2; bge 131 v 305, at 4.4; bge 123 ii 595, at 
4 a); bge 98 Ia 194, at 2 a); bge 83 i 173, at 4; bge 131 ii 697, at 4.1.
 1706 bge 98 Ia 194, at 2 a). See also bge 83 i 173, at 4.
 1707 bge 118 Ib 187, at 5 a); bge 141 ii 262, at 4.2; bge 113 v 150, at 3 a).
 1708 bge 131 ii 697, at 4.1.
 1709 bge 129 iii 656, at 4.2.2.
 1710 On teleological interpretation, see bge 128 i 34, at 3 b). See also bge 123 iii 442, at 2 d); 
bge 129 iii 656, at 4.3.
 1711 bge 83 i 173, at 4. See also bge 116 Ia 359, at 5 c).
 1712 bge 141 iii 155, at 4.2; bge 123 ii 595, at 4 a). See also bge 83 i 173, at 4, and bge 83 iv 
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times, compares the methods of treaty interpretation with domestic law, sug-
gests that the Court draws on (and is influenced by) methodological insights 
gained in the context of domestic interpretation when it interprets treaties. 
Vice versa, the Court has used the methods of treaty interpretation to interpret 
some domestic laws, especially intercantonal agreements (eg supra, 3.1).
3.5 Comparing the Practice of Swiss Courts
The preceding survey of Swiss courts’ practice of treaty interpretation (supra, 
3.1– 3.3) opens the doors for a comparison of their respective approaches.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law is cited and followed by all Swiss courts 
under scrutiny. While this practice is not necessarily the oldest, given the long- 
standing activity of cantonal courts, it is by far the most easily accessible, and 
it covers the longest period of time. These practical considerations aside, rel-
evant judgments of other courts are much scarcer, except for the sfac’s. The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal’s appellate function in the Swiss judiciary largely ex-
plains the Court’s interpretive authority. This authority also hinges on other 
factors, including the breadth of the Court’s jurisdiction (contrary to the nar-
row jurisdiction of the sfcc, for instance), the range of treaties the Court has 
interpreted, and the detailed guidance it provides on interpretative methods 
regarding specific treaties (eg the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons), but also more generally (by endorsing the vclt’s methods).  Other 
courts tend to provide more precise interpretations in politically sensitive 
 cases only, eg the sfcc in Nezzar, or the sfac in cases pertaining to dtas and 
the ubs Agreement.
Only the sfac’s practice is as detailed as (and, occasionally, more detailed 
than) the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s. This is especially the case when the sfac 
interprets dtas and the ubs Agreement. The Court has been more thorough 
than the Swiss Federal Tribunal when assessing the customary character of 
the vclt’s methods, and when determining whether the vclt has codified or 
crystallized custom, for instance. It is also more explicit in its endorsement of 
‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ in the context of international law. On 
the other hand, its case law is more specialized than the Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal’s and, at times, more ambiguous and contradictory. This is for example the 
case when the sfac uses the practice of the Swiss authorities to interpret a 
treaty, but does not accept such unilateral interpretations when they are based 
on the practice of Switzerland’s treaty partners.
While the sophistication and precision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case 
law has increased over time, its recent practice also comes with flaws from the 
perspective of interpretative methods and good judicial reasoning. Recurring 
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the legal act and its characteristics in some cases (eg when the Court simply 
relies on art. 31(1) vclt, or when it primarily uses scholarship to underpin its 
interpretative conclusions), circularity (ie, references to the Court’s own inter-
pretations), and self- referentiality (ie, references to the practice of  other Swiss 
courts and authorities). Moreover, in some instances, its practice is squarely 
at odds with the vclt. One common mistake pertains to the use of domestic 
legislative history (especially the dispatch of the Federal Council) to interpret 
treaties.
These problematic features can be found in the practice of all courts un-
der scrutiny, to the extent that their case law is detailed enough. Most courts 
have endorsed the customary character of the vclt’s methods, and many have 
 noted the congruence that exists between the interpretative methods of do-
mestic written law and those of treaties. Courts also acknowledge the duty of 
States to interpret treaties in good faith and independently from domestic law. 
However, some courts, like the sfcc, hardly ever refer to the vclt. Swiss courts 
barely depart from the path traced by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. They often 
strive to demonstrate that their case law is consistent with it. Exceptionally, 
cantonal jurisdictions have adopted unorthodox approaches, eg by engaging in 
contractual interpretation or by mentioning restrictive interpretation.
Swiss courts’ interpretative methods are particularly detailed with regard 
to dtas, the Swiss– eu Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons, and so-
cial security agreements. The courts tend to adopt idiosyncratic interpretative 
approaches in different substantive areas of international law. With regard to 
the Swiss– eu Agreement on Free Movement, for instance, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal (followed by other Swiss courts) tends to emphasize purposive inter-
pretation.1713 Its approach is less markedly teleological for other treaties. Inde-
pendently from the characteristics of different regimes and from the fact that 
not every case raises complex interpretative issues, courts do not seem to use a 
predictable, clear, and consistent interpretative scheme across cases.
The Swiss Federal Tribunal occasionally uses the practice of other Swiss au-
thorities, especially that of the Swiss Federal Council. Other Swiss courts tend 
to follow the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and they typically neglect the practice 
of other State organs, including the executive. All Swiss courts make scarce 
use of foreign and international case law. One exception is the case law of the 
ECtHR, which is often (and sometimes extensively) cited by the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal in relevant cases.1714 Most courts use scholarship which, sometimes, 
 1713 On this issue, see already Besson and Ammann (n 97) 340 ff.
 1714 For a detailed analysis, see Ammann, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Swiss 
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is even their only resource. This casts doubt on whether they have  thoroughly 
engaged with the practice on a given issue, especially when few authors 
are cited.
Many other empirical causes likely explain some of the variations in the 
case law (eg the composition of a court in different cases). Their in- depth ex-
amination is beyond the scope of this study.
3.6 Putting the Swiss Judicial Practice into Perspective
The survey of the Swiss judicial practice also makes it possible to compare1715 
this practice with that of other domestic courts.
The Swiss case law resembles that of other domestic courts in many re-
spects. Shared features include the endorsement of the vclt’s methods qua 
customary law, but also a tendency to refer to these methods selectively, or 
without necessarily following through. Courts also tend to not always explic-
itly acknowledge the mandatory character of these methods. They rely on 
their own precedents, and they provide little detail as to their interpretative 
methodology. Their degree of diligence seems to hinge on the subject mat-
ter of the case. Finally, domestic courts sometimes disregard the constraints 
established by interpretative methods, eg by referring to domestic (but not 
to intergovernmental) preparatory work that pertains to the ratification of a 
specific treaty.
In other regards, the Swiss judicial practice differs from that of foreign 
courts. Swiss judges seem to consider interpretative methods to be obligatory, 
unlike other judges, especially judges in jurisdictions that are not parties to 
the vclt. Another difference is that the Swiss Federal Tribunal is keener to use 
these methods than other Swiss (and especially cantonal) courts, unlike in the 
United States for instance, where the Supreme Court is reluctant to use these 
methods, contrary to the lower courts. Swiss courts are also less inclined to cite 
foreign materials (eg foreign judgments). This is likely partly due to the laconic 
style of Swiss rulings, and to the absence of separate opinions in the Swiss ju-
diciary (see supra, Chapter 3, 4.2.5).
 1715 Of course, as previously mentioned (supra, 2.1), comparability is limited by the layer of 
domestic constitutional law that inevitably conditions domestic courts’ interpretations, 
by the scarcity of material available for some foreign jurisdictions, and by the fact that the 
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While Swiss courts sometimes diligently follow the methods of treaty interpre-
tation, some features of their practice are problematic from the perspective of 
legality and high- quality reasoning (supra, Introduction, section 3). I identify 
four clusters of problems.
 1. Neglect of interpretative methods. Courts tend to ignore the methods of 
treaty interpretation. This omission is either systematic, frequent, or occa-
sional (eg only in connection with specific treaties). It ranges from full ne-
glect to the neglect of only some methods (which usually goes along with 
biases in favor of other methods) and the conditions under which they 
apply (eg art. 32 vclt). Cantonal courts hardly refer to treaty interpreta-
tion and its methods. Another symptom of this neglect is that the courts 
have used concepts that are not required by the interpretative methods 
of international law, eg effet utile and restrictive interpretation, and do-
mestic concepts and categories. Finally, courts are sometimes hesitant to 
embrace the customary character of some methods, and they mention 
Switzerland’s ratification of the vclt to justify their applicability.
 To ignor interpretative methods is particularly problematic from the per-
spective of legality. The less courts dwell upon their interpretative ap-
proach, the more difficult it is to evaluate whether their decisions have 
been reached in conformity with the law. Of course, not every case raises 
difficult interpretative issues, and it would be counter- productive to re-
quire courts to elaborate on their interpretative methodology in such in-
stances. However, in many rulings, controversial interpretative issues do 
arise, which calls for a more careful approach to interpretative methods.
 The neglect of interpretative methods also creates difficulties from the 
vantage point of the quality of judicial reasoning. Indeed, in doing so, 
courts fail to reason predictably, clearly, and consistently.
 2. Selective reliance on auxiliary means and insufficient substantiation. 
Courts often assert a given interpretation without substantiating this 
conclusion. Assertion is not necessarily problematic. It may be appro-
priate when a relatively straightforward legal issue is involved. However, 
assertion is deeply problematic when it is used to conceal a lack of meth-
odological rigor. Such rigor is required from the perspective of both the 
legality and the quality of judicial reasoning.1716
 1716 This type of assertion has been denounced by Stefan Talmon with regard to the icj’s iden-
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 A related feature of the case law is that courts tend to rely on auxiliary 
means, instead of direct manifestations of State practice on treaty inter-
pretation. Again, using auxiliary means is not necessarily flawed, and it 
is in line with art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute. Yet the selective and sloppy resort 
to such means can lead courts to ignore the actual State practice, which 
(in cil at least) must be coherent, constant, and general. It is hence po-
tentially problematic from the perspective of legality. As a matter of fact, 
courts particularly often use legal scholarship, while neglecting the prac-
tice of their treaty partners, and international judicial decisions. More-
over, high- quality judicial reasoning requires that interpretations be 
backed by predictable, clear, and consistent reasoning.
 3. Self- referentiality and circularity. The Swiss judicial practice is highly self- 
referential (when courts cite other Swiss authorities) and even circular (when 
they cite themselves). Courts frequently rely on the interpretative practice 
of the Swiss authorities, especially the practice of Swiss courts. They par-
ticularly frequently rely on their own previous case law. This is, again, prob-
lematic from the perspective of the legality and quality of judicial reasoning. 
Indeed, it can lead to a disregard for the sources of international law and 
for the characteristics of international lawmaking (which, by definition, in-
volves more than one Sate). It can also undermine the predictability, clarity, 
and consistency of judicial reasoning, since it may conceal a lack of trans-
parency and of thorough engagement with the interpretative issue.
 4. Imprecision, uneven level of detail, and superficial reasoning. Courts rarely 
apply the interpretative methods of treaty law in a systematic, detailed, 
and transparent way. The level of detail of their case law is uneven. Some 
remarks about the methods of treaty interpretation, though pedagogical 
and detailed, are highly repetitive. This suggests that courts do not actu-
ally engage with these methods, but merely pay lipservice to them. Again, 
it is important to stress that not every interpretative issue is complex and 
controversial. This explains the heterogeneity of the case law to a certain 
extent. Moreover, repetitive cases may be due to the fact that the basic in-
terpretative issue at stake is essentially identical. On the other hand, su-
perficial reasoning can create the sense that an issue is clear, even though 
it does raise interpretative issues. It also risks disregarding the sources 
and specificities of international law and of the issue at hand. Finally, it 
prevents predictable, clear, and consistent reasoning.
To conclude, in at least four respects, the Swiss judicial practice of treaty 
interpretation stands in tension with the methods of treaty interpretation 
and with high- quality reasoning. As I  will show, these clusters of problems 
also arise, mutatis mutandis, in connection with unwritten international law 
(Chapter 8, section 4, infra). 
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 chapter 8
Swiss Courts and the Interpretation 
of Unwritten International Law
[There is a] need for clarity as regards the sources of public interna-
tional law, or at least as much clarity as possible. Questions relating 
to sources lie at the heart of international law. Of particular concern 
is the lack of rigour shown by some domestic judges when it comes 
to determining the rules of customary international law.1717
[How the existence of rules of customary international law, and 
their content, are to be determined,] is not only of concern to spe-
cialists in public international law; others, including those involved 
with national courts, are increasingly called upon to identify rules 
of customary international law. In each case, a structured and care-
ful process of legal analysis and evaluation is required to ensure 
that a rule of customary international law is properly identified, 
thus promoting the credibility of the particular determination as 
well as that of customary international law more broadly.1718
∵
1 Introduction
While treaty law is undoubtedly the source of international law that is most 
frequently used in domestic courts, it is not the only one. Besides written inter-
national legal acts, courts also apply unwritten ones, namely customary inter-
national law (cil) and general principles of international law.1719
 1717 Michael Wood, ‘What Is Public International Law? The Need for Clarity About Sources’ 
(2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 205, 205.
 1718 ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, With 
Commentaries’ (n 891) 122 para 2.
 1719 There is a wealth of literature on unwritten international law. For recent contributions, 
see eg Peter Staubach, The Rule of Unwritten International Law: Customary Law, General 









Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
The Interpretation of Unwritten International Law 273
Compared to treaty law (supra, Chapter 7), there is little domestic judicial 
practice pertaining to cil, and this practice is often more ‘hesitan[t] ’.1720 This 
a fortiori applies to general principles of international law, which are barely 
 cited. As I  will explain, courts’ fluctuating terminology1721 makes it hard to 
identify the few cases dealing with these two sources of international law.
Nonetheless, there are various important reasons for studying domestic 
courts’ interpretation of cil and general principles of international law. First, 
both do provide answers to international legal issues. Consider, for example, 
the customary principle pacta sunt servanda, or the general principle of inter-
national law according to which the violation of an international legal duty 
triggers a duty to provide reparation.1722 The legal norms that prescribe the 
use of the four interpretative methods, as well as other secondary norms of 
international law, are customary norms themselves. Second, the interpretation 
of both cil and general principles of international law is governed by specific 
methods with which States must comply (supra, Chapters 5 and 6). It is there-
fore important that this practice does not escape scrutiny. Third, the influence 
of cil and general principles of international law on the formation of inter-
national law (especially on the formation of treaty law) cannot be overstated. 
A vast number of treaties have been codified based in part on cil. Fourth, giv-
en that some States are frequently exposed to specific customary international 
legal issues and general principles of international law, their experience is at 
least occasionally relied on by other States to ascertain the law governing these 
matters (on the concept of ‘specially affected States’, see supra, Chapter 3, 2.1).
In the first section of this chapter, I examine the domestic judicial practice 
of cil, with an emphasis on the Swiss practice (2). As always, my focus lies 
on courts’ compliance with the interpretative methods of cil, and with the 
virtues of high- quality reasoning (on these two basic criteria of evaluation, 
see supra, Introduction, section 3). The next section is devoted to domestic 
courts’ interpretation of general principles of international law (3). I evaluate 
this practice based on the same aforementioned criteria. Finally, after this tour 
d’horizon of the Swiss practice, I provide an overall evaluation thereof (4), once 
again from the perspective of legality and quality. As was the case in my chap-
ter on treaty law (Chapter 7, supra), the case law on which this chapter is based 
reflects the state of courts’ online databases or websites in June 2019.
 1720 Hegde (n 46).
 1721 On this issue, see also Besson and Ammann (n 60) 16 ff.
 1722 pcij, case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), judgment, claim for 
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It is important to recall at the outset that legal norms requiring the use of in-
terpretative methods are secondary norms. Hence, they are customary norms. 
Norms about interpretative methods are largely the product of judicial law (su-
pra, Chapter 5, section 3, and Chapter 6, section 2). When courts interpret cus-
tom, they generate a practice that can contribute to defining the interpretative 
methods of customary law (as is also the case with the methods of interpretation 
of treaty law and of general principles of international law). Indeed, domestic rul-
ings provide evidence of the constitutive elements of cil (supra, Chapter 4, 3.1.2). 
This explains, though it does not justify, why domestic courts may be tempted 
to refer to their own practice to identify customary interpretative methods. This 
circularity cannot detract from the fact that courts are not the only actors whose 
practice matters for the purposes of identifying customary interpretative meth-
ods. When interpreting international law, courts must use the methodological 
yardsticks defined by the practice of States at large, not only by themselves (or 
by their own State). This is the case regardless of whether domestic law requires 
them to respect their previous rulings, the case law of other domestic courts, or 
the decisions of other domestic authorities.
2 Customary International Law
In this section, I  describe the practice of domestic courts on cil in general 
(2.1), before taking a closer look at the Swiss judicial practice (2.2).
2.1 Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of Customary  
International Law
As was the case with treaty interpretation (supra, Chapter 7, section 2), the  present 
section mainly relies on scholarly analyses of domestic courts’ interpreta tion of 
cil. I have relied on accounts providing insights (even at the margins) into the 
judicial interpretative methods of cil in African,1723 Asian,1724 European,1725  
 1723 Maripe (n 354); Nwapi (n 1388).
 1724 Takashiba (n 1383); Hegde (n 46); Marochkin and Popov (n 183); Karim (n 1383).
 1725 Fleuren (n 1388); Patrick Capps, ‘The Court as Gatekeeper:  Customary International 
Law in English Courts’ (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 458; Peter Bachmayer and August 
Reinisch, ‘The Role of Judges at Austrian Courts in the Development of International 
Law’ (2015) 14 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 151; Wouters 
(n 1223); Stirling- Zanda (n 102); JHM Willems, ‘Treatment of Customary International 
Law and Use of Expert Evidence by the Dutch Court in the Bouterse Case’ (2004) 4 Non- 
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North American,1726 South American,1727 and Oceanian1728 jurisdictions, as 
well as on broader analyses of the domestic practice.1729 While I have, whenev-
er possible, used analyses of domestic courts’ interpretation of cil that are not 
limited to a given substantive area (eg to ihrl), the dearth of scholarship on 
the issue made it necessary to also rely on more specialized contributions.1730 
Unfortunately, and even more so than for treaty law, it is difficult to find rel-
evant scholarship for some jurisdictions, partly due to linguistic barriers and 
to limited online availability. It is crucial to develop this scholarship further in 
order to mitigate geographic bias.
Drawing parallels between foreign legal scholarship about the foreign court 
practice, on the one hand (2.1), and Swiss case law and legal scholarship, on the 
other (2.2), raises issues of comparability. Moreover, scholarship alone provides 
limited insight into a State’s judicial practice, especially when this scholarship is 
scarce (which, unfortunately, is often the case). I hence also relied on judgments 
that had been added to the ildc database as of June 2019.1731 For similar reasons 
as for my analysis of treaty interpretation (supra, Chapter 7), I did not canvass all 
available ildc judgments dealing with cil and its methods. Instead, I focused on 
rulings from jurisdictions for which relevant scholarship was available.1732
Listing cases from an array of jurisdictions also raises questions of com-
parability given the differences that characterize domestic legal orders. In 
France,1733 Mexico,1734 and the Netherlands,1735 for instance, the Constitution 
 1726 Paul L Hoffman, ‘The “Blank Stare Phenomenon”: Proving Customary International Law 
in u.s. Courts’ (1996) 25 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 181; 
Szewczyk (n 1133); Criddle (n 1141).
 1727 José Luis Guzmán Dalbora, ‘The Treatment of International Crimes in Chilean 
Jurisprudence: A Janus Face’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 535; Dondé 
Matute (n 920); Pablo F Parenti, ‘The Prosecution of International Crimes in Argentina’ 
(2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 491.
 1728 Alan Boyle, ‘International Law Before National Courts: Some Problems From a Common 
Law Perspective’ (2004) 4 Non- State Actors and International Law 59; de Jonge (n 1387).
 1729 Eg Staubach (n 1265); Iovane (n 182).
 1730 This applies, for instance, to articles published in 2010 in a special issue of the International 
Criminal Law Review devoted to Latin America and icl. See also Gordon A Christenson, 
‘Customary International Human Rights Law in Domestic Court Decisions’ (1996) 25 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 225; Akande and Shah (n 859).
 1731 As is the case with treaty law, the database provides a filter for cil.
 1732 For these jurisdictions, I looked at all available judgments. One exception is the United 
States: in light of the large number of rulings available (138 as of June 2019), I focused on 
Supreme Court rulings.
 1733 See Bernard Stirn’s observations in ‘The Judge and International Custom / Le juge et la 
coutume internationale’ (Council of Europe 2013) 100.
 1734 Dondé Matute (n 920) 579.
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does not specifically mention cil. This contrasts with jurisdictions such as 
Australia, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Philippines, Portugal, Russia, and South 
Korea, which mention cil or related umbrella terms and often regulate some 
aspects of its relationship with domestic law.1736 While I do not analyze these 
constitutional characteristics, caution is warranted when comparing these 
various domestic practices. Even within one jurisdiction, a ruling cannot be 
appraised without the necessary caveats, eg the specific context in which cil 
is interpreted.1737
When looking at these domestic practices, a first finding is that a reference to 
cil in domestic constitutions does not guarantee that courts actually apply it. Jan 
Wouters, in a comparative analysis of domestic rulings in continental Europe, ob-
serves a gap between the law in the books (eg constitutional provisions providing 
that cil is binding on the domestic legal order) and the law in practice.1738 Admit-
tedly, some courts, like the Dutch courts, have been applying cil ‘[f] rom times im-
memorial’,1739 and in some substantive areas of international law, cil is regularly 
applied, eg in the context of the law of immunities.1740 In general, however, schol-
ars (and practitioners)1741 note that there is little domestic case law pertaining to 
this source of international law.1742 This partly explains the limited availability of 
scholarship on the issue.
A common scholarly diagnosis concerns domestic judges’ discomfort and 
hesitation vis- à- vis cil.1743 In the United States, civil rights lawyer Paul Hoff-
man humorously reports that invoking cil in court triggers the so- called 
‘blank stare phenomenon’, judging from the reaction of the bench.1744 Other 
 1736 Eg the States listed by Yuji Iwasawa, ‘Domestic Application of International Law’ (2016) 
378 Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international 24. For an overview of consti-
tutional provisions of continental European States, see also Wouters (n 1223) 26 f.
 1737 Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 5.
 1738 Wouters (n 1223) 27.
 1739 Fleuren (n 1388) 246.
 1740 Akande and Shah (n 859).
 1741 See Bernard Stirn’s remarks in ‘The Judge and International Custom / Le juge et la cou-
tume internationale’ (n 1733) 99.
 1742 Eg in Nigeria: Nwapi (n 1388) 55; Christian N Okeke, ‘The Use of International Law in the 
Domestic Courts of Ghana and Nigeria’ (2015) 32 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 371, 415. See also, on the Austrian case law, Reinisch and Bachmayer 
(n 1074) 10.
 1743 Wouters (n 1223)  27. This unease is also reflected in legal scholarship, see Vassilis P 
Tzevelekos, ‘Introductory Note:  Beyond the Identification of International Customary 
Rules’ (2017) 19 International Community Law Review 1, 1.
 1744 Hoffman (n 1726). In Scotland, by contrast, courts have held that there is no need to pro-
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us scholars denounce courts’ ‘legal procrastination’1745 regarding cil. Rosalyn 
Higgins observes that ‘there is sometimes a nervousness or disinclination [of 
domestic courts] about getting into this area’.1746 In Bangladesh, courts prefer 
to apply domestic legislation rather than cil when mentioning a particular 
right.1747 In Kenya as well, some cases show courts’ failure to address relevant 
issues pertaining to cil.1748 Even when courts use a cil norm, they are often 
eager to demonstrate that it has been codified, and/ or that it is reflected in 
written statements.1749 Courts are especially reluctant to apply cil due to their 
concern that this might contradict the principle of legality, be it in the area of 
criminal law1750 or more generally.1751 In Latin America, by contrast, courts’ 
use of cil1752 to set aside domestic statutory limitations has been considered 
unconstitutional by many scholars,1753 and courts’ methods for identifying cil 
in this context have been criticized.1754 For judges to neglect cil as a matter of 
principle is deeply worrying, as it means a source of international law is being 
ignored by the courts. This is problematic from the perspective of the legality 
of judicial decisions, but also from the perspective of their quality, given that 
courts do not provide cogent reasons for this neglect.
‘International Law and Nuclear Weapons in Scottish Courts’ (2002) 51 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 171, 173 f.
 1745 Hartka (n 183).
 1746 Higgins (n 365) 211.
 1747 Karim (n 1383) 106.
 1748 Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v. Attorney General and Minister 
of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Kenyans for Justice and 
Development Trust ( Joining), Final judgment, [2011] eKLR, ildc 1804 (ke 2011), 28 
November 2011, Kenya; Nairobi; High Court.
 1749 For a critical analysis, see Wouters (n 1223) 28 ff.
 1750 de Jonge (n 1387)  45; Pablo Galain Palermo, ‘The Prosecution of International Crimes 
in Uruguay’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 601, 611 f; Stirling- Zanda 
(n 102) 6. See however Guzmán Dalbora (n 1727) 544; Dino Carlos Caro Coria, ‘Prosecuting 
International Crimes in Peru’ (2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 583, 596.
 1751 On these concerns, see Handl- Petz (n 1384) 86 f.
 1752 On the use of international law more generally for this purpose, see Viera Gallo Quesney 
and Lübbert Álvarez (n 1386) 109 ff. See however (regarding amnesty laws) Eguiguren 
Praeli (n 1386) 4.
 1753 Eg (in Argentina), Parenti (n 1727) 498 ff. For examples of such cases, see (among oth-
ers): Office of the Prosecutor v. Priebke (Erich), Ordinary appeal judgment, request of extra-
dition, p/ 457/ xxxi, ildc 1599 (ar 1995), 2 November 1995, Argentina; Supreme Court 
[csj]; Riveros v. Office of the Public Prosecutor, Recourse of cassation and unconstitution-
ality, M 2333 xlii, ildc 1084 (ar 2007), 13 July 2007, Argentina; Supreme Court [csj].
 1754 Eg Chile v. Arancibia Clavel (Enrique Lautaro), Appeal Judgment, Case No 259, A 533 xxx-
viii, ildc 1082 (ar 2004), 24 August 2004, Argentina; Supreme Court [csj], and the 
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Judges’ unease regarding cil is particularly problematic given some of the 
(usually implicit) considerations on which it rests. Jan Wouters, whose analysis 
focuses on continental Europe, mentions the widespread assumption that cil 
is indeterminate, and judges’ concern that its application might be perceived 
as ‘undemocratic’. However, as Wouters rightly notes, these characteristics 
and risks are by no means necessary and unique features of cil. According to 
him, courts are mostly inhibited by ‘psychological factors’.1755 Other explana-
tions for this judicial uneasiness towards cil listed by Wouters are constraints 
 imposed by domestic constitutional law, including domestic procedural rules 
(all of which are irrelevant from the perspective of the State’s duty to com-
ply with international law), the (flawed) understanding that custom primarily 
governs interstate relations and hence lacks direct effect, and both lawyers’ 
and judges’ lack of familiarity with cil.1756 This last point is symptomatic of a 
more generalized, yet mistaken, neglect of unwritten law, be it domestic1757 or 
international.1758 August Reinisch and Peter Bachmayer contend that domes-
tic courts’ frequently careless and laconic treatment of cil is primarily due 
to ‘pragmatic’ efficiency considerations.1759 Several scholars have noted that 
the application of cil is at least partly contingent on the composition of the 
bench.1760
What also emerges from the domestic judicial practice is the imprecise ter-
minology used by domestic courts to refer to cil. This jeopardizes predictabil-
ity, clarity, and consistency, but also legality when the two- tiered test of State 
practice and opinio juris is elided. cil is sometimes ambiguously or implicitly 
referred to (eg via the expression ‘rules of international law’).1761 Courts often 
fail to distinguish cil from general principles of international law,1762 and they 
tend to conflate cil and jus cogens.1763 August Reinisch and Peter Bachmayer 
 1755 Wouters (n 1223) 31 ff.
 1756 See ibid.
 1757 Staubach (n 1265) 115.
 1758 Eg Paquete Habana, Decision, No 395, No 396, 175 us 677 (1900), 20 S.Ct. 290 (1900), 
44 L.Ed. 320 (1900), ildc 392 (us 1900), 8 January 1900, United States; Supreme Court 
[us], at para 68.
 1759 Reinisch and Bachmayer (n 1074) 47.
 1760 Eg in Bangladesh:  Karim (n 1383)  106 ff. Another example is Chile:  Guzmán Dalbora 
(n 1727) 537.
 1761 Eg (mentioning the practice of English courts) Maripe (n 354) 259.
 1762 Handl- Petz (n 1384) 88; Marochkin and Popov (n 183) 230 f; Wouters (n 1223) 34. This 
confusion is sometimes already enshrined in domestic constitutional law. See Hannes 
Vallikivi, ‘Domestic Applicability of Customary International Law in Estonia’ (2002) vii 
Juridica international 28, 31.
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note that Austrian courts sometimes refer to ‘general international law’, which 
thus circumvents the two- tiered test required for the determination of cil.1764 
Similarly, as observed by Massimo Iovane, courts sometimes rely on general 
principles of international law instead of establishing the existence of State 
practice and opinio juris (a stringent test which may thwart the proof of the 
existence of cil).1765 In Botswana, the High Court has relied on soft law to 
establish an ‘international consensus on the importance of access to water’, 
without mentioning cil, and without clarifying how it had ascertained this 
consensus.1766
Even when courts apply and clearly refer to cil, their reasoning is rarely 
detailed, which is problematic from the perspective of the legality and quality 
of judicial reasoning. Courts typically neglect the two constitutive elements 
of State practice and opinio juris. When they mention cil, they simply assert 
its existence without substantiating their statements.1767 Iovane notes that do-
mestic courts tend to assert the customary nature of specific treaties (or, more 
generally, of a given norm) without examining State practice on the issue.1768 
Simonetta Stirling- Zanda, in her study of the practice of a number of European 
courts, notes that judges seldom look at State practice and opinio juris.1769 She 
observes that in the Italian case law, for instance, a thorough analysis of the 
two constitutive elements of custom is ‘a rare finding’.1770 In Estonia, Hannes 
Vallikivi criticizes the laconism of the domestic judicial practice on cil, not-
ing that courts do not explain why custom is (or is not) applied in the case at 
hand.1771
Scholars also note the uneven level of detail of the case law on cil with-
in the same jurisdiction.1772 As already mentioned, not every case in which 
cil is applicable requires a thorough, exhaustive analysis of custom and of 
its interpretative methods, and considerations of judicial economy preclude 
 1764 Reinisch and Bachmayer (n 1074) 41 ff.
 1765 Iovane (n 182) 617.
 1766 Maripe (n 354) 277.
 1767 Hegde (n 46) 69; Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 17; Reinisch and Bachmayer (n 1074) 31. On the 
icj’s tendency to assert the existence of cil, see Talmon (n 73).
 1768 Iovane (n 182) 610 f.
 1769 Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 3 f.
 1770 See ibid 13. See eg Chibomba v. Embassy of the Republic of Zambia to the Italian Republic, 
Final appeal judgment, Case No 13980/ 2017, ildc 2703 (it 2017), 6 June 2017, Italy; 
Supreme Court of Cassation. In this ruling, the Court wrongly stated that art. 11 uncsi 
had customary status.
 1771 Vallikivi (n 1762) 37.



















Odile Ammann - 978-90-04-40987-3
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com03/09/2021 03:54:31PM
via free access
280 Chapter 8
judges from doing so. The level of detail that is appropriate mainly hinges on 
the difficulty of the interpretative issue. Yet a generalized neglect of methodo-
logical issues is worrying. It leaves the door open for unlawful and poor- quality 
decision- making.
There are, of course, exceptions to these trends. Some courts have  provided 
elaborate accounts of the conditions under which cil can be applied, and 
of the methods that govern its identification.1773 German courts in particu-
lar have engaged in high- quality reasoning on cil.1774 Japanese courts have 
looked at State practice and opinio juris, and their reasoning appears to be 
more detailed with respect to cil than for treaty law.1775 In its famous Paquete 
Habana decision of 1900, the us Supreme Court conducted an exceptionally 
comprehensive (though not uncontroversial) analysis of State practice, pre-
dominantly based on scholarly writings.1776 All in all, however, courts tend 
to shirk the analysis of State practice and opinio juris. Relatedly, some courts 
have sought to avoid the application of cil by using a particularly demand-
ing standard to appraise the criterion of the generality of State practice.1777 
English judges have been more detached from the ‘consensus’ requirement 
(by which they presumably allude to the generality that State practice must 
display). They have called it ‘a fiction’, and they have emphasized the need to 
identify custom ‘as best they can’, based on available resources.1778 This shows 
that detailed reasoning does not necessarily serve the application of interna-
tional law. Of course, whether this reasoning respects the sources of interna-
tional law is a different question.
To establish the existence of cil, domestic courts usually rely on auxil-
iary means instead of gathering more immediate evidence of State practice 
and opinio juris (eg official statements or other acts of State organs). A  first 
 1773 de Jonge (n 1387) 46 f. See also Beaulac and Currie (n 1385) 139; Reinisch and Bachmayer 
(n 1074) 10 ff.
 1774 Eg German Holder of Greek State Bonds v. Hellenic Republic, Second instance judgment, 5 
U 98/ 14, ildc 2427 (de 2014), 4 December 2014, Germany; Schleswig- Holstein; Higher 
Regional Court [olg], at para 42 f; Anonymous, Individual constitutional complaint, 2 
BvR 1506/ 03, BVerfGE 109, 13, njw 2004, 141, ildc 10 (de 2003), 5 November 2003, 
Germany; Constitutional Court [BVerfG], at para 42 ff.
 1775 Takashiba (n 1383) 220.
 1776 Paquete Habana, Decision, No 395, No 396, 175 us 677 (1900), 20 S.Ct. 290 (1900), 44 
L.Ed. 320 (1900), ildc 392 (us 1900), 8 January 1900, United States; Supreme Court [us].
 1777 Regarding South African courts under apartheid:  ila, ‘(Study Group on) Principles on 
the Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law, Final Report: Mapping the 
Engagement of Domestic Courts With International Law’ (n 15) 17.
 1778 Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] qb 529 (ca) 550, at 364 
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auxiliary means that is commonly used is scholarship.1779 Scholarly writings 
to which courts resort for the purposes of identifying custom are often domes-
tic1780 or stem from neighboring States.1781 A second type of auxiliary means 
courts consult is national and international case law.1782 Besides these aux-
iliary means, courts commonly rely on treaty law.1783 Some judges explicitly 
acknowledge and privilege the use of these resources. Australian judges for 
instance consider that cil is ‘evidenced by international treaties and conven-
tions, authoritative textbooks, practice and judicial decision [sic]’,1784 a state-
ment originally made by English courts.1785 Using these materials is explicitly 
permitted by the ilc’s draft conclusions on cil.1786 However, it can become 
 1779 Reinisch and Bachmayer (n 1074) 39 ff; Hegde (n 46) 69. Many ildc entries confirm this 
statement and cannot all be cited here, eg Maritime Union of Australia, Re; Ex Parte csl 
Pacific Shipping Incorporated, csl Pacific Shipping Incorporated v.  Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission and Others, Application to the Full Court of the Australian High 
Court, [2003] hca 43, (2003) 200 alr 39, ildc 204 (au 2003), 7 August 2003, Australia; 
High Court [hc]; Anita W v. Johannes Adam II, Prince of Liechtenstein, Final appeal/ cas-
sation, 7 Ob 316/ 00x, ildc 1 (at 2001), 14 February 2001, Austria; Supreme Court of 
Justice [ogh], at para 11.
 1780 Regarding French courts: Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 12. See also Re Víctor Raúl Pinto, Re, Pinto 
(Víctor Raúl) v. Relatives of Tomás Rojas, Decision on Annulment, Case No 3125- 04, ildc 
1093 (cl 2007), 13 March 2007, Chile; Supreme Court, at para 29.
 1781 Eg Reinisch and Bachmayer (n 1074)  39. See also Municipality of Bergen v.  Regional 
Government of Düsseldorf, Appeal judgment, 4 C 3.07, BVerwGE 132, 152, ildc 2745 
(de 2008), NVwZ 2009, 452, döv 2009, 422, 16 October 2008, Germany; Federal 
Administrative Court [BVerwG], at para 20.
 1782 Iovane (n 182) 612 ff. See eg Public Prosecutor v. F, First instance, Criminal procedure, 
ljn:  ba9575, 09/ 750001- 06, ildc 797 (nl 2007), 25 June 2007, Netherlands; The 
Hague; District Court. According to the reporter, the Court ‘should have been somewhat 
more cautious’ when it relied on a ruling of the icty to ascertain customary interna-
tional law. See also the comprehensive materials used in Argentine Necessity Case, K and 
Others v.  Argentina (Represented by President Néstor Kirchner), Decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Senate, 2 BvM 1- 5/ 03, 1, 2/ 06, vol 118, 124, 
60 njw (2007), 2610, 138 ilr 1 (2010), ildc 952 (de 2007), 8 May 2007, Germany; 
Constitutional Court [BVerfG], and S v. Ministro de Economía Hipolito Yrigoyen, Final deci-
sion, 2 BvM 9/ 03, BVerfGE 117, 141, njw 2007, 2605, wm 2007, 57, DVBl 2007, 242, 
bb 2007, 206, ildc 465 (de 2006), 6 December 2006, Germany; Constitutional Court 
[BVerfG], at para 59 ff.
 1783 Nwapi (n 1388) 55. See also Office of Public Prosecutor of the Free and Hanseatic City of 
Hamburg v. cm and Others, Judgment, 603 KLs 17/ 10, ildc 2390 (de 2012), BeckRS 
2013, 07408, 19 October 2012, Germany; Hamburg; Regional Court [lg], at para 749 f.
 1784 de Jonge (n 1387) 46.
 1785 The Christina [1938] AC 485, 497, Lord MacMillan.
 1786 See draft conclusions 6(2), 10(2), and 11, ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of 
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problematic from the perspective of legality, eg if courts rely on insufficient, 
outdated, or purely domestic material. Relatedly, reasoning that is based on 
non- compelling resources threatens the predictability, clarity, and consistency 
of judicial decisions.
A striking and troubling feature of the domestic case law on cil is its self- 
referential and even circular aspect.1787 The risk of circularity is perhaps even 
more acute in the context of cil than for other sources, given that domestic 
rulings can provide evidence of State practice and opinio juris and, qua auxilia-
ry means, assist interpreters in identifying norms of cil (supra, Chapter 4, sec-
tion 3, and supra, section 1). And indeed, courts tend to predominantly (or even 
solely) refer to their own State’s practice and opinio juris and to their own case 
law, in lieu of establishing the existence of the constitutive elements of cil or 
the meaning of a customary norm on the international plane.1788 They espe-
cially tend to cite their previous case law (or that of other courts of their State) 
to identify custom,1789 which represents an even more pronounced form of 
self- referentiality (what I call circularity). This circular and/ or self- referential 
reasoning even concerns courts known for having, in some decisions at least, 
provided detailed accounts of State practice and opinio juris, eg the BVerfG.1790 
In some Commonwealth States, courts have relied on English case law to 
 determine cil,1791 which represents a looser form of self- referentiality, but 
self- referentiality nonetheless, unless a regional custom is being ascertained. 
 Circularity (courts’ reference to their own practice) and self- referentiality 
(courts’ reference to the practice of their own State) are side effects of domestic 
courts’ ‘peculiar double nature’, as described by the ila Study Group on Domes-
tic Courts: domestic judges generate State practice, but they must also identify 
what State practice is to interpret international law1792 (supra, Chapter 4, sec-
tion 3). Circularity and self- referentiality are also encouraged by the fact that 
 1787 On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 60) 125 ff.
 1788 See Iovane (n 182) 609; Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 9.
 1789 See (among other examples found in ildc): Research Foundation for Science Technology 
and Natural Resources Policy v. Union of India and Another, Appeal of monitoring commit-
tee recommendation, Writ Petition (civil) 657 of 1995, ildc 385 (in 2005), 1 May 2005, 
India; Supreme Court. See also de Jonge (n 1387) 43 f; Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 9, 17.
 1790 See Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 14.
 1791 Eg in Australia: The Queen v. Disun, Appeal against conviction, [2003] wasca 47, (2003) 
27 war 146, [2004] almd 703, ildc 2054 (au 2003), 7 February 2003, Australia; 
Western Australia; Supreme Court [wasc]; Court of Appeal [wasca]; Court of Criminal 
Appeal (historical).
 1792 ila, ‘Working Session Report of the ila Study Group on Principles on the Engagement of 
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courts may have a domestic legal duty to follow judicial precedents or, in the 
absence of a doctrine of stare decisis, because domestic law requires their de-
cisions to be reasonably consistent with previous cases.1793 Regardless of these 
explanations, courts’ identification of international law based on their own 
precedents risks disregarding the sources (and evolution) of international law.
2.2 Swiss Courts and the Interpretation of Customary International Law
After this cursory overview of the domestic judicial practice of cil (supra, 2.1), 
I analyze the Swiss judicial practice of cil based on the methods these courts 
use, and based on the reasons they give to justify their interpretations.1794 Rel-
evant cases were identified via keywords.1795 In addition, I conducted specific 
searches (through keywords such as ‘Staatenpraxis’, ‘pratique internationale’, 
and ‘tendances internationales’) to examine how courts refer to concepts 
linked (even loosely) to cil, and to avoid missing relevant cases.
I have described the potential and limitations of keyword searches in other 
work.1796 One difficulty that must be stressed again in the context of cil is 
courts’ imprecise terminology. This makes it hard to determine whether judg-
es are actually referring to cil.1797 Terms deemed too vague (eg ‘the law of 
nations’, or ‘general international law’) were excluded from the search. This 
terminological difficulty is not as acute in the case of treaty law, which courts 
usually mention through relatively precise (though inconsistent) language 
(agreement, treaty, convention, etc.).
Another factor that complicates the search is that Swiss judicial databases 
do not provide lists of decisions pertaining to cil, contrary to what is the case 
 1793 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 37.
 1794 For a comprehensive study of the practice of the Swiss authorities pertaining to 
cil, see ibid. The study references a number of rulings that are also discussed in the 
present book.
 1795 The keywords used (regardless of grammatical variations) are: Völkergewohnheitsrecht, 
völkergewohnheitsrechtlich, völkerrechtliches Gewohnheitsrecht, internationales 
Gewohnheitsrecht, droit international coutumier, droit coutumier international, cou-
tume internationale, opinio juris, opinio iuris, diritto internazionale consuetudinario, 
diritto consuetudinario internazionale. Cantonal cases were surveyed in the language in 
which courts conduct their proceedings (German for Zurich and Basel- Stadt, French for 
Geneva, and German and French for the canton of Bern).
 1796 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal’s Practice of International Law in Figures’ (n 5).
 1797 Examples abound. In BGer, judgment 2P.36/ 2004 of 9 May 2005, at 5.6, for instance, the 
Court states that art. 31(1) vclt reflects the ‘general principles of customary interna-
tional law’. More generally, see ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
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with treaty law (at least for federal court databases). cil also lacks an identi-
fier in the Systematic Compilation of Federal Legislation, contrary to treaties, 
which courts often cite with their designated number in the compilation. The 
descriptors (or tags) on cil attributed to some decisions of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal were insufficient for the purposes of this study, given the few deci-
sions tagged.
As was the case with treaty law, I examine the interpretative practice of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal (2.2.1), of other federal courts (2.2.2), and of se-
lected cantonal courts (2.2.3) and military tribunals (2.2.4). I also highlight 
the parallels between the methods Swiss courts use to interpret domestic 
and international custom (2.2.5). I then compare the practice of these dif-
ferent Swiss courts (2.2.6). Lastly, I examine the similarities and differences 
between the Swiss case law and the practice of other domestic courts 
(2.2.7).
2.2.1 The Swiss Federal Tribunal
Given the relatively few cases in which the Court has applied cil,1798 a di-
achronic analysis is unwarranted. The small number of cases also makes it 
difficult to identify the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s approach to the four interpre-
tative methods (text, context, object and purpose, and history). The methods 
are rarely explicitly mentioned (or acknowledged as customary) in the case 
law, even if they must guide the identification of State practice and opinio ju-
ris (supra, Chapter 6, section 2). In fact, as I will show, these two constitutive 
elements are largely absent from the Swiss judicial practice as well. Both in-
terpretative methods and constitutive elements are more salient in cases on 
domestic custom (infra, 2.2.5).
Instead of looking at the evolution of the Court’s case law over time, it is 
more compelling to take the substantive areas of international law in which 
the Court has referred to cil as our angle of analysis. Relevant rulings mainly 
pertain to four substantive areas:  the law of treaties, migration and refugee 
law, the law of immunities, and ihrl. While these subject matters sometimes 
overlap, they are useful for breaking down and evaluating the case law.
 1798 Ie, in comparison to cases dealing with treaties. See Ammann, ‘International Law in 
Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens:  The Swiss Federal Tribunal’s Practice of 
International Law in Figures’ (n 5). The number of cases on cil taken into account in this 
chapter is higher than the figures provided in this previous empirical study I conducted, 
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cil is often mentioned in connection with the law of treaties.1799 This is 
symptomatic of the role treaties play in practice to interpret custom, and vice 
versa. This role is endorsed by the ilc’s draft conclusions on custom,1800 and it 
is visible in the practice of the Swiss authorities at large.1801
A first cluster of cases includes rulings that refer to the vclt. A  repre-
sentative example of the Court’s way of identifying custom is provided by a 
decision of 1986, in which the Swiss Federal Tribunal stated that the vclt’s 
provisions are applicable to intercantonal agreements if no other domestic 
legal provision governs the issue, and to the extent these provisions codify 
‘recognized customary international law’. It then applied art. 46 vclt, noting 
that this provision reflected a position that had become dominant in inter-
national law in recent decades.1802 In this decision, the Court stressed that 
Switzerland had endorsed this norm, citing acts of the Swiss government and 
of two ministries.1803 As will become apparent, this tendency to emphasize 
the Swiss  practice – which, per se, does little work, if any, from the perspec-
tive of the identification of customary international law – is common in the 
Swiss case law. While such references to the Swiss practice serve the  purposes 
of reinforcing the (sociological and intrastate) acceptance of the Court’s rul-
ings, this trend is problematic from the perspective of legality. In this deci-
sion, the Court also mentioned rulings of international courts and arbitral 
 tribunals.1804
In another case, the Court noted that the principles codified in art. 31(1) 
vclt are ‘essentially’ a codification of cil, and that they are consistent with 
its own existing case law.1805 The customary character of the vclt’s methods 
has been reiterated in later cases.1806 In a judgment of 2018, the Swiss Federal 
 1799 On the links between treaties and cil: ilc, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of 
Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (n 185) 15 para 
34; ilc, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Michael 
Wood, Special Rapporteur’ (n 294) 14 ff para 27 ff; Besson and Ammann (n 60) 55 ff.
 1800 Draft conclusions 6(2), 10(2), and 11, ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of 
Customary International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
 1801 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 55 ff.
 1802 bge 112 Ia 75, at 4 c).
 1803 Ibid.
 1804 Ibid.
 1805 bge 122 ii 234, at 4 c). See also BGer, judgment 4P.114/ 2006 of 7 September 2006, 
at 5.4.1.
 1806 bge 141 ii 447, at 4.3.1. See also (regarding art. 31(1) vclt) BGer, judgment 2P.36/ 2004 
of 9 May 2005, at 5.6. In other rulings, the Court states that treaties must be interpreted 
‘based on customary international law and the international law of treaties’. See BGer, 
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Tribunal stated that even if India, one of the parties to the dispute, had not 
ratified the vclt, the Convention’s provisions on treaty interpretation were ap-
plicable qua customary international law.1807 The Court has also affirmed the 
customary character of art. 26 and 27 vclt,1808 which have been increasingly 
prominent in cases dealing with conflicts between domestic and international 
law. The Court occasionally points out that the Convention is customary with-
out differentiating between its provisions.1809 This is problematic with regard 
to both the legality and the quality of the Court’s reasoning.
cil is also mentioned in relation to aspects of treaty law other than the 
vclt. Under specific conditions, and as already noted, the Court applies cus-
tomary principles of treaty law to intercantonal agreements by analogy.1810 
Moreover, it frequently states that a given treaty provision has the status of 
cil and vice versa, presumably to emphasize the legality of its interpretations. 
On the other hand, the Court also highlights instances of divergence between 
these sources. It has for example observed that the Vienna Convention on State 
Succession in Respect of Treaties, which Switzerland has not ratified to date, 
contains norms departing from cil.1811 In this case, the Court noted that the 
automatic continued validity of treaties was not supported by cil, and that 
there was no unitary State practice when the Convention was adopted in 1978. 
In support of this statement, the Court cited writings of Swiss and foreign legal 
scholars, and the digest of the Swiss practice of public international law pub-
lished annually in the Swiss Review of International and European Law.1812 The 
Court then referred to its own case law.1813 The decision is illustrative of the 
self- referential character of the practice of domestic (including Swiss) courts 
(see also supra, 2.1). It exemplifies Swiss courts’ imprecise terminology, since 
the Court uses the term ‘general international law’ as a synonym for ‘customary 
international law’.1814 In another earlier case, the Court stated that there was 
no cil prescribing an automatic continuation of treaties, without substanti-
ating this statement.1815 This seems insufficient from the perspective of both 
legality and high- quality judicial reasoning.
 1807 BGer, judgment 4A_ 65/ 2018 of 11 December 2018, at 2.4.1.
 1808 bge 125 ii 417, at 4 d); bge 142 ii 35, at 3.2.
 1809 bge 120 Ib 360, at 2 c).
 1810 Eg bge 96 i 636, at 4 c).
 1811 bge 139 v 263, at 4.2.3.
 1812 Ibid.
 1813 Ibid, at 4.2.4.
 1814 Ibid, at 10.2.
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A second subset of cases pertains to migration and refugee law. In a well- 
documented decision of 1985, the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that the prin-
ciple of non- refoulement has the status of cil.1816 It based this statement on 
Swiss and international legal scholarship, on a digest of the ECtHR’s case law, 
and on a decision published in the official digest of the Swiss federal admin-
istrative practice. Once again, the case illustrates the self- referential character 
of the case law. In a decision of 1997, the Court laconically noted that cil does 
not give foreign nationals the right to be granted entry by a State.1817 In the 
landmark (and politically sensitive) Spring judgment, the Court stated that 
in the 1930s, neither Swiss nor international law gave rise to a State duty to 
grant asylum, and that the ad hoc approach adopted by the League of Nations 
with regard to this issue showed that there existed no customary definition of 
refugee at the time.1818 The Court exclusively relied on the writings of Swiss 
scholars and experts to justify this statement. This approach seems insuffi-
cient, especially given the gravity of the issue at stake. The Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal added that at the time of the facts of the case, non- refoulement was not a 
mandatory principle of cil. It then cited the writings of foreign and Swiss legal 
scholars,1819 which confirms the important place of scholarship in the case law. 
The Court further noted that based on ‘Swiss conceptions as well’, the prohi-
bition of genocide had the status of mandatory cil.1820 This argument can, at 
best, demonstrate the compliance of Swiss authorities with this prohibition, 
but not its customary status.
A third substantive area of cil that is particularly prominent in the Court’s 
case law is the law of immunities.1821 The cases on the issue provide interest-
ing insights into the Court’s method. In a particularly detailed, well- researched 
decision of 1980, the Court held that the principle of qualified (as opposed to 
absolute) immunity reflected cil. The evidence cited in support of this state-
ment is relatively extensive, compared to the laconic style of many Swiss rul-
ings on cil. It consists of several writings by Swiss and foreign legal scholars 
and two decisions issued by the BVerfG. The Court also noted that only ‘Great 
Britain and the socialist States’ did not endorse this principle.1822 Finally, it 
 1816 bge 111 Ib 68, at 2 a). See also BGer, judgment 1A.212/ 2000 of 19 September 2000, 
at 5 a).
 1817 bge 123 ii 472, at 4 d).
 1818 bge 126 ii 145, at 4 c) aa).
 1819 Ibid, at 4 c) bb).
 1820 Ibid, at 4 d).
 1821 For a recent example, see BGer, judgment 1B_ 258/ 2017 of 2 March 2018, at 9.2.
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acknowledged that the requirement of a ‘Binnenbeziehung’ established by the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal did not have the status of cil.1823 This last statement 
contrasts with other rulings in which the Swiss practice is presented as conclu-
sive evidence of custom.
In a case pertaining to the respective immunities of Switzerland and Italy, 
for instance, the Court stated that ‘unwritten rules of international law’ are 
‘reflected in scholarship and judicial decisions, for Switzerland especially in 
those of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’.1824 The Court has also done so in another 
case pertaining to the law of immunities, this time involving Turkey.1825 The 
aforementioned extract confirms domestic courts’ tendency to use their own 
practice to interpret cil, and their imprecise terminology. The Turkish case is 
remarkable for its mention of foreign State practice. In fact, even such brief 
comparative considerations are rare in the case law,1826 as paradoxical as this 
may seem considering the importance of State practice for the formation (and, 
therefore, the identification) of cil.
Another example of self- referentiality in the law of immunities is a deci-
sion of 1989 involving the Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos, in which the 
Court noted that cil has always granted personal inviolability and immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction to heads of States, their family, and their suite. To 
support this statement, the Court used textbooks and the yearly digest of the 
Swiss practice of public international law.1827 Scholars like Simonetta Stirling- 
Zanda have praised this digest, remarking that it is a valuable aid for Swiss 
legal officials called to identify cil.1828 Yet this should not detract from the fact 
that exclusively relying on the practice of the Swiss authorities is, as previous-
ly mentioned, self- referential, and potentially even circular. It can also be an 
expression of deference to the practice of these authorities (and especially of 
the executive) which is unwarranted from the perspective of the sources and 
interpretative methods of international law.
With regard to some issues of the law of immunities, the case law lacks pre-
cision. In a decision of 1984, the Court clarified that while it had previously 
stated that the European Convention on State Immunity reflected the devel-
opment of international law,1829 this did not mean that it reflected cil.1830 
 1823 Ibid, at 3 b). See also bge 135 iii 608, at 4.2.
 1824 bge 111 Ia 52, at 3.
 1825 bge 104 Ia 367, at 2 a).
 1826 Ibid, at 2 d). For another example, see bge 132 ii 65, at 3.5.
 1827 bge 115 Ib 496, at 5 b).
 1828 Stirling- Zanda (n 102) 16.
 1829 bge 111 Ia 52, at 3.
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Instead of analyzing State practice and opinio juris, the Court used its own case 
law. It thereby opted for a potentially circular line of reasoning that does not 
univocally disclose the reasons underpinning the Court’s interpretation. The 
lack of customary status of said Convention has not prevented the Court from 
referring to it qua ‘expression of modern Western European conceptions’ in 
some cases.1831 In later rulings, the Court has been more reluctant to confirm 
the Convention’s customary character.1832
In contrast to its cautious attitude vis- à- vis the customary status of the 
European Convention, the Court has affirmed the customary character of 
the un Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property (uncsi). The uncsi’s text was adopted in 2004, and Switzerland 
ratified the Convention in 2010. As of June 2019, the Convention had not 
entered into force. For these and other reasons, its customary status is con-
troversial.1833 The Court nonetheless noted in several decisions that the 
uncsi ‘purports to be a codification of customary international law’,1834 a 
formulation which is anything but clear. It did not substantiate this state-
ment, except via a scholarly piece1835 and its own previous case law on the 
uncsi.1836 Given the implications of this interpretative conclusion, offering 
additional reasons is necessary from the perspective of legality and high- 
quality judicial reasoning.
In a judgment of 2017 involving the Syrian central bank, the Court left 
open whether art. 6(1) uncsi had the status of cil.1837 In another case on the 
 uncsi, the Court examined the finding of the Geneva Supreme Court’s Labor 
Law Chamber that art. 11 uncsi codified cil. The Court upheld this interpreta-
tion, stating that since Switzerland had ratified the Convention, it was ‘justified 
to use it as an inspiration when making a decision based on the general rules 
of international law of jurisdictional immunities’.1838 While an ‘inspiration’ is 
 1831 bge 104 Ia 367, at 2 a). See also bge 111 Ia 52, at 3.
 1832 bge 120 ii 400, at 3; bge 134 iii 122, at 5.1. See also BGer, judgment 4A_ 331/ 2014 of 31 
October 2014, at 3.2.
 1833 Eg Riccardo Pavoni, ‘The Myth of the Customary Nature of the United Nations Convention 
on State Immunity: Does the End Justify the Means?’ in Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc 
(eds), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law (Oxford 
University Press 2018). On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 60) 65 ff.
 1834 bge 134 iii 122, at 5.1; bge 136 iii 575, at 4.3.1; BGer, judgment 4A_ 541/ 2009 of 8 June 
2010, at 5.5; BGer, judgment 4A_ 331/ 2014 of 31 October 2014, at 3.1.
 1835 BGer, judgment 4A_ 541/ 2009 of 8 June 2010, at 5.5; bge 134 iii 122, at 5.1.
 1836 BGer, judgment 4A_ 541/ 2009 of 8 June 2010, at 5.5.
 1837 BGer, judgment 2C_ 820/ 2014 of 16 June 2017, at 4.5.
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likely not decisive, the ruling fails to convince. It suggests, once more, that the 
Court interprets cil primarily based on the Swiss practice.
One could also read a self- referential tendency in the Court’s finding that 
the Federal Act on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities, and the Financial 
Subsidies Granted by Switzerland as a Host State codifies cil.1839 Other cases 
on the law of immunities simply affirm the customary status of some treaty 
provisions (eg art. 31 and 37 vcdr).1840 They also occasionally highlight diver-
gences between treaty law and cil.1841
A fourth cluster of cases pertain to ihrl. The Court has stated that some 
provisions of the udhr can have the status of cil, even if the Declaration, qua 
resolution of the un General Assembly, is not legally binding.1842 It has con-
cluded – without providing reasons for this conclusion – that art. 26(3) udhr 
does not have such a status.1843 The Court’s reasoning is, as in many  cases, 
highly laconic. In rare instances, the Court has referred to the ECtHR’s case 
law on cil.1844 The European Court interprets the echr based on a ‘Europe-
an consensus’, in light of the evolving practices of the Contracting States, and 
hence in a way that is reminiscent of the ascertainment of cil.1845 Therefore, 
using the Court’s case law to identify cil can be helpful. However, it cannot be 
used to circumvent the two- tiered test of State practice and opinio juris.
cil has also been mentioned in other substantive domains of  international 
law than the aforementioned four areas.1846 These cases show that treaties and 
scholarship play a central role in the Court’s reasoning, provided its conclusions 
about custom are substantiated at all. In a number of cases, the Court has for 
 1839 Federal Act on the Privileges, Immunities and Facilities, and the Financial Subsidies 
Granted by Switzerland as a Host State of 22 June 2007 (sr 192.12); see BGer, judgment 
4A_ 331/ 2014 of 31 October 2014, at 3.3.
 1840 bge 113 Ib 257, at 7.
 1841 bge 115 Ib 496, at 5 c).
 1842 BGer, judgment 2C_ 738/ 2010 of 24 May 2011, at 3.2.3.
 1843 Ibid, at 3.2.3.
 1844 It has held that the European Court considers that cil grants the accrediting State immu-
nity with regard to its own nationals employed in its representations abroad. See BGer, 
judgment 4A_ 386/ 2011 of 4 August 2011, at 7. The Court has also stated, when interpret-
ing the echr, that the European Court’s case law reflects State practice, see bge 139 i 16, 
at 5.2.2.
 1845 Besson, ‘Human Rights’ Adjudication as Transnational Adjudication: A Peripheral Case of 
Domestic Courts as International Law Adjudicators’ (n 56) 55 f.
 1846 See for instance bge 129 ii 114, a dispute between the canton of Zurich and a private 
hydroelectric power station on the appropriate amount for a water concession. See also 
bge 124 ii 293, where the Court considers that cil prohibits States from engaging in, 
encouraging, or tolerating activities on their territory that cause substantial environmen-
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example held that cil prohibits exercises of public authority on the  territory 
of another State without the latter’s consent.1847 Yet the Court’s  method is so 
laconic that it is impossible to evaluate its reasoning, except to emphasize its 
brevity and assertive character.
Exceptionally, the Court has contradicted the executive with respect to its 
interpretation of cil. In the Noga case, the appellant invoked a legal opinion of 
the fdfa according to which a renunciation to immunity only affects acta jure 
gestionis. This statement was explicitly rejected by the Court.1848 This  inter- 
branch divergence is noteworthy, given the deference Swiss courts  usually 
show to the executive in the law of immunities.1849 In most cases, the Court 
did not go against the practice of other State organs, at least not explicitly.
2.2.2 Other Federal Courts
2.2.2.1 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court
While the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (sfac) regularly mentions cil, 
remarks on its methods of identification are rare. Still, while the Court applies 
custom less often than the Swiss Federal Tribunal, its rulings on the issue are 
often more detailed (supra, 2.2.1). Some judgments contain remarkably thor-
ough analyses of cil that are unparalleled in the Swiss judicial practice.1850
Like the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the sfac has mentioned cil in connec-
tion with the law of treaties, and more specifically with the vclt, usually to 
highlight the customary character of its provisions. Drawing on scholarship, 
it has stressed several times that pacta sunt servanda and the prohibition to 
invoke domestic law to justify violations of international law have the status of 
cil.1851 The Court has not engaged in a study of State practice and opinio juris 
in this context. This is likely due to the undisputed character of these princi-
ples. The Court has even stated that the principle of pacta sunt servanda and 
the principle of good faith already applied before Switzerland’s ratification of 
 1847 BGer, judgment 2C_ 19/ 2017 of 21 September 2017, at 2.1; BGer, judgment 2C_ 265/ 2012 
of 22 March 2012, at 2; BGer, judgment 2C_ 197/ 2011 of 22 March 2011, at 2.1; BGer, 
judgment 2C_ 201/ 2011 of 7 October 2011, at 2.1.
 1848 bge 134 iii 122, at 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.
 1849 Besson and Ammann (n 60) 49.
 1850 sfac, judgment A- 4771/ 2012 of 2 July 2014, at 7.2.1; sfac, judgments A- 3776/ 2010 and 
A- 2411/ 2010 of 16 August 2012, at 6.1.1.
 1851 sfac, judgment B- 2183/ 2006 of 28 August 2007, at 4.3.4; sfac, judgments B- 1277/ 
2007 and B- 1279/ 2007 of 18 September 2007, at 5.7. See also (stressing the cil status of 
art. 26 vclt) sfac, judgment A- 4013/ 2010 of 15 July 2010, at 4.2; sfac, judgment 
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the vclt qua cil.1852 To support this conclusion, the Court has relied on state-
ments of the federal executive and on international law treatises.1853 The Court 
often notes that the vclt’s methods are customary.1854 While many judgments 
addressing this matter are repetitive, in the sense that the same paragraph on 
the vclt has been copied and pasted into myriad other judgments,1855 some 
decisions are remarkably detailed with regard to this issue.1856 The sfac has 
also explained that cil can be replaced by a new custom or a treaty.1857
The Court has affirmed the customary status of treaty provisions in the area 
of refugee law. It has for example noted that art. 33 of the Refugee Convention 
has the status of mandatory cil.1858 The Court has also observed that even 
if a State is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, it must respect the 
principle of non- refoulement based on cil.1859 In both cases, the Court does 
not explain how it identifies this customary status, which is, as in many cases, 
problematic from the perspective of both legality and quality.
cil is also used by the sfac to identify specific sovereign rights which are 
not as present in the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law on cil. The Court has for 
example considered that the sovereign right to issue passports has the status of 
cil.1860 It has also found that the territory of Campione is part of the Swiss cus-
toms territory in virtue of cil. The sfac based this conclusion on the practice 
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Federal Council, and other administrative 
bodies, and on domestic and international legal scholarship. Remarkably, the 
Court also relied on statements of the Italian Ministry of Finance and of the 
 1852 sfac, judgment B- 2869/ 2014 of 25 February 2015, at 3.2.3; sfac, judgment A- 7789/ 
2009 of 21 January 2010, at 3.3.3; sfac judgment B- 1884/ 2014 of 13 July 2015, at 3.2.3. 
Regarding the principle of good faith, see sfac, judgment A- 4695/ 2015 of 2 March 2016, 
at 4.3.2.1.
 1853 sfac, judgment B- 2869/ 2014 of 25 February 2015, at 3.2.3; sfac judgment B- 1884/ 2014 
of 13 July 2015, at 3.2.3.
 1854 Eg (representative of dozens of other examples) sfac, judgment A- 340/ 2015 of 28 
November 2016, at 4.1.3.6, and at 6.
 1855 Eg (and again representative of many other examples) sfac, judgment A- 6391/ 2016 of 
17 January 2018, at 3.
 1856 Ibid.
 1857 Ibid, at 4.1.3.1.
 1858 sfac, judgment E- 3913/ 2009 of 5 June 2013, at 9.3.1.
 1859 sfac, judgment E- 5731/ 2015 of 5 October 2015, at 6.1; sfac, judgment F- 4270/ 2016 
of 29 September 2016, at 5.2; sfac, judgment D- 4460/ 2015 of 27 January 2016, at 8.4 
(with a citation to a document of the International Rescue Committee and the Norwegian 
Refugee Council on the legal status of Syrian refugees). See also (noting Lebanon’s com-
pliance with this principle) sfac, judgment D- 3429/ 2015 of 2 July 2015, at 4.2.3.
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European Commission.1861 These types of acts are hardly ever used by Swiss 
courts. The Court’s ruling goes against the tide, as Swiss courts’ reasoning is 
largely self- referential and/ or circular, ie, heavily based on the Swiss practice, 
while neglecting that of other States.
In rare cases, the Court has elaborated on the two constitutive elements 
of cil, State practice and opinio juris. Citing the icj, it has noted that State 
practice can be ascertained by examining and comparing appropriate acts 
of States and through other empirical means, eg acts States perform in the 
framework of ios. By contrast, the Court has stated that opinio juris is gen-
erally ascertained based on State practice. While this seems to conflict with 
the ilc’s emphasis on a separate assessment for each element,1862 the com-
mentary to the ilc’s draft conclusions highlights that the same material can 
be used to assess both state practice and opinio juris, as long as this material 
is ‘examined as part of two distinct inquiries’.1863 The Court has also men-
tioned the criteria of coherence (‘uniformità’), constancy (‘durata’),1864 and 
generality (‘diffusione geografica’).1865 In most instances, however, and like 
other Swiss and foreign domestic courts (and even international courts),1866 
the sfac ignores these two constitutive elements and simply asserts the ex-
istence of cil.
2.2.2.2 The Swiss Federal Criminal Court
The Swiss Federal Criminal Court (sfcc) has mostly mentioned cil in the law 
of immunities.1867 While in some instances, the Court only mentions custom 
in passing, other rulings are more detailed.
 1861 sfac, judgment A- 2411/ 2010 of 16 August 2012, at 5.2.4.
 1862 Draft conclusion 3(2), ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
 1863 See ibid 129 para 8.
 1864 The Court considers that pursuant to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, 10 years of practice are 
insufficient to generate customary law, especially in fiscal matters. See sfac, judgment 
A- 4771/ 2012 of 2 July 2014, at 7.2.2; sfac, judgments A- 3776/ 2010 and A- 2411/ 2010 of 
16 August 2012, at 6.1.2.
 1865 sfac, judgment A- 4771/ 2012 of 2 July 2014, at 7.2.1; sfac, judgments A- 3776/ 2010 and 
A- 2411/ 2010 of 16 August 2012, at 6.1.1.
 1866 Talmon (n 73).
 1867 Eg sfcc, judgment bb.2016.386 of 24 May 2017, at 9.2. Some rulings deal with sover-
eign rights, analogously to the case law of the sfac (supra, 2.2.2.1). Based on rulings of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the sfcc has stated that cil excludes the exercise of public 
powers by one State on the territory of another State without the latter’s consent. sfcc, 
judgment rr.2011.321 of 30 March 2012, at 5.1; sfcc, judgment rr.2011.247+248 of 
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Some references to cil are brief, in the sense that they laconically assert the 
existence of custom. This can, again, be problematic from the perspective of 
legality and of high- quality reasoning, though not always.1868 In a judgment of 
2014, the sfcc stated that coercive measures taken in the area of  international 
cooperation in criminal matters can conflict with immunities granted by pub-
lic international law, adding that sovereign equality applies in interstate rela-
tions pursuant to cil.1869 This rapid treatment of custom is understandable, 
given the undisputed character of this customary principle. A more problem-
atic feature of the case is that the Court asserted that in the absence of a treaty 
between Switzerland and the Holy See, only cil norms on jurisdictional im-
munity applied.1870 However, instead of analyzing State practice and opinio 
juris, the Court referred to the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and to 
relevant scholarship.1871 The absence of a detailed review of State practice and 
opinio juris based on various interpretative methods, and the Court’s laconic 
assertions of the existence of cil, are arguably unproblematic whenever cus-
tom is not central to the issue and to the Court’s reasoning. This is for example 
the case when custom is not applied, but merely mentioned in passing and 
in very general terms.1872 Yet the boundary between such instances and those 
where cil is applied and generates a controversial interpretative issue can 
be fuzzy. Moreover, a precedent can easily be consolidated by being cited in 
subsequent cases, even if its reasoning is flawed. This snowball effect makes it 
important for courts to be careful in their reasoning, even in judgments that 
do not seem complex.
Other references to custom are slightly more detailed than the examples 
 cited so far, although they do not provide insights into the interpretative meth-
ods and constitutive elements of custom. In Nezzar, the appellant claimed 
that the nexus requirement Swiss courts apply in the law of immunities (ie, 
the requirement for immunity claims to be sufficiently tightly connected to 
 Switzerland in order to be adjudicated) had the status of cil. The Court stated 
that cil ‘is based, according to the majority of the doctrine, on a constant, 
uniform, and general practice of legal subjects, accompanied by the conviction 
 1868 The sfcc has for example noted, based on the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law, that 
the vcdr codifies principles of cil regarding diplomatic immunities and privileges. See 
sfcc, judgment bb.2014.19 of 7 October 2014, at 1.7.1.
 1869 sfcc, judgment rr.2014.243 of 2 December 2014, at 2.2.1.
 1870 Ibid, at 2.2.2.
 1871 Ibid, at 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
 1872 Eg sfcc, decision (Beschluss) bb.2014.181– 186 of 14 October 2015, at 8.2; sfcc, judg-
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that this practice is legally obligatory’. It then referred to scholarship and to a 
report of the Federal Council.1873 The Court rejected the plaintiff ’s argument 
that the nexus requirement was customary. It did so based on the legislative 
history of a former provision of the smcc requiring such a nexus, legal schol-
arship, and the fact that the nexus requirement could lead to violations of the 
Geneva Conventions. The Court also mentioned the Swiss judicial and admin-
istrative practice.1874 Its other references to cil in the Nezzar judgment are 
not detailed. In Adamov, an earlier case decided in 2007 and pertaining to the 
immunities of State representatives, the Court mentioned custom jointly with 
treaty law, its own case law, and legal scholarship.1875 It also noted ‘a tendency 
to restrict the immunities of State officials with regard to international crimes’, 
citing the landmark Pinochet decisions of the House of Lords of 1998 and 1999, 
and the icj’s Arrest warrant ruling of 2000.1876 The ruling is remarkable, given 
how rarely the Court usually refers to the practice of foreign and international 
courts when ascertaining cil. Such references are, of course, more likely (and 
warranted) if a case deals with a cil issue that is unsettled and in flux. None-
theless, even in a landmark ruling such as Nezzar, the Court’s analysis of inter-
national legal practice and scholarship can be criticized for being ‘somewhat 
superficial and schematic’.1877
2.2.3 Cantonal Courts
2.2.3.1 The Supreme Court of the Canton of Geneva
As is the case with the Swiss Federal Tribunal (supra, 2.2.1) and the sfcc (su-
pra, 2.2.2.2), the Supreme Court of the canton of Geneva has referred to cil in 
a number of rulings pertaining to the law of immunities. Based on the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal’s case law, the Court has stated that art. 32 vcdr (on the 
State’s waiver of immunity from jurisdiction) reflects cil.1878 It has noted that 
the status of a foreign State in domestic litigation is governed by cil, which 
grants States absolute immunity. The Court has added that ‘in Switzerland, this 
principle has given way to the principle of relative immunity, which is based 
 1873 sfcc, judgment bb.2011.140 of 25 July 2012, at 3.3.2.
 1874 Ibid.
 1875 sfcc, judgment rr.2007.73 of 6 December 2007, at 2.2.6.
 1876 Ibid. The Court also noted that its own case law was consistent with the icj’s decision.
 1877 Ramona Pedretti, ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Immunitäten von Staatsoberhäuptern und 
anderen Staatsvertretern: Am Beispiel des Nezzar- Falls’ (2013) 31 recht 182, 193.
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on the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis’.1879 This 
indicates that the Court predominantly looks at the Swiss practice when inter-
preting custom.
In line with the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Court has stated that utmost 
caution is warranted regarding the application of provisions of the Europe-
an Convention on State Immunity qua cil.1880 By contrast (and, again, like 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal), the Court considers that the uncsi codifies cil. 
In two particularly detailed rulings of 2011 and 2012, it reached this general 
conclusion based on a statement of the Swiss Federal Council.1881 After ac-
knowledging that the Convention was not yet in force, it cited the ECtHR and 
the Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) of the Netherlands, which both deem art. 11 
uncsi customary.1882 Finally, it mentioned the case law of the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, based on which the Convention and its art. 11 have customary sta-
tus.1883 The references to foreign and international rulings are noteworthy, as 
they are particularly rare in cantonal case law (but also in the Swiss case law at 
large). Still, the Court heavily relies on the Swiss practice. In other decisions, it 
has exclusively cited the Swiss Federal Tribunal1884 or the Federal Council1885 
to justify the uncsi’s customary character.
Few cases on cil deal with topics outside the law of immunities. One ex-
ample is a ruling of 2011 in which the Court stated that public law is subject to 
the principle of territoriality, except if a treaty, foreign law, or cil provide oth-
erwise.1886 Relatedly, in a judgment of 2017, the Court stated that cil excludes 
 1879 cj- ge, Chambre de surveillance en matière de poursuite et faillites, judgments dcso/ 
209/ 2016 and dcso/ 210/ 2016 of 30 June 2016, at 2.2; cj- ge, Chambre de surveillance 
en matière de poursuite et faillites, judgment dcso/ 214/ 2015 of 13 July 2015, at 2.1. See 
also cj- ge, Chambre de surveillance en matière de poursuite et faillites, judgment dcso/ 
391/ 2011 of 27 October 2011, where the Court mentions this shift by relying on an arti-
cle by Christian Dominicé.
 1880 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 59/ 2014 of 25 April 2014, at 3.1 
and 3.2.
 1881 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 53/ 2012 of 13 March 2012, at 5.2; 
cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 95/ 2011 of 7 July 2011, at 5.1.2. 
See also cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 142/ 2014 of 24 September 
2014, at 3.3.
 1882 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 53/ 2012 of 13 March 2012, at 5 
5.2.2 and 5.2.3; cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 95/ 2011 of 7 July 
2011, at 5.1.4 ff.
 1883 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 53/ 2012 of 13 March 2012, at 5.2.4.
 1884 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 94/ 2013 of 15 October 2013, at 4.1.
 1885 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 205/ 2011 of 30 November 2011, 
at 4.2.
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the exercise of public powers by one State on the territory of another State 
without the latter’s consent.1887 Given the limited number of substantive areas 
of international law addressed by the case law on cil, the Court likely does 
not refer to custom in areas where it would be relevant. Moreover, the Court 
has not referred to the two constitutive elements of cil, nor has it elaborated 
on the process through which cil is formed. Its only references to opinio juris 
concern domestic custom (infra, 2.2.5).1888
2.2.3.2 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich
Only very few rulings of the High Court and of the Administrative Court of the can-
ton of Zurich refer to cil. As with many cantonal courts, it is likely that the dearth 
of case law is due to judges’ unease vis- à- vis this unwritten source (see also supra, 
2.1), to the types of cases brought before cantonal courts, to the relatively small 
sample of case law available online, and to the limited search options provided by 
cantonal databases. In line with the practice of other courts, rulings of the High 
Court and Administrative Court of the canton of Zurich dealing with cil pertain 
to subject matters such as the law of immunities,  treaty law, and refugee law.
The High Court of the canton of Zurich has cited an extract of a ruling of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal pertaining to the so- called ‘Binnenbeziehung’ (the 
nexus required by Swiss courts to adjudicate immunity claims).1889 It has qual-
ified this nexus requirement as (domestic) customary law.1890 The Court has 
also invoked cil (while citing a scholarly piece) regarding the definition of a 
treaty reservation.1891 However, the Court’s laconism in these cases prevents a 
detailed assessment of its interpretative methods.
The Administrative Court has noted that the principle of non- refoulement 
‘is at times attributed to cil or, in more recent scholarship, to jus cogens’.1892 
This statement, if taken literally, could suggest that the Court disregards that 
cil and jus cogens can overlap. The Court has also held that sending official 
communications via mail is allowed by cil,1893 and that it is ‘tolerated by most 
States’.1894 This test (toleration) could indicate that the Court does not engage 
 1887 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 458/ 2017 of 25 April 2017, at 6 b).
 1888 cj- ge, Chambre administrative, judgment ata/ 714/ 2013 of 29 October 2013, at e).
 1889 oger- zh, judgment ps130067 of 14 May 2013, at 3.5.2; oger- zh, judgment ps120238 of 
24 January 2013, at 3.4.3.
 1890 oger- zh, judgment ps130067 of 14 May 2013, at 3.5.3; oger- zh, judgment ps120238 of 
24 January 2013, at 3.4.3.
 1891 oger- zh, judgment ps120140 of 5 April 2013, at 5 d).
 1892 VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2001.00128 of 19 June 2001, at 1 c) aa).
 1893 VwGer- zh, judgment vb.2012.00456 of 8 August 2012, at 1.3.
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with the methods of determination of cil, and that it does not carefully exam-
ine the existence of an opinio juris. In a ruling of 2017 pertaining to the Swiss–
Australian dta, the Court held that dtas and treaties more generally were to 
be interpreted based on treaty law, cil, and the vclt.1895
Overall, drawing conclusions from such a scarce practice is difficult, apart 
from the observation that cil is usually mentioned incidentally.
2.2.3.3 The Court of Appeals of the Canton of Basel- Stadt
The Court of Appeals of the canton of Basel- Stadt has only mentioned cil in 
passing.1896 It has analyzed the two constitutive elements of domestic custom-
ary law1897 (on this issue, see infra, 2.2.5), but not of cil.
2.2.3.4 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Bern
The Administrative Court of the canton of Bern has noted that dtas must be 
interpreted based on cil and the vclt.1898 Apart from these few cases, the 
High Court and Administrative Court of the canton of Bern hardly every refer 
to cil.
2.2.4 Military Tribunals
Given the scarcity of cases of the Military Court of Cassation (mcc) on  treaty 
law (supra, Chapter  7, 3.3.4), it comes as no surprise that even fewer cases 
mention cil. A survey of the mcc’s case law from 2006 onwards did not yield 
relevant cases from the perspective of cil.1899 Yet the former art. 109 of the 
Swiss Military Criminal Code (smcc) sanctioned violations of the ‘laws and 
customs of war’, and its current art. 114 incriminates violations of customary 
ihl. Hence, cil can play a role in military criminal law cases.
To identify relevant rulings, I  hence relied on auxiliary means and other 
materials. Helpful resources include the websites of ngo s1900 or of research 
 1895 VwGer- zh, judgment sb.2016.00118 of 31 May 2017, at 2.2.1.
 1896 ag- bs, judgments bez.2014.9 and bez.2014.10 of 23 May 2014, at 3.3.1.
 1897 ag- bs, judgment vd.2013.122 of 28 July 2014, at 3.3.3; ag- bs, judgment vd.2012.98 of 
Feburary 20, 2013, at 4.5.
 1898 VwGer- be, judgment 100 2014 12 of 20 April 2016, at 5.1; VwGer- be, judgment 100 2017 
27 of 1 May 2018, at 4.1; VwGer- be, judgment 100 2017 24 of 29 June 2018, at 4.1.
 1899 As mentioned, this study is based on a survey of the rulings of the mcc available online 
since 2006 (see <www.oa.admin.ch/ de/ entscheidungen- militaerjustiz.html>). For rea-
sons of scope, older decisions were not surveyed systematically. To complement the sur-
vey of the decisions of the mcc since 2006, relevant decisions were mainly identified via 
proxies (ie, legal scholarship and other online resources).
 1900 In the database of Swiss cases of the ngo trial International (<trialinternational.org>), 
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institutions1901 which highlight important rulings (including Swiss rulings) 
from the perspective of ihl and icl. What emerges is that few Swiss pro-
ceedings have led to a judicial decision. Some scholars have reported on  cases 
pertaining to ihl and icl, but they do not address courts’ interpretative 
methods.1902 They merely highlight the difficulty for Swiss judges to apply cil 
given its frequent indeterminacy, and the tension this creates with the prin-
ciple of legality.1903 This difficulty is also emphasized by the lower military 
tribunals.1904
One of the few military court cases mentioning cil is the ruling of the Mili-
tary Court of Appeal in Niyonteze.1905 In this case, the Court noted that the for-
mer art. 109 smcc (which was still in force at the time) sanctioned violations 
of the laws of war prohibited by treaty law, but also by cil.1906 Regarding the 
latter, the Court referred to ‘international norms recognized by the interna-
tional community’, citing a dispatch of the Federal Council of 1967.1907 This 
seems to confirm the previously highlighted trend of self- referentiality. Even-
tually, due to a specificity of the smcc, the Court did not apply cil.
2.2.5 Relationship With Interpretative Methods under Swiss Law
What is the relationship between the methods governing the interpretation of 
cil and those that apply to the interpretation of domestic custom? In light of 
the relative richness of the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law compared to the 
practice of other Swiss courts, it is on the former that I focus in this subsection.
The similarity of the methods governing the identification of domestic ver-
sus international custom is logically entailed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s 
perspective of cil. Another resource is the icrc’s website (<www.icrc.org/ applic/ ihl/ ihl- 
nat.nsf/ vwLawsByCategorySelected.xsp?xp_ countrySelected=CH>).
 1901 Eg <competenceuniverselle.wordpress.com/ en- suisse>.
 1902 Andreas R Ziegler, ‘In re G.’ (1998) 92 American Journal of International Law 78; Marc 
Henzelin, ‘La compétence universelle et l’application du droit international pénal en 
matière de conflits armés : la situation en Suisse’ in Laurence Burgorgue- Larsen (ed), La 
répression internationale du génocide rwandais (Bruylant 2003); Andreas R Ziegler, Stefan 
Wehrenberg, and Renaud Weber (eds), Kriegsverbrecherprozesse in der Schweiz / Procès 
de criminels de guerre en Suisse (Schulthess 2009); Andreas Müller and Stefanie Heinrich, 
‘Die Strafverfolgung von Völkerrechtsverbrechen in der Schweiz’ (2015) 10 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 501.
 1903 Henzelin (n 1902) 165 f. See also Besson and Ammann (n 60) 96.
 1904 Henzelin (n 1902) 170.
 1905 <competenceuniverselle.files.wordpress.com/ 2011/ 08/ niyonteze- tribunal- militaire- 
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acknowledgment that domestic methods govern the interpretation of all 
norms that are applicable in the (monist) Swiss legal order (supra, Chapter 7, 
3.4). However, this similarity is less explicitly acknowledged in its case law than 
in its interpretation of treaties. The small number of judgments that address 
the methods of identification of cil, but also of domestic customary law, likely 
explain this gap.1908
Still, relevant rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal show that the basic interpre-
tative methods of domestic and international custom are indeed the same. The 
Court has occasionally relied on textual interpretation, for instance when assess-
ing whether domestic written law leaves room for customary law,1909 or simply to 
demonstrate that a custom exists,1910 does not exist,1911 or has been codified,1912 or 
to clarify its content.1913 It has also used systematic interpretation (again, inter alia 
when examining written law and the room it leaves for a domestic custom),1914 
and teleological interpretation (eg when examining the purpose of a practice1915 
or when evaluating whether domestic written law needs to be  complemented).1916 
Finally, it has referred to historical interpretation (eg when mentioning the crite-
rion of a sufficient duration of the practice,1917 but also to identify the historical 
origins of a customary norm more generally).1918
The constitutive elements of domestic and international custom are 
identical as well, save for some features that hinge on the idiosyncrasies of 
domestic and international lawmaking.1919 It is worth noting that when the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal interprets domestic custom (which is a source of Swiss 
law),1920 its remarks on the formation and constitutive elements of cus-
tom are more detailed than when it deals with cil. The Court has explained 
that customary law derives from a lasting, uninterrupted practice and opinio 
 1908 On this issue, see Besson and Ammann (n 60) 94 ff.
 1909 bge 136 i 376, at 5.2; bge 138 i 196, at 4.5.4.
 1910 bge 88 iii 98; bge 96 v 49, at 4.
 1911 bge 90 i 276, at 3.
 1912 bge 81 i 81, at 4.
 1913 bge 80 i 74 at 2.
 1914 bge 136 i 376, at 5.2; bge 138 i 196, at 4.5.4.
 1915 bge 136 i 376, at 5.2.
 1916 bge 138 i 196, at 4.5.4.
 1917 Eg bge 136 i 376, at 5.2; bge 85 i 103, at 3; bge 84 i 89, at 4; bge 96 v 49, at 4.
 1918 bge 83 ii 345, at 2 (on the historical origins of the customary principle of good faith).
 1919 One example is the fact that practice and opinio juris are generated by different actors on 
the domestic versus international plane. Domestic custom can be generated based on the 
practice of legal officials and individuals, see bge 83 i 242, at 3; bge 84 i 89, at 4.
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juris,1921 and it has only mentioned the concept of opinio juris with regard to 
domestic custom.1922 The same goes for the conditions State practice must ful-
fill (ie, coherence, constancy, and generality).1923
The practice shows that domestic custom differs from cil in some respects. 
Domestic customary law can only emerge if there is a lacuna in domestic writ-
ten law. Domestic custom cannot contradict written domestic law.1924 More-
over, it cannot impose new tax obligations on its subjects,1925 nor can it inter-
fere with fundamental rights.1926 Again, these peculiarities derive from rules 
on domestic lawmaking, and they do not affect the congruence of the interpre-
tative methods of domestic and international law.
2.2.6 Comparing the Practice of Swiss Courts
The practices of the various Swiss courts under scrutiny share a number of 
traits. One such commonality pertains to the subject matter of cases dealing 
with cil, namely the law of treaties, refugee law, and the law of immunities. 
Moreover, courts tend to emphasize the Swiss practice (as opposed to that of 
other States) when identifying cil. International courts are seldom mentioned 
as well. cil often serves a gap- filling function in the absence of applicable 
 treaty law. Courts also frequently seem to invoke custom to reinforce an in-
terpretative conclusion reached on other grounds. State practice is more fre-
quently analyzed (though, in most cases, superficially) when courts highlight 
the lack of custom on a given issue. Other common features of the case law are 
the imprecise terminology used by the courts, an absence of references to State 
practice and opinio juris in an overwhelming majority of cases, and a greater 
level of detail in high- profile cases, which are rare occurrences.
The Swiss case law is not homogeneous in every respect. Circular reason-
ing, for instance, is particularly pronounced in the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s 
practice, presumably because it acts as the last judicial instance with regard 
to many legal issues in the Swiss legal order. This also explains why other Swiss 
courts tend to refer to the case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, and not to 
 1921 bge 119 Ia 59, at 4 b); bge 94 i 138, at 2 b); bge 84 i 89, at 4; bge 83 i 242, at 3, and bge 
81 i 26, at 4 (mentioning the requirement of opinio necessitatis); bge 104 Ia 305, at 4 a), 
and bge 102 Ib 296, at 3 f) (opinio juris et necessitatis).
 1922 bge 104 Ia 305, at 4 a); bge 103 Ia 369, at 4 c); BGer, judgment 6B_ 218/ 2013 of 13 June 
2013, at 3.3.
 1923 BGer, judgment 6B_ 218/ 2013 of 13 June 2013, at 3.3; bge 105 Ia 2, at 2 b).
 1924 bge 94 i 305, at 2; bge 105 Ia 2, at 2 a); bge 104 Ia 305, at 4 a); bge 138 i 196, at 4.5.4.
 1925 bge 94 i 305, at 3; bge 105 Ia 2, at 2 a). On the strict requirements applied to the forma-
tion of customary tax law, see also bge 84 i 89, at 4.
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their own. The sfac has provided the most detailed accounts of the interpre-
tative methods of cil. Moreover, it has used cil in relation to sovereign rights, 
a subject matter which hardly appears in the case law of other Swiss courts. 
Instances of disagreement between the courts and the executive are excep-
tional. They primarily concern the Swiss Federal Tribunal. It is important to 
stress that the scarcity of cantonal cases dealing with cil makes it difficult to 
compare this cantonal practice with that of other Swiss courts.
2.2.7 Putting the Swiss Judicial Practice Into Perspective
How does the Swiss judicial practice (supra, 2.2.1– 2.2.4) compare to that of oth-
er domestic courts (supra, 2.1), setting aside the differences stemming from 
States’ various constitutional frameworks? Apart from minor divergences, the 
Swiss case law reflects broader trends on the international plane.
Common features include the fact that cil is seldom mentioned, and that, 
when it is, it is often in cases dealing with the law of immunities. Another 
generally applicable observation is courts’ unease regarding cil, and their 
reliance on codifications thereof. Other commonalities are the imprecise ter-
minology courts use to refer to cil, the fact that analyses of State practice 
and opinio juris are rare, courts’ frequent reliance on treaties, scholarship, 
and case law, and their tendency to use their own State’s practice regarding 
cil.1927
Only a few differences can be noted. One such contrast is that few Swiss 
rulings have addressed the tension that may exist between cil and the prin-
ciple of legality. Another one is the absence of Swiss case law pertaining to 
statutory limitations and their relationship to cil (a case law that has prolifer-
ated in Latin American countries). Moreover, it is likely that judges bound by a 
doctrine of stare decisis are more inclined to cite precedent (usually domestic 
but also foreign case law) because they are used to consulting relevant cases. 
The fact that this practice may come less naturally to judges in civil law juris-
dictions could explain why courts in Switzerland rarely refer to foreign and 
international case law.
3 General Principles of International Law
General principles of international law are the parent pauvre of the sources 
of international law if one considers their marginal relevance in international 
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legal practice. The icj, for example, ‘sparingly’1928 relies on general principles 
as a source of international law. In line with this trend, domestic courts rarely 
cite general principles of international law, which makes it difficult to identify 
and analyze domestic courts’ interpretative approach.
After providing an overview of the domestic judicial practice in  general 
(3.1), I  examine how general principles of international law are applied by 
Swiss courts (3.2). I conclude with an evaluation of the Swiss judicial practice 
regarding both cil and general principles (4.), with the goal of assessing its 
legality and quality (supra, Introduction, section 3).
3.1 Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of General Principles of  
International Law
From the perspective of the sources of international law, domestic judicial de-
cisions can express States’ recognition of general principles of  international 
law (supra, Chapter  4, 3.1.3). There is hardly any scholarship on domestic 
courts’ interpretation of general principles of international law, which reflects 
the paucity of relevant domestic judicial practice in the first place (see already 
Chapter 6, supra). Moreover, due to the imprecise language courts use to refer 
to general principles of international law, relevant cases are not easily iden-
tifiable. General principles of international law are, as previously mentioned 
(supra, 2.1), often confused with cil.1929 Some domestic courts refer to general 
principles, while actually citing treaty provisions.1930 Treaty law is, of course, 
useful to ascertain unwritten international law, as the ilc has highlighted.1931
Still, domestic courts do at times (though infrequently) refer to general 
principles of international law.1932 The ildc database contains a number of 
cases pertaining to general principles of international law.1933 In Russia, Ser-
gei Marochkin and Vladimir Popov note that courts have sometimes referred 
 1928 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (n 906)  36. See also Sienho 
(n 73) 489.
 1929 Marochkin and Popov (n 183)  230 f.  See also ilc, ‘First Report on Formation and 
Evidence of Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ 
(n 185) 16 para 36.
 1930 Marochkin and Popov (n 183) 232. On the role of treaty law in the determination of cil, 
see Besson and Ammann (n 60) 55 f.
 1931 ilc, ‘First Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law by 
Special Rapporteur Sir Michael Wood’ (n 185) 14 ff para 33 ff. See also draft conclusion 
11 in ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law, With 
Commentaries’ (n 891).
 1932 Eg on the Chilean case law: Guzmán Dalbora (n 1727) 539, 543.
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to this source, albeit without citing a specific principle.1934 In Canada, the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario has stated that domestic interpretative meth-
ods were not to be relied upon to interpret treaties, unless these methods 
constituted general principles of international law.1935 In some jurisdictions, 
a rich case law has developed on the principle of sustainability and related 
principles.1936
The domestic judicial practice on general principles of international law 
shares features with the practice pertaining to cil (supra, 2.1). In the area of 
ihrl, domestic courts have identified a number of general principles of inter-
national law, but they have largely neglected States’ practice of recognition. 
They have mostly relied on auxiliary means (scholarship and judicial deci-
sions), as well as treaties, acts of ios, and soft law.1937 This disregard for States’ 
practice of recognition is also observed in the context of cil (where the test 
applied to State practice is stricter than the looser criterion of ‘recognition’ that 
serves to identify general principles of international law). In some cases, courts 
have provided more details as to the method of identification of general prin-
ciples.1938 Another way in which courts’ use of general principles is connected 
to the identification of cil is that by relying on general principles, domestic 
courts circumvent the two- tiered test of State practice and opinio juris.1939 This 
 1934 Marochkin and Popov (n 183) 231.
 1935 van Ert (n 1385) 182.
 1936 Staubach (n 1265) 122.
 1937 Eg Supreme Court of the Republic of Serbia and Others v. People’s Assembly of the Republic 
of Serbia, Original petition for constitutional review, No 17/ 2003, ildc 31 (csxx 2003), 
13 February 2003, Serbia and Montenegro (historical); Federal Constitutional Court 
(historical); Filártiga and Filártiga and United States (Intervening) v.  Peña- Irala, Appeal 
Judgment, Docket No 79– 6090, Case No 191, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), ildc 681 (us 
1980), 30 June 1980, United States; Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) [2d Cir]; Secession of 
Quebec, Re, Reference to Supreme Court, [1998] 2 scr 217, (1998) 161 dlr (4th) 385, 
(1998), 55 crr (2d) 1, ildc 184 (ca 1998), 20 August 1998, Canada; Supreme Court 
[scc], at para 114; Supreme State Prosecutor v.  Ribičič (Mitja), Order on Whether to 
Open Pre- Trial Criminal Investigation, Ks 962/ 2006, ildc 523 (si 2006), 27 June 2006, 
Slovenia; Ljubljana; Regional Court.
 1938 Argentine Necessity Case, K and Others v.  Argentina (Represented by President Néstor 
Kirchner), Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, Order of the Second Senate, 2 
BvM 1– 5/ 03, 1, 2/ 06, vol 118, 124, 60 njw (2007), 2610, 138 ilr 1 (2010), ildc 952 (de 
2007), 8 May 2007, Germany; Constitutional Court [BVerfG], at para 81.
 1939 See Iovane (n 182) 617. This observation has also been made with regard to international 
courts: Sienho (n 73) 490, with reference to icj, case concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), judgment, merits, icj Reports 2010, 20 April 2010, 14. 
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stratagem jeopardizes legality. Finally, courts’ terminology is imprecise, and it 
often conflates general principles of international law and cil.1940
3.2 Swiss Courts and the Interpretation of General Principles of  
International Law
As is the case with cil (supra, 2.2), the small number of Swiss judgments that 
refer to general principles of international law makes a diachronic study in-
appropriate. To identify relevant cases, I focused on keywords1941 indicating a 
sufficiently explicit, unambiguous reference to a general principle of interna-
tional law. Vague expressions1942 were excluded, as they did not clearly estab-
lish that courts were actually referring to general principles in the sense of art. 
38(1)(c) icj Statute.1943
This keyword- based approach has drawbacks. Given the imprecise termi-
nology used by the Swiss courts, some pertinent cases may not have been iden-
tified. On the other hand, the inflationary use of adjectives such as ‘general’ 
and ‘principle’ in judicial decisions and in legal discourse more generally – and 
the array of meanings attached to these terms – makes it hard to determine 
when they are employed to refer to general principles of international law.1944 
To speculate as to whether a given case is actually relevant, is difficult in prac-
tice and is likely to lead to overinclusive results. Moreover, even expressions 
that seem precise are not always used to point to a general principle of inter-
national law.
 1940 Eg Italia Nostra v. Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Intervening), 
Appeal Judgment, Case No 3154/ 2008, ildc 1138 (it 2008), 23 June 2008, Italy; Council 
of State [Council of State].
 1941 The keywords used in the present analysis (taking into account their grammatical var-
iations) are:  allgemeine Grundsätze des Völkerrechts, allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze 
des Völkerrechts, allgemeine Völkerrechtsgrundsätze, allgemeine Rechtsprinzipien des 
Völkerrechts, allgemeine Völkerrechtsprinzipien, allgemeine Prinzipien des Völkerrechts, 
principes généraux du droit international, principes généraux de droit international, 
principes généraux du droit des gens, principi generali del diritto internazionale, principi 
generali di diritto internazionale.
 1942 Keywords excluded from the scope of this analysis because of their indeterminacy, and 
that appear in the Swiss case law, include: general principles, principles of international 
law, principles of the law of nations, unwritten principles of international law, general 
rules of international law, recognized principles of international law, principles that are 
recognized internationally, fundamental principles of the law of nations, and principles. 
On some of these expressions (and others) used by Swiss courts, see Besson and Ammann 
(n 60) 69, 112 ff.
 1943 Courts (and other authorities) often refer to principles qua category of norms rather than 
qua sources of international law, for instance. See ibid 21.
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One example of such an ambiguous case is the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s rul-
ing in a border dispute between the cantons of Valais and Ticino. The Court 
held that the ‘principles of international law’ were applicable to the dispute on 
a subsidiary basis.1945 In this exceptionally well documented ruling, the Court 
referred to a number of ‘principles’ in connection with international law, yet it 
did not mention what source of international law it was applying. It is unclear 
whether it was referring to general principles in the sense of art. 38(1)(c) icj 
Statute.
In the following sections, I discuss, again, the practice of the Swiss Feder-
al Tribunal (3.2.1), the sfac and the sfcc (3.2.2), and judgments of cantonal 
(3.2.3) and military courts (3.2.4). I also highlight the convergence of the meth-
ods Swiss courts use to interpret general principles of domestic and interna-
tional law, respectively (3.2.5). I  then compare the practices of these various 
courts with one another (3.2.6), and with those of foreign domestic courts 
(3.2.7).
3.2.1 The Swiss Federal Tribunal
A first noteworthy feature of the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal is that 
few rulings written in German mention general principles of international law. 
Rulings in French, by contrast, have referred to them in a number of cases, eg 
by mentioning the so- called ‘principes généraux du droit des gens’. However, 
as I will emphasize, some of these references serve other purposes than that of 
invoking the general principles of art. 38(1)(c) icj Statute. Moreover, while the 
Court often cites these principles in passing, it rarely relies on them in its rea-
soning, nor does it seek to identify whether such general principles are indeed 
‘recognized’ by States, as the icj Statute provides.
Second, in a number of rulings, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has used general 
principles as a fallback source, especially when no treaty provision was appli-
cable.1946 This reflects the broader tendency of courts and legal authorities to 
rely on written law whenever it is available, including to identify unwritten 
international law.1947 This trend should not detract from the fact that  general 
principles are on equal footing with other sources of international law. In a 
 1945 bge 106 Ib 154, at 3.
 1946 Eg bge 110 Ib 173, at 2; bge 120 Ib 189, at 2 b).
 1947 On the role of treaty law to interpret unwritten international law, eg cil, see ilc, ‘First 
Report on Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law by Special Rapporteur 
Sir Michael Wood’ (n 185) 15 para 34; ilc, ‘Third Report on Identification of Customary 
International Law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur’ (n 294) 14 ff para 27 ff. See also 
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case of 1994, for instance, the Court noted that no treaty between Switzerland 
and Egypt was applicable and that no ‘general principles of supranational 
rank’ governed the issue. The law of immunities consisted largely in domestic 
law, apart from the minimal protection which cil accorded to foreign States. 
The Court concluded that the question at stake had to be resolved ‘in light 
of the general principles of public international law as they can be derived 
from case law, scholarly writings, and the solutions that have been retained 
in international treaties governing interstate jurisdictional conflicts’.1948 How-
ever, the remaining parts of the ruling focus on treaty law (and on the issue 
of whether it reflects cil) and on the Court’s own case law. This shows that 
courts do not necessarily do what they say, including in terms of interpretative 
methods. General principles of international law played a similar residual role 
in a case of 2009 pertaining to the law of immunities. As no treaty was applica-
ble to the case at hand, the Court noted that the cantonal judges had applied 
the ‘general principles of international law’.1949 In another ruling on the law of 
immunities, the Court considered that given that the European Convention 
on State Immunity was not applicable, it had to decide the case based on the 
general principles of international law.1950 Confirming courts’ tendency to rely 
on written law, the Court added that these principles had been codified in the 
uncsi which, though not yet in force, ‘purports to be a codification of cil’.1951 
The language the Court uses indicates that general principles of international 
law are conflated with other sources of international law.
Third, the Court sometimes mentions general principles of international 
law loosely to refer to international law in general. In an extradition case in-
volving Italy, the Court (in a way that is symptomatic of the self- referential 
tendency of the domestic case law) stated that ‘based on Swiss conceptions, 
general principles of international law are directly applicable qua domestic 
law; when they are of ordre public (jus cogens), they trump contrary positive 
treaty law’.1952 Another example in which the notion of general principles of 
international law is used loosely is a case pertaining to the Free Trade Agree-
ment between Switzerland and the eec. The Court held that the Agreement 
had to be interpreted based on (general principles of) international law, as op-
posed to eu law.1953 Similarly, the Court has stated that cases pertaining to 
 1948 bge 120 ii 400, at 2.
 1949 bge 135 iii 608, at 4.2.
 1950 bge 134 iii 122, at 5.1.
 1951 Ibid.
 1952 bge 117 Ib 337, at 2 a). See also BGer, judgment 1A.63/ 2002 of 9 April 2002, at 2.1.
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immunity from execution must be decided based on the general principles of 
international law.1954 In a series of cases, the Court has noted that when assess-
ing a request for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, general principles 
of international law must be taken into account regardless of whether a treaty 
has been concluded between the States concerned.1955
Fourth, and as previously mentioned, general principles of international 
law are sometimes conflated with other sources of international law, or with 
specific types of international legal acts, such as jus cogens. This ambiguity is, 
once again, problematic from the perspective of the quality (and especially the 
clarity) of judicial reasoning. In a ruling of 1995, the Court left open whether 
the treaty provisions invoked by the appellant qualified as a general principle 
of international law pursuant to art. 53 vclt and could, ‘qua norm of the in-
ternational ordre public’, motivate the refusal to extradite an individual to the 
United States.1956 Yet art. 53 refers to a ‘peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law’, and not to general principles of international law as stated by the 
Court. Another example, this time of the Court’s tendency to amalgamate gen-
eral principles and other sources, is provided by a case of 2014 pertaining to the 
uncsi, in which the Court stated that the Convention codifies general princi-
ples of international law.1957 In spite of this language, the Court likely intended 
to refer to cil, which it considers to be reflected in the uncsi (see also supra, 
2.2.1). The Court has also considered that the prohibition of torture codified in 
art. 3 echr is a general principle of international law which must be taken into 
account in a request for extradition.1958 In this ruling, which refers to general 
principles several times, the Court relied on a previous case allegedly pertain-
ing to the same issue. However, in this earlier case, the Court had mentioned 
jus cogens and not general principles of international law.1959 The Court has 
sometimes more neatly distinguished general principles of international law 
from other sources of international law.1960
 1954 BGer, judgment 5A_ 618/ 2007 of 10 January 2008, at 3.
 1955 BGer, judgments 1A.90/ 2006, 1A.94/ 2006, 1A.95/ 2006, 1A.96/ 2006, 1A.97/ 2006, and 
1A.98/ 2006 of 30 August 2006, at 1; BGer, judgment 1A.162/ 2003 of January 15, 2004, at 
1; BGer, judgment 1A.166/ 2003 of 19 January 2004, at 1; BGer, judgment 1A.275/ 2000 of 
8 December 2000, at 1 a); BGer, judgment 1A.74/ 2000 of 8 March 2000, at 1 a).
 1956 bge 121 ii 296, at 3 c).
 1957 BGer, judgment 4A_ 331/ 2014 of 31 October 2014, at 3.2. See also BGer, judgment 7B.2/ 
2007 of 15 August 2007, at 5.1.
 1958 bge 108 Ib 408, at 8 a). On this issue, see also BGer, judgment 1A.135/ 2005 of 22 August 
2005, at 3.1; BGer, judgment 1A.220/ 2000 of 28 August 2000, at 2 a). For another exam-
ple, see bge 123 ii 511, at 7 c).
 1959 bge 101 Ia 533, at 7 b).
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Fifth, in a number of cases, keywords referring to ‘general principles of interna-
tional law’ appear in the title of scholarly pieces cited by the Court, but whether 
they influence the Court’s reasoning is unclear.1961 In one such case, the Court 
 noted that it is a ‘principle of the law of nations’ that a State can expel foreign 
nationals who endanger peace and public order, or whose presence constitutes 
a danger or an inconvenience. It then cited, inter alia, Louis Delbez’s Principes 
généraux du droit international public, a book pertaining to ihl.1962 In this case, 
the Court also stated that the European Convention on Extradition ‘expresses 
general principles common to a number of States’.1963 Given the laconism of the 
Court’s remarks, whether it is indeed referring to (and seeking to identify) a gen-
eral principle of international law properly called is unclear.
Sixth, and last, the Court sometimes identifies specific general principles, 
yet without mentioning their recognition by States pursuant to art. 38(1)(c) 
icj Statute.1964 It has for example noted that it is a general principle of in-
ternational law that in a war, reprisals are in principle allowed within cer-
tain limits.1965 To substantiate this statement, the Court exclusively relied on 
scholarship. The same approach – ie, a focus on scholarhip – can be found in 
a remarkably detailed case of 2016 pertaining to competition law, the Gaba 
judgment. In this ruling, the Court stated that according to a principle of inter-
national law, States can regulate foreign situations to which they have a genu-
ine link.1966 In another case, the Court, based on its own case law, stated that 
reciprocity is a general principle of international law.1967 In an earlier ruling, 
the Court had indeed qualified reciprocity as such, yet without elaborating on 
this statement.1968 While general principles do not require evidence of State 
practice and opinio juris, as is the case with cil, their existence depends on 
their recognition by States. Judicial economy obviously precludes courts from 
engaging in a full- fledged comparative analysis of domestic legal practices, un-
less the general principle occupies a central place in their reasoning. Such a 
comprehensive analysis seems especially redundant for general principles that 
are well established, such as good faith1969 or sovereign equality. However, not 
 1961 Eg bge 100 ii 200, at 3; bge 106 Ib 400, at 10 a).
 1962 bge 106 Ib 400, at 10 a).
 1963 Ibid, at 5 c).
 1964 Eg bge 100 ii 200, at 2.
 1965 bge 92 i 108, at 3 a).
 1966 Bge 143 ii 297, at 3.5.
 1967 bge 110 Ib 173, at 3 a). See also bge 111 v 302, at 5 a).
 1968 bge 109 Ib 165, at 5.
 1969 BGer, judgment 2C_ 806/ 2011 of 20 March 2012, at 5.2; see also bge 143 ii 224, at 6.3 
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all general principles can be taken as axiomatic: some are controversial, and 
their existence must be demonstrated.
3.2.2 Other Federal Courts
3.2.2.1 The Swiss Federal Administrative Court
Unsurprisingly, few decisions of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (sfac) 
mention general principles of international law. In a ruling of 2011, for instance, 
the sfac agreed with the lower court’s statement that reciprocity was a gen-
eral principle of international law.1970 Most of the sfac’s decisions confirm 
the trends noted with regard to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (supra, 3.2.1). Three 
trends will be discussed here. The first concerns self- referential, repetitive rea-
soning. Judgments can be considered repetitive when relevant paragraphs are 
used from one judgment to the other without any adjustment. Another trend 
is the neglect of the domestic recognition of general principles of international 
law. The third trend is the use of imprecise terminology.
Many repetitive rulings pertain to the good faith requirement which, under 
Swiss statutory law,1971 applies to requests for international administrative as-
sistance in tax matters. In several highly similar cases, the Court has stated that 
this principle is found in domestic law and (based on its own case law) in the 
general principles of international law.1972 The Court has made the same ob-
servation when relying on the analogous good faith requirement of the Ordi-
nance on International Administrative Assistance Pursuant to dtas.1973 These 
decisions are all identical in their wording, in line with the repetitive tendency 
noticed in the context of treaty interpretation (supra, Chapter  7, 3.3.1.1). Of 
course, when cases raise highly similar legal issues, and a fortiori for joined 
cases, it is misguided and unrealistic to require courts to reinvent the wheel 
in every ruling. On the other hand, an uncritical reliance on analogous cases 
without questioning the underlying reasoning can create difficulties in terms 
of the legality and quality of judicial reasoning.
 1970 sfac, judgment B- 8732/ 2010 of 22 September 2011, at 4.3.2.
 1971 Art. 7(c) of the Federal Act on International Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters of 
28 September 2012 (sr 651.1) states that a request for assistance will not be considered 
if it violates the principle of good faith.
 1972 sfac, judgment A- 6849/ 2014 of 22 October 2015, at 4; sfac, judgment A- 6337/ 2014 
of 21 October 2015, at 5; sfac, judgments A- 6703/ 2014, A- 6707/ 2014, and A- 6727/ 
2014 of 25 November 2015, at 5; sfac, judgment A- 3387/ 2015 of 19 February 2016, at 
5; sfac, judgment A- 2872/ 2015 of 4 March 2016, at 5; sfac, judgments A- 3830/ 2015 
and A- 3838/ 2015 of 14 December 2016, at 4; sfac, judgment A- 7143/ 2014 of 15 August 
2016, at 5.
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The Court almost never establishes the international recognition of general 
principles. One exception is a ruling of September 2015, in which the Court 
first referred to good faith in a case of international administrative assistance. 
In this decision, it stated that general principles of international law are ‘an 
autonomous source of international law’, before observing that good faith was 
such a general principle. To support this conclusion, the Court mentioned de-
cisions of the sfcc and of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, scholarly writings, and 
a circular of the Federal Office of Justice.1974 While the ruling is relatively well 
documented, the Court merely used the Swiss practice and auxiliary means to 
establish the existence of a general principle. This confirms, once more, the 
self- referential tendency of domestic courts interpreting international law.
As has been observed for the Swiss Federal Tribunal (supra, 3.2.1), some rul-
ings of the sfac show that the expression ‘general principles of international 
law’ is used loosely. In a decision of 2010, for instance, the sfac, based on the 
case law of the ECtHR, stated that art. 8 echr must not be interpreted in a 
vacuum, but in light of the general principles of international law. It thereby 
referred to general principles as a shorthand for international law. Such impre-
cise terminology should be avoided, as it jeopardizes predictability, clarity, and 
consistency.
3.2.2.2 The Swiss Federal Criminal Court
Most rulings of the sfcc on general principles of international law follow the 
case law of the Swiss Federal Tribunal and the sfac. In a series of identical 
cases, the Court, based on the practice of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, has stated 
that reciprocity is a general principle of international law.1975 It has noted, like 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal, that ‘based on Swiss conceptions, general princi-
ples of international law are directly applicable qua domestic law; when they 
are of ordre public (jus cogens), they trump contrary positive treaty law’.1976 
The sfcc has also observed (again, like the Swiss Federal Tribunal) that the 
general principles of international law and reasons of international ordre pu-
blic can preclude extradition.1977 In other instances, the Court has noted, in 
line with the sfac’s practice, that general principles of international law are 
 1974 sfac, judgment A- 6843/ 2014 of 15 September 2015, at 7.4.3.
 1975 sfcc, judgment rr.2007.210 of 30 June 2009, at 5.2; sfcc, judgment rr.2007.208 of 30 
June 2009, at 5.2; sfcc, judgment rr.2007.209 of 30 June 2009, at 5.2; sfcc, judgment 
rr.2007.211 of 30 June 2009, at 5.2.
 1976 sfcc, judgment rr.2007.142 of 22 November 2007, at 4.1.
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‘an autonomous source of international law’.1978 The deference of the sfcc on 
these specific issues can be explained by its narrow jurisdiction, and by the 
fact that it does not routinely apply international law. However, it can also, at 
times, suggest a lack of genuine, in- depth engagement with these issues when 
they do arise.
The sfcc has relied on treaty law to ascertain general principles of interna-
tional law. It has for example used art. 26 and 31 vclt and scholarly writings 
to support its statement that good faith is a general principle of international 
law.1979 Yet in none of these cases did the Court explain how such principles 
were to be ascertained. Again, laconism is understandable when a general 
principle of international law is undisputed, but it can become problematic as 
soon as the general principle at stake is less established.
3.2.3 Cantonal Courts
3.2.3.1 The Supreme Court of the Canton of Geneva
Decisions of the Court mentioning general principles of international law are 
extremely rare, and evaluating its practice based on such a small sample is dif-
ficult. Still, its case law confirms trends observed in the case law of other Swiss 
courts, namely terminological imprecision, the use of general principles as a 
fallback source, and self- referentiality. It is also worth noting that the Court 
often cites the Swiss Federal Tribunal. While this deference can be explained 
by the Tribunal’s role as an appellate judicial body, it may preclude a thorough 
engagement of lower courts with the interpretative issue at stake.
In a decision of 2009, the Court concluded that Taiwan ‘possesses the ele-
ments proper to a State based on the general principles of public  international 
law, ie, a territory, a population, and an effective government’.1980 Besides 
relying on scholarship, the Court derived these general principles from the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law.1981 It is doubtful that the Court was indeed 
referring to general principles in the sense of art. 38(1)(c) icj Statute. The ter-
minology it uses must hence be taken with a grain of salt. Another example 
of terminological imprecision is a ruling of 2016 in which the Court listed 
 1978 sfcc, judgments rr.2017.251– 252 of 7 December 2017, at 2.5; sfcc, judgment 
rr.2013.209 of 14 March 2014, at 4.1; sfcc, judgments rr.2013.203– 204 of 28 February 
2014, at 3.1; sfcc, judgments rr.2012.82– 83 of 26 February 2013, at 2.1.
 1979 Ibid. In several cases, the Court describes the principle pacta sunt servanda as a general 
principle of international law before citing art. 26 vclt: sfcc, judgment rr.2010.286 of 
22 February 2011, at 5; sfcc, judgment rr.2011.81 of 21 June 2011, at 4.1; sfcc, judg-
ment rr.2010.279 of 19 January 2011, at 4.
 1980 cj- ge, Chambre civile, judgment acjc/ 370/ 2009 of 20 March 2009, at 3.2.
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general principles of international law among the sources of international 
law.1982 In this case, it referred to the vclt’s interpretative methods as ‘gen-
eral principles of interpretation’,1983 which is symptomatic of Swiss courts’ 
loose terminology.
The self- referential character of the practice, courts’ preference for written 
international law, and their use of general principles as a fallback source, are 
illustrated by a labor law dispute in which the defendant invoked her juris-
dictional immunity. Based on the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s case law, the Court 
considered that utmost care was warranted when applying the European 
Convention on State Immunity of 1972 qua cil. The claim was therefore to be 
appraised based on the general principles of international law.1984 The Court 
then applied the uncsi with the understanding, following the Swiss  Federal 
Tribunal’s case law and a statement of the Federal Council, that it codified 
principles accepted by Switzerland.1985
3.2.3.2 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich
Courts in the canton of Zurich hardly ever refer to general principles of in-
ternational law. Almost no case was found in the online database of the High 
Court, except for a ruling in which the Court refers to the ‘principles of interna-
tional law’ according to which States must respect each other’s sovereignty.1986 
A search in the database of the Administrative Court did not yield any results 
either.
3.2.3.3 The Court of Appeals of the Canton of Basel- Stadt
The case law search did not locate any decision in which the Court of Appeals 
explicitly mentioned general principles of international law. While these re-
sults are partly due to the fact that the Court’s case law is only available online 
from 2014, it is plausible that general principles of international law, if they are 
used at all, are of marginal importance in the Court’s decisions.
3.2.3.4 The High Court and the Administrative Court of the Canton of Bern
A search in the case law of the High Court and Administrative Court did not 
yield any results. The Courts sometimes refer to domestic general principles of 
 1982 cj- ge, Chambre des assurances sociales, judgment atas/ 495/ 2016 of 23 June 2016, at 11.
 1983 Ibid, at 10 c).
 1984 cj- ge, Chambre des prud’hommes, judgment caph/ 59/ 2014 of 25 April 2014, at 3.1.
 1985 Ibid.
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domestic law1987 (like courts in other cantons), but not to general principles of 
international law.
3.2.4 Military Courts
Given the few rulings of the mcc pertaining to treaty law (supra, Chapter 7, 3.3.4) 
and cil (supra, 2.2.4), it is likely that judgments pertaining to general principles 
of international law are of minor importance, if they exist at all. A survey of the 
mcc’s recent case law1988 did not make it possible to identify relevant rulings, nor 
did a search based on other auxiliary means and resources.1989
3.2.5 Relationship With Interpretative Methods under Swiss Law
In this subsection, and similar to what I  did for other sources of interna-
tional law (supra, Chapter 7, 3.4 and supra, 2.2.5), I  focus on the case law of 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal. The fact that its practice on general principles of 
 international law is not as scarce as that of other Swiss courts makes it easier to 
compare the methods it uses to interpret both general principles of Swiss law 
and general principles of international law.
As previously noted, the Court acknowledges that domestic methods govern 
the interpretation of all norms of the domestic legal order (supra, Chapter 7, 
3.4). Given the monism of the Swiss legal order (supra, Chapter 3, 2.2.1), this 
arguably entails a convergence of the methods governing the interpretation 
of general principles of Swiss law and those applicable to general principles 
of international law. However, this similarity is not as apparent in the case law 
as in the context of treaty interpretation. General principles of Swiss law are 
typically mentioned in passing.1990 Moreover, the Court’s inflationary use of 
the word ‘principle’ makes it more complicated to establish a convergence of 
methods.1991
Still, this continuity becomes salient in some instances. The Court has for 
example alluded to the recognition of general principles of domestic law,1992 
eg by scholars and constant case law,1993 which is reminiscent of the recogni-
tion required by art. 38(1)(c) icj Statute. The Court has also acknowledged that 
 1987 VwGer- be, judgment 200 2014 1185 of 19 October 2015, at 6.3; VwGer- be, judgment 100 
2015 218 of 15 March 2016, at 5.1.
 1988 <www.oa.admin.ch/ de/ entscheidungen- militaerjustiz.html>.
 1989 See the resources mentioned in Chapter 7, 3.3.4 (supra).
 1990 bge 120 iv 107, at 2 c); bge 112 ii 118, at 5 e); bge 102 Ib 198, at 2.
 1991 Eg bge 117 ii 290; bge 138 ii 191.
 1992 bge 92 i 350, at 4.
 1993 bge 89 i 483, at 6 e). See also bge 123 i 63, at 4 b) (regarding the constitutional general 
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some general principles of federal law are also general principles of cantonal 
law,1994 which resembles the two levels of general principles in internation-
al law, where general principles of domestic law can also be general princi-
ples of international law. When interpreting general principles of Swiss law, 
the Court has used the four interpretative methods. It has engaged in textual 
interpretation (by pointing to codified expressions of general principles),1995 
teleological interpretation (by emphasizing the point or function of the princi-
ple or through evolutive interpretation),1996 and systematic interpretation (eg 
by mentioning analogous norms in the legal order).1997 Occasionally, it uses 
historical arguments to interpret general principles.1998
3.2.6 Comparing the Practice of Swiss Courts
Given the few cases in which general principles of international law are men-
tioned, it is difficult to reliably identify variations in the practice of different 
courts. There is virtually no cantonal or military court practice. Nonetheless, 
except for some minor differences, relevant rulings display a range of shared 
features.
Common traits of Swiss courts’ practice pertaining to general principles of 
international law are: the use of these principles as a fallback source, when no 
other source of international law (and especially no written international legal 
act) is applicable; the absence of remarks as to the recognition and methods of 
ascertainment of these general principles; the self- referential character of the 
practice; the imprecise terminology employed by courts; and, finally, repetitive 
tendencies in the case law, due to the fact that the existence of many general 
principles is asserted based on previous rulings.
In terms of differences, the subject matters of cases dealing with general 
principles of international law vary from one court to another (and especially 
at 2. In bge 108 ii 490, at 7, the Court notes that general principles can be ‘derived’ from 
the private law order.
 1994 bge 140 iii 636, at 3.5.
 1995 bge 138 ii 346, at 7, 9; bge 138 ii 191, at 4.3.2; bge 134 ii 117, at 7; bge 132 v 127, at 
6.1.1; bge 130 ii 113, at 4.2; bge 120 ii 243, at 3 d); bge 118 ii 435, at 2 b); bge 117 v 
309, at 4 b); bge 113 iv 101, at 2 c); bge 107 ii 189, at 3; bge 98 ii 221, at 4 a); bge 98 Ia 
281, at 3; bge 97 iv 205, at 1; bge 93 i 666, at 2; bge 91 i 4, at 2; bge 84 i 209, at 5; bge 
86 ii 365, at 1; bge 83 ii 231, at 2 c).
 1996 bge 134 ii 117, at 7; bge 126 v 143, at 2 b); bge 116 v 298, at 4 c), d); bge 98 Ia 460, at 
5 a). See also bge 115 v 347, at 1 d) (concluding that there was no general principle).
 1997 bge 139 v 297, at 3.3.3; bge 139 v 82, at 3.3.2; bge 132 v 127, at 6.1.1; bge 127 v 252, at 
4 a); bge 126 v 244, at 4 a); bge 124 ii 570, at 4; bge 121 iv 10, at 3 a); bge 119 Ib 311, 
at 4 a); bge 108 v 109, at 2 c); bge 93 i 666, at 2.
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from one federal court to another, depending on these courts’ jurisdiction). 
The sfac adjudicates more cases dealing with tax matters, for instance, and 
the sfcc is, of course, faced with criminal legal issues. Still, the main subject 
areas in which general principles are cited are relatively similar across the 
board. They include the law of immunities, extradition cases, legal assistance 
in criminal matters, administrative assistance in tax matters, and treaty law. 
Some cases pertain to the principle of good faith and reciprocity. Besides slight 
variations in terms of subject matter, one difference is that the sfcc closely 
follows the case law of the other federal courts, while these other judicial bod-
ies are less deferential in their reasoning. Cantonal courts typically follow the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal, although their jurisdiction does not prevent them from 
interpreting general principles.
3.2.7 Putting the Swiss Judicial Practice into Perspective
The small number of relevant cases dealing with general principles makes it 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions as to how the Swiss judicial practice 
fits into the broader practice of domestic courts. What can be noted is that the 
use of imprecise terminology, the confusion of general principles with other 
sources and norms of international law, and the mention of general principles 
jointly with written international law are observed both in Switzerland and 
abroad.
The only salient difference pertains to the subject matter of cases dealing 
with general principles. While in other jurisdictions, courts have used general 
principles in connection with ihrl and international environmental law, for 
instance, these subject areas are absent in the Swiss judicial practice. On the 
other hand, the Swiss practice is relatively developed in the law of immunities 
and administrative assistance in tax matters, two areas that reflect some fea-
tures of Swiss foreign relations law (supra, Chapter 3, 2.1).
4 Evaluation
Based on this survey of the Swiss judicial practice pertaining to unwritten in-
ternational law (ie, cil and general principles of international law), several 
characteristics of the case law can be considered problematic.
 1. Neglect of unwritten law. First, there is little judicial practice pertaining to 
unwritten international law. Courts seem biased against it, even though 
cil and general principles of international law are autonomous sources 
of international law. Of course, the scarce practice regarding unwritten 
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to invoke it in court. Still, the small number of cases (especially as regards 
cantonal cases and cases decided by military courts) in which unwritten 
international law is applied suggests that it is neglected when it would 
be relevant. cil is only mentioned in some substantive areas of interna-
tional law, and general principles of international law tend to be used as 
a fallback source, when no other international legal norm applies. This 
neglect of unwritten international law may undermine the legality of ju-
dicial decisions.
 2. Selective reliance on auxiliary means and insufficient substantiation. The 
case law also reveals a generous resort to auxiliary means (especially 
scholarship) and other resources (such as treaty law) to identify unwrit-
ten international law. Granted, reliance on auxiliary means is explicitly 
allowed by art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute, and the ilc explicitly authorizes the 
use of treaty law, resolutions of ios, case law, and scholarship to identify 
cil.1999 However, a lack of rigor in the use of this material to interpret 
international legal acts is problematic from the perspective of the sources 
of international law and of high- quality judicial reasoning. Another po-
tentially problematic aspect is that legal scholarship often suffers from a 
geographic (and national) bias. Of course, such preferences are partly due 
to linguistic considerations, resources, and ease of access, and the use of 
Swiss scholarship may be warranted when the relationship between inter-
national law and domestic law is at stake. However, these reasons do not 
justify a systematic neglect of other works of scholarship. Finally, a further 
difficulty is that auxiliary means tend to be used as proxies or shortcuts 
that replace direct manifestations of State practice (eg official statements 
or governmental reports). Ryngaert and Hora Siccama rightly talk about 
domestic courts’ tendency to ‘outsource the determination of custom to 
treaties, non- binding documents, doctrine or international judicial prac-
tice’.2000 The existence of custom and general principles is often assert-
ed without much substantiation. Courts provide little evidence (if any) 
of State practice and opinio juris or, in the case of general principles, of 
their recognition by States. They have asserted the customary character 
of some international legal norms even when this customary nature is 
debated on the international plane, and they almost never mention the 
two constitutive elements of cil. The fact that these two constitutive 
 1999 See draft conclusions 11– 14, in ilc, ‘Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary 
International Law, With Commentaries’ (n 891).
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elements are highlighted at least occasionally in the context of domes-
tic custom shows that there is room for improvement with regard to cil. 
Analogous remarks apply to general principles of international law.
 3. Circularity and self- referentiality. The highly self- referential and even cir-
cular character of the case law is also problematic from the perspective 
of the legality and quality of judicial reasoning. Courts tend to refer to 
the practice of the Swiss authorities in general (or even, more loosely, to 
‘Swiss conceptions’ about international law), and especially to the Swiss 
judicial practice and to their own case law to identify unwritten norms of 
international law, as if this domestic practice were decisive in this con-
text. This feature is troubling from the perspective of legality, since inter-
national law is generated by interstate lawmaking practices. Ascertaining 
its meaning requires that courts consult the practice of other States as 
well. Yet Swiss court cases contain few references to international and to 
foreign domestic judicial decisions, even though these judicial decisions 
are as important as domestic ones from the perspective of art. 38(1)(d) 
icj Statute.
 4. Imprecision, irregularity, superficiality, and repetitive reasoning. Courts’ 
terminology to interpret unwritten international law is imprecise. Both 
cil and general principles of international law tend to be conflated 
with other sources and norms of international law. The practice is also 
characterized by its uneven level of detail regarding the methods by 
which unwritten international law is ascertained. Textual, systematic, 
teleological, and historical interpretative tools are not emphasized in 
the case law, nor are the constitutive elements of unwritten law. The 
generally superficial treatment of these issues is particularly salient if 
one considers the relatively detailed remarks courts have sometimes 
made regarding unwritten domestic law. Finally, a large number of 
cases are highly repetitive. Such repetitions partly result from the fact 
that some cases address highly similar issues, or are even joined cases. 
However, in other instances, this repetitive practice may indicate 
courts’ lack of genuine engagement with the sources and interpretative 
methods of international law.
As has become apparent, the main clusters of problems raised by Swiss 
courts’ practice of cil and general principles roughly mirror those highlighted 
in the context of treaty interpretation (supra, Chapter 7, section 4). Of course, 
the practice leads to specific difficulties in each case, due to differences be-
tween written and unwritten law. Swiss courts’ application of cil also leads to 
specific difficulties compared to those pertaining to general principles. In spite 
of these idiosyncrasies, the basic issues encountered are similar for all sources 
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of international law, be it from the perspective of the legality of the practice, or 
from the perspective of its quality.
To summarize, in at least four important respects, Swiss courts’ interpre-
tation of unwritten international law fails to observe the law’s interpretative 
methods and the virtues of predictability, clarity, and consistency.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
1 The Argument Defended in This Book
Lawyers tend to agree that as an empirical matter, domestic courts increasingly 
often apply international law. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, for instance, is more 
frequently confronted with this body of law today than in the past, judging 
from the growing number of references to it in its practice. As I have shown 
elsewhere, the percentage of rulings of the Swiss Federal Tribunal mentioning 
international law has more than tripled between 1954 and 2014.2001
When domestic courts apply international law – which does not concern 
all cases in which international law is mentioned – they are required to de-
termine its meaning and, hence, to interpret it. Yet as I have highlighted in 
this book, domestic judges across the world, including Swiss courts, tend to 
neglect the interpretative methods required by international law, ie, textual, 
systematic, teleological, and historical interpretation. Moreover, domestic 
courts often fail to meet the standards of good judicial reasoning to which 
both domestic and international law aspire, ie, predictability, clarity, and 
consistency.
In this book, I  have argued why States and their courts must take the 
interpretative methods of international law more seriously. I  have shown 
that States must do so regardless of their domestic (and especially their 
 constitutional) legal specificities, and that courts must do so irrespective 
of the outcome of their decisions. I have also stressed that States and their 
courts can and must do better in terms of reasoning. Courts in particular 
must strive to provide interpretations of international law that live up to the 
virtues of high- quality judicial reasoning, ie, predictability, clarity, and con-
sistency. These virtues are not necessarily legal requirements, but our laws 
and legal practices aspire to fulfill them. Said virtues are used in both domes-
tic and international legal practice to evaluate the quality of interpretations 
and the degree to which a given decision should influence future interpreta-
tions of the law. Importantly, these three virtues serve legality. Disrespecting 
them means promoting opacity and, thereby, facilitating departures from 
what the law requires.
 2001 Ammann, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts Through an Empirical Lens: The Swiss 
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Interpretation is an activity that is both free and constrained, and judi-
cial interpretation is no exception (supra, Chapter 2). Judicial creativity, in 
order to respect the law, must respect the frame traced by the law, a frame 
that includes the law’s interpretative methods. Legal interpretation is gov-
erned by methods which sometimes also exist in codified form, namely tex-
tual, systematic, purposive, and historical interpretation (supra, Chapter 6). 
These methods are customary in domestic and international law. The law’s 
interpretative methods must be obeyed even if they do not determine the 
interpretative outcome, and even if their neglect does not always trigger a 
violation of States’ international legal obligations. It is worth noting that 
the law’s interpretative methods do not challenge the maxim jura novit cu-
ria. Instead, they ensure that the law that courts are called to identify is 
respected.
Both interpretative methods and the virtues of high- quality judicial rea-
soning may overlap with other legal duties, such as judges’ domestic duty to 
provide reasons for their decisions, or States’ duty to interpret treaties in good 
faith. They may also intersect with other legal and moral principles that apply 
to judicial interpretation, and especially with the principle of the rule of law, 
which is both a moral and a legal principle. While these various principles and 
the questions they raise are undoubtedly important for the activity of domes-
tic courts, their analysis is beyond the scope of this project and must be left for 
another occasion.
In this book, I  have clarified the legal effect of domestic rulings in inter-
national law (supra, Chapter 4). Bringing the domestic judicial practice of in-
ternational law in conformity with the law’s interpretative methods and with 
the virtues of predictability, clarity, and consistency matters not only because 
States must respect international law. It also matters because domestic judicial 
decisions can contribute to the formation and evolution of international law 
(art. 38(1)(a)– (c) icj Statute), and because they can assist interpreters in ascer-
taining international law (art. 38(1)(d) icj Statute). It is therefore important 
that domestic rulings actually establish what they are meant to establish, from 
the perspective of both their legality and quality.
I have also explained why there are good reasons for constraining States 
(including their courts) in their interpretations of international law (supra, 
Chapter 5). I have identified three main reasons for doing so. First, the fre-
quent vagueness of international law can lead to arbitrariness if there is no 
legal framework to harness it. Second, in liberal democracies, judges must be 
accountable to the lawmaker. Third, international law is governed by the prin-
ciple of auto- interpretation, ie, the principle that every State has the power 
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court is competent to do so. This power leaves room for self- serving inter-
pretations, and this risk must be mitigated if States are to interact on a level 
playing field.
I have then described the interpretative methods required by  international 
law in more detail, and I have explained why there are good reasons for us-
ing these methods (supra, Chapter 6). In this context, I have highlighted the 
similarity of interpretative methods in domestic and international law, even 
if the respective characteristics of domestic and international lawmaking 
can lead to differences in the way these methods are used. This similarity 
should make courts less skeptical or neglectful of international methods. It 
should show them that the basic interpretative tools which international 
law requires States to use are familiar ones. Importantly, these tools must be 
used and be taken seriously with regard to both domestic and international 
law.
Finally, I have analyzed the Swiss case law on international law to deter-
mine whether it observes said methods and virtues of judicial reasoning. 
A study of the Swiss judicial practice pertaining to treaty law (supra, Chap-
ter  7), customary international law, and general principles of international 
law (supra, Chapter 8) reveals that there is room for improvement from the 
perspective of the law’s interpretative methods, on the one hand, and of high- 
quality judicial reasoning, on the other hand. I have highlighted four clusters 
of difficulties that apply to all three sources of international law under scru-
tiny: (i) courts’ disregard or misapplication of the interpretative methods of 
international law; (ii) the lack of substantiation of courts’ interpretative as-
sertions (and, relatedly, their reliance on auxiliary means like scholarship, but 
not on more direct expressions of State practice); (iii) the self- referentiality 
and even circularity of the case law (as courts primarily rely on the practice 
of their own State, on their own case law, and on domestic scholarship, as 
opposed to the practice and scholarship of other States); and finally (iv) the 
imprecise terminology and uneven level of detail of domestic courts’ reason-
ing on international law, and the frequent superficiality and repetitiveness of 
this reasoning.
Of course, not every application of international law raises difficult in-
terpretative issues. In such cases, judges cannot be expected to discuss in-
ternational legal issues at length. Moreover, judges are constrained in terms 
of the resources they can resort to. Judicial economy, in particular, requires 
them to dispose of cases efficiently. These constraints must be factored in 
when formulating recommendations for improving the practice (infra, sec-
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2 Recommendations
The current Swiss judicial practice of international law shows that both the 
legality and the quality of Swiss rulings need to be improved (infra, 2.1). More-
over, given the status of domestic rulings in the sources of international law 
and as auxiliary means, their accessibility needs to be enhanced (infra, 2.2).
I address each of these points in turn, and formulate recommendations on 
how these goals can be met. While I do not go into the details of the specific or-
ganizational measures that would be required within the courts (and beyond) 
to improve the practice, the recommendations listed below point to the direc-
tion in which reforms should go.
2.1 Improving the Legality and the Quality of Domestic Rulings
Domestic judicial decisions are not reliable elements of determination of the 
sources of international law, nor are they reliable auxiliary means to determine 
the meaning of international law, if they have not been reached in conformity 
with international law. The same applies to decisions that do not offer predict-
able, clear, and consistent interpretations of international law. If compliance 
with international law, its methods, and high- quality judicial reasoning is to 
be achieved, courts must address and remedy the four clusters of problems 
identified in this book (supra, section 1).
Taking these problems seriously necessitates allocating adequate resources 
to international legal issues. It also requires deeper institutional reforms. Two 
major ways of improving the Swiss judicial practice deserve emphasis. They 
pertain to domestic courts’ level of expertise on international law (infra, 2.1), 
but also to specific institutional measures that can strengthen the legality and 
the quality of their reasoning (infra, 2.2).
Before discussing these two points, it is important to acknowledge that the 
obvious need for efficiency precludes judges from engaging in a full- fledged 
and textbook- like study of State practice whenever a case touches upon an 
issue of international law. Nor can we reasonably demand from judges to keep 
track of all foreign and international case law. Human knowledge about the 
practice of international law is, by definition, imperfect. On a practical – and 
important – level, both time and money are, as we all know, finite resources. 
Thus, when international law is only mentioned in passing without influenc-
ing the court’s reasoning, or when its meaning is uncontroversial or has been 
clarified extensively in previous cases, judicial economy and common sense 
explain why judges do not provide detailed reasoning.
However, there is a fine line between practical (but also rule- of- law- type) 
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legality and quality in judicial decision- making. When ascertaining interna-
tional law, obvious interpretative mistakes must be avoided, such as the use 
of domestic travaux préparatoires to interpret a treaty, or the neglect of a co-
herent, constant, and general State practice in the context of cil. Moreover, 
high- quality reasoning is arguably just as important as judicial economy. A first 
step that must be taken to achieve these goals is to strengthen domestic courts’ 
expertise in the field of international law.
2.1.1 Strengthening Courts’ Expertise on International Law
To ensure that Swiss courts respect international law and its interpretative 
methods, and for their rulings to constitute reliable auxiliary means, Swiss 
courts’ expertise on international law needs to be strengthened. Judges with 
in- depth knowledge of international law should be allocated to chambers in 
which international legal issues are particularly likely to arise.2002 Moreover, 
to analyze international legal issues, judges must be able to collaborate with 
specialized judicial staff (eg law clerks)2003 with adequate linguistic and sub-
stantive legal skills. Importantly, courts must be able to access a pool of experts 
within their institution, instead of having to reach out to other domestic au-
thorities. For instance, if Swiss courts consult the Swiss Directorate of Interna-
tional Law and, therefore, the federal executive, their independence may be 
undermined.
Another important measure that must be taken is to improve the access 
of courts and their staff to international legal materials and to specialized 
documentation. This includes platforms such as ildc and the International 
Law Reports, which provide summaries of relevant domestic judgments on 
international law, but also other online databases that grant extensive access 
to specialized scholarly literature. In this context, it is essential that domestic 
courts are exposed to a broad range of legal materials that reflects the diversity 
of national approaches to international law. Access to foreign scholarship, and 
especially to non- Western scholarship not originally written in English, or not 
translated into English, is still limited and must clearly be improved. The same 
applies to the case law of foreign courts: both the ildc database and the In-
ternational Law Reports are biased towards Western, English- speaking States. 
Given domestic courts’ prominent place from the perspective of art. 38 icj 
Statute (supra, Chapter 4, section 3), an overrepresentation of some States in 
 2002 On this point, see Bucher (n 264) para 48.
 2003 On this topic, see Peter Bieri, ‘Law Clerks in Switzerland: A Solution to Cope With the 
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widely used databases means that the practice of these States will be inflated 
on the international plane.
Specialized training on Switzerland’s international obligations and other 
important topics of international law should be available and even become 
mandatory for Swiss judges and their staff.2004 For instance, it has been shown 
that some treaties ratified by Switzerland are not well- known by the courts.2005 
Swiss courts should also be informed in a regular and systematic fashion about 
important domestic and foreign cases on international law. Reading up on 
these topics cannot be left to the initiative of individual judges and law clerks. 
Instead, institutional incentives are needed.
Yet another way of strengthening domestic courts’ expertise and awareness 
of international legal issues is for judges to foster regular intellectual  exchanges 
with other domestic and foreign judiciaries. Such interactions allow domestic 
judges to share their knowledge and difficulties, and to discuss cross- cutting 
international legal issues. While such exchange platforms already exist, they 
must be used more fruitfully for discussions pertaining to international law 
specifically.2006
It is important to stress that the aim of such measures is not to foster herme-
neutic uniformity, in the sense that courts in all States would have to reach the 
same interpretative conclusion when facing a given international legal issue. 
This is not what I am arguing for, nor is this what international law and the 
vclt require from States. However, domestic courts in all States must respect 
the sources and interpretative methods of international law. This also means 
that they must interpret international law with due regard for foreign judicial 
practices, which contribute to the formation and evolution of international 
law. Moreover, qua auxiliary means, foreign rulings can facilitate domestic 
judges’ interpretative task. If domestic judicial decisions are to contribute to 
international lawmaking, they must be known to courts in other States.
It is worth noting that advocacy plays an important part in improving domes-
tic courts’ expertise on international legal issues. In most cases, lawyers are the 
ones who raise such issues in the first place, and the contribution their briefs 
make to the reasoning of domestic courts cannot be underestimated. Skilled 
advocates with an in- depth knowledge of international law greatly strengthen 
 2004 For a similar point, see Bucher (n 264) para 49.
 2005 This need has for instance been highlighted by the cedaw Committee:  Concluding 
Observations of the cedaw Committee, un Doc cedaw/ c/ che/ co/ 3/ 7, 7 August 2009, 
para 16.
 2006 One example and potential model, in this context, is the Network of the Presidents of the 
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the legality and quality of judicial decision- making. Domestic courts’ expertise 
in the field of international law can only benefit from lawyers who are trained 
accordingly and who regularly practice in this field.
In Switzerland, international law does not have a prominent place in advo-
cacy. The great bulk of Swiss law firms do not specialize in public international 
law, even if a handful of them have developed expertise in this area. One possi-
ble explanation for this is that international law is not a formal requirement to 
pass the bar exam in Switzerland. Moreover, the Swiss legal market is relatively 
small, so it might not seem worthwhile for law firms – especially for smaller 
ones – to develop a strong focus on international law.
The lack of emphasis on international law in legal practice, but also in law 
schools (infra), means that lawyers may not always recognize the international 
law dimensions of their clients’ cases. Even when they do, the low profile of 
international law may lead them to think that invoking international law is 
unlikely to be successful and that this strategy might even harm their case. 
Moreover, there is no culture of pro bono litigation in Switzerland, and litiga-
tion is costly. Thus, many individuals and small or midsized businesses will 
be discouraged from going to court for financial reasons. As courts can only 
interpret international law if a corresponding case is brought to them, it can 
be expected that many questions pertaining to international law will never 
make it to the courtroom. Thus, for courts’ international law expertise to be 
strengthened, the legal profession must place greater emphasis on, and invest 
in, international law. In the meantime, it is essential that prominent cases in 
which international legal issues are raised are well argued. Through the intel-
lectual rigor of their briefs, lawyers can have a significant impact on the Swiss 
judicial practice and beyond.
One such example of a remarkably well argued, high- profile case is the 
‘KlimaSeniorinnen’ litigation. In this case, the association ‘KlimaSeniorinnen 
Schweiz’ (which seeks to ensure that elderly women are protected from the 
effects of climate change) and four other women argued in great detail that 
the Swiss government’s failure to properly address climate change by taking 
effective measures for the prompt reduction of CO2 emissions violated various 
constitutional rights as well as international human rights law, including art. 
2 and 8 echr. They also invoked art. 6(1) and 13 echr, and mentioned art. 34 
echr.2007 After the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport,  Energy, 
and Communications (detec) declared their  – thoroughly and carefully 
 2007 The full argumentation is available at <ainees- climat.ch/ documents>. 
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reasoned  – application inadmissible,2008 the KlimaSeniorinnen appealed to 
the sfac. The Court rejected the appeal in a brief judgment that hardly en-
gaged with the international legal issues at stake.2009 At the time of writing 
(June 2019), the – again, extremely thorough – appeal of the KlimaSeniorinnen 
before the Swiss Federal Tribunal was still pending.2010 The extent to which the 
Court will engage with the appellants’ claims pertaining to international law 
remains to be seen.
Another important way of fostering domestic expertise is through law 
teaching.2011 Currently, public international law is, for many law students in 
Switzerland, a one- time occurrence in the curriculum, usually in the form of a 
mandatory module at the beginning of their studies. While other law courses 
sporadically include references to international law (eg to the echr), occa-
sional mentions alongside domestic law do not not suffice to strengthen stu-
dents’ international law expertise. Moreover, there is little clinical education 
and training for advocacy skills at law schools, including in public interna-
tional law. Only a minority of law graduates will choose to deepen their basic 
knowledge of public international law through research and practical expe-
rience at a later point. Thus, the fact that international law does not figure 
more prominently in legal briefs and domestic court rulings should not come 
as a surprise. If higher education institutions – and those training and testing 
future advocates – put greater emphasis on international law, the domestic 
practice pertaining to international law can only stand to gain in richness 
and depth.
Of course, and as I  will emphasize (infra, 2.2), initiatives are also needed 
at the international level to strengthen domestic courts’ expertise on inter-
national law.
 2008 detec, decision of 25 April 2017, available at <ainees- climat.ch/ documents>. The detec 
found that the authorities’ alleged failure to take appropriate measures against climate 
change did not affect the appellants’ rights and obligations, and that they could there-
fore not request a ruling on real acts as per art. 25a of the Federal Act on Administrative 
Procedure of 20 December 1968 (sr 172.021). The detec further held that the appli-
cants did not have victim status, and that they could therefore not enjoy the protection of 
art. 13 echr.
 2009 sfac, judgment A- 2992/ 2017 of 27 November 2018. Only paragraph 8 engages with 
international law, namely with art. 6(1), 13, and 34 echr, and not with art. 2 and 8 echr.
 2010 The appellants’ brief is available at <ainees- climat.ch/ documents>.
 2011 For a historical analysis of international law teaching in Switzerland, see Andreas R 
Ziegler, ‘Die Entwicklung der Völkerrechtslehre und -wissenschaft in der Schweiz: Eine 
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2.1.2 Addressing Institutional Obstacles
Several more profound reforms can help support the legality and quality of 
Swiss rulings pertaining to international law. Indeed, various features of the 
Swiss legal order (supra, Chapter 3) constrain Swiss courts’ interpretative activ-
ity in a way that can be problematic from the perspective of these two vantage 
points.
The political affiliation of most Swiss judges (which includes an annual 
fee to their political party), and the fact that judges must stand for reelec-
tion, are ways to address a legitimate, deep- rooted concern of the Swiss pol-
ity to secure judges’ democratic accountability. However, these constraints 
can be problematic from the perspective of judicial independence. Conse-
quently, they can jeopardize the legality and quality of judicial reasoning. 
This difficulty with regard to judicial independence is particularly salient in 
international law, which is heavily politicized. In Switzerland, some political 
groups frequently target specific areas of international law, such as interna-
tional refugee law, ihrl and the case law of the ECtHR, Swiss– eu relation-
ships, and the relationship between domestic and international law (supra, 
Chapter  3, 3.4). While debating international law domestically is not only 
legitimate, but essential, the politicization of international law increases 
the pressure on Swiss judges. Importantly, the institutional constraints to 
which they are subject may negatively influence the legality and quality of 
their work.
Separate opinions are worth exploring for the Swiss judiciary, at least for the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal (supra, Chapter 3, 4.2.5). They foster judges’ thorough, 
comprehensive, and transparent engagement with international legal issues, 
which serves both the quality and the legality of judicial decisions. Of course, 
judges are more likely to deliver separate opinions if the political pressures 
they face are acknowledged and addressed. Moreover, introducing separate 
opinions further increases judges’ already heavy workload. Still, they can sig-
nificantly improve the sharpness of the domestic case law.
Finally, Swiss courts’ so- called ‘pragmatic methodological pluralism’ has 
obvious advantages:  it encourages interpretative solutions that are adapted 
to the case at hand. Yet this methodological framework cannot gloss over the 
characteristics of international lawmaking, nor can it be used by courts to 
justify a lack of predictability, clarity, and consistency. Courts cannot apply it 
to international legal issues without the necessary adjustments. For instance, 
they must acknowledge that historical interpretation requires looking at the 
practice of the treaty parties, and not merely at the practice of their own State. 
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2.2 Enhancing the Accessibility of Domestic Rulings
After having suggested ways of improving the legality and the quality of Swiss 
rulings (supra, 2.1), I now turn to more general measures that need to be  taken 
with regard to domestic rulings, considering their place in the sources of 
 international law.
Given that domestic judicial decisions contribute to the formation and evolu-
tion of international law, and considering that they are auxiliary means in interna-
tional law (supra, Chapter 4, section 3), the availability of these judgments needs 
to be enhanced.2012 Indeed, if domestic rulings are hard to access, they cannot 
(and, from a rule of law perspective, should not) contribute to the formation and 
evolution of international law. Nor can (and should) such rulings deploy their ef-
fects qua auxiliary means, by assisting interpreters in the ascertainment of inter-
national law.
Some Swiss rulings that are relevant from the perspective of international law 
are difficult for foreign judges and legal scholars to identify and/ or read, and there 
are hardly any comprehensive syntheses of the Swiss case law on international 
law. The searchability of this case law needs to be improved. Important decisions 
should be broadly available (even if only in the form of a summary) and system-
atically included in relevant databases, such as the ildc database and the Inter-
national Law Reports.
Beyond Switzerland, and as I have previously noted (supra, 2.1.1), access to 
the case law of non- English speaking (but also non- Western) jurisdictions is 
still limited.2013 As a result, and for a variety of reasons that cannot be fully 
unpacked here, there is an imbalanced and selective use of domestic rulings in 
international legal practice and scholarship. Recent research2014 as well as the 
 2012 This point is in line with previous efforts to make State practice more broadly avail-
able, eg Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No R (64) 10 
on the Publication of Digests of State Practice in the Field of Public International 
Law, 6 October 1964, <www.coe.int/ t/ dlapil/ cahdi/ Source/ Texts_ &_ Documents/ 
Resolution_ 64_ 10_ en.pdf>; Recommendation No R (97) 11 on the Amended Model 
Plan for the Classification of Documents Concerning State Practice in the Field of 
Public International Law, 12 June 1997, <www.coe.int/ t/ dlapil/ cahdi/ Source/ Texts_ &_ 
Documents/ Recommendation_ 97_ 11_ en.pdf>. See also ilc, ‘Report on the Sixty- Eighth 
Session (2 May– 10 June and 4 July– 12 August 2016)’ (n 904) para 54 ff; ilc Secretariat, 
‘Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, Elements in the Previous 
Work of the International Law Commission That Could Be Particularly Relevant to the 
Topic’ (2013) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 659; Forteau (n 280).
 2013 twail scholars have flagged that the practice of non- Western States is neglected, see eg 
(in the context of cil) Chimni (n 1193) 20 ff.
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ildc casebook published in 20182015 confirm this anglophone (and, more gen-
erally, Western) bias. This imbalance is highly problematic from the perspective 
of State’s equal place in the sources of international law and as international 
lawmakers. The practice of non- Western legal systems in particular needs to be 
more easily accessible to the average domestic decision- maker and scholar, eg 
via domestic digests on States’ international legal practice.2016  Important de-
cisions should not merely be available in English, since many  domestic  judges 
do not routinely consult resources in this language. The domestic case law in-
cluded in relevant databases needs to be regularly updated based on consist-
ent criteria, and in a geographically balanced way. Such  databases must offer 
a truly inclusive, representative, and reliable picture of the domestic judicial 
practice of international law.
Taking such measures is important because databases like ildc and the In-
ternational Law Reports are widely used by international legal scholars. While 
some researchers may acknowledge the potential limitations of such tools, they 
will, in most cases, and for lack of a better option, still choose to base their work 
on them.2017 Databases should also include lower court cases. Importantly, 
this case law must be accessible to all, and not restricted to a narrow circle of 
research institutions, as is currently the case with ildc and the International 
Law Reports. From the very beginning, the goal of the ildc database has been 
to make relevant domestic case law ‘more accessible to a larger audience’.2018 
Similar remarks apply to the International Law Reports, which are only acces-
sible to scholars affiliated to specific research institutions, yet purport to have 
an unparalleled ‘authoritative position in international law’.2019
The (undoubtedly ambitious) task of increasing the visibility of domestic 
case law could be entrusted to the un’s Office of Legal Affairs. This would turn 
 2015 The most cited jurisdictions include Canada, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. See Nollkaemper and Reinisch (n 89) xiii ff.
 2016 As of 1 October 2017, only 30 States were publishing such domestic digests, see ilc 
Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law: Ways of Making the Evidence 
of Customary International Law More Readily Available’ (n 1328)  35 para 105. The 
digest of the Swiss practice pertaining to international law, currently compiled by Lucius 
Caflisch, is published yearly in the Swiss Review of International and European Law.
 2017 See eg Ryngaert and Hora Siccama (n 229) 4: ‘We cannot exclude the existence of other 
relevant cases that have not been reported in ildc or ilr. National reporters for these 
databases may be inactive, or even non- existent, as a result of which domestic cases rel-
evant to customary international law may not have been reported. Whether ildc or ilr 
suffer from reporting bias is not part of our inquiry, however’.
 2018 Nollkaemper and Reinisch (n 89) iii.
 2019 Cambridge Core, International Law Reports, <www.cambridge.org/ core/ series/ 
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such a project into a State- driven and public endeavor. A project conducted un-
der the aegis of the un would be able to do justice to linguistic diversity,  given 
the linguistic resources and working languages of the organization. When pur-
suing such a project, the ilc Secretariat’s 2019 memorandum on ‘Ways and 
Means for Making the Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily 
Available’2020 can serve as an important source of inspiration. The memoran-
dum contains helpful remarks about the linguistic and practical obstacles to 
making State practice available.2021 Another useful resource is the working pa-
per on the same issue which Manley O Hudson submitted to the ilc in 1950 in 
his quality as Special Rapporteur.2022 Close to seven decades  later, the ilc Sec-
retariat notes that this recommendation to make State practice more broadly 
available ‘has not yet been heeded by most governments’.2023 It is worth not-
ing that Hudson even recommended the conclusion of a multilateral agree-
ment ‘providing for a comprehensive exchange of Government publications 
on questions of international law and international relations’.2024 While both 
Hudson’s working paper and the Secretariat’s report deal with State practice in 
relation to cil, many of the findings and recommendations they contain can 
also be applied to State practice that is relevant in the context of treaties and 
general principles, as well as to auxiliary means.
One risk of such measures is data overload. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, for 
instance, provides full electronic access to all its recent case law. Such a liberal 
publication policy makes it difficult to identify relevant decisions. Moreover, 
Manley O Hudson’s statement that ‘it would be a herculean task to assemble 
the decisions on questions of international law of the national courts of all 
States’ holds even more true today than when he wrote it in 1950.2025 On the 
other hand, it would be unfortunate to lose the complexity and richness of do-
mestic judicial practice by including only a limited number of domestic cases 
in relevant databases. To handle this complexity and the amount of cases, all 
States should use at least roughly the same criteria of classification when they 
 2020 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  Ways of Making the 
Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available’ (n 1328).
 2021 See ibid 30 ff para 84 ff.
 2022 ilc, ‘Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, Working Paper by 
Manley O Hudson, Special Rapporteur’ (1950) un Doc a/ cn.4/ 16 and Add. 1.
 2023 ilc Secretariat, ‘Identification of Customary International Law:  Ways of Making the 
Evidence of Customary International Law More Readily Available’ (n 1328) 29 para 82.
 2024 ilc, ‘Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, Working Paper by 
Manley O Hudson, Special Rapporteur’ (n 2022) 32 para 92.
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publish domestic digests on the practice of international law.2026 Such digests 
are helpful to identify important new cases that need to be added to existing 
databases. Moreover, they facilitate the use of foreign case law by other domes-
tic courts qua elements of the sources of international law and qua auxiliary 
means. The Swiss Federal Tribunal and other courts could also communicate 
the most relevant decisions from the perspective of international law in their 
annual reports or through press releases.2027
Another risk is that international agencies (eg the un’s Office of Legal Af-
fairs) guide the outcome of domestic courts’ reasoning about international 
law, instead of merely offering them methodological assistance. This influence 
on the result reached by judicial decisions must be avoided. In any case, such a 
control on interpretative outcomes is not what the present book is calling for. 
I have argued for a homogeneous hermeneutic framework in international law, 
but not for a homogeneous case law all things considered.
It goes without saying that the proposed measures cannot be implemented 
if States and other relevant actors do not devote enough resources to this topic. 
One must stress that such steps are needed if courts are to fulfill their task as 
legal interpreters, and if they are to offer reliable means of determination of in-
ternational law that can be used by other decision- makers, instead of painting 
a skewed picture of international law.
Of course, whether the picture painted by a domestic court is indeed 
skewed is a complex question, unless the court is explicit about what it is do-
ing. A court may be contributing to a more broadly supported evolution in the 
practice of international law.2028 It may also simply be expressing reasonable 
disagreement with other courts, government branches, and States on a given 
issue. Hence, the weight given to domestic courts’ interpretations must neces-
sarily be determined in context, with regard to the specific case.
 2026 Recommendation No R (97) 11 on the Amended Model Plan for the Classification of 
Documents Concerning State Practice in the Field of Public International Law, 12 June 
1997, <www.coe.int/ t/ dlapil/ cahdi/ Source/ Texts_ &_ Documents/ Recommendation_ 97_ 
11_ en.pdf>.
 2027 Ehrenzeller (n 638) 19 f.
 2028 This issue has for example been addressed by Katzenstein, ‘International Adjudication 
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